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This thesis applies a structural feminist political economy analysis to explain the 
uneven outcomes from gender interventions promoting gender-equitable 
distribution of state resources, protection from gender-based violence, and 
women’s economic empowerment in post-conflict Timor-Leste. Scholars of the 
“local turn” in peacebuilding, which arose in response to peacebuilding’s failures 
in creating sustainable peace, have argued local cultures and institutions were 
more legitimate, authentic, and sustainable sites to build peace than international 
models. In contrast, I identify the emergence and continuity of an elite class 
coalition dominating the state, which relies upon a highly gendered allocation of 
resources and a concomitant shoring up of exploitative militarised and patriarchal 
gender relations. Hence, I argue the outcomes from gender interventions in post-
conflict Timor-Leste have been shaped by the actions and interests of a dominant 
coalition of rural and Dili-based social forces, all members of the Liurai-Dato 
(King-Noble) class. I use qualitative data and extensive fieldwork to show how 
members of the Liurai-Dato class depend on gender and kinship for legitimacy, 
wealth, and continuity, which have mitigated against gender just outcomes for 
gender interventions.  
Not only did the interventions take place in this setting of elite dominance, 
peacebuilders made concessions to elites and violent men in order to keep the 
peace, a tendency amplified by local turn approaches. These approaches to security 
have reinforced the valorisation of armed masculinity, associated most strongly 
with the dominant class, which have in turn justified the unequal distribution of 
state petroleum resources. As well, gender relations construct social relations 
through kinship, accumulation through brideprice, and the political economy of 
domestic violence, rendering legal and political reforms ineffective. Lastly, 
peacebuilding programs sought to use microfinance to empower women and grow 
the economy, but its main beneficiaries were the Liurai-Dato class, repeating 
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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
GENDER INTERVENTION 
1.1 Gender Interventions as Fields of Enquiry 
The study and practice of peacebuilding interventions have increasingly 
incorporated gender perspectives. Most prominently, the Women Peace and 
Security policy agenda, which began in 2000 with the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325), called for a gender perspective to be 
incorporated in all United Nations (UN) operations, decision-making, policies, 
and programs for peace and security. The growing linkages between gender and 
peacebuilding are related to feminist work in security studies and international 
relations. Such work has greatly advanced our understanding of war and peace, 
and their gendered dimensions. As a result, it is increasingly recognised that 
unequal gender relations mean that men and women do not experience war, 
violence, peace, settlements, and justice in the same ways. It is further increasingly 
recognised that women and men are targeted differently and experience different 
outcomes from peacebuilding. Moreover, after peacebuilding interventions, there 
are frequently substantial “gender gaps” and uneven distribution of power, 
resources, burdens, and violence across genders, classes, and geographic divides 
(Goetz and Jenkins 2016, Cockburn 2013).  
In peacebuilding settings, one area of gender intervention arose from gender 
mainstreaming in peacebuilding and another area from stand-alone gender and 
development programs. Gender mainstreaming involves the incorporation of a 
gender perspective  in legislation, policies, or programs, in all areas and at all levels 
(Hannan 2002). In the security realm it merges with development programming 
more broadly. This merging of gender, security and development has a corollary 
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in the integration of security and development in the rise of peacebuilding itself 
(Duffield 2001). The official rationale behind gender mainstreaming is to make 
peacebuilding more effective and sustainable, and hence build more stable 
societies and efficient economies. Post-conflict countries have been seen as sites 
upon which peacebuilders could “build back better”, including more gender 
equitable societies. The broad scope of gender mainstreaming in both security and 
development agendas leads this study to collect these under the term “gender 
intervention”.  
Situating itself within the subfield of peacebuilding in international relations, this 
thesis applies a structural feminist political economy analysis to the case of gender 
interventions in Timor-Leste. The case of Timor-Leste is particularly instructive, 
as the country was subjected to very high levels of peacebuilding and gender 
intervention between 1999 and 2017. Peacebuilding interventions have had a 
sustained focus on gender and women’s empowerment. However, like 
peacebuilding interventions generally, gender interventions in Timor-Leste have 
had uneven outcomes. Outcomes have been uneven in terms of achieving the 
stated goals of the interventions, such as providing redress and resources to female 
victims of war crimes, or electing more women as village chiefs (Kent 2012b, 2016, 
Cummins 2011). Additionally, gender interventions have been characterised by 
uneven and disappointing outcomes when measured against the more ambitious 
goals of gender justice (Chappell 2016, Goetz 2007). Gender justice is “the ending 
of—and if necessary the provision of redress for—inequalities between women and 
men that result in women's subordination to men” (Goetz 2007, 31). Whereas 
women’s level of participation in national politics in Timor-Leste is high by 
international standards, overall deep inequalities remain, with increasing 
inequality between rural and urban areas, and very high levels of violence against 
women across the country. Uneven outcomes after gender interventions and 
peacebuilding interventions are not surprising but warrant investigation.  
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1.2 The Scholarly Context  
At the same time as the expansion of gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding, 
there arose a “local turn” in peacebuilding in response to peacebuilding’s failure to 
create long-lasting and equitable peace. Scholars of the local turn pushed against 
the notions that liberal interventions focussed on the rule of law, the creation of 
democratic institutions and liberal markets could fashion a sustainable peace 
(Richmond 2005, 2007). Hence, prevalent explanations for disappointing and 
uneven outcomes came to be most closely associated with the local turn in 
peacebuilding and its focus on an alleged incompatibility between international-
liberal norms and “local” non-liberal norms and practices. This is seen to result, at 
best, in hybrid forms of governance, combining both international and local 
elements. Moreover, scholars of the local turn—using a bifurcated framework of 
local/international, and hybrids thereof—have argued local cultures and 
institutions are more legitimate, authentic, and sustainable sites upon which to 
build peace. 
Explanations of uneven outcomes using local turn’s approach came to dominate 
the theory and practice of peacebuilding. Indeed, Timor-Leste, as a case study has 
come to be the cause célèbre of scholars of the local turn. Initially, this was in the 
context of the extensive and far-reaching peacebuilding and, of particular 
relevance to this thesis, in the subsequent years of peacebuilding, that the turn to 
the local found traction in the implementation of peacebuilding intervention 
programs in Timor-Leste. The implications of the local turn’s understanding of 
gender interventions are rarely explicitly drawn out, but nonetheless, there was an 
implicit idea that gender interventions under liberal peacebuilding frameworks are 
not appropriate for post-conflict societies, as I explore in detail in Chapter 2. It is 
also for these two reasons—Timor-Leste as a prototype of the local turn theories 
and because of the depth of gender interventions there, that this thesis uses Timor-
Leste as a case study of the outcomes of gender interventions.  
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This thesis provides a rejoinder to the local turn in peacebuilding arguing that 
predominant explanations of peacebuilding’s unevenness associated with the local 
turn are weak. They are insufficient because, first, scholars of the local turn 
conceptualise peacebuilding as a “clash” of liberal and local paradigms or a hybrid 
thereof. Consequently, local turn scholars leave contentious politics within 
intervened states or interveners under-examined, as  Hughes (2009, 2015) as well 
as  Hameiri and Jones (2017) have argued. This lacuna limits the local turn’s 
explanatory power when factors beyond the interaction of “local” and 
“international” come into play, as they do very apparently in gender interventions. 
Second, such explanations are over-reliant on the slippery and analytically weak 
concept of authenticity. These explanations assume that domestic actors will 
automatically reject international interventions, as they prefer authentic tradition. 
Yet, some scholars of the local turn acknowledge that authenticity is constructed 
and malleable (Mac Ginty 2010). As Hughes points out, this act of construction 
means that the nature of indigeneity itself is contested in a variety of ways within 
local communities (Hughes 2015, 909). Third, and relatedly, when it comes to 
explaining uneven outcomes for women in post-conflict areas, a bifurcated 
framework of local/international elides gender and class power hierarchies within 
societies, family groups and households. But intra-kinship groups and intra-
households are key sites of violent power struggles, militarised conflicts and 
domestic violence. Therefore, scholarship and peacebuilding practice relying on 
local turn frameworks are normatively problematic in providing justification, even 
a cover of legitimacy, to the continuation of highly unequal gender relations. 
Fourth, prevalent explanations associated with the local turn in peacebuilding, 
when operationalised in practice, can have adverse outcomes for gender justice. 
To elaborate, some works have advocated a hybrid and translational approach to 
peacebuilding. In gender interventions, this can have unintended negative 
consequences. On the one hand, by relying on normative frameworks advocating 
authenticity—coupled with a pragmatic buy-offs of violent groups for peace— 
peacebuilders have inadvertently supported national and subnational groups who 
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can benefit from, and seek to maintain, hierarchies and patriarchal relations. 
Assumptions of local authenticity and their lack of analysis of local power relations 
make it difficult for peacebuilders to better interrogate the claims of their local 
interlocutors. This results in a paradox whereby, on the one hand, peacebuilders 
are pressed to fix deep problems with gender, rights, and women’s empowerment, 
yet on the other, there is pressure to support groups whose interests lie in 
supporting patriarchal relations. Compounding this paradox is that implications 
of gender injustice have flow-on effects to areas as diverse as human development, 
education, rights, and justice and thus undermine building sustainable peace 
because injustices in these areas can drive society-wide grievances.  
Scholars working on gender and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste have, like the wider 
local turn, sought to account for the uneven outcomes of interventions. These 
scholars have used feminist, historical, normative, and legal approaches to 
describe and explain uneven outcomes in Timor-Leste (Harris-Rimmer 2010, Kent 
2012a, Wallis 2015, Kent 2016, Charlesworth and Wood 2001, 2002). Some focussed 
on gender mainstreaming in the interventions themselves under the rubric of 
feminist security studies (Olsson 2009, Joshi 2005). Others used constructivist 
frameworks comparable to that of the local turn, suggesting uneven results from 
the interventions arise because of the disconnect between local norms, discourses, 
or cultures and liberal human rights (Hall and True 2008, Smith 2015b, a). Others 
still have recently looked at the intersection between gender and budget spending 
in the Timorese economy, but have left Timorese class structures unexamined 
(Niner 2016, Costa 2018). While building on this extensive body of work on gender 
and peacebuilding intervention in Timor-Leste, it is the contention of this thesis 
that this scholarship has tended to overlook the constitutive relationship between 
gender, kinship, and class. I argue the explanation for the uneven outcomes of 
gender intervention lies in the historically specific, co-constitutive structures of 
gender, kinship, and class.  
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1.3 The Case of Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste 
International gender interventions in Timor-Leste took place within the broader 
frameworks of peacebuilding interventions and thus require some elaboration. 
The thirteen-year peacebuilding intervention (1999-2012) in Timor-Leste came at 
the end of twenty-five years of Indonesian occupation (1975-1999). In between 
these periods, starting in 1998, authoritarian rule by Indonesia’s Suharto regime 
buckled under the pressure of economic collapse and massive public 
demonstrations. In this context, the crumbling Indonesian government faced 
increasing public pressure to resolve the question of Timorese autonomy. 
Autonomy was contested because the occupation of East Timor had been 
fundamental to the identity of both the Indonesian military and the New Order 
regime. 1  The disintegration of Suharto’s rule gave rise to internal army-
government contests, of which the Timor question was a part. At the same time, 
global governance institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), together with civil society groups, pressured the 
government for a variety of liberal democratic reforms. Under these pressures, 
interim President B. J. Habibie allowed the East Timorese to vote on whether to be 
an autonomous part of Indonesia or to become independent (Bourchier 2000). In 
the referendum, organised by the election observer mission, UNAMET, the people 
of East Timor voted decisively on 31 August 1999 to reject autonomy within 
Indonesia and pursue independence (Robinson 2003).  
In the lead up to breaking from Indonesia in 1998-1999, and especially surrounding 
the August 1999 referendum, the Indonesian armed forces perpetrated war crimes 
(CAVR 2006). The Indonesian military also funded and directed Timorese militia 
to destroy infrastructure and commit war crimes, including mass killings and 
sexual violence (Robinson 2003). The vote for independence from Indonesia meant 
the Indonesian military and militia would lose jobs, money, land, and power. The 
                                                 
1   I use East Timor to refer to the period under Indonesian occupation (1975-1998) when it was the province 
of Timur-Timor, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste to refer to the independent country after 1998.  
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fear of material losses fuelled the rampage (Kammen 2016). Timorese militia, 
brutalised and fortified with drugs, alcohol and blood rituals, were sent on 
missions of violent destruction, amounting to crimes against humanity (Tanter, 
Ball, and Van Klinken 2006, CAVR 2006). During the same period, more than 
200,000 Timorese, including pro-integration militia, fled or were forced across the 
border into Indonesian West Timor (Thu 2008, Downie 2007). 2  The election 
mission, UNAMET, withdrew haphazardly after UN staff were killed on the border 
with Indonesia, and was criticised for abandoning the Timorese (Nicol 2002).  
Weeks later, on 20 September 1999, INTERFET, the Australian-led International 
Force for East Timor intervened in order to secure East Timor. Australia’s leading 
role in the INTERFET was motivated by the threat of an arc of unstable, failing or 
failed states in Australia’s near region that could pose transnational threats to 
Australia (Ayson 2007).  During a 2007 lecture on diplomacy, the then Australian 
Foreign Minister Downer said:   
Australia wants to be able to look to its North and its East and see 
strong, stable, prosperous states. States that lack good governance and 
face a bleak economic future are vulnerable to the damaging effects of 
transnational crime. They run the risk of becoming havens for criminal 
gangs and others who seek to evade the law. The presence of these 
people in a turbulent and chaotic neighbourhood would obviously not 
be in our interest (Downer 2007). 
Australia participated in, led or supported interventions in Cambodia, Timor-
Leste, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands (Ayson 2007). Australia’s rationale for 
intervention in the Asia Pacific to contain transnational risks was also in the 
context of the United States’ withdrawal from the region (Hameiri 2008). Australia 
was left to take the lead in managing interests in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and the 
Pacific. Over the next 13 years, expensive, extensive, and far-reaching 
peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions were undertaken in Timor-Leste 
                                                 
2   Interview with a male ex-militia member from East Timor residing in West Timor, Indonesia, WT071, Timor 
Tenggah Selatan, 31 March 2015. “We came here without any order from any government and no 
government will order us back”. 
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(Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015, Downie 2007, Chesterman 2004). These are 
listed in Table 2.1 on page 26.  
1.4 Research Design  
This thesis seeks to explain uneven outcomes of gender interventions by 
evaluating three gender interventions: Gender Responsive Budgeting, the Law 
Against Domestic Violence and microfinance. At one level, the thesis assesses 
outcomes according to interveners’ aims in each case. Gender Responsive 
Budgeting (GRB), started in 2008 and aimed to make democratic institutions 
properly accountable to women. In this case study, the period after the 2006-2007 
crisis and increased spending under CNRT is the most relevant period to study the 
outcomes of GRB. The Law Against Domestic Violence (LADV) aimed to create 
legal protections for women’s rights to safety and security. It was lobbied for in the 
period leading up to independence, passed in 2010, and its implementation is an 
ongoing intervention. Microfinance aimed to make credit markets work to 
empowerwomen economically. Microfinance has a long history in Timor-Leste as 
I show in Chapters 7 and 8, but the thesis especially examines the two decades 
between 1998 and 2018.  
At another level, the study explains how the gender interventions worked in 
practice and evaluates their outcomes using the notion of gender justice as a 
yardstick. Gender justice is the cessation of gender inequality that results in 
women's subordination to men (Goetz 2007, 31). Its focus on redistribution, power, 
and material relations between women and men, allows the thesis to assess the 
distributional outcomes of gender interventions (Goetz 2007). Evaluating 
distributional outcomes means basically assessing which groups of men and 
women get what, when, and how from gender interventions. This necessitates 
describing the historical formation of groups, their interests, and contextualising 
distributional outcomes of gender interventions within the fiscally larger 
distributional outcomes of peacebuilding interventions. Finally, describing and 
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accounting for distributional outcomes after gender interventions requires an 
assessment of the distribution of violence. As such, the thesis also evaluates the 
gender justice outcomes of peacebuilding on violence against women. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1) What explains the uneven outcomes of gender interventions? 
a) How do the outcomes of gender interventions compare with gender intervention’s 
aims? 
2) How do the outcomes of gender interventions compare with the goals of gender justice? 
a) What are the distributional outcomes of (gender) interventions for different groups? 
b) What explains the high levels of violence against women in Timor-Leste? 
c) What have been the experiences of rural women of programs aimed to promote 
women’s empowerment? 
Table 1.1 Research Questions  
By drawing on propositions from both structural political economy analyses of 
Southeast Asia and feminist political economy, this thesis develops explanatory 
analytical tools capable of providing answers to these research questions. As 
scholars of structural political economy in Southeast Asia have long argued, 
international actors are just one social force among many, and thus must contend 
with the contests between domestic social forces over power and wealth (Rodan, 
Hewison, and Robison 2006, Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello 2017). Historically, 
the outcomes of these contests in Southeast Asian states have resulted in the 
domination of oligarchic, authoritarian, and capitalist groups, classes, and class 
fractions. The state, on this view, is a social power relation, a structure between 
those groups with more power and less, and the state expresses the agency 
interests and ideologies of particular social forces, especially classes. Scholars 
applying structural political economy approaches to international interventions in 
the region have argued that contestations between historically-specific social 
forces shape outcomes of peacebuilding because these contests result in changes 
and continuites of the distribution and reproduction of political power  (Hameiri, 
Hughes, and Scarpello 2017, Hughes 2009, 2015, Jones 2010).  
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Likewise, the current study proposes that social forces play a more significant role 
in shaping outcomes of gender interventions than local/international divides or 
hybrids. Interveners find themselves embroiled in conflicts involving coalitions of 
domestic social forces. These coalitions do not correspond with a local-
international divide. Extending this structural political economy by analysing 
extensive qualitative data, the study contends that post-conflict Timor-Leste has 
been dominated by a coalition of rural and Dili-based elites, united by their 
membership of the kinship-based Liurai-Dato (King-Noble) class. Therefore, the 
thesis argues it is essential to understand the origins, interests, ideologies, and 
actions of national and local Timorese social forces. This understanding should 
especially include Timorese dominant classes and class fractions, and the broader 
socio-political structures within which they are embedded, to explain their 
orientation towards gender interventions and hence their outcomes.  
There are two reasons that extant structural political economy frameworks are, by 
themselves, inadequate for the present study. First, the study seeks to analyse 
gender interventions, which, as I explained, constituted a separate but overlapping 
area of peacebuilding intervention. Structural political economy explanations of 
peacebuilding have not yet explicitly examined the intersection of gender relations 
with the social relations between oligarchic, authoritarian, classes and class 
fractions. To encompass the empirical specificity of gender interventions, this 
thesis uses a synthetic explanatory framework: structural feminist political 
economy (FPE). The structural FPE framework synthesises a structural analysis of 
social forces in Timor with True’s FPE of violence against women (True 2012). 
Using True’s FPE framework to analyse the political economy of violence against 
women necessitates an analysis of the material power relations inhering in and 
causative to:  the gender division of labour, of war and militarised conflict, and 
neoliberal globalisation (True 2012). This thesis expands True’s framework to 
include a structural analysis of kinship. The addition of kinship is necessary in the 
Timor case for reasons I elaborate below.  
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The inclusion of kinship leads to the second reason that structural political 
economy explanations are necessary but insufficient to explain outcomes of gender 
intervention in Timor-Leste. Namely, political power and kinship relations overlap 
in Timorese class formation. The synthetic framework of structural FPE reveals the 
linkages between hierarchical gender relations and hierarchical class formation. In 
particular, it highlights the historical and material basis for gender relations and 
the role that gender plays in socio-political contestations between powerful 
coalitions over the distribution of power and resources. As such, the inclusion of 
an analysis of the power relations inhering in kinship thus opens the black box of 
what constitutes authenticity in social and gender relations. Most crucially to this 
thesis’ explanation of the uneven outcomes of peacebuilding, my analysis  shows 
how members of the Liurai-Dato class depend on gender and kinship relations for 
networks, legitimacy, wealth, and continuity. In that sense, gender relations and 
the social relations are co-constitutive. Moreover, it demonstrates how this overlap 
shapes the outcomes of gender interventions. Outcomes of gender interventions 
have been shaped by the actions and interests of the Liurai-Dato class seeking to 
uphold gender and socio-political orders.  
My study argues that four factors have shaped outcomes of gender interventions. 
First, as outlined above, gender interventions took place in a setting of elite 
dominance. Specifically, this thesis identifies the emergence of an elite class 
dominating the state in Timor-Leste. Because of the overlap of kinship and class, 
the Liurai-Dato class relies upon a highly gendered allocation of resources and 
power, comprising materially exploitative militarised and patriarchal gender 
relations. Second, peacebuilders made concessions to elites and violent men in 
order to keep the peace, a tendency amplified by local turn approaches. These 
approaches to security reinforced the valorisation of armed masculinity, associated 
most strongly with the elite, which in turn justified the unequal distribution of 
state petroleum resources. Third, gender relations construct social relations 
through kinship relations, which also reproduce class relations. Aspects of kinship 
relations such as the accumulation through brideprice, and the political economy 
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of domestic violence, are important to the power of the dominant class, thus 
rendering legal and political gender reforms ineffective. Lastly, peacebuilding 
programs sought to use microfinance to empower women and grow the economy, 
but its primary beneficiaries were the Liurai-Dato class, repeating patterns of 
accumulation and rule through debt established during Indonesian-era 
microfinance.   
1.4.1 Methods and Fieldwork 
The present study is grounded in an extended period of fieldwork in Timor-Leste 
and Indonesian West Timor, five months in each in 2015, as well as an earlier 5 
months of fieldwork in Timor-Leste in 2011.  For reasons of space and clarity, the 
fieldwork in West Timor informed elements of the thesis but does not comprise a 
separate case, nor is it referred to explicitly. The months of fieldwork there 
informed my understanding of brideprice, traditional dispute resolution and 
microfinance among sociologically and culturally similar groups of Timorese. 
Likewise, the fieldwork from 2011—a preliminary study—is referred to but does not 
constitute the bulk of the data used in the analysis (see Appendix for more details).  
Thus the present study principally uses qualitative data from Timor-Leste 
collected in 2015. I collected a variety of data during the extended fieldwork: 
interviews, observations, newspaper articles, reports and brochures. 
Geographically, the sites for this fieldwork comprised Oecusse, Manufahi, and Dili, 
as indicated on the map below (Figure 1.1). The sites were chosen to reflect 
different rural and urban settings, class divisions, patrilineal and matrilineal 
groups, and different physical environments. Oecusse was also the site of high 
levels of gender interventions, while Manufahi had relatively fewer interventions. 
Oecusse was also undergoing a period of intensive infrastructure development. 
Dili is a necessary site in which to interview elites, government, and non-
government workers. I stayed in field sites for weeks or months, boarding with 
Timorese families in both Dili and Manufahi, and living and working closely with 
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Timorese families in Oecusse, using Tetun for everyday communication and 
interviews.  
The research was designed using feminist frameworks that draw attention to 
hierarchies and power in their methodologies (Ackerly, Stern, and True 2006). 
Feminist methods are also attentive to gaps and silences of data and include these 
in the research design (Reinharz and Davidman 1992). The wide-ranging, long-
term fieldwork allowed in-depth interviews with elites and non-elites, with 
particular critical attention given to gender, class hierarchies and engagement with 
Timorese women’s organisations (Nentwich and Kelan 2014, 132). Extended 
fieldwork living with Timorese families allowed me to be a participant observer in 
many important kinship events: weddings, births, funerals, death memorials, 
engagement ceremonies. During ordinary activities and extraordinary events, I 
observed who spoke, who ate first, who was deferred to, and asked why some 
people had authority and others did not, and why some people gave money and 
goods, while others received them (Kerstan and Berninghausen 1992, Fishburne-
Collier 1988). Living with families and speaking both Tetun and Indonesian 
allowed me to move out of elite spheres and talk on frank terms with ordinary 
citizens. Marriage, kinship, and violence were the focus of many of my interviews 
and daily conversations where themes around structure, hierarchy, power, control 
and violence emerged (Reinharz and Davidman 1992). Living, working and 
celebrating with Timorese families provided a deep understanding of power and 
hierarchy, which are often hidden, and not apparent, aspect of life.  
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PLACE TIMOR-LESTE  WEST TIMOR, 
INDONESIA 
TIMOR-LESTE 
PERIOD May 2011 – 
September 2011  
January 2015 – May 
2015 
June 2015 – 
November 2015 
TOTAL TIME 5 months 5 months 5 months 
NUMBER OF 
INTERVIEWS 
18 interviews 75 interviews 80  interviews 
(Principal data used) 
TOTAL 173 INTERVIEWS 
Table 1.2 Overview of Fieldwork  
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Figure 1.1 Fieldsites in Timor-Leste 20153 
1.4.2 Data 
Semi-structured interviews form the central, constitutive part of the thesis. Over 
the five months in Timor-Leste in 2015, I conducted around 80 semi-structured 
interviews with four main types of participant: national experts (national and 
district level, with some NGO participants); gender experts (international, 
national and local NGOs); local leaders (village and hamlet chiefs, spiritual 
leaders); and  ordinary people with no links to local or national leaders 
(predominantly women).  More than double the number of women than men were 
interviewed to ensure a variety of women’s voices were heard. Tables 10.2 and 10.3 
in the Appendix summarise and provide profiles of the main informants cited in 
the thesis. An additional area of data collection was newspaper monitoring. In 
Timor-Leste, four months of newspaper articles were collected from Timor Post 
                                                 
3  Reprinted from National Statistics Directorate, Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing Atlas, 2000 
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(June to September 2015). Articles were selected if they concerned the themes of: 
gender, violence against women, local governance, NGOs, human trafficking, state 
resource distribution, corruption and microfinance.  
A full description of fieldwork, methods and data are collected in the Appendix.  
INTERVIEWEES  WOMEN MEN 
Citizens in rural communities 16 3 
Leaders or members of village councils 5  5 
People connected to the village or subnational leadership by close 
kin ties 
7  2 
Timorese gender experts 13 4  
International gender experts 4  0  
National or Subnational policymakers, experts, or NGO workers 4  14 
International policymakers or experts 1  2 
TOTAL  50 30 
Table 1.3 Identity of Timor-Leste Interviewees (2015) Gender Disaggregated  
1.5 Structure of the Study 
As mentioned above, the research questions and the explanatory propositions 
raised in response were used to analyse a specific set of gender interventions—
Gender Responsive Budgeting, the Law on Domestic Violence and Microfinance. 
These three gender interventions are part of a larger set of fourteen gender 
interventions (for the complete list, see Table 2.1). The larger set of gender 
interventions comprised: gender mainstreaming in the United Nation’s missions 
and national institutions; gender quotas; work on conflict-related sexual and 
gender-based violence in the Commission for Truth Reception and Reconciliation 
(CAVR); new laws on domestic violence; funding to Timorese women’s 
organisations; microfinance; and, conditional cash transfers. The thesis covers all 
fourteen to varying degrees, but a detailed analysis of each of them is outside the 
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scope of this study. These three interventions—GRB, the LADV and microfinance 
form the core of the thesis. One reason for examining these three gender 
interventions is that gender mainstreaming (Joshi 2005, True 2009, Olsson 2009), 
reparations (Kent 2016) and political participation quotas (Cummins 2011, Ospina 
2006) in post-conflict Timor have been covered in extant scholarship, while 
political economy aspects of gender remain little examined. The other reason is 
the analytical framework that material power is central to understanding 
outcomes of interventions.  These three interventions deal directly with resources, 
violence and power, have significant material impacts on power and redistribution 
across Timorese society, affect large numbers of Timorese women and, have 
important gender justice outcomes. It is for these reasons that the three cases of 
GRB, the LADV and microfinance have been chosen.  
Over the cases, three central themes emerge: control over state resources, control 
over women and control over local resources. The chapters draw out these themes, 
even as they focus in turn on the specifics of each gender intervention and the 
factors that have shaped them. In Chapter 2, I outline a synthetic framework to 
analyse gender intervention. The theoretical framework proposed in that chapter 
is that gender relations and class relations manifest and are contested by varying 
coalitions of social forces at different political scales. In other words, particular 
constellations of gender relations and social forces are different at the level of the 
state, family, or community. Referring to the first theme, at the level of the state, 
Chapter 3 provides a historical background and a deployment of the structural FPE 
analytical framework. It describes broadly the formation of the Liurai-Dato class 
through incorporation into the Portuguese military and bureaucracy. Control of 
the deeply gendered slave trade and tax system also benefitted this class. Male 
members of the Liurai-Dato class have justified their superordination over other 
groups through the valorisation of armed masculinity. Correspondingly, recurrent 
war and conflict magnified the socially constructed distance between men and 
women, arming men, victimising and denigrating women, particularly through 
conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).  
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Chapter 4 builds on this analysis of historically-specific social and gender relations 
to examine the gender intervention, GRB.  Existing explanations for the successes 
and failures of GRB have not yet explored the political-economic context in which 
they take place (Costa 2018). I argue GRB takes place in a setting of elite 
dominance—and must be seen in the context of the Liurai-Dato class’ monopoly 
over state resources. Under these circumstances, the substantial spending on 
veterans under Gusmão from 2007 onwards is seen as part of coalition building 
between city-based and rural elites. Elite control over state resources is quite 
patently justified by the valorisation of armed masculinity, which again magnifies 
the socially constructed distance between women and men.  
Chapter 5 addresses the second theme of control over women, that is, it moves 
away from the level of the state to focus on gender interventions in family and 
gender relations. The gender intervention examined here is the introduction and 
implementation of the Law Against Domestic Violence. Chapter 5 shows how 
peacebuilders have—in line with the local turn but against the wishes of the 
Timorese women’s movement—made concessions to male-dominated local 
authorities. This chapter outlines how the Law Against Domestic Violence, which 
took parliament ten years to pass into law, split both the Liurai-Dato class, and 
those working on the peacebuilding intervention along gender progressive and 
regressive lines.4 Concessions to male power holders at the local level in a variety 
of areas, but particularly in traditional dispute resolution, have cemented village 
chiefs’ and allied men’s control over kinship. Supporting traditional dispute 
resolution in cases of domestic violence inadvertently supports a political economy 
of domestic violence. 
Staying in the thematic area of control over women, Chapter 6 uses a structural 
analysis of kinship to explain how the exchange of women using brideprice lays 
the foundations of the Liurai-Dato class. The gender intervention of the LADV is 
thus contested by a coalition of class and kinship based interests. In that sense, 
                                                 
4 Interview with Timorese gender expert, ET082, Dili, 8 June 2015.  
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Chapter 6 explains how gender relations constitute social and political relations in 
the Timor-Leste case. Brideprice was not targeted for reform by gender 
interventions, yet remains an area of profound gender injustice in Timor-Leste. 
Brideprice and marriage lay the foundations of the kinship system, and with it, the 
political economy of rural areas. Taken together, Chapters 5 and 6 show how 
gender interventions focussed on legal reform, firstly, come up against powerful 
interests, and secondly, cannot address underlying unequal material relations. 
Contestation and structural constraints change how gender interventions turn out 
in practice. 
The third thematic areas centres on control over local resources, and the 
interrelationship of this with debt, power and neoliberal markets. The gender 
intervention, in this case, is microfinance. Microfinance has long been part of 
gender and development and subject to extensive criticisms. Chapter 7 shows how 
peacebuilders sought to empower women economically using microfinance. This 
intervention had the backing of the national elite, who reframed microfinance as 
a socially focussed, cooperative economy. Gender interventions for microfinance, 
however, overlooked the powerful legacies of Indonesian microfinance in Timor, 
especially the role microfinance played in consolidating rural elites’ control over 
resources. Chapter 8 builds on this historical analysis of microfinance in Timor 
from 1975 to 2007. It argues microfinance on the ground has defied expectations 
of peacebuilders and not resulted in the expansion of inclusive finance, stronger 
rural markets and economic growth. Rather, microfinance in post-independent 
Timor-Leste has been another tool with which the rural-based sections of the 
Liurai-Dato class can accumulate and control scant financial resources. These 
resources strengthen rural elites’ control of social relationships through debts and 






CHAPTER 2.  CRITICAL APPROACHES TO 
PEACEBUILDING AND GENDER 
2.1 Introduction 
Uneven outcomes after gender interventions are not surprising. There is an 
extensive literature on uneven, disappointing, or failed outcomes in gender and 
development (Cornwall 2007, Molyneux 2002, Chant and Sweetman 2012). There 
is also a substantial literature on the uneven or failed outcomes of peacebuilding 
interventions (Chopra 2002, Fukuyama 2004, Rotberg 2004, Doornbos 2006, 
Autesserre 2014, Ghani and Lockhart 2008). The rehearsal of these debates in this 
chapter provides the background to the theory and practice of gender 
interventions within peacebuilding in Timor-Leste over the last two decades. Most 
importantly, it allows me to set out my framework and argument explaining the 
uneven outcomes of gender interventions.  
Of particular relevance to this chapter are three overlapping explanations as to 
why extensive and expensive peacebuilding interventions in Timor-Leste from 
1999-2005 have had mixed results. These explanations are the dominant ones, and 
ones I seek to challenge in this thesis. This period includes the most extensive 
peacebuilding intervention under the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) 
(see Table 2.1 below). The first explanation for the failure of such extensive and far-
reaching interventions was that the newly created state institutions lacked the 
capacity to control violence or enforce the rule of law and thus were unable to 
prevent the 2006-2007 political and security crisis in Timor-Leste (Goldstone 2004, 
2013, Kingsbury 2008, 2012, Leach and Kingsbury 2013). The second and parallel 
explanation was Timorese political elites lacked legitimacy among the Timorese 
citizenry because of a long period of exile coupled with their closeness to 
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international peacebuilders (Kingsbury 2012, Richmond and Franks 2008). A third 
literature, the local turn, came to dominate explanations for peacebuilding’s 
failures. The local turn scholarship, for over a decade, has built on these lack of 
legitimacy and capacity explanations to argue that more integration and 
understanding of local people, institutions, cultures, would make peace both more 
sustainable and legitimate (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, Richmond 2009). Like 
the local turn in peacebuilding, this thesis also moves beyond the inadequate 
institutional explanations. However, this thesis takes class and gender relations to 
be decisive factors shaping outcomes. To date, there has been little discussion 
about how a local turn in peacebuilding, with its emphasis on authentic 
institutions, cultures, and the “everyday”, works out for women on the ground in 
Timor-Leste. As a result of these silences, scholars of the local turn elide the role 
that gendered power relations play in shaping intervention outcomes. Moreover, 
because of the emphasis and support for local legitimacy, those proposing a local 
turn in peacebuilding inadvertently justify and naturalise unequal gender 
relations.  
This chapter outlines a framework that has as its point of departure a 
thoroughgoing critique of the local turn literature. The reason for doing so is that 
firstly, the literature on the local turn dominates current explanations for uneven 
outcomes of interventions. Secondly, as I go on to explicate, the use of local turn-
influenced progamming had inadvertantly mititgated against gender justice. For 
instance, the present chapter asserts that critical scholars using local turn and or 
hybridity framings have infrequently examined gender (McLeod 2015). Further, 
because their frameworks work from a dichotomy between local and international 
as an explanation for uneven outcomes, it can account for neither emancipatory, 
feminist alliances, nor gender regressive alliances, across international and local 
lines in gender interventions. Nor can approaches predicated on 
local/international dichotomies examine material or structural causes for uneven 
outcomes such as hierarchical social and gender relations. The structural feminist 
political economy framework outlined in the second half of this chapter provides 
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better analytical frames. Moreover, because of the focus on “who gets what why 
and how” out of gender interventions, such an approach shows in later chapters 
how a local turn framework inadvertently works to naturalise hierarchies, 
including those of gender, thus undermining progressive transformations. This 
chapter proceeds to outline an alternative approach to study gender intervention: 
structural feminist political economy. My approach draws together work on 
peacebuilding by Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello (2017), Hughes (2009) Hameiri 
and Jones (2017) with the feminist political economy of violence against women of 
True (2012). As such, my framework avoids reifying “national versus international” 
as analytical categories or causal mechanisms, instead examining class and gender 
power relations within and across those groups in order to explain the uneven 
outcomes of gender interventions.  
2.2 Peacebuilding Interventions 
Peacebuilding expanded and deepened in the two decades following the end of the 
Cold War, providing the global political backdrop to the intervention in Timor-
Leste. After 1990, the number of UN peacekeeping operations increased. Initially, 
peacebuilding involved maintaining ceasefires, liberalising economies, holding 
elections and then leaving (Sabaratnam 2011, Paris 2004). Even more so after the 
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, “saving failed states” was seen as a pressing 
global problem (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). On this view, the US, its allies and the 
“Global North” more generally, faced risks from intrastate and transnational 
violence in the form of terrorism, refugees, and other non-traditional security risks 
(Sabaratnam 2011, Helman and Ratner 1992, Hameiri 2010, 1). The “liberal peace” 
justified these peacebuilding interventions. The liberal peace is the hypothesis that 
liberal markets, democratic institutions and the rule of law are necessary to the 
maintenance of long-term peace, and the presence of one liberal aspect 
strengthens the others (Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011). The liberal 
peace was also seen as an obligation of the Global North to protect and promote 
human rights, liberal markets and liberal democracy (Richmond 2005). Without 
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liberal markets, democratic institutions and the rule of law, states would become 
“fragile” or “weak”. Yet, there was no straightforward way to implement the liberal 
peace through rapid liberalisation and democratisation.  
Thus, some scholars called  for prioritising institutions of the state over democratic 
elections or liberalising markets, or what Paris (2004) termed “institutionalisation 
before liberalisation”.  
In addition to concerns over the timing of peacebuilding interventions, 
international humanitarian concerns prompted a shift to more extensive 
peacebuilding interventions. In particular, the failure of peacekeepers to prevent 
the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre resulted in 
recommendations for more extensive peacebuilding policies (Brahimi 2000, 
Williams and Bellamy 2007). International organisations, national agencies and 
militaries were therefore justified to intervene in other states, not only to provide 
immediate humanitarian relief but towards the attainment of longer term security 
and development objectives associated with the liberal peace. Therefore, the UN 
became increasingly willing to intervene in the governance and institutions of 
sovereign countries, in contrast to previous policies that supported state 
sovereignty, regardless of a state’s record on development or human rights 
(Chandler 2005).5 Subsequently, peacebuilding took on larger projects such as 
election monitoring, demobilisations, suppressing public violence, writing new 
laws, building new institutions, training staff and establishing transparency and 
accountability measures. Because statebuilding became the primary means of 
implementing peacebuilding objectives, peacebuilding operations continued well 
into the post-conflict period (Hameiri 2010, Sabaratnam 2011).  
The first period of peacebuilding intervention in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2005, 
occurred precisely during the expansion and deepening of peacebuilding 
operations by the UN (see Table 2.1 below). The deployment of the International 
                                                 
5   Academics and policy makers in the early 2000s developed the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine 
which argued countries ought to intervene militarily to protect people at risk of gross human rights abuses 
and war atrocities (Chandler 2012). 
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Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to stop the violence coincided with the 
publication of the Brahimi Report recommending deepening and expanding UN 
roles during peacebuilding (Brahimi 2000). After international forces had gained 
control over the territory, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) began. It was a large, expensive, and complex “transitional 
administration” mandated to control all aspects of the state—revenue, 
expenditure, military and police—to demobilise Timorese soldiers, conduct trials 
and imprison criminals. In distinction to most other peacebuilding operations in 
“failed states”, UNTAET had a mandate to fund, staff and design state institutions, 
not reform existing ones (Chesterman 2002, 2004). Subsequently, Timor-Leste has 
been subjected to very high levels of intervention. Since 1999, Timor-Leste has 
hosted six UN missions. Major projects and programs from other international 
organisations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) ran concurrently with UN peacebuilding.6 I discuss the roll out 
of security and peacebuilding, especially the effects of buying the peace, in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
  
                                                 
6  UN family organisations active in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2017 included the UN Development Program 
UNDP, UN Capital Development Fund UNCDF, UN Development Fund for Women UNIFEM (from 2012 
UNWomen), and UN Population Fund UNFPA. 
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NUMBER NAME PURPOSE ACRONYM DATES 
1 The United 
Nations Mission in 
East Timor7 
Hold the referendum 
on autonomy 
UNAMET June 1999 – 
October 1999 
2 The International 





intervention to restore 
law and order 
INTERFET 20 September 
1999 – 28 
February 2000 




The UN civilian 
administration and 
peacebuilding mission 
UNTAET 25 October 1999 
– 20 May 2002 
4 UN Mission of 
Support in East 
Timor 
Administrative support; 
maintain law and order 
UNMISET May 2002 – May 
2005 
5 The political 






UNOTIL May 2005 – 
August 2006 
6 After the 2006-7 
crisis, the UN 
Integrated Mission 
in East Timor 
Assist Timor-Leste in  
overcoming the 
consequences and 
underlying causes of the 
2006 crisis 
UNMIT 26 May 2006 – 
31 December 
2012 
Table 2.1 UN Peacebuilding Interventions in Timor-Leste, 1999-2012 
2.3 Gender Interventions 
As mentioned, peacebuilding interventions in Timor-Leste provided the context 
for extensive gender intervention. This section now gives the background of 
gender interventions in Timor-Leste to set up the discussion in later chapters. One 
area of gender intervention arose from gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding 
and another area arose from stand-alone gender and development programs.8 I 
                                                 
7 Table data based on Downie (2007), UNMIT (2008) and UNSCR (2012). 
8 Gender mainstreaming is an approach to policy that assesses the implications of legislation, policies, or 
programs for gender relations. It advocates for consideration of gender relations to be an “integral 
dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all 
political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not 
perpetuated” (United Nations ECOSOC 1997)  
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use “gender interventions” to encompass both types of intervention; counting 
fourteen gender interventions in total (see Table 2.2).  
The first gender intervention, gender mainstreaming of the UN peacekeeping 
operation, took place under the framework of the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325) on Women, Peace, and Security, 
from 2000-2002. Linked to this was the second gender intervention establishing 
the Gender Affairs Unit (GAU) within UNTAET (2000-2005), initially in line with 
CEDAW and later UNSCR1325. The third gender intervention created the Timorese 
national institution for gender equality, the Office for the Promotion of Women, 
which United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNWomen partially funded. 
The Office was responsible for gender mainstreaming in the Timorese 
government.9 This Office became a central gender mainstreaming institution in 
the Timorese government.10 The fourth gender intervention was the UNTAET’s 
creation of the Gender and the Law Working Group composed of East Timorese 
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and civil society organisations. They aimed 
to conduct gender analysis of all UNTAET regulations and proposed legislation to 
aid in the gender mainstreaming process. The Gender and Law Working Group 
lobbied for a Law Against Domestic Violence (LADV) and a Women’s Charter to 
influence the design of the Timorese Constitution. Fifth, after female politicians 
won 26 percent of seats in the first elections of 2001 they formed the Group of 
Women Parliamentarians in Timor-Leste in 2002 (GMPTL – henceforth the 
Women’s Cross Party Caucus) (Ospina 2006). This grouping was formalised by 
parliamentary resolution in 2007 (Soetjipto 2014). The primary mission is to 
mainstream gender in the legislative process. The sixth gender intervention under 
the rubric of gender mainstreaming was the support of international interveners 
                                                 
9   Interview with UNWomen, senior manager ET076, Dili, 6 June 2015.  
10  From 2012-2015 this office was called Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI). From 2015-
2017 the Office was called The Secretary of State for the Support and Socio-Economic Promotion for Women 
(SEM). 
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to Cross Party Caucus and East Timorese Women's Communication Forum to 
lobby for the Gender Responsive Budgeting Resolution.  
Gender interventions also proceeded under the broader rubric of women’s human 
rights or gender and development. The seventh gender intervention I categorise 
here was the women’s human rights approach taken by the Commission for Truth 
and Reconciliation (CAVR) (2001-2005). CAVR, tasked with investigating war 
crimes during the Indonesian occupation, made gender interventions by 
documenting experiences of female soldiers and clandestinos, victims of sexual 
and gender-based violence and women’s experiences of war. CAVR recommended 
memorialising women’s contributions and making reparations to victims of war 
(Kent 2016). Eighth—and characteristic of gender and development interventions 
globally—was UNTAET’s support of the Timorese Women’s Network in 2000, 
REDE Feto (Tetun: Women’s Network). Rede Feto held the first Timorese 
Women’s Congress in 2000 and wrote a Platform for Action for Women’s Rights 
in Timor-Leste (2000). UN support from UNIFEM (later UNWomen), the GAU and 
UNFPA were crucial in supporting Timorese women’s organisations such as the  
East Timorese Women's Communication Forum (FOKUPERS) 11  and Rede Feto 
with money, offices, staff, technical expertise, and access to transnational networks 
(Grenfell and Trembath 2007). In turn, Timorese women’s organisations were 
often the implementing partners for gender interventions and provided political 
information, introductions, support, guidance, and access to communities for 
interveners. Ninth, GAU, Rede Feto and UNWomen lobbied, in the face of strong 
opposition, for the introduction of quotas for women in national parliament, 
discussed in more detail below. Tenth, Timorese women’s organisations and the 
Cross Party Caucus, with the support of UNWomen lobbied for ten years (1999-
2009) to introduce the LADV. The presence of women parliamentarians enabled 
the passing of this law. 
                                                 
11 Indonesian: Forum Kommunikasi Perempuan East Timor. East Timorese Women's Communication Forum  
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Eleventh, the LADV guarantees funding a Special Victims Unit in the Timorese 
police force and specialised victims’ services to provide support and protection to 
victims of violence. The twelfth gender intervention was international support for 
microfinance. Microfinance is primarily for women clients. Microfinance has been 
promoted by new banking regulations and forms part of the government’s strategic 
development planning for a cooperative based rural economy. The thirteenth 
gender intervention was lobbying by Timorese women’s organisations and 
UNWomen for quotas for women’s leadership positions in Village Elections. 
Quotas for women and young people also formed part of the World Bank’s 
participatory Community Empowerment Program in Timor-Leste (2000-2002). 
The fourteenth gender intervention is the conditional cash transfer for vulnerable 
mothers, the Bolsa da Mãe. Gender intervention in Timor-Leste thus comprises a 
wide variety of policies and programming. 
 
Table 2.2 Gender Interventions in Timor-Leste 2001-2017 
No. GENDER 
INTERVENTION  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK TYPE OF 
INTERVENTION 
AIMS FUNDERS  
1 UNSCR 1325 on 
Women, Peace 
and Security.  
UN Security Council 
UNSCR1272 forming UNTAET 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
Mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations across four 
“pillars”: participation, prevention, protection and relief 
and recovery 
UN Security Council 





CEDAW &  later UNSCR1325 
on gender mainstreaming  
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
To inform all peacekeeping components of the gender 
aspects of the mission; Bimonthly gender training to all 
new UNTAET staff (civil and military)  












accession 2003). Accession to 
UNSCR1325 in 2016 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
Responsible for leading implementation of the LADV; 
Leading gender-working groups in each Ministry  
UNFPA, UNIFEM 









Gender analysis of regulations and proposed legislation 
by East Timorese judges, prosecutors, public defenders, 
and representatives of civil society organisations. The 
Women’s Charter (2001) to influence the Constitution 
- 
5 Cross Party 






Gender analysis of regulations and proposed legislation 
and make recommendations to government 
UNWomen technical 
support; Timorese 
government funding  
6 Gender 
Responsive 
Budgeting   
Resolution No.28/II 2009 
requiring gender 
mainstreaming in the budget 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
To ensure a gender perspective on all budget legislation; 
Issuing recommendations to ministries to make their 
budgets gender sensitive  
Cross Party Caucus; 
UNWomen 
7 Commission 




UNTAET Regulation 2001/10  
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
To ensure women’s stories of the war were told and 







LEGAL FRAMEWORK TYPE OF 
INTERVENTION  
AIMS FUNDERS  




CEDAW, Beijing Platform for 
Action. Timor-Leste Women’s 
Platform for Action (2001) 
Gender and 
Development 
Rede Feto: To enable information sharing across 
the Women’s network. Lobbying for political 
empowerment. To make one out of every four 
candidates on the party list a woman 
Rede Feto; UNTAET, 
UNWomen; Timorese 
government funding 
9 Gender quotas 
in Parliament 
Article 12 of the Law on the 
Election of the National 
Parliament No 6/2006  
Gender 
Mainstreaming  
To provide a concrete incentive for the political 
participation of women through their mandatory 
inclusion in the lists of candidates 
- 




Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, Timor-
Leste Criminal  Code 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
To establish the legal regime applicable to the 
prevention of domestic violence and set out the 
obligations of the State to provide protection and 
assistance to victims 
Timorese Government and 
its ministries, led by SEM  





UNTAET police regulations; 




To provide police support and protection to the 
victims of gender-based and family violence in line 
with the state’s obligations to its citizens 
UNTAET; UNIFEM; 
Timorese Government; 




Public Instruction No.  06/2010  Gender and 
Development 
To increase women’s participation in the local 
economy; to stimulate local economies; to provide 
livelihoods to vulnerable people, including victims 
of domestic violence 
Timorese Government; 
Banking and Payments 
Authority of Timor-Leste; 
UNCDF; IFC; ADB 




Laws on Village Elections 2004, 
2009, and 2016 
Gender and 
Development 
To increase women’s political participation in 
village councils 
The Secretary for 
Technical Administration 
of Elections (STAE); 
UNDP; World Bank; 
Pátria; UNWomen 
14 Bolsa da Mãe 
(2008-2017) 
Mother’s purse  
Constitutional right to state 
support for the vulnerable 
Gender and 
Development 
Conditional Cash Transfer to vulnerable families 
with children to ensure school attendance and 
vaccination  
Timorese Government; 




2.4 The Critique of the Liberal Peace 
Confidence in peacebuilding declined after disappointing outcomes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Iraq, Afghanistan and, later on, in Timor-Leste. Concerning Timor-
Leste specifically, the critique of the liberal peace gathered force after the 
outbreaks of violence in the 2006-2007 political crisis. The roots of the crisis, 
discussed in Chapter 4, lay in grievances over demobilisation and favouritism in 
recruitment to the military and the police, which were mobilised by politicians in 
intra-elite rivalry. The resumption of violence led some scholars to claim that 
peacebuilders had built a “failed” state in Timor-Leste (Goldstone 2013). More 
broadly in regard to Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, Paris (2004) used a neo-
Weberian framework to argue peace required strong institutions before the 
introduction of liberal democracy or free markets. Neo-Weberian institutional 
approaches, while critical, invariably explained uneven or disappointing outcomes 
for peacebuilding as resulting from a lack of state capacity to foster economic 
growth or control violence (Hameiri 2010, Lemay-Hébert 2009).  
In contrast to capacity explanations, legitimacy explanations for uneven outcomes 
hinged on the apparent “ontological problem of whether the liberal peace is 
transferable into non-western or non-liberal polities” (Richmond and Franks 2009, 
13). Crucially, scholars argued the lack of fit between Western and non-Western 
models led to uneven outcomes, including recurrent conflict and violence 
(Leonardsson and Rudd 2015, 833, Autesserre 2010). According to these scholars, 
interventions failed because they attempted to impose liberal principles that 
clashed with the norms, cultures, and institutions of societies subject to 
intervention (Duffield 2005, 314, Richmond 2007). Some authors claimed that 
peacebuilding was a colonial “empire-lite”, and thus, illegitimate (Ignatieff 2003). 
On this basis, critical scholars such as Mac Ginty and Richmond called for a “local 
turn” in peacebuilding to enable local institutions, agencies, ideas, and cultures to 
be able to “form peace locally” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 769-771). They and 
other scholars of the local turn suggested that international peacebuilders had 
ignored or devalued “the local dynamics of conflict societies” (Richmond 2011, 115).  
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The local turn in peacebuilding aimed to re-orient research from the international 
“high politics” to “everyday” local realities (Randazzo 2016, 1355). However, of 
particular concern was the interaction of international and local that scholars 
sought to capture in the notion of “hybridity”. For critical peacebuilding scholars, 
hybridity was “a state of affairs in which liberal and illiberal norms, institutions 
and actors co-exist” (Belloni 2012, 22). For a number of scholars, “the local” was a 
site or agent of subaltern “resistance, agency and autonomy” (Richmond and 
Mitchell 2012, 1).  Such scholars focused on how “everyday” peacebuilding activated 
agency, including “verbal interaction, group interactions, group organisation, 
negotiation or networking, counter-organisation, narration or discussion of the 
policies in question” (Richmond and Mitchell 2012, 3). Therefore, the methodology 
of “critical localism” (Mac Ginty 2015) is qualitative, involving interviews 
(although, as I discuss later, these were often elite interviews), focus group 
discussion, often using narrative or discursive analysis. These methods mimicked 
postcolonial narrative and discursive analytical approaches, uncovering moments 
of “hybridisation”. 
It was Bhabha’s definition that informed the theory of hybrid peacebuilding, where 
hybridity is an outcome of a “colonial encounter” between interveners and 
intervened (Peterson 2012, Richmond 2011, 116, Bhabha 2004). Postcolonialism is 
the analytical framework for cultural, literary, and historical works concerned with 
the relationships of knowledge and power between former colonies and European 
colonial powers (Mishra and Hodge 2005). Postcolonialism drew on post-
structural or postmodern theory by “deconstructing” accepted views of language, 
culture, narrative, identity, and gender. Bhabha argued that post-colonial subjects 
use the language and discourse of the coloniser, termed “mimicry”, but with a 
crucial difference. This repetition of discourse, with a difference, then creates a 
hybrid discourse of the colonised, which is not repressive, but emancipatory 
(Bhabha 2004, Mishra and Hodge 2005).  
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In the peacebuilding context, Peterson maintained that hybridity was useful in 
providing a “clearer picture of the actual functioning of aid”, by centring on the 
interaction of local and international, not just on the peacebuilding missions 
themselves (Peterson 2012, 10, Mac Ginty 2010). However, although hybridity could 
be merely a descriptive term, a greater proportion of the critical literature used 
“hybrid peace” as a prescriptive goal (Millar 2014, 504). This was linked to ideas of 
the local being authentic. For example, Kumar and de la Haye (2012) argued 
integrating local cultural forms into “hybrid governance” ought to increase 
peacebuilding’s legitimacy and therefore its effectiveness. Some local turn scholars 
objected, saying interveners could not “engineer” a top-down hybrid peace (Mac 
Ginty 2010, Wallis, Jeffery, and Kent 2016). Nonetheless, in the Timor-Leste case, 
hybrid peace was prescribed in a large number of works (Boege et al. 2008, Boege, 
Brown, and Clements 2009, Brown and Gusmão 2009, Brown and Gusmão 2012, 
Brown 2012a, Cummins 2010, Cummins and Leach 2012, Mearns and Farram 2008, 
Richmond 2007). At the same time, interveners applied hybrid programming in 
Timor-Leste. Examples included hybrid court on war crimes (Burgess 2006, Reiger 
2006), hybrid local governance (Brown 2012a, Brown and Gusmão 2012) and hybrid 
approaches to conflict resolution, including domestic violence (Kovar 2012, UNDP 
2013) (a list of these is in Table 5.1 International Programs Incorporating 
Traditional Dispute Resolution). Thus, the critical local turn and hybridity, in 
dialogue with internal debates within intervening organisations, altered 
peacebuilding in practice, particularly those areas associated with tradition and 
authenticity, such as family, personal and cultural law and practice.   
Adding support to local turn approaches was the significant crossover of personnel 
between academic and practitioner roles. Academics participated in workshops on 
transitional justice, for example, and wrote monitoring and evaluations of 
peacebuilding programs (Mearns 2002, Fox and Soares 2003, Trembath, Grenfell, 
and Noronha 2010, Grenfell and Trembath 2007). To illustrate, Chopra and Hohe 
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who both worked within UNTAET, 12  also published in academic journals, and 
prescribed a “participatory intervention”. They envisaged that only contentious 
and abusive local structures were to be “reinvented” by international peacebuilders 
(Chopra and Hohe 2004). In their view, in cases where local political structures are 
resilient and not grossly in breach of human rights standards, interventions should 
reinforce local political authority (Chopra and Hohe 2004, 299-302). As a result, 
later iterations of local government laws officially incorporated “local political 
structures” such as lia nain (Tetun: elder)  into elected village councils (Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste 2009) 
2.4.1 The Limits of the Critique of the Liberal Peace 
This section outlines problems with the local turn and hybridity. First, I argue it is 
an inadequate framework to explain uneven outcomes of interventions. These 
centre on definitional and methodological weaknesses stemming from a lack of 
attention to structural power and especialy gender hierachies. Second, and 
relatedly, the local turn’s reliance on ideas of authenticity, without attention to 
hierarchy, also lead to normative limitations on the discussion and disruption of 
class and gender relations. 
First, the term “local” is slippery and contested. Across the critical literature, “local” 
could denote one or more of the following: a shorthand term for those subject to 
interventions (in this case Timorese citizens); a sub-national jurisdication or area; 
a site of resistance and alternatives to the state and the international; and or, 
“cultural appropriateness” (Hughes, Öjendal, and Schierenbeck 2015, 818). This 
inability to capture what the local is creates problems for analysis. For one thing, 
as I explain throughout the thesis, to locate the reasons for intervention 
unevenness in the differences between a binary of local and internationals misses 
important social and political coalitions across these groups. In gender 
                                                 
12 Chopra worked for UNTAET as a District Administrator; Hohe worked first for UNAMET as a district 
electoral officer and then later a District Field Officer for UNTAET.  
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interventions specifically, a binary analysis overlooks political coalitions formed 
between gender progressive groups of international, national and ordinary 
citizens, and gender regressive groups’ backlashes across these boundaries. 
Nonetheless, as Hughes, Öjendal, and Schierenbeck argue, “the local” offered some 
analytical purchase for critics of the liberal peace as a “reminder of the 
undemocratic nature of intervention itself” and the need for accountability to 
those undergoing it (Hughes, Öjendal, and Schierenbeck 2015, 819). In the process, 
according to proponents of a local turn, the authenticity of the local was generally 
assumed to prevail over the international. Second, to avoid essentializing a binary 
opposition between local and international, writers using local turn frameworks 
formulated degrees or types of interaction of local and international (Hameiri and 
Jones 2017, 58). Despite this, as Hameiri and Jones pointed out, these frameworks 
still rely on the dichotomy—that is why “binaries are always reinstated” (Hameiri 
and Jones 2017, 58). Most compellingly, Hameiri and Jones argued that hybridity 
cannot explain “why particular institutions emerged and function”; and crucially, 
they cannot tell us who benefits from these hybrid institutions because certain 
social groups support, while others resist, interventions, in accordance with their 
own interests or normative agendas (Hameiri and Jones 2017, 58-9). To summarise, 
the results of peacebuilding are uneven, but frameworks that locate the cause of 
unevenness in the interaction between reified notions of local and international 
miss the power and resource inequalities and contestations within the local, 
before, during and after peacebuilding. 
Despite local turn scholars’ commitment to unearthing the “everyday and 
subaltern”, thus far evidentiary research in Timor-Leste has relied on a few 
Timorese interlocutors generally from the Liurai-Dato class. As I explained in 
section in the appendix on elite bias in research methods in Timor, when 
researchers have gone beyond Dili, many have focussed on interviewing village 
chiefs and lineage heads, as these men are, in the eyes of Timorese society, held to 
be the keepers of tradition. In the case of Timor-Leste, reliance on a few sources 
was a mutually reinforcing loop, where particular interlocutors emphasised the 
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importance of preserving the position of the elite Liurai-Dato class. Richmond, for 
instance, used the opinion of Viqueque district administrator, Francesco da Silva, 
to argue that top-down approaches and democracy were ineffective (Richmond 
2011, 199). The same administrator was quoted elsewhere arguing for the retention 
of Liurai-Dato leadership in villages because, if village chiefs are not “descendants 
of the Liurai, they have a lot more problems” (Cummins and Leach 2012, 101). In 
another example, Timorese researchers Fidelis Magalhães 13  and Jose ‘Josh’ 
Trindade were strong advocates for the local turn, and both worked for Xanana 
Gusmão (Office of the Prime Minister 2007-2015) and Taur Matan Ruak (Office of 
the President 2012-2017).14 Scholars of the local turn heavily referenced interviews 
with, and writing by, these two key Timorese advocates of the local turn  (Freire 
and Lopes 2013, n19, Cummins and Leach 2012, 90, McWilliam, Palmer, and 
Shepherd 2014, 305, Hicks 2012, 131, Wallis 2012a, n228, n230, Richmond 2011, 120). 
As both Randazzo (2016, 1358-59) and Sabaratnam (2013) note, scholars of the local 
turn make normative choices about who is local, and who is not. The bias also 
mitigates against describing contentious politics, whereby martial arts gangs or 
militia groups or even feminist organisations are not generally considered by either 
interveners or national governments, to be part of authentic or legitimate local 
groups (Scambary 2013, Smith 2015b). These choices affected scholars’ analyses of 
intervention outcomes, particularly when scholars made assumptions 
homogenising politics, ideology, and power of local groups (and nations).  
The implications of scholars’ choices of “who is local” become more apparent when 
we turn to examine gender in peacebuilding interventions. A key theorist of the 
local turn, Richmond, for example, saw “gender issues and human rights” as arising 
out of liberal peacebuilding, but criticised the roll out of rights, suggesting that 
formal rights were emphasised to the exclusion of material or welfare aspects of 
peace settlements (Richmond 2014, 456). It is not correct to say that gender 
                                                 
13 Magalhães was elected to national parliament in 2017 as second on the list for Taur Matan Ruak’s People’s 
Liberation Party (PLP). 
14 Taur Matan Ruak is the commonly used nom de guerre of former guerrilla leader José Maria Vasconcelos. 
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interventions arise only from liberal frameworks (ignoring transnational and local 
feminisms) or that liberal peace interventions focussed on gender and rights to the 
exclusion of other issues. Most crucial, however, is the use of local or hybrid 
frameworks for understanding outcomes of gender intervention. Richmond 
presupposed a dichotomy between international liberal peacebuilding, which 
prioritised individual rights, and local societies who prioritise group rights, in this 
case, the Timorese nation. To illustrate, in The Transformation of Peace Richmond 
proposed that this tension between individual and group rights existed because in 
part, humanitarian decisions are “hegemonic acts” made by “third parties” in 
relation to others’ interests (Richmond 2005, 137-140). However, in Richmond’s 
analysis, the definition of who comprises a rights-bearing group, and who has 
power within those groups was overlooked. The present study instead highlights, 
as Peterson stated in the case of peacebuilding in Kosovo, that citizens experience 
peacebuilding “along ethnic, class and even [sic] gender lines, with some viewing 
the interface with the international as emancipatory, others as politically 
expedient and yet others as regressive or debilitating” (Peterson 2012, 19). In the 
final analysis, although the critique of the liberal peace offers important appraisals 
of peacebuilding, power, gender and hierarchy “also prevail in ‘everyday peace’ on 
the local level” (Paffenholz 2011, 150). It means that explanatory accounts based on 
clashes, frictions, or hybridity between local or international overlook critical 
structural factors within recipient societies shaping outcomes, such as class and 
gender.  
In the case of Timor-Leste, a number of scholars using local turn and hybridity 
frameworks made  problematic assumptions about the authenticity of local groups 
and overlooked the historical basis and power dynamics inhering in class and 
gender relations. These assumptions about the authenticity of Liurai  have resulted 
in a fossilisation of  tradition in the study of, and policy making in Timor-Leste 
(Kammen 2017). “Local” societies, institutions, culture and so on are naturalised in 
local turn accounts because their focus is on describing the international-local 
hybrid. On this view, power relations in the form of class and gender inequalities 
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are taken as authentic and legitimate, rather than uncovering their particular 
emergence. These assumptions meant that uneven outcomes for gender 
intervention are located in the incompatibility between international and local 
institutions, cultures, or practices. Development practitioner and anthropologist, 
Cummins (2013) used a mix of hybridity and institutionalism to explain the 
disappointing results of gender quotas in village elections in Timor-Leste. 
Cummins argued, like numerous other scholars, that “democratisation” has built 
“liberal-democratic institutions over existing customary governance structures 
and norms”, creating “political hybridity” in village governance (Cummins 2013, 
144, 148. See also, Kirk 2015, Wallis 2012a, Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009). Thus, 
women’s lack of political participation in village governance can be explained by 
the fact traditional institutions are authentically male dominated: “the major 
difficulty for the women was that many community needs continue to be met 
through various aspects of lisan, which in patriarchal areas [sic]15 is led by male 
authority figures” (Cummins 2013, 151). According to Cummins, hybridity helped 
improve the situation for women because a new practice grew whereby a woman 
representative accompanied the village chief during traditional dispute resolution 
in a case of domestic violence.  
Although representation in these dispute resolution arrangements may improve 
individual outcomes, it does not alter the material outcomes in traditional dispute 
resolution, as I explain in Chapter 5. Moreover, the description of such a system as 
“hybrid” does not explain the persistence of certain men’s control over village 
institutions; the use of traditional dispute resolution; or the stubbornly high levels 
of domestic violence. Even more importantly to this study, because international 
interveners are but one of a series of powerful groups able to change outcomes, 
their alliances matter. As I explain in Chapters 5 through 8, sections of the donor 
community make concessions to and inadvertently support gender regressive 
                                                 
15 This should be “patrilineal” to describe the type of descent and inheritance of a particular kinship group, 
rather than patriarchal, which describes a system of male dominance of social, economic and political life, 
originating in the family. 
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actors. Thus, this study holds that processes perceived as authentic, such as 
traditional dispute resolution, are best analysed using a structural feminist 
political economy approach, which reveals the intersectionality of class and 
gender. Significantly, traditional dispute resolution processes materially benefit 
village elites. Village elites’ control over resources at the local level, and their 
control over women set the conditions that lead to high levels of re-victimisation. 
Some critical scholars of the local turn have argued liberal or neoliberal aspects of 
peacebuilding interventions cause uneven, unexpected, or ineffective outcomes in 
the Timor-Leste case (Richmond and Franks 2008, Croissant 2008, Mac Ginty 
2010). On this view, peacebuilding intervention forced neoliberal market relations, 
with origins in Western capitalism, onto non-western communities who were 
organised according to non-market relations such as kinship. In contrast, the 
current study takes its cue from Hughes (2015), and focusses on how economic 
stratification and power relations intersect at the local level, looking specifically at 
“second-generation” neoliberal development programming (Rittich 2006). In this 
thesis, neoliberalism and its critiques are most important when looking at gender 
interventions to promote women’s economic empowerment. Specifically, this 
includes second generation, market-led development strategies to reduce 
gendered poverty such as microfinance, and conditional cash transfers. 
The local turn has criticised the liberal peace yet often their approach is not 
entirely removed from the conventional, liberal approaches as is assumed. For 
instance, local turn approaches overlap with “participatory” ones, an orthodoxy in 
these “second generation” development programs. The World Bank and other 
interveners already used the concepts of “local”, “emancipatory” and “empowering” 
in programs such as participatory budgeting, local governance reform, 
decentralisation, and microfinance. Mac Ginty and Richmond made a distinction 
between a “genuine” local and the “expedient and shallow” local of the World 
Bank, which is part of the liberal peace (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). 
Nevertheless, on the ground, prescriptive hybridity and local approaches blur with 
those of participatory development. Therefore, critiques of participatory and 
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“locally owned” development are relevant to the critique of the local turn and 
hybridity.  
Feminist approaches to the hybrid model advocated by scholars of the local turn 
add a feminist concern with power but retain the concept and a focus on discourse 
and discursive methods. It is worth pointing out that discursive approaches are 
distinct from the focus on material power taken in this thesis. For example, 
McLeod considered “hybridity” to be a useful analytical tool which highlights the 
complex interactions between local and international actors, recognising that “the 
diversity of locals and internationals” means neither category is “clear-cut” 
(McLeod 2015, 51). McLeod aimed to broaden hybridity by adding a feminist 
concern that encompasses “the personal” and not simply “macro-political 
processes” (McLeod 2015, 52). This translates into a concern for the diversity of 
bodily and emotional responses to war—and how these shape political choices. 
Also using a hybrid framework, Smith used a constructivist approach to argue 
gender equality norms were associated with international interveners, which led 
to mistrust of these norms because Timorese saw interveners as part of a colonial 
legacy. This association with “colonialism” “intertwined” with national and 
international patriarchal barriers to the legitimacy of NGOs working on gender 
(Smith 2015b, 67). One problem with constructivist approaches to gender in 
Timor-Leste is they overlapped conceptually with local turn approaches because 
they took women’s rights as a largely foreign or transnational norm. On this view, 
the norms of women’s rights crossed national boundaries through international 
intervention and subsequently “cascaded” into society (Hall 2009, Allden 2007, 
Ottendörfer 2013). On the one hand, constructivist approaches elide the way 
contentions over gender relations in Timor arise independently of outside norms 
because women and girls resist patriarchal domination and seek to advance their 
interests within the gender order. On the other hand, constructivist approaches 
also reduce the visibility of struggles over resources between women and men of 
different classes, which shape how gender interventions turn out in practice. I turn 
now to an overview of critiques of gender interventions.    
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2.4.2 Gender Intervention in Timor-Leste: Successes, Problems and 
Critiques 
Speaking about gender mainstreaming more broadly, True (2009) argued that 
gender mainstreaming’s mandate under UNSCR1325 has been left “unfulfilled”, 
including in the Timor-Leste case.16 Specifically in relation to gender interventions 
in Timor-Leste there is an existing critical literature describing shortcomings of 
gender mainstreaming in the Timor-Leste case. For example, as Charlesworth and 
Wood (2002, 346-7), Joshi (2005) and Olsson (2009) have pointed out, not only did 
gender mainstreaming encounter resistance from national leaders, but it was also 
underfunded, understaffed, and marginalised within the UN operation itself. In 
Australian aid too, Wigglesworth described a pattern of “lack of commitment” to 
gender mainstreaming among staff (Wigglesworth 2010, 137).  
Initial planning for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste had included a Gender Affairs 
Unit (GAU) to conduct gender mainstreaming. However, due to tight budgets 
holding up the UN resolution to create UNTAET, the budget for the gender 
mainstreaming unit was cut. After deployment, the head of UNTAET, Sergio Vieira 
de Mello, supported cutting GAU because he did not see what role gender 
mainstreaming could play in reconstruction in Timor-Leste (Olsson 2009, 80, 
Charlesworth 2008, 354).  Senior women at UN headquarters including Angela 
King, special advisor to the UN Secretary-General on Women’s Advancement, and 
Sherrill Whittington, high-level gender consultant, intervened to ensure GAU’s 
creation. King and Whittington facilitated a meeting between de Mello and  
Timorese women’s organisations that convinced de Mello of the importance of 
gender mainstreaming (Olsson 2009, 80).  
                                                 
16  For a full discussion of UNSCR 1325 and the six subsequent UNSCR “Women Peace and Security” 
Resolutions, see the special issue of International Political Science Review “Women, Peace and Security: 
Exploring the implementation and integration of UNSCR 1325” (George and Shepherd 2016) and the special 
issue of the International Feminist Journal of Politics “Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security” (Shepherd 2011). 
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Another way that international institutions themselves obstructed gender 
intervention in Timor-Leste was on the issue of quotas. UNTAET’s electoral affairs 
office and the UN Department of Political Affairs opposed the introduction of 
quotas for women in national parliament (Olsson 2009, 129, Hall 2009, Hall and 
True 2008). As a result, there was no quota in the 2001 elections. However, 
Timorese women’s organisations, with financial and technical support from 
UNIFEM, ran electoral campaigns for female candidates, resulting in women 
taking 26 percent of the seats in 2001 (Hall and True 2008). In 2006, the law was 
changed to include a quota whereby “lists of effective and alternate candidates 
must include at least one woman per every group of four candidates, under pain 
of rejection” (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2006, Article 12). After the 2007 
elections, women made up 27 percent of parliamentarians, which was not an 
improvement. This prompted another amendment to the Law on the Election of 
Parliament to increase the quota to one in every three parliamentary candidates. 
Under those circumstances, women won 38.8 percent of seats in the 2012 elections, 
very high by global standards. Thus, after some adjustments, the quota has been a 
successful gender intervention in Timor-Leste.  
A key demand of Timorese women’s organisations in the initial Women’s Congress 
in 2001 was a law criminalising domestic violence (Hynes et al. 2004, Swaine 2003). 
International interveners, GAU, UNIFEM and UNFPA, provided staff and expertise 
to help draft the LADV (Smith 2015b). Yet, a number of scholars have shown that 
within UNTAET itself, protection for women in cases of domestic violence was not 
a priority (Olsson 2009, 152, Groves, Resurreccion, and Doneys 2009). After ten 
years of lobbying, the LADV was passed in 2010. Although passing the LADV is a 
successful gender intervention, the introduction, implementation and outcomes 
of LADV have been contested and uneven, as I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Likewise, Gender Responsive Budgeting also faced opposition during its 
introduction and implementation. Since 2012 and the change in government, there 
has been no gender budget statement issued by Parliament, and bureaucrats have 
obstructed implementation and misappropriated funds, as described in Chapter 4  
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(Austen et al. 2013, Costa 2018). As such, the outcomes of these gender 
interventions have been uneven.  
In the study of peace and conflict, scholars have developed different explanations 
for uneven outcomes in peacebuilding (within which gender interventions take 
place). Scholars have provided explanations for the gaps between gender 
mainstreaming’s aims and outcomes. In the first place, as other scholars have 
documented, one cause of uneven outcomes of gender intervention in Timor-Leste 
was opposition to gender mainstreaming within the UN and other interveners 
(Olsson 2009, Charlesworth and Wood 2001). Charlesworth and Wood (2002, 348) 
for instance argue not only were some areas of the UN mission uncommitted to 
gender mainstreaming but also vulnerable to gender bias. Because gender 
mainstreaming in Timor-Leste was perceived to be “all about women”, UN 
programs and decision-making left male patterns of behaviour unexamined and 
unreformed. In general, interveners misrecognised the relationship between 
gender and power.  
Scholars have also drawn attention to the relative marginality of gender within the 
peacebuilding intervention. This is despite the way in which donor’s gender 
interventions were criticised for overemphasising women and gender. For 
instance, the late creation of GAU meant some gender mainstreaming measures 
were not part of the initial peacekeeping operation. It also left GAU without a 
discrete funding “envelope” (Charlesworth 2008, Olsson 2009, 81). GAU comprised 
just six staff out of 11,000 in UNTAET, too few to properly carry out its mandate to 
mainstream gender in all peacebuilding and train hundreds of UN staff in gender 
mainstreaming (Olsson 2009, 80). In sum, initial obstruction of GAU led to 
resource constraints, which limited GAU’s effectiveness and that of the gender 
intervention more broadly. Another, and crucial, reason scholars have given for 
the uneven outcomes of gender intervention was opposition from the Timorese 
parliament, notably in areas such as laws on domestic violence (Hall 2009, Hall 
and True 2008) and gender responsive budgeting (Costa 2018). The law 
criminalising domestic violence faced opposition from within the Timorese 
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leadership, evidenced quite convincingly by the ten years it took for the Timorese 
parliament to pass the LADV. 
Critics have sometimes viewed gender mainstreaming as inappropriate, and 
enforced by Western aid conditionality (True 2009, 45). In other words, gender 
mainstreaming faced a backlash within peacebulidng missions, in scholarship on 
peacebuilding and among targets of intervention that sought to paint it as 
externally-imposed, “westernised”, liberal and thus unsuitable (Hodžić 2009). 
Backlash has been conspicuous in Timor-Leste. National leaders and international 
commentors have criticised gender programming as illegitmate, inauthentic, 
marginal or overly focussed on what commentators percieve to be  “hot-button” 
and marginal issues such as gender-based violence (Hicks 2013, 31,  for a critique 
see Niner 2011). Further issues included aid conditionality, criticism of some 
democratic principles that undermined established age or military hierarchies, and 
gender interventions on gender-based violence or women’s political 
representation (Hughes 2009). Some Timorese elites saw gender interventions to 
be at odds with national goals or culture and tied to Western interests. The 
influential Timorese leader, Xanana Gusmão, for example, argued that during UN 
rule Timorese were obliged to acculturate gender and human rights to please the 
UN, their “masters of independence” (Niner 2011, 47, Hughes 2009). As such, it is 
important to realise that sections of the Timorese elite found common cause with 
the local turn in peacebuilding on specific, often gender-based, issues. 
Aside from uneven outcomes resulting from international and national opposition, 
there have been some problems within current gender mainstreaming practice. 
Gender mainstreaming is not always informed by a feminist approach that 
understands gender as a relationship of power (True 2009, 45). On this view, the 
reasons for these disappointing outcomes included that gender mainstreaming 
often lacked a feminist lens; it had a narrow vision of security that privileged 
physical security and elections over social and economic security; and it was not 
sufficiently attentive to the unequal power relations between states (True 2009). 
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Another reason has been because of the  transformation of the received meaning 
of “gender” as it became part of mainstream development. The concept of “gender 
relations” was initially a feminist term to describe unequal material relations of 
power between women and men and the unequal social construction of masculine 
and feminine norms. However, “‘gender’ gained salience within development 
when it began to take the shape of an acceptable euphemism that softened ‘harder’ 
talk about rights and power” (Cornwall 2007, 70). Gender mainstreaming in Timor-
Leste was not always positioned to connect women’s rights with broader economic 
demands on the state, such as the right to housing, education, health, and safety 
(True 2009). For example, although the gender intervention on GRB sought to 
remedy gendered state budgets, in some senses, GRB has allowed the Timorese 
government to self-promote their actions on “women positive” policies, without 
admitting shortcomings (Sharp and Broomhill 1990), particularly the gaps between 
planning and outcomes. 
Attention to the uneven distributional effects of international peacebuilding 
intervention is not new. It is commonly acknowledged that gender justice has 
more traction in the area of political and civil rights than economic rights and 
entitlements (Goetz 2007, 24). Others have analysed the shortcomings of 
peacebuilding interventions for women in the Timor case, but have not focussed 
on the relationship between gender and class. Similarly to the argument of this 
study, Harris-Rimmer maintained that the peacebuilding intervention failed to 
promote socio-economic rights (Harris-Rimmer 2010). Likewise, my analysis 
supports existing studies that show entitlements of victims and veterans are 
significant factors in the Timorese political economy, and in outcomes for women 
(Niner 2016, 502-3, Wallis 2012b). Kent has convincingly linked peacebuilding 
intervention to a post-conflict “politics of memory” that damages women’s 
entitlements and women’s rights in Timor (Kent 2016, Kent and Kinsella 2015).  
Nonetheless, these authors have had different concerns to mine, seeking to 
examine how (trans)national actors have tried to build gender perspectives into 
laws and institutions (Hall 2009, Costa, Sawer, and Sharp 2013, Harris-Rimmer 
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2010, Graydon 2016). In contrast, it is the argument of this thesis that legal reforms 
using “rights-based approaches falsify the position of the socially weak, who are in 
no position to make claims or ensure that the more powerful actors meet their 
obligations” (Goetz 2007, 26). In other words, there is an assumption that formal 
institutions rule behaviours and guarantee rights. For example, the intervention 
on the issue of gender-based violence was attentive to legal reform, especially the 
creation of the Law Against Domestic Violence, but did not address material 
relations that set the conditions for high levels of violence against women. Other 
measures as advocated in the Women’s Charter to combat material factors 
contributing to domestic violence such as brideprice were unsuccessful (Ospina 
2006). In that sense, gender intervention within a peacebuilding framework in 
Timor-Leste was, similarly to the case of gender intervention in Liberia, 
“instrumental in providing, space and resources for gender mainstreaming” 
(Garnett 2016, 99). Yet, in the final analysis, gender interventions lacked in-depth 
consideration of social relations and material conditions, and especially the 
connections between material conditions and VAW.  
2.5 A Structural Feminist Political Economy of Gender Intervention 
This section lays out the structural feminist political economy framework I use to 
explain uneven outcomes of gender interventions in terms of gender and class—
and in particular, the role of dominant classes in shaping the post-conflict order 
that is so crucial to outcomes. This framework synthesises structural political 
economy with True (2012) feminist political economy of violence against women. 
Her framework explains the global yet specific occurrences and drivers of violence 
against women, whereas I seek to explain outcomes of gender interventions, which 
have a significant gender dimension. Thus, a synthetic structural political 
economy framework is required. I also modify True’s FPE approach to encompass 
kinship, which is vital to analyse the Timor-Leste case because kinship, especially 
brideprice, is how class and gender are co-constituted. Thus, my structural 
feminist political economy framework has six elements that together account for 
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uneven outcomes of gender interventions: Material relations and social forces; 
gender justice; gender divisions of labour; war, militarised conflict and violence; 
kinship; and neoliberal globalisation. 
2.5.1 Material Relations and Social Forces  
Structural political economy prioritises the role of material relations between 
individuals in villages, households, and the state, and the role of material relations 
in contests between social forces over the socio-political order. This contestation 
between social forces, can, of course, be violent (Jones 2010). Material relations are 
the “relationships that govern the distribution and use of resources, benefits, 
privileges, and authority within the home and at large” (True 2012, 29). These 
relationships are the basis of power: “All forms of power—including the use of 
violence—are understood as having a material basis, often founded on material 
relations of inequality within and across societies and cultures” (True 2012, 9).  
Material relations arising out of economic processes over time define the key social 
forces with shared or divergent material interests (Cox 1981). “Social forces” denote 
elements in society with the capacity to cause and or resist social change. They are 
elements with the capacity to shape social structures, such that they are seen as a 
dominant presence. Social forces can be grouped along class, class fractions, 
religious, locational or ethnic lines governing the distribution and use of resources 
(Jones 2013, 73). Importantly, state institutions are the focus of so much political 
struggle and contestation because “they play a key role in structuring access to 
power and resources” (Jones 2013, 73). Material relations between economically 
stratified social forces comprise the “social structural factors [that] establish the 
environment in which politics operates, and establishes sets of pressures that 
shape political” and institutional outcomes (Hewison, Robison, and Rodan 1993, 
4). The composition of social forces is historically contingent and forms the 
institutions, rules that give rise to the social order and the ideologies that underpin 
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them, such as who has the right to rule, and other forms of legitimacy. In the 
current study, class is the key social force examined.   
Structural political economy thus takes material relations to be causal mechanisms 
shaping institutions. On this view, states and state institutions are not “apparatus 
abstracted and separated from society” (Jones 2010), but rather comprised of 
contested social forces with specific material interests in upholding or contesting 
a political order. Given my structural theoretical position, my analysis of gender 
intervention looks at policies and decisions which “directly and indirectly 
influence the distribution of wealth, power and the structure of social 
relationships” (Hewison, Robison, and Rodan 1993, 17). Most importantly to this 
thesis, those who own or control wealth-generating property directly or indirectly 
shape the principal institutions that shape ideology in gender progressive or 
retrogressive directions (True 2012, 7, Agarwal 1994, 16). Different social forces 
have divergent interests, and these interests can result in these groups upholding 
or challenging the gender order. Gender relations are a crucial aspect of the 
broader process through which the dominant class secures its position.  
For these reasons, it is important to ask “who benefits” from peacebuilding 
(Hughes 2009, 41). When we understand this, we “understand what kind of power 
was awarded by the peace and to whom” (Hughes 2009, 41). The premise of my 
argument is, therefore: gender interventions comprise decisions, policies, 
institutions and their operation which in turn are part of “social and political 
domination, as a system in which the state takes a critical, partisan role” (Hewison, 
Robison, and Rodan 1993, 17). For instance, after the war’s end, historical leaders 
of the armed resistance and FRETILIN’s (The Revolutionary Front for Independent 
Timor-Leste) diplomatic front played decisive roles in the national government 
facilitated by international interventions. FRETILIN was the largest and most 
significant pro-independence party and was founded in 1974. It is the party 
associated with Timor-Leste’s struggle for self-rule. Post-independence, Timor-
Leste’s integration into the global economy occurred through privileging the influx 
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of capital and entrenching elites as gatekeepers of these flows, “which put wider 
sections of the post-conflict population at a disadvantage in seeking economic 
opportunities, forcing them to submit to the competitiveness of the market” 
(Hughes 2009, 72). Thus, outcomes of gender interventions that modify socio-
political orders are dependent on the results of contestation between social forces. 
These social forces, including locals, internationals, and coalitions of them, deploy 
competing, often cultural and gendered claims, to legitimacy. In addition, they 
seek to form or renew a particular social order and interveners play a signficant 
role in supporting some groups over others. Or as Hughes puts it, rather than 
locating results of peacebuilding in local-liberal divides or hybrids, an analysis of 
the intersection between politcal economy and the politics of culture is more 
accurate.   
[O]utcomes are better understood as emerging from the intersection 
between, on the one hand, a politics of culture in a post-conflict 
context, couched as a claim to power and status advanced against 
‘outsiders’ and interlopers; and on the other, the business of 
constructing new economic, political and social orders and making 
claims for their authority—a project in which local actors are 
significantly engaged (Hughes 2015, 209)  
I argue that structural factors in Timor-Leste, particularly elite dominance, have 
stymied the goals of gender justice. This is partly because gender interventions 
focus on transnational actors and organisations—such as NGOs with links to 
donors—and assume these actors are inherently progressive, while in reality they 
are the middle class (Hutchison et al. 2014, 14).  These actors may or may not be 
(gender) progressive or regressive. The extension of Timor-Leste’s gender quotas 
and its vibrant civil society have not resulted in the extension of  gender justice to 
the majority of Timorese women. This reflects international experience where “the 
extension of civil and political rights, [or in the case of gender quotas, increased 
participation and representation] to excluded groups does not produce equal 
levels of participation and even less equal economic rewards” (Goetz 2007, 28). Nor 
does the extension of political representation result in progress in women’s social 
and economic status (True 2013, 357).  Thus, there exists in Timor, as elsewhere, a 
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significant gap between the goals of gender interventions and their outcomes, 
which partly arise from gender interventions focussed on narrow areas of political 
and economic rights, and market access.   
Like Hughes (2015), my approach is a structural one, concerned with identifying 
the social origins, interests, and ideologies of various social forces, including 
women’s organisations, in order to describe outcomes of gender interventions. In 
distinction to Hughes, I focus on the intersection between social forces and gender 
relations. The intersection is complex. One reason they are complex is that 
“women cannot be identified as a coherent group” and gender cuts across all social 
forces “producing differences of interests—and conceptions of justice—between 
women” (Goetz 2007, 18). Yet, women’s movements can galvanise some women 
around issues of bodily autonomy, reproduction and the gender division of labour, 
despite those women’s differing social origins. 
2.6 Feminist Political Economy  
After having outlined the first of six elements making up my structural feminist 
political economy, (a) material relations and social forces, this section outlines my 
feminist political approach. This is comprised of (b) gender justice (c) the gender 
division of labour (d) war, militarised conflict and violence, (e) kinship and (f) 
neoliberal globalisation. A framework comprised of all of these factors is required 
to explain the outcomes of gender intervention. However, an evaluation of 
outcomes also features a normative measure, and the evaluative criterion I develop 
here is gender justice.  
2.6.1 Gender Justice  
Answering the question, “What can account for the uneven outcomes of gender 
intervention in Timor-Leste?” requires a yardstick with which to measure the 
outcomes of gender interventions. In this study, in addition to intervention 
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objectives themselves, the yardstick used is gender justice. Gender justice is “the 
ending of—and if necessary the provision of redress for—inequalities between 
women and men that result in women's subordination to men” (Goetz 2007, 31). 
Using a benchmark like gender justice allows this thesis to look at uneven 
outcomes of gender interventions beyond their sometimes narrowly defined aims. 
Further, because I am concerned with structural features, gender justice is a notion 
that focusses on distributive and material features. The differences and overlaps of 
material interests, particularly the intersection of class and gender, complicates 
both the definition and enactment of gender justice (Goetz 2007, 18).  Thus, I use 
this term because it encompasses a variety of areas, including redistribution and 
redress at multiple levels. 
Gender justice is also amenable to a structural feminist political economy 
approach because it encompasses a normative goal for gender relations at the level 
of the individual, the family, the community, the state or the globe (Goetz 2007, 
16). The local, as I have shown above, is often defined as ideas, institutions, 
cultures, and people at subnational, community, kinship, and household levels. 
Relationships between men and women in these arenas are critical to the 
distribution of power and resources and “they are key sites of gender-specific 
injustice” (Goetz 2007, 18). Gender injustice at the level of kinship or family 
hollows out democracy because the deep “continuities between patriarchy in the 
private sphere, and in governmental, non-governmental and market sphere” strip 
so many citizens—women, youth, socially-derided racial or ethnic groups, of 
legitimacy and authority (Goetz 2007, 39). Also, where patriarchal practices of the 
state and family have deep continuities, there may be little desire among power 
holders, or their constituents, to reform gender relations. Despite gendered 
inequalities in access and control over resources, these go unchallenged “because 
standards of accountability do not necessarily consider gender iniquities to be 
intolerable or require official remedy” (Goetz 2007, 27).   
I use gender justice to evaluate outcomes for gender intervention in security, 
distribution, legal reform and the state. The state may be perceived as having more 
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pressing security and economic priorities than gender justice, linked to the general 
problem of gendered notions of security. Concessions to various groups can 
mitigate against gender reforms and multiply the exceptions for “personal law” 
such as “marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption, burial, and clan-based property 
management” (Goetz 2007, 37). These concessions can have negative outcomes for 
gender justice, at the same time they link gender relations to the state:  
many states [have ceded] control over women and children in periods 
of state formation to traditional patriarchal groups, excluding many 
forms of injustice in private relationships from the purview of formal 
law as a form of compensation to those authorities for their surrender 
of power to the state (Goetz 2007, 35) 
For example in Timor-Leste, the use of traditional dispute resolution for cases of 
gender-based violence is common, despite the Law on Domestic Violence. De facto 
legal pluralism is not unusual internationally. In many cases, “state rulings on 
justice are ignored” because relationships between men and women at the level of 
the family and community are seen as legitimate, natural, biological, or cultural 
and outside the remit of the state (Goetz 2007, 35, Grenfell 2006). Rather than view 
this as the persistence of traditional institutions, I understand this to be the 
persistence of structural relations, of which these traditional dispute resolution 
processes are but a part. The existence of personal laws governing kinship, gender 
and the family are “understood to be a product of conflictual power relations at 
local level” which are historically-specific and influenced by transnational and 
international forces and regimes (Hughes 2015, 910).  
In sum, my feminist political economy approach analyses gender intervention 
against the benchmark of gender justice. Gender justice allows me to look at 
gender relations across time while remaining focused on outcomes for women. It 
can look at structural relations beyond the sometimes narrow legal, political, and 
security focussed remits of the interventions. Gender justice gestures towards the 
political economy approach I use here because of its attention to redistribution. It 
shows the deep continuities in gender injustice between the individual, the family, 
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and the state. Lastly, kinship and the family are key sites of gender injustice and 
linked to my critique of the local turn in peacebuilding.  
2.6.2 Gender Division of Labour  
Gender is the “socially constructed expectation that persons perceived to be 
members of a biological sex category will have certain characteristics” (Sjoberg 
2013, 5). Sex and gender are conceptually distinct with sex being characteristics 
associated with biological sex and gender the socially constructed expectations 
constituting binary sex difference. Gender relations denote the unequal relations 
between socially constructed categories of masculine and feminine. Gender 
relations was a new analytical concept in the 1970s, which moved “beyond ‘women’ 
to active engagement with the relations of power that reproduced an unequal and 
inequitable status quo” (Cornwall 2007, 70). Thus, the analytical frame of “gender 
relations” was the locus in which women’s subordination and male domination 
were produced and sustained (Cornwall 2007, 70, 72). Many societies devalue 
women and phenomena denoted “feminine” and look more favourably on men and 
phenomena denoted “masculine” (Connell 2005, Hutchings 2008). A feminist 
political economy perspective draws attention to ways in which gender relations in 
many societies tend to accord women a greater share of (unrecognised) burdens, 
and less access to and control over resources and benefits (True 2012). Unequal 
access to and control over power and resources, combined with asymmetries in 
gender ideology reproduce unequal gender relations. However, as gender relations 
are “socially and historically constructed” they are variable across time, space and 
between different groups and require explanation (Hozić and True 2016, 6).  
A relational view of gender should avoid conflating gender and women, as this can 
“obscure the analytic importance of gender as a constitutive element of all social 
relationships and as [typically] signifying a relationship of power” (Cornwall 2003, 
1326). Thus, I contextualise the gender interventions within specific gender 
relations in Timor-Leste, which requires attention to men and militarised 
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masculinities (Wigglesworth et al. 2015, Niner et al. 2013, Streicher 2011, Myrttinen 
2005, Kent 2016). Even so, because women were the primary focus of the gender 
interventions and because I am concerned with uneven outcomes for women, I 
look at the “gendered experiences of women”, and the unjust circumstances that 
gender interventions sought to lessen or ameliorate (Chappell 2016, 8).   
Gender relations encompass the gender divisions of labour. The gender division of 
labour is a system where women are held to be “primarily responsible for the 
unremunerated and often invisible, unpaid work” in the household (True 2012, 30, 
Meillassoux 1975, 4). 17  The gender division of labour manifest a society’s 
differential valuations of work by men and women. Crucially, work performed by 
women is generally devalued relative to work done by men (Sweetman 2008). 
Rather than the value of the task itself, it is the devaluation of women, which 
reduces the perception of the value of women’s labour (Pearson 2004). 
As a result of systematic devaluation, the gender division of labour entails 
inequalities in bargaining power between men and women within the household 
(Pearse and Connell 2016). On this view, the household is not unified but rather a 
site of “negotiation, even contestation, over gender norms and the distribution of 
resources among family members” (Pearse and Connell 2016, 32). Household 
bargaining thus involves contests over material resources and work. At the 
broadest level, men benefit from women’s unpaid work and the devaluation of 
women’s labour, receiving a “patriarchal dividend” (Walby 1989, 21, Connell 2005). 
The gender division of labour can be subject to both resistance and violent 
enforcement (True 2012, 30-1). Relatedly, it is the material gender inequalities 
between women and men with respect to income, property, employment and 
control over resources that best explain the magnitude of violence against women 
in various contexts globally (True 2012, 18). In Timor-Leste, the gender division of 
labour hinges on a distinction between domestic work in the household and public 
                                                 
17 The household is not a particular place or group of people, nor confined to heterosexual couples and their 
children, but stands for “the bundle of relationships … through which primary reproductive activities are 
organised, recognising that these frequently involve principles of kinship and residence” (Kabeer 1991, 7). 
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work, rather than unpaid domestic work and paid work, and it is this division 
between household and public work that I take forward.18 It is comparable to the 
division between paid and unpaid work because household work is “invisible” 
compared to work done by men in the public sphere. I operationalise my FPE 
approach by describing and analysing the burdens, justifications, structures and 
hierarchies in Timor’s gender division of labour (Nentwich and Kelan 2014). 
Gendered material relations are also underpinned by ideologies of male authority 
that justify women’s greater labour burden and their lack of control over resources 
in the household and beyond (True 2012). Within the ideology of male authority, 
the idea of “masculinity” does “rhetorical work of valorisation, denigration, and 
exclusion done by the formal, relational properties of masculinity as a concept, 
regardless of the substantive qualities in question” (Hutchings 2008, 24, emphasis 
added). The ideology of male authority rationalises husbands’, fathers’, brothers’ 
and uncles’ control of women (Rubin 1975, 168). What is more, the ideology of male 
authority permeates institutions outside the household. Male power in one sphere 
justifies and reinforces authority in others, including in the state. Thus, although 
the household and kinship are key sites producing gender injustice, men’s 
disproportionate capture of power and resources saturates all areas. In Goetz’s 
words: “the patriarchal mindsets and social relations that are produced in the 
private sphere are not contained there but infuse most economic social and 
political institutions” (Goetz 2007, 18).  
Some argue criticism of Timorese society as patriarchal is misplaced because 
Timorese belief systems valorise women as the source of life (Hicks 2004, 2015), 
however, valorisation of reproduction reinforces gender differences, which are 
                                                 
18 In Timor-Leste, domestic work is work associated with the private sphere and the household, such as 
childrearing, cleaning, cooking, but also tending to household gardens, raising small animals, and running 
small shops or businesses from the home. Public work includes paid work, but also any work associated 
with the public sphere such as tending far away fields and staple crops, raising communal houses, 
transporting goods, heavy lifting, driving, politicking, and negotiation between families. This is common 
in rural areas in developing countries. The gender division of labour is normative, rather than actual, 
because in Timor-Leste women regularly perform “public” work (see Grenfell et al. 2009, Grenfell et al. 2015 
for a description of the gendered division of labour in Timor-Leste and ). 
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ultimately harmful to women. In societies using brideprice, women’s socially 
constructed role in reproduction and as the lynchpin of kinship systems means 
that women’s fecundity is at once both “repressed and revered” (Meillassoux 1975, 
78, Fishburne-Collier and Rosaldo 1981, 279). In the Timor case, this manifests in 
what some anthropologists have termed a “maternal religion”, which places 
fertility at the centre of ritual (Hicks 1990, 2004, 2012, Silva and Simião 2012). Some 
scholars have thus advocated a “return” to woman-centred religion or 
matrifocality, which would be more culturally legitimate than imposing “Western” 
gender mainstreaming (Trindade 2008). But the valorisation of women’s role in 
reproduction reduces women’s value to a function of their fertility—as a function 
of their biology—to the exclusion of other features (Cockburn 2013, 437). 
Moreover, and like many human societies, although Timorese women are 
celebrated as the source of life, menstruation and birth is considered polluting, 
dangerous and taints women by association (Nguyen 2015, 26-8).  Thus, a feminist 
approach shows that woman-centred “matrifocality”—worship of women’s 
fecundity—does not lead to female authority or an increase in women’s ability to 
control material resources. An emphasis on motherhood complements rather than 
contradicts the ideology of male authority because men’s power lies in the more 
important material world, whereas women have a sacred place in the spiritual 
world (Niner 2012, Fishburne-Collier and Rosaldo 1981). The disjuncture between 
dogma and practice arises because cultural gender notions rarely reflect actual 
male-female relations (Ortner and Whitehead 1980, 10).  
2.6.3 War, Militarised Conflict and Violence 
As True emphasises in her feminist political economy of violence against women, 
there are  linkages between different forms of violence against women and the 
structures of the gender division of labour, war and conflict and neoliberal 
globalisation (True 2012). In the case of gender intervention in Timor-Leste, a 
feminist political economy approach needs to encompass war and militarised 
conflict. War and militarised conflict in Timor formed social classes and 
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constituted certain social forces. These social forces’ interests were served by an 
ideology celebrating of armed masculinity, which was thus used to shape the 
relationships between state and society. In the post-conflict period, social forces 
constituted during war have captured the bulk state resources, at the same time as 
constraining most women’s access to state and household resources. Secondly and 
relatedly, the lack of access to resources sets the conditions for continued high 
levels of sexual and gender-based violence. 
Violence against Women (VAW) “is rooted in gendered social structures rather 
than individual and random acts; it cuts across age, socio-economic, educational 
and geographic boundaries” (UNWomen 2013). These structures, as I explained 
above, are historically-specific. 19  Sexual and gender-based violence are more 
prevalent during conflicts because of the greater availability means of violence 
(especially arms), ideologies that celebrate armed masculinity and men’s 
entitlement to sex, and rape as a weapon of war. In these respects, war and 
militarised conflict shape social relations in gender retrogressive directions 
(Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2016).   
FPE approaches, because of their focus on material relations, have tended to see 
violence against women as “epiphenomenal, derivative of another more major 
social process at work such as war or capitalism” whereas VAW possesses its own 
logic in materially unequal gender relations (True 2010, 44). This is not the 
approach taken here. Rather, a feminist structural political economy approach can 
help explain how material relations, the state, ideology and the gender division of 
labour and kinship and their distributional outcomes set the conditions for high 
                                                 
19 I use the UN definition of Violence Against Women as: “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or 
is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life”  (UNWomen 
2013). Until relatively recently, women’s experiences of intimate partner violence were dismissed by turns 
as exceptional or normal.  In the 1980s, new research on prevalence established how pervasive, multifarious 
and extensive VAW was (Kelly 2005, 475). In the 1990s, following successful lobbying by anti-VAW activists 
armed with new data and a new strategy to make “women’s rights, human rights”, the study of VAW moved 
from margin to mainstream in the academy (Kelly 2005, 475). Networking and coalition-building by 
activists on a single anti-VAW message generated support and resources for the anti-VAW movement and 
has been a “wellspring” for much feminist activism (Kelly 2005, 475).  
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rates of violence against women. For example, there is a relationship between 
women’s lack of access to productive resources, and men’s control over these 
resources and violence against women (True 2010, 39).  
Moving to the Timor-Leste case, the ideology of male authority manifests during 
and after war in what True terms the “celebration of armed masculinity” (True 
2012). This celebration of armed masculinity helps explain the nature of outcomes 
of gender interventions in Timor-Leste. To take a step back: patriarchal systems 
devalue femininity vis-à-vis masculinity, regardless of the content or substance of 
that masculinity (Hutchings 2008). Although the content of masculinity varies 
according to time, place and power relations, masculinity is always valued more 
than femininity (Hutchings 2008). Both the content and relational values of 
masculinities require empirical analysis and explication in any study of gender 
relations. Hegemonic masculinity is a term developed by Connell to describe how, 
although all men benefit from patriarchal dividends, not all men benefit equally 
because of the intersection of class status with gender, for instance (Connell 2005). 
The ideological valorisation of an ideal type of hegemonic masculinity reinforces 
certain men’s disproportional benefits from social and gender orders. Militaries 
are institutions of hegemonic masculinity which perform the rhetorical work of 
constructing the importance of men and their place dominating military 
institutions (Kronsell 2006, 108). In militaries, armed masculinity is the norm, and 
its dominance is part-and-parcel of militarisation, the “step-by-step process by 
which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes 
to depend on for its well-being on militaristic ideas” (Enloe 2000, 3). As I show in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the celebration of armed masculinity has a damaging effect on 
gender justice. For one thing, guns are a source of masculine identity “linked with 
power and subordination” and that maintains the socially constructed associations 
of men with war and guns (True 2012, 45).  
The ideologies of male authority and armed masculinity hold “hierarchical 
political, economic orders together at every level” (True 2015, 421). The valorisation 
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of armed masculinity justifies socio-political orders. For example, even prior to the 
Indonesian invasion, Timorese elite classes were militarised, that is, because elites 
were themselves members of the military, they became dependent upon the 
military for resources, and motivated by militaristic ideas (Enloe 2000, 3). The 
celebration of armed masculinity was characteristic of the Timorese elite, yet in 
the post-conflict era, this celebration has also extended into wider society through 
the valorisation of veterans. In another example, the ideology celebrating armed 
masculinity was also crucial to Indonesian rule, holding together the New Order. 
In particular, violence against East Timorese justified the Indonesian military’s 
dominant role in the Indonesian state (Anderson 1993). Indonesia’s war in Timor 
“gave an aura of unity and heroic purpose to an organisation that otherwise may 
have appeared bloated and fat” to the Indonesian public (Hughes 2009, 38). At the 
individual level, promotion in the Indonesian military was often tied to an 
individual’s facility with violence in Timor (Anderson 1993). 
War and militarisation often create the conditions for high levels of VAW which 
gender interventions seek to reduce. When we refocus attention away from the 
security of the state to the insecurity of women, we can see structural continuities 
between domestic violence, structural violence of poverty and deprivation and 
sexual and gender-based violence (True 2012, 4). Thus, the division between public 
war and private violence is a gendered one. War and VAW are not separate but 
exist on a continuum of violence (True 2010, 38).  In the post-conflict period, VAW 
can continue or increase (True 2014b). For example, in Timor-Leste, domestic 
violence has not decreased, although incidences of violence committed by an 
unknown perpetrator have (Hynes et al. 2004). Indeed estimates of the prevalence 
of VAW have increased, but this could be because of better translations and 
measurements of VAW. During war, male war deaths can exceed female deaths, 
but in post-conflict contexts, numbers of women dying from war-related food, 
health, and personal insecurity can increase (Ormhaug, Meier, and Hernes 2009). 
Thus, feminists define post-war security as comprising not just the cessation of 
public fighting between men, but also the satisfaction of human needs including 
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the safety of women in their homes (Cockburn 2013). Thus, VAW is a factor 
necessary to explain the uneven outcomes of peacebuilding. In sum, war and 
militarisation shape institutions and social classes, which in turn genders 
distributional outcomes. Post-conflict reconstruction does not prioritise women, 
even though protection of women (from the violence of the enemy) often justifies 
war or military intervention (Young 2003, 146, True 2012).  
Further, the use of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a military strategy 
to secure political and economic power and resources affects outcomes in gender 
interventions. Wartime SGBV committed by belligerent forces can “taint” female 
victims, and exclude them from communities and resources (True 2012, 127). 
Victims of wartime SGBV perpetrated by the “good guys” are often not counted or 
reported (True 2012, 127). This can normalise non-reporting of sexual violence that 
occurs within families and communities and contribute to a culture of impunity 
for perpetrators that create the conditions for the continuation of high levels of 
SGBV (True 2012, 127, Meger 2015, 417).  
Methodologically, accounting for uneven outcomes of gender intervention 
involved problematizing “taken for granted” or common-sense ideologies such as 
the valorisation of male authority, militarisation, or matrifocality (Ackerly, Stern, 
and True 2006, Kronsell 2006). Interrogating how the ideology of male authority 
or matrifocality is relational, meaningful and practised was part of my feminist 
normative approach (Robinson 2006).  I concentrated on eliciting ideas, facts and 
relationships related to gender justice and redistribution during my participant 
observation and large numbers of semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
with various sectors of Timorese society (see Table 1.3). I also applied a feminist 
political economy approach to the interrogation of anthropological material. 
Herein, I examined the disjuncture between matrifocal rhetoric on women’s value 
in motherhood, fertility, and birth, and the lack of control and access to resources 
experienced by women in practice (Fishburne-Collier and Rosaldo 1981, Reinharz 
and Davidman 1992). 
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2.6.4 Kinship  
Kinship is another key site producing gender relations and social inequality in the 
case of Timor-Leste and thus requires elaboration in my structural FPE approach. 
In particular, determining who benefits from kinship relations can help explain 
high levels of VAW, the entrenchment of harmful practices, and gaps between 
gender interventions’ aims and outcomes. Moreover, kinship plays a key role in 
class formation, most notably in the current climate through the mechanism of 
brideprice. This contention—that kinship organises social relations—is in line 
with feminist critiques of anthropological studies of kinship (Peletz 1995). In this 
vein, I apply Fishburne-Collier’s argument that paying brideprice in exchange for 
women causes social inequality, particularly in creating and reproducing ranks, 
(Fishburne-Collier 1988, 145). Rank is a specific anthropological term used to 
describe kin-based lineages with subordinate and superordinate groups. The 
following section lays out the theoretical basis for the relationship between 
kinship, gender relations, and class formation.  
At a basic level, all kinship systems prohibit some sexual relations and prefer 
others. The wide variations in preferences and prohibitions of sexual relations 
illustrate that kinship is not biologically determined but a “normative” code of laws 
and morals for sex and marriage (Rubin 1975, 169, Meillassoux 1975, 11). The 
centrality of marriage in patrilineal kinship systems led early theorists such as Levi-
Strauss to describe these systems as being based chiefly on “the exchange of 
women”. The exchange of women is an exchange of “sexual access, genealogical 
structures, lineage names and ancestors, rights and people—men women and 
children—in concrete systems of social relationships" (Rubin 1975, 177). Rubin 
argues the exchange of women is “made up of and reproduces, concrete forms of 
socially-organised” gender relations (Rubin 1975, 169). Anthropologists 
convincingly argued that, in kinship based societies, “marriage, as the basis of 
kinship, organises social inequality” (Fishburne-Collier 1988, vii, Meillassoux 1975). 
To put it another way: marriage is the basis of kinship, and kinship organises social 
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relations. In this sense, control over marriage is control over political power 
(Meillassoux 1975, 45).  
At the same time, the intersection of kinship with political power is not 
anachronistic in the Timor case. Classes and centralised states have existed  in 
Timor-Leste. However, kinship is productive of and produced by contemporary 
capitalist relations. Kinship remains crucial in many areas of Timorese social and 
political life, but intersects with electoral politics, cash, the finance market, the 
state, and social classes. The mutual constitution of kinship and access to political 
power in the Timor case is not unexpected because kinship systems are socially 
constructed and thus shaped by historical and material conditions (Meillassoux 
1975, 3). Indeed, the politicisation of kin groups is a significant part of class 
formation (Meillassoux 1975, Peletz 1995, 355) and state formation (Musisi 1991). 
Indeed, Chapter 3 describes the historical politicisation of Timorese kin groups, 
wherein male lineage heads leveraged militarisation, slavery, and gender relations 
to control resources and form the currently dominant Liurai-Dato class.  
Turning now to the contemporary period, one crucial way kinship and capital are 
mutually constitutive is through brideprice. Brideprice is a significant part of the 
Timorese political economy, requiring definition and explication. Brideprice is a 
form of marriage payment and refers to the valuables that the bride’s family 
receives from the groom’s family before, during and after marriage (see Table 6.1). 
In Timor-Leste, the exchange of women for a marriage payment is a “brideprice” 
because it is asymmetric, that is, net assets move from the groom’s family to bride’s 
family in exchange for the bride. Timor is not unique; marriage payments feature 
in many societies today. Brideprice is common in Africa, the Pacific, Central Asia, 
East Asia and Southeast Asia (Hudson 2016). Dowry (net assets move from the 
bride’s family to the groom/groom’s family) is regularly practised in South Asia 
and was common in Europe. Of all of the marriage payments, brideprice is the 
most widespread globally (Goody and Tambiah 1973, 51).  
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Brideprice and the exchange of women impact gender justice because they exclude 
women from political and economic benefits of their own circulation. Political 
authority and alliances that are created through brideprice have been the focus of 
anthropological work on Timor-Leste (McWilliam 2007, 2011, 2005, Hicks 2004, 
2013, 2015). Such work contained an implicit assumption that because the exchange 
of women is beneficial in creating and cementing alliances between patrilineages, 
it also confers benefits to women. It tended to minimise or overlook the gendered 
aspects and gender injustices in the exchange of women. However, gender analysis 
shows that women are the “conduit of a relationship, rather than the partner to it” 
and cannot “realise the benefits of their own circulation” (Rubin 1975, 174). Besides, 
after marriage a wife’s loyalties belong to her husband’s kin, her children belong 
to her husband’s kin, and she works on land belonging to her husband’s kin 
(Meillassoux 1975, 75-7). Most crucially to this study’s feminist political economy 
analysis, male family members, not women, receive and control brideprice. 
Women, thus, cannot realise the political or economic benefits of their circulation. 
The use of cash and buffalo to exchange women between groups of men has a 
negative outcome for women because “women become equivalent to livestock” 
(Meillassoux 1975, 72-74). 
2.6.5 Neoliberal Globalisation  
Gender interventions in Timor took place during second-generation neoliberal 
reforms. First generation neoliberal reforms were about minimising the role of the 
state in regulating markets, while second generation reforms are characterised by 
greater attention to the role of the “effective” state in harnessing social relations 
for the market and society (Rittich 2006, 210, Hameiri 2010). In particular, the 
regulation of economic transactions is prioritised, principally the protection of 
“property and other investors rights” (Rittich 2006, 210). Economic growth and 
social inclusion were not seen as exclusive but complementary (Rittich 2006, 210). 
Social inclusion was also to be effected through law, regulatory and institutional 
reform (Rittich 2006, 210).  
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Second generation neoliberalism has major implications for the conceptualisation 
of gender, and gender justice, in gender interventions. For instance, “growth with 
equity” combined poverty reduction with the economic inclusion of women 
(Hughes 2009, 52).  The economic inclusion of women was to be effected through 
financial inclusion, read, microfinance. Such approaches emphasising women’s 
agency in the market instrumentalise an ideology of empowerment, self-help and 
self-actualisation  (Jakimow 2009). Yet, market access and inclusion does little to 
overturn hierarchal social and gender relations (Goetz and Gupta 1996, Rankin 
2002, Ferguson 2010, Elyachar 2005).  
Critical peace scholars advocating for local approaches have overlooked the 
critiques of these kinds of “second generation” approaches to participatory 
development by scholars such as Cooke (2003) Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007) and 
Carroll (2010). Such approaches show how projects taking a “local approach” 
canstill  advocate liberal agendas “to harness the ambition of each and every 
individual in local resources, labour and markets” (Hughes, Öjendal, and 
Schierenbeck 2015, 819). In another relevant critique, Meagher argued hybrid 
governance resembles the sub-contracting of government services to private and 
informal spaces to reduce the size and responsibility of government that was 
prevalent during neoliberal policymaking of the 1980s and 1990s (Meagher 2012, 
8). In like manner, I argue that hybrid programming in local governance reform 
has also coincided with, in this case, the Timorese central government’s interest in 
“shedding expenditure responsibilities that exceed its fiscal capacity” (Cammack 
2004, 204). Reliance on legitimacy or capacity explanations for government’s use 
of local or hybrid approaches overlooks the shared interests governments can have 
in liberal approaches to spending and cost-saving, local and individualised, 
participatory development.  
Specifically, in the case of peacebuilding interventions in Timor-Leste, donors have 
been instrumental in promoting the use of microfinance for women’s economic 
empowerment. There are two aspects regarding microfinance and gender 
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intervention that necessitate the inclusion of neoliberal globalisation in my 
framework to evaluation gender interventions. First, this promotes new forms of 
gendered economic governance. Legal reform spearheaded by the World Bank’s 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), government and donor subsidies and 
national policymaking have been instrumental in shaping microfinance in Timor-
Leste, with troubling outcomes as I show in Chapters 7 and 8.  Second, in Timor-
Leste, microfinance is a part of a new and global “deep marketisation” of 
development, reaching beyond the state and institutionalising debt relations in 
the social sphere (Carroll 2015). In practice then, despite a focus on the social, and 
the idea the “institutions matter” in second generation reforms, international 
development agencies still saw “development as identical with economic growth”, 
only now “good governance” is seen as guaranteeing markets (Rittich 2006, 210).   
2.6.6 Implications of the Framework 
In this study, I operationalise True and Hughes’ theoretical insights on neoliberal 
globalisation in my methods and analysis of gender interventions (True 2012, 
Hughes 2015, 2012). First—and related with the gender division of labour—I 
concentrate on household work, budgets, who works, who is paid, and, crucially, 
who owes debts to whom (Guérin 2014). This indicates the kinds of economic and 
social stratification at the village and national level. Where possible, I try to 
connect labour and debts to historical relations of power, and to current gender 
relations. I look at class, gender and age stratification, and the reasons and 
ideologies accompanying them (see Appendix for a breakdown of class, gender and 
age of participants). Second, I analyse people’s explanations for the frequency, 
severity, causes, and solutions for violence against women in interviews and 
participant observation, using a feminist framework of analysis (Reinharz and 
Davidman 1992). Economic conditions and causes featured in these narratives 
warrant explanation. Third, I problematise the narrative of local versus 
international, or local versus neoliberal, in Timorese policymaking. By examining 
advocacy, opposition, contestation, and interests, I find groups are “involved in 
CRITICAL APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING AND GENDER  
67 
complex, tactical, multi-scalar alliances”, that cut across easy associations of 
peacebuilders with neoliberalism or local actors with an anti-liberal stance 
(Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello 2017, Hameiri and Jones 2017). Lastly, I coupled 
long exposure to village life of work and debts with an examination of the history 
of microfinance in Timor-Leste. Again, I go beyond the narratives of 
microfinance’s international introduction, locating its real history in the 
documents describing economic life in the Indonesian occupation, and in the Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia microfinance success story (Robinson 2004, Seibel and Ozaki 
2009).   
In like manner, operationalising a structural FPE approach methodologically 
involved analysing the post-conflict gendered distribution of state resources by 
comparing distributional outcomes for political coalitions, spending policies, 
veterans, victims of wartime violence, and vulnerable women in the community. I 
also relied on documentation of sexual and gender-based violence during the war, 
drawing out the relationships between sexual violence and material interests 
(CAVR 2006). Analysing government spending in the Timor-Leste case revealed 
the well-known trade-off between “military and social spending”, and the fact that 
increased military spending marginalises women (True 2012, 423).  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began by outlining differing explanations for the uneven outcomes of 
peacebuilding interventions more broadly and gender interventions specifically. 
These explanations have dominated both academic and practitioner work on 
peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. Many analyses of the uneven outcomes of 
peacebuilding intervention pointed to problems with interveners’ statebuilding 
that created institutions without legitimacy or capacity. One particular critique of 
the liberal peace, the “local turn”, emphasised the lack of authenticity or a clash or 
cultural paradigms between local and international. There are problems with an 
argument based on legitimacy. Firstly, an explanation for unevenness and failures 
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of intervention that is reliant on binaries between local or international, or hybrids 
of them, cannot explain the differential impact of intervention on different groups 
within a society. Some groups support, while others repel interventions, in 
accordance with their own interests and ideology. Coalitions of interests and 
struggles between them shape outcomes. Thus, scholars using the local turn suffer 
from a lack of attention to other relations of power within target societies 
especially gender and class. I proposed that these structural relations are the cause 
of uneven outcomes of gender intervention. Gender intervention in Timor-Leste 
is an example of how different social forces and groups, both local and 
international, support and challenge aspects of peacebuilding interventions. 
Again, feminist analyses of gender mainstreaming have been often less attentive 
to class factors shaping outcomes for international programming.  
The chapter outlined my analytical framework: structural feminist political 
economy. My approach starts from an analysis of gender relations including the 
gender division of labour and the ideology of male authority. The approach 
brought together True’s (2012) feminist political economy with the structural 
political economy of Hughes (2015), Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello (2017), 
Hughes (2015), Jones (2010). Accordingly, gender relations and social forces are 
seen as co-constitutive in my theoretical framework.  
I then made explicit my case for evaluating outcomes of gender intervention using 
the yardstick of gender justice, because gender justice encompasses political 
economy concerns with redistribution along gender and class lines. The gender 
division of labour is an important tool to analyse material relations between men 
and women. The gender division of labour results in inequalities in bargaining 
power between men and women within the household and these are subject to 
violent enforcement.  
An analysis of gender intervention in Timor-Leste must include how war and 
militarisation have shaped Timorese socio-political life. Specifically, it has been 
crucial in the interrelated process of class formation and accumulation through 
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material effects of war and the valorisation of armed masculinity. War and 
militarisation set the conditions for high levels of violence against women because 
of the availability of arms, cultures of impunity for perpetrators of sexual and 
gender-based violence and the securitisation of men and masculinity. Of particular 
relevance to my critique of the local turn, keeping the peace can lead to a “trade-
off” between military and social spending, with the effect of adding to women’s 
labour burdens.  
The structural feminist political economy framework then defined kinship’s dual 
role in gender relations and class formation, following Fishburne-Collier (1988) 
and Meillassoux (1975). Kinship is thus a necessary inclusion in a feminist 
structural political economy of Timor-Leste because of kinship’s enduring role in 
class formation and brideprice. An examination of kinship relations reveals how 
gender relations and class are co-constitutive. 
Neoliberal globalisation has been most apparent in “second generation” regulation 
of economic life in Timor-Leste. Some interveners have favoured access to markets 
as a solution to poverty, while others have advocated conditional cash transfers. 
Microfinance sets up a debt relation between poor women and international 
financial markets, while conditional cash can relegate more caring work to 
women’s sole responsibility. Nonetheless, these contemporary relations of debt 
and power are grounded in older processes of class formation and accumulation. 
It is to the development of historically-specific class and gender relations in Timor 





CHAPTER 3.  CLASS FORMATION: SLAVERY AND 
MILITARISATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter foregrounds the emergence and role of class formation in Timor-
Leste as it has impacted the outcomes of gender interventions. The Liurai-Dato 
class emerged out of the monopolisation of trade, slavery, plantation agriculture, 
bureaucratisation, and militarisation during Portuguese and Indonesian rule. The 
dominance of the Liurai-Dato class underpins and conditions state power in 
Timor-Leste. The Liurai-Dato class is demarcated and formed through kinship, as 
I explain in Chapter 6. In the contemporary period, the most successful members 
of the Liurai-Dato class have been able to leverage their high-born status into well-
paid political leadership, government or private sector jobs in Dili. Extended family 
members who are unable to break into these higher levels of the state remain in 
less prestigious functions such as village chiefs. Members of the Liurai-Dato class 
have shaped the emergence and use of institutions in line with their material 
interests and ideologies, including those institutions deployed in gender 
interventions. Uneven outcomes for gender interventions arise because the 
agendas and interests of economically and politically dominant Liurai-Dato class 
“diverge” from the goals of gender interventions (Jones 2010, 552). 
This chapter examines four historically specific social dynamics—class formation, 
slavery, militarisation, and gender relations—to show how the historical 
emergence of, and conflicts between, kin groups, underpin and condition the 
formation of classes. It first considers the role Portuguese trade, taxes, and 
institutions played in the formation and consolidation of the Liurai-Dato class 
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from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. In particular, it is 
argued the change from a patchwork of Portuguese-Timorese alliances and 
enmities to centralised bureaucratic rule incorporating Liurai and Dato resulted in 
greater vertical inequality between Timorese. Next, the chapter explains how 
Indonesian rule (1975-1999) continued the pattern of elite incorporation. The 
corollary of elite incorporation has been the subordination of other groups of 
Timorese as slaves, serfs, or bonded labourers. The subordination of such groups 
is of continuing relevance because of the kinship-mediated class system. Next, the 
chapter describes the militarisation of the Liurai-Dato class. This class came to 
depend on the military for its well-being during Portuguese and Indonesian rule. 
The penultimate section analyses the role of sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV). In the political economy of the Indonesian occupation, there was a 
continuum between unequal gender relations and conflict related SGBV that 
manifested in the use of rape as a weapon of war, sexual slavery, the exchange of 
women and polygyny. The final section briefly describes the emergence of the 
Timorese women’s movement within FRETILIN and the women’s wing of 
FRETILIN, the Popular Organisation of Timorese Women (Organização Popular 
Da Mulher Timorense, OPMT). The examination of the women’s movement in the 
context of militarisation and SGBV provides context for Chapter 4 on gender 
responsive budgeting, where conflicts over “heroes” and “victims” have produced 
a gendered distribution of state resources.   
3.2 The Emergence of the Liurai-Dato Class  
The dominant class of Timorese society comprises two overlapping groups that are 
demarcated by kinship—the Liurai (Tetun: King) and the Dato (Tetun: Noble).20 
Liurai lineages are “aristocratic”; considered the first settling or autochthonous 
family of any given area. Hence, Liurai lineages are the effective landowners, 
                                                 
20 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.vv. “Liurai”, which is, “King; Timorese native chief”. 
and “Dato”, which is, “native chief, nobleman; nobility, nobles”. Compare Dato with the Indonesian term 
“datu”, which is “title of headman”. Kamus Indonesia Inggris: An Indonesian-English Dictionary, Third 
Edition., s.v. “datu”. 
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determining other’s rights to land in the area (Hicks 1983, 51). Dato lineages are 
“noble” and lower status than Liurai lineages. Members of Liurai lineages usually 
marry endogamously; that is, they marry other Liurai or Dato.  In sum, the Liurai 
and Dato are respectively first and second ranked kin groups, linked by 
intermarriage, which together comprise a dominant class.21 In the contemporary 
period, like in the past, members of this class dominate subnational political and 
economic institutions. A smaller number of people of the Liurai-Dato class 
dominate Dili-based institutions, forming a recognisable political elite. It is to the 
formation of this class that I now turn.  
Between the sixteenth and late eighteenth century, Portuguese control of Timor 
was minimal (Kammen 2003, Gunn 1999). Portuguese traders were just one of 
many groups of merchants and missionaries in the eastern part of the Southeast 
Asian archipelago (Kammen 2003, Davidson 1994). Timor was part of the “informal 
Portuguese empire” rather than the formal Portuguese state (Andaya 2010).22 For 
this reason, the beneficiaries of the Timorese slave and sandalwood trades were 
maritime traders, corporations and the Catholic Church located in Goa and Macao, 
not Portugal. From the late eighteenth century, Portuguese state-sanctioned, and 
militarily supported, trade in slaves and sandalwood grew. The deepening 
mercantile connection with Portugal had consequences for social and political 
structures in Timor. 
Timor-Leste’s exclave of Oecusse (see the map in Figure 1.1) is a good illustration 
of how trade and military alliances with the Portuguese in this context of growing 
mercantile connection, was the catalyst for the formation of the Liurai-Dato class. 
The stepping off point was the conversion of the Liurai of Lifau in Oecusse to 
Catholicism in 1641 (Davidson 1994, 57). Subsequent conversion and intermarriage 
of local rulers, Liurai and Dato, resulted in more mixed—mestiço—people and 
                                                 
21 The specific relationship between kinship and class in Timor is explained in Chapters 5 and 6.  
22 The colonial empire was termed the Estado do India (Portuguese: The Indian State). Despite claiming Timor 
in 1515, Timor-Leste was not even named as a Portuguese overseas dominion until 1681 (Andaya 2010). 
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Portuguese speaking people in Oecusse, Flores and Solor, termed “Topasses” 
(Andaya 2010). 23  The Topasses sometimes held Portuguese administrative and 
military posts in Oecusse, but they were outside formal Portuguese control. For 
instance, the Topasses fought both the Portuguese and the Dutch for control over 
the lucrative sandalwood, slave, and coffee trades (Davidson 1994). The Topasses 
exacted tributes of slaves and sandalwood from their subjects and captured slaves 
and goods from enemy groups (Hägerdal 2012, 62). Later on, the  Topasses da Costa 
family blocked repeated attempts by the Portuguese to sell or trade the nominally 
Portuguese owned Oecusse exclave to the Dutch (Hicks 1983). They did so by 
making themselves indispensable to the Portuguese war with other groups by 
collecting taxes and supplying troops to the Portuguese during trade wars with the 
Dutch (Yoder 2016, Hägerdal 2012). These patterns of incorporation, allegiance, 
and enmity occurred across Timor and helped shape the patterns of districts seen 
today in the map in Figure 3.1 below.24
                                                 
23 Mestiço is a mixed ethnicity person. In Timor, in general, mestiço families can include two or more of the 
following ethnic backgrounds: Timorese, Portuguese, Mozambican, Angolan, Brazilian, Hakka Chinese, 
Macanese, Arab, Indonesian-Malay, or Dutch. Topasses is likely derived from topi (Indonesian: hat). 
Topasses were also commonly called “Black Portuguese” (Hägerdal 2012). 




Figure 3.1 Map of Timor-Leste 
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The situation changed from the 1850s, as the plantation economy using coffee 
began to replace sandalwood and slaves. During this period, the Portuguese 
subjected the forty-nine Liurai on the eastern half of Timor to a twenty percent 
levy on coffee production. As the economy shifted to plantation coffee in the late 
nineteenth century, the nascent Liurai-Dato class gained access to new resources. 
Liurai benefitted from coffee wealth because it allowed them to buy “more 
weapons and gunpowder, to raise more buffalo, stage more feasts, marry more 
wives, wage more wars, plunder enemy settlements and accumulate more human 
heads and slaves” (Shepherd and McWilliam 2013, 331). Those Liurai not growing 
coffee had to pay ten percent of their rice harvest (Gunn 1999, 160). In practice, 
however, most Liurai paid irregularly. More importantly, under the new 
Portuguese tax system, Liurai were prohibited from levying their own taxes and 
tributes, as they had formerly, which marked their incorporation into the colonial 
systems. The prohibition led to violent resistance by the Liurai (Davidson 1994). 
The twenty percent coffee levy chafed, and there were seven major tax rebellions 
between 1860 and 1915 (Davidson 1994). For example, in 1911 tax increases resulted 
in Liurai Dom Boaventura leading a rebellion of disaffected Liurai in Manufahi. 
The Manufahi rebellion was defeated by a coalition of Portuguese and enemy 
Timorese Liurai. 
Notwithstanding the rise and fall of individual fortunes, the relationship between 
Liurai/Dato and commoners remained asymmetric. After the Manufahi rebellion 
in 1911-12, Liurai kingdoms were divided into smaller units called Suco all over 
Portuguese Timor.25 Liurai who had revolted against the Portuguese were replaced 
by “individual Liurai descendants and [Dato] totally loyal to the Portuguese” 
(Guterres 2006, 96). Loyal Liurai became heads of Portuguese administrative 
districts or Regulo, while others became lower ranked Village Chiefs back in their 
home village (Gunn 1999, 246-7, Kammen 2017, 135). The line between the two 
                                                 
25 The word suco  is a Portuguese rendering of suku. Suku in modern Indonesian means “extended family, 
ethnic group, or tribe”. Kamus Indonesia Inggris: An Indonesian-English Dictionary, Third Edition., s.v. 
“suku”. Three spellings exist today in Tetun: suku, suko, suco and it generally signifies the collection of 
hamlets comprising a spread out “village”. In this study, suku is translated as “village” throughout.  
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ranks of aristocratic Liurai and noble Dato became blurred (Hicks 1983, 23). More 
broadly, although some individual Liurai lost power, the colonial administrators 
realised the usefulness of “maintaining the façade of indigenous political 
figureheads in the service of the colonial state [. …] The result was a highly 
dependent neo-traditional revival of dynastic rule” (Kammen 2016, 102). Class 
structure in Timor, as a result, was pyramid-like. Privileged classes of European, 
Mestiço, Chinese, and “assimilated” Liurai and Dato numbered around 7,000 
people, while peasants, slaves and serfs numbered around 435,000 people (Jolliffe 
1978, 42). Mestiço families were comprised of Liurai and Dato families who married 
or became the intimate partners of Europeans, Chinese or other outsider peoples. 
Kammen describes what I take to be a typical example of Liurai-Dato intermarriage 
with Europeans: One of the Portuguese Governor’s sons was sent to manage his 
father’s coffee plantations in Ermera and he settled in the district of Maubara, 
where he took a daughter of a local Dato family, Madalena Lo Bete, as his mistress 
(Kammen 2016, 104).  
Most crucially to the argument of this chapter, after 1912, taxes were fundamental 
to the formation and dominance of the Liurai-Dato class because commoners were 
forced to provide goods and labour to Liurai and Dato  who passed the taxes on to 
the Portuguese in a system of indirect rule. Despite the imposition of levies by the 
Portuguese, their role in administering and controlling who paid taxes was crucial 
to developing Liurai and Dato wealth and power within the Portuguese colonial 
state. During their reorganisation of the state after the Manufahi wars of 1912, 
Portuguese introduced a “capitacão” (Portuguese: head tax). The capitacão was a 
direct and monetised taxation system to replace the twenty percent levy on coffee 
production. The head tax was equivalent to around four month’s labour, and 
people absconding from cash payment, or payment of labour in lieu of cash, were 
jailed (Gunn 1999, 211-12). Liurai and Xefe Suku (Tetun: Village Chief) were not only 
exempt from the head tax but also entitled to a twelfth of the corvée labour 
extracted through the head tax (Davidson 1994). The labour burdens were 
considerable and inescapable:  “individuals unable to pay the head tax were forced 
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to work as auxiliar (Portuguese: auxiliaries), some allocated to civil servants and 
traditional chiefs as domestic servants” (Kammen 2003, 76). Others were 
compelled to labour on plantations and roads (corvée labour)(Kammen 2003, 76). 
Brutal physical punishments during this corvée labour were the norm and meted 
out by higher ranked Timorese (Jolliffe 1978, 48).  
In the same period of reorganisation after the Manufahi war, the Portuguese 
incorporated Liurai and Dato into a bureaucratic system, systematising vertical 
inequality between Timorese, as shown in Table 3.1. Of note, the Portuguese 
appointed new administrators for the head tax—Village Chiefs who were from 
either the aristocratic Liurai or noble Dato lineages (Hicks 1983, 23). The position 
of Village Chief was inherited, but the individual from the right family had to be 
elected by “consensus” (Hicks 1983, 23). Candidates had to be male, moderately 
fluent in Portuguese, and Christian. It is important to realise that the Village Chief 
was elected by only a quarter of the population of one village—the male members 
of aristocratic and noble lineages (Hicks 1983, 23). In those middle levels of the 
racialised colonial bureaucracy Timorese had access to, the Liurai and Dato 
dominated all of the available paid employment available, such as the new 
subnational administration role, Xefe Postu (Tetun: Chief of the Post) (Kammen 
2016, Hicks 1983). Likewise, in the military, Liurai automatically became 
commissioned as officers whereas the lower ranked Dato did not automatically 
gain officer status (Hicks 1983).  
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Table 3.1 Rank Continuity During the Portuguese Period, 1850-1975 
These class structures translated into the parameters of a new Timorese political 
elite in the capital, Dili. The Dili-based members of the Liurai-Dato class had more 
wealth and power than those Liurai and Dato outside of Dili. In the early 1970s, 
educated youth from Mestiço and Liurai families working in the civil service, the 
military, or the press, formed a recognisable intelligentsia in Dili. 27  However, 
events in Portugal soon overtook them. In 1974, the military coup against the 
fascist Salazar-Caetano regime in Lisbon precipitated the decolonisation of Timor 
(United Nations 1976, Jolliffe 1978, 49). The Timorese intelligentsia responded by 
forming political parties to prepare for independence (Jolliffe 1978). 28 
Unsurprisingly, political party leaders were from aristocratic Liurai families (Hicks 
1983, 8, Guterres 2006). FRETILIN, formed in 1974, was the leftist party of 
                                                 
26 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.v. “reino” meaning “kingdom, realm; tribe; subjects; 
commoners; people”.  
27 In the 1960s, with the granting of Portuguese citizenship to Timorese, Portugal expanded education for 
children of Liurai and Dato in Catholic seminaries. These were the only literate Timorese. For a discussion 
of the influence of the Church education on the formation of this intelligentsia see Carey (1999). 
28 For an overview of the political parties in 1975 see Gunn (2011, 1999), and Dunn (2003). 
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independence that went on to lead the resistance against the Indonesian military 
for decades. FRETILIN’s founding members Xavier do Amaral, Nicolau Lobato, 
Rosa Bonaparte, Justino Mota and Xanana Gusmão were from Liurai families, while 
Mari Alkatiri, Jose-Ramos-Horta were from Liurai / Mestiço families.29 Similarly, 
in the rival Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), founding member, Francisco 
Lopes da Cruz, was the son of a Liurai, while members Domingos de Oliveira and 
the brothers Mario Carrascalão, João Carrascalão were from a Mestiço family.30 
Other prominent UDT members came from the Catholic Church, the Portuguese 
administration, or from the Hakka-Chinese business community (Gunn 2011). 
Likewise, the founder of the pro-Indonesian integration party APODETI, José 
Abilio Osorio Soares, was from a Liurai family (Bovensiepen 2014a). 
3.2.1 Timorese Elites in the Indonesian Occupation 1975-1999 
Fearing that left-leaning FRETILIN party would seize power and proclaim 
independence on FRETILIN’s terms, the rival political party UDT, backed by the 
police, staged a coup on the 11th of August 1974. UDT was a conservative party 
advocating a slow decolonisation process, continued links with Portugal, and 
maintaining the power of the Liurai (Jolliffe 1978, Gunn 1999). Because UDT were 
conservative, they feared the social changes that FRETILIN promised with their 
revolutionary program. After the coup, UDT called for the imprisonment of all 
FRETILIN members. The subsequent civil war between FRETILIN and UDT was 
violent, with numerous atrocities committed on both sides (CAVR 2006). 31 
                                                 
29 FRETILIN began in 1974 as the Associação Social-Democratica Timorense (ASDT), or Timorese Social 
Democratic Association. Other leaders of the 1975 generation from Liurai families included: Vicente Sahe, 
member of the FRETILIN Central Committee, and son of the Liurai of Bucoli; Borja da Costa, member of 
the FRETILIN Central Committee, and son of the Liurai of Same (Guterres 2006). 
30 Mario and João Carrascalão were sons of a wealthy coffee plantation owner, and Domingos de Oliviera was 
a member of the military administered customs office and his family had coffee interests. Mario Carrascalão 
(d. 2017) was a member of the fascist National Union party of Salazar/Caetano Portugal (United Nations 
1976). 
31 This chapter relies heavily on the work of the CAVR the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação 
(the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation). CAVR was a UN initiated Commission, “tasked 
by the government of East Timor with “establishing the truth regarding past human rights violations” and 
presenting “factual and objective information”’ to determine whether and what kind of pattern of abuses 
of human rights took place (Roosa 2007, 569-570). 
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FRETILIN, backed by the army, defeated UDT and declared independence on the 
28th of November 1975 (Nygaard-Christensen 2012). At the same time, Indonesian 
and Timorese troops skirmished on the border. 
Using the UDT-FRETILIN fighting as a pretext, and with the backing of the USA 
and Australia, the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) invaded Timor on the 7th of 
December 1975 (US Embassy Jakarta 1975). Indonesia and its allies justified the 
invasion by citing FRETILIN’s socialism. Left wing politics had been brutally 
suppressed in Suharto’s 1965 takeover, and hatred of leftist FRETILIN propelled 
and vindicated the invasion of Timor-Leste. The invasion was brutal. Tens of 
thousands of Timorese were killed (Jolliffe 1978, 277-9, CAVR 2006). Many 
Timorese evacuated Dili for the mountains where they held out against the 
invasion. In districts close to Indonesian West Timor, the resistance was mostly 
defeated by 1977. In contrast, the central mountains and east of the island 
remained under FRETILIN control until the ABRI offensive of December 1978 
crushed the last open resistance (CAVR 2006).32 During this period, many Liurai 
and Dato who had previously been suspicious of FRETILIN and who had supported 
one of the other parties lent their support to the anti-Indonesian forces under 
FRETILIN, despite FRETILIN being an ostensibly Marxist party, committed to 
ending social hierarchies. 
The 25-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor was brutal and coercive, but 
incorporation of the Liurai-Dato class was part of the occupation’s political 
strategy of “working with and through the local population” (Jones 2010, 255). 
Administratively, the Suku or villages of the Portuguese period became Desa 
(Indonesian: village) (Yoder 2005, n189). 33  In terms of personnel, initially 
Indonesian military men filled high level positions within the bureaucracy, civil 
service and the military posts such as Bupati (Indonesian: District Administrator) 
                                                 
32 Interview with the daughter of a Village Chief, a young girl at the time of the invasion, ET158-2011, Dili, 7 
July 2011. 
33 Yoder (2005), for example, states that the 18 Suku listed in 1952 in Oecusse became the 18 Desa under 
Indonesian administration  
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and Camat (Indonesian: Sub-District Administrator), but they were later replaced 
with Timorese men (CAVR 2006, Hill 2001). As the former Timorese District 
Administrator of the eastern district Lautem, recalled: 
Public servants from the Portuguese-era were immediately appointed. 
Those of us who came down [from the hills] early and had been public 
servants were immediately appointed, whether FRETILIN, APODETI or 
UDT… just appoint him (CAVR 2006, 46). 
The District Administrator’s statement reveals the continuity of institutional 
personnel. There was a pattern of elite integration throughout Timor where, “an 
effort was made to select individuals from the old noble families to fill these 
positions” (Kammen 2016, 136).34 A significant number of Liurai and Dato were 
thus able to retain their privilege over commoners by becoming part of the 
Indonesian bureaucracy.  
                                                 
34 Estimates suggest that from 1975-1999, up to one quarter (250,000) of all Timorese people were killed as a 
result of  fighting, deliberate famine, or in concentration camps (CAVR 2006). 
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35 Source on territorial command structure: Kammen (1999) 
36 Militia leaders and pro-Integration officials were still drawn from the Liurai-Dato class 
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Like the Portuguese colonial government, the Indonesian government distributed 
material benefits to Timorese who cooperated. In Dili, high-level bureaucrats were 
rewarded for supporting Indonesian rule, such as the former manager of the 
Portuguese Banco Naçional Ultramarino (BNU), who grew wealthy managing 
coffee plantations for the Indonesian military-backed PT Denok (Budiardjo and 
Liong 1984, 100).37 In a similar example, the wealthy Carrascalão family won back 
their coffee plantations in the 1980s. Individuals from that family often held 
prominent leadership positions within the Indonesian government (Budiardjo and 
Liong 1984, 100). Away from Dili, district and sub-district administrators and 
village chiefs gained material benefits such as “cash incomes” and access to 
resources through “petty corruption” and extortion or exploitation of other 
Timorese (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 100). The Indonesian military rewarded 
supporters with government jobs and material benefits, creating a state-dependent 
elite, with several thousand of Timorese on the payroll.38  
Despite the efforts at incorporation, Indonesian military rule alienated some 
members of the Liurai-Dato class, propelling them to join the resistance. In 
Maubara, for instance, the Indonesian military and their associates took coffee 
plantations from some elite families and sidelined them from political office, while 
non-Liurai families who had backed the pro-Indonesian party APODETI were 
given posts in the administration (Kammen 2016, 136). An Indonesian intelligence 
report from 1982 similarly suggested that some elites felt their social inferiors had 
usurped their positions:  
Some of the GPK leaders [FALINTIL/FRETILIN leaders] are Liurai or 
the offspring of Liurai. 39  Some traditional leaders were replaced as 
leaders of tribes because of the upheavals, and new leaders were 
appointed by Operation commanders. Some of these traditional leaders 
feel very resentful because they have lost their wealth and now find 
                                                 
37 PT Denok’s role in the occupation is described in Chapter 7.  
38  For example, the Liurai Gaspar Nunes who supported UDT, was appointed speaker of the provincial 
legislature (Kammen 2016, 135). One of my interviewees, now bounced back down to Village Chief, had 
been a member of the DPR-D during the 1990s. Interview with Village Chief ET104, Oecusse, 30 July 2015. 
39 GPK is Gerakan pengacau keamanan (Indonesian: Security disturbance movement).  
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themselves in positions of disadvantage and moreover being led by 
people who are not the descendants of Liurai.40 
The Indonesian military document does show that the occupying forces 
considered control over disenfranchised elites sidelined by the invasion to be 
crucial to the occupying forces. Timorese elites in the administration were 
constantly under watch; Table 3.2 shows the Indonesian military territorial 
command, which paralleled each administrative level. Parallel military commands 
had authority over all Timorese, whether Liurai, Dato or commoner.41 Intelligence 
operatives monitored Timorese village chiefs, district and subdistrict 
administrators for their loyalty constantly (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 102). 
Within the FRETILIN-led resistance, there was an internal struggle regarding 
whether to reform, relinquish, or reject, the superior class status of Liurai. In one 
camp was a centre nationalist group that supported retaining Liurai leadership. 
This group dominated FRETILIN before the Indonesian invasion. In a revealing 
example, in the first and only district level elections organised by FRETILIN in July 
1975, Timorese were forced to elect members of the Liurai class to the constituent 
assembly because Liurai were “competent” (Gunn 2011, 93). After the invasion, in 
areas under FRETILIN control, some Liurai and Dato members re-imposed “feudal 
relations”, “demanding that the masses give them the respect they had experienced 
when they were Portuguese civil servants” (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 58). The 
tension between the Liurai-Dato class and commoners manifested in criticism of 
centrist FRETILIN President Xavier do Amaral’s “feudalistic attitudes and 
insistence upon a comfortable lifestyle” in FRETILIN’s mountain bases (Budiardjo 
and Liong 1984, 59). Do Amaral was deposed as FRETILIN president in 1977 
                                                 
40 Source: Established Procedure (Protap) on Intelligence no. 01/IV/1982 cited in Budiardjo and Liong (1984, 
194). 
41 The “dual structure” of Indonesian civilian and military command was the same in the rest of New Order 
Indonesia (Turner 2005, Crouch 2007). 
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because of criticisms of his view that civilians return to the villages from the 
mountains.42  
In the other camp were FRETILIN radicals who campaigned against “tribalism, 
regionalism, arranged marriages and feudal servitude” (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 
59). This view is represented in the 1974 FRETILIN manifesto, which held 
Portuguese colonialism responsible for the “obsolete and anachronistic political 
and administrative structure” and aspired to be free of this colonisation and “other 
forms of domination and exploitation” (Jolliffe 1978, 328-30). For FRETILIN 
radicals, raising awareness of class divisions through  “conscientisation was crucial 
to social reform” (da Silva 2012). 43  FALINTIL commander Ular Rihi described how 
he came to recognise the presence and meaning of Timorese class hierarchy during 
the Indonesian occupation:44  
During the Portuguese times, I had been of the Liurai class; there was 
always the possibility of getting ordinença [ordnance—Tetun: military 
logistic support]. While we were going to school, they were carrying our 
provisions while we were riding the horses. During the war, we found 
ourselves in their position, carrying everything, performing manual labour 
so that we could put ourselves in their shoes. I began to learn what it was 
to be oppressed and to understand how wrong class oppression was (Rihi 
2009). 
Ular Rihi’s awareness of his class position came through manual work. The war 
between UDT and FRETILIN and infighting within FRETLIN made it clear that the 
superordination of the Liurai-Dato class generated conflicts within and between 
Timorese people (CAVR 2006). 
Even though radical members of FRETILIN challenged Liurai superordination, 
FRETLIN’s commitment to social reform diminished in the 1980s. Many radical 
                                                 
42 Much later, in 2008, do Amaral said he was deposed because he suggested that in the forests, FRETILIN  
members should look to “new ideas”, principally they should stop having children. Klaak Seminal, “Hau nee 
ema FRETILIN” (I am a FRETILIN person), 22 September 2008.  
43 “Conscientisation” is a term taken from the work of Brazilian education theorist, Paulo Freire and applied 
in Timor-Leste. For a description of the application of Freire’s theories of consciousness raising by 
FRETILIN during this period, see da Silva (2012). 
44 “Ular Rihi” was the nomme de guerre of FALINTIL Commander Virgílio dos Anjos. 
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leaders were killed during the war, while many Timorese elite families or family 
members survived as war refugees and exiles in Mozambique, Angola, Portugal, 
and Australia (Wise 2011). Some people living in exile were both members of the 
Liurai-Dato class and social conservatives. For example, during the civil war 
between UDT and FRETILIN, 90 percent of the Catholic nuns and priests, many of 
them from the Liurai-Dato class, left for Portugal (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 117).45 
More concretely, in 1984, the commitment to reforming the Timorese class system 
was sidelined when Xanana Gusmão led the FALINTIL guerrilla army in a  split 
from the political party FRETILIN to become a non-partisan armed force (Kammen 
2012). In the process, Gusmão established an umbrella nationalist organisation, 
CNRM (later also called CNRT, not to be confused with Gusmão’s post 2007 party 
CNRT), which included FRETILIN’s rivals from UDT. The reorganisaton resulted 
in a softening of the position of the radicals (Niner 2001, Kammen 2012). By the 
1990s, FRETILIN had shifted to a reformist and nationalist ideology. After 
independence, many Timorese from elite families returned to Timor, taking up 
positions of authority and influence in business, politics and development (Hughes 
2011, Wise 2011). 
During the Indonesian occupation, the political views, actions and allegiances of 
leaders were inconsistent and remain difficult to document. The presence of 
Timorese elites in Indonesian institutions of the state and military, the lack of 
records, and the defection and rehabilitation of guerrillas made it difficult for 
participants and observers alike “to keep track of who was involved in the 
independence struggle” (Hughes 2009, 44). To this day, who sacrificed themselves 
and who collaborated is highly contested (Kent 2016, Kent and Kinsella 2015, 
Rothschild 2017). Likewise, there are contested claims over who is a Liurai loos 
(Tetun: true Liurai), rather than merely installed as a Portuguese or Indonesian 
collaborator. These contestations are particularly fraught because Liurai lineages 
can claim a right to own land and to rule over others. Over time a recognisable 
                                                 
45  Interview with a Catholic Nun, currently in a leadership role who was exiled in Portugal during the 
Indonesian occupation. ET122, 18 August 2015 
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dominant class has formed, and despite contestations, occupation and 
incorporation, its dominance continues.  
3.2.2 Slavery’s Legacy 
Important to the formation of the Liurai-Dato class was the simultaneous 
historical development of slavery in Timor. Commercialised chattel slavery was an 
essential part of European trade in Timor, as it was in much of Southeast Asia. 
Slaves were the second most valuable export from the island, after sandalwood 
(Gunn 1999, 46, Kammen 2003). Traders could procure slaves year round, unlike 
the seasonal sandalwood. Timorese slaves could be enslaved directly by European 
traders, or more usually, enslaved by Liurai and Dato as a result of war or debt and 
then sold to European and Southeast Asian maritime traders (Andaya 2010, 406).  
Demand for slaves could be high. After the Dutch genocide of the Bandanese in 
1621, the Dutch needed new workers for nutmeg and mace plantations on Banda, 
and this fuelled the demand for Timorese slaves (Gunn 1999, 46). Later on, in the 
nineteenth century, demand for Timorese slaves, and other non-Javanese slaves 
intensified again because of the Dutch prohibition on selling Javanese slaves in 
Dutch-controlled ports (Kammen 2003).  
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Serbi48 was the term 
for Timorese women 
in sexual slavery in the 
Second World War 
A woman, without the right to 
refuse, is married on payment 
of money or in kind to her 
parents, guardian, or family49 
Table 3.3 Types of Unfree Labour in Timor during the Portuguese Period  
Within Timor there existed various forms of unfree labour—termed “traditional 
slavery” by scholars, although these forms blurred in practice (see Table 3.3).50 
                                                 
46 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.v. “ulun” which is “head” and s.v. “horis”, which is 
“living, alive”.  
47 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.v. “lutu-hum”, which is, “retainers of the Liurai, lit. 
“Dwellers at the bottom of the pale [wooden fence]”.  
48 Source: Matsuno and Oliviera (2016) 
49 Definition in this column are based on  Allain (2012, 277-79) 
50 Slavery exists where a slaveholder or his agent exerts personal and physical domination over the slave. It is 
based on ownership, and characterised by absolute power of slaveholder backed up by physical or 
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Hägerdal describes two kinds of terms that Timorese used historically for  slaves: 
lutu-hum (Tetun: personal retainer) who were bound to a master because of debts 
(hence bonded labour); and ulun-houris (Tetun: chattel slave) who were usually 
prisoners of war and their families, but could be sold (Hägerdal 2010, 33). There is 
no specific term for women in domestic slavery but I return to the issue of female 
slavery later in the chapter. Liurai could simply declare someone a slave for any 
number of crimes and take their property (Hägerdal 2010, 25). Moreover, if 
commoners failed to pay taxes or corvée labour to their social superiors, they could 
face death or enslavement. The line between bonded labour and slavery was 
slippery and indistinct. 
Although Portugal outlawed slavery in 1875, slavery in Timor-Leste continued until 
the 1950s (Kammen 2003, 78). Thus, Liurai and Dato and Portuguese colonists 
continued to use unfree labourers, long after the export of slaves was outlawed 
(Kammen 2003, 78). The Liurai and the Dato controlled and benefitted from the 
bodies and work of retainers, war-captives, and women in servile marriages long 
into the twentieth century. Hierarchies between master and slave could be 
extreme; one of da Silva’s interlocutors recalled in the last years of Portuguese rule 
in the 1960s seeing that when the “dead body of local Liurai was buried, his 
mattress was the human body of his human slave” (da Silva 2012, 115).51 Thus, slaves 
and serfs were at the bottom of the four-tier hierarchy of lineages: first the Liurai, 
then Dato, then commoners, and then slaves (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). More than 
half of the Timorese population were commoners, and subordinate to the Liurai-
Dato class (Jolliffe 1978, Hicks 1990). A much smaller number of Timorese were 
bound in servitude to the Liurai-Dato class or to colonial masters. Today, the 
generalised term for slave is atan (Tetun: slave; servant) although others are still 
in use.52 To be clear, “traditional slavery” of either serfs or chattel slaves no longer 
                                                 
psychological violence (Patterson 2012, 323). “Unfree labour” is a generic term to encompass chattel slavery, 
dependency, indenture,  domestic slavery in marriage and modern slavery (Hägerdal 2010, 20-1, Allain 2012). 
51 da Silva’s interlocutor was a member of FRETILIN who ran education programs in occupied East Timor  
52 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.v. “atan”. This practice of slaves being 
killed/committing suicide upon their master’s death was also observed in Sumba, a culturally similar area 
of Eastern Indonesia (Hoskins 2004, 107).  
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exists in Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, many people descended from the subordinate 
classes live in debt bondage to their social superiors, as I explain in Chapter 8, and 
servile marriages are not uncommon (Khan and Hyati 2012).53 Hence, legacies of 
traditional slavery, which was part of the hierarchy establishing class formation, 
continue to shape social relations. 
The widespread militia violence at the end of Indonesian occupation in 1998 was 
linked to social class. Militias had always been a crucial part of the Indonesian 
military’s strategy of using “Timorese to fight Timorese” (Wandelt 2007). Kammen, 
discussing militia violence during the lead up to Independence, argued that militia 
members were recruited from the “lumpenproletariat—preman (Indonesian: 
strongmen, gangsters), gamblers” and the unemployed (Kammen 2003, 82). To 
support this argument, Kammen documents a pattern of recruitment from among 
lower-ranked lineages (slave and peasant/commoner lineages) in certain districts. 
For instance, in Lautem, militia members were from the akanu lineages (Fataluku: 
slave) (Kammen 2003, 82). Similarly, in coffee growing areas of Ermera and Liquisa, 
militia members were the descendants of plantation bonded and indentured 
labourers (Kammen 2003, 82). Kammen’s two examples may indicate a wider 
pattern where militia members were the sons and grandsons of slaves and unfree 
labourers, although Timorese militia and pro-Indonesian party leaders were from 
the Liurai-Dato class. This resembled the pattern throughout Indonesia where 
preman were recruited from the underclass to do the violent work  of the state 
(Wandelt 2007, 143). 
Scholars of Timor-Leste’s contemporary society and politics mostly overlook the 
social ramifications of unfree labour in the forms of slavery, debt bondage, and 
servile marriage (cf. Kammen 2003). Instead, their studies focus on institutions of 
political leadership that are dominated by the Liurai-Dato class. Studies drawing 
on the local turn in peacebuilding typically argue the layering of the “modern” state 
                                                 
53 For a discussion on the problems of defining modern slavery see Patterson (2012). Patterson uses “traditional 
slavery” to refer to slavery when it occurs as a part of social hierarchies, such as the system I describe here.  
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institutions on top of “traditional” of village leadership is crucial to any analysis of 
the contemporary Timorese politics and society (Hohe 2002a, b, Fox 2008, 
Trindade 2008, Brown 2012b, Cummins and Leach 2012, Hicks 2013). But in doing 
so they ignore unfree labour and the power relations involved. “Traditional” social 
relations persist because Liurai or Dato status is almost a prerequisite for access to 
paid work, land, capital, welfare, education, political power, justice, ability to 
marry, and social position, as I show in Chapters 4 through 8. As I argue in this 
thesis, these very power relations shape the outcomes of gender interventions.  
3.3 Political Economies and Ideologies of Militarisation 
This section explains how social forces in Timor-Leste shape and are shaped by 
militarised political economies. As I earlier defined, militarisation is an 
incremental process whereby  an object or subject becomes dependent on the 
military or militaristic ideas (Enloe 2000, 3). In Timor, this process began after 
Portugal had lost the colony of Brazil in the late nineteenth century and its military 
officers sought new positions in Timor, Angola and Mozambique (Davidson 1994, 
6). Thus, an increasing number of army and navy officers were appointed as 
colonial governors in Timor. Consequently, the political status of Portuguese 
Timor changed from a “trading enclave” to a “permanent military outpost” 
(Davidson 1994, 6). Portuguese military governors, and their officers, gained jobs 
in the new colonial bureaucracy from which flowed material benefits such as land, 
plantations, and access to unfree Timorese productive and reproductive labour. 
Subsequently, the Liurai-Dato class came to associate themselves with and benefit 
from the military power of the Portuguese state. As explained above, Portuguese 
trade depended on fostering enmity between, and creating military and trade 
alliances with, different groups across Timor. Part of this involved the Portuguese 
granting military titles to Timorese rulers to cement relationships with the Liurai 
and Dato. In return for military rank, the Liurai and Dato gave the Portuguese 
“vows of loyalty, tribute and trade access, and a supply of labour for warfare and 
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other colonial tasks” (Yoder 2005). In turn, the Liurai and Dato benefitted from the 
military titles as a way to leverage “an external power to support their authority” 
(Davidson 1994, Araujo 1975). Military titles symbolised Timorese elites’ expanding 
control over organised violence and their access to Portuguese arms, wealth, and 
trade.  
During the nineteenth and twentieth century, the Liurai-Dato class progressively 
militarised in that the “well-being” of members of this class increasingly “depended 
on militaristic ideas” and it saw military ideas and institutions as valuable and 
normal (Enloe 2000, 3). Repeating an earlier pattern, Liurai who fought for the 
Portuguese were made lieutenants and colonels (Araujo 1975). As described above, 
after the Manufahi War the Portuguese reduced the size of kingdoms but 
importantly reformed the new districts into military commands (Guterres 2006, 
96). In addition, in the 1960s, Portuguese colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique 
resulted in the transfer of Portuguese military officers stationed in Timor to other 
posts abroad. Henceforth, Liurai and Dato Timorese replaced them, resulting in a 
“Timorisation” of all the layers of the military and the bureaucracy (Dunn 2003).  
During the Indonesian occupation, resources and power flowed to Timorese who 
supported the occupiers. Again, this distribution of material benefits to armed 
men, and military leaders, contributed to militarisation. On the one hand, 
Timorese men began to earn wages in the regular military and police forces. As a 
result, by 1998 there were 6,097 Timorese serving in the security sector in the 
province of East Timor: 5,510 in the Indonesian army and 569 in the Indonesian 
police (CAVR 2006). On the other hand, many Timorese fought alongside the 
military but were not included as regular security forces but as part of “civilian 
defence” called HANSIP. This was in line with the “total people’s defence” that 
applied to the whole of Indonesia and was a core military strategy and structure. 
Civilian defence members were, after a time, paid salaries by the Indonesian army 
(CAVR 2006, Chapter 4). After the 1980s, the strategy of using “Timorese to fight 
Timorese” grew more intense (Wandelt 2007, 123). Large numbers of HANSIP 
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members, auxiliaries (Indonesian: TBO Tenaga Bantuan Operasi) and unpaid 
militia troops were deployed as part of the Indonesian counter insurgency strategy 
of repression and welfare (CAVR 2006, Wandelt 2007). East Timorese militia who 
fought for integration with Indonesia, although not on the official military payroll, 
were rewarded with regular cash payments, as well as other material benefits 
including rice, vehicles, transport, fuel, office space, communications equipment, 
medical supplies and weapons (CAVR 2006, Annex 1).  
Militia leaders had overlapping roles in military and civilian government—and in 
illicit activities—in either case using their association with the military to attain 
wealth and power. High-ranking militia leaders made money from corruption and 
extortion (CAVR 2006). Crucially, the majority of Timorese militia leaders also 
held positions as government officials, village heads, and university vice 
chancellors (Tanter, Ball, and Van Klinken 2006, 74). These men’s roles as civil 
service employees blurred with their roles as military officers,  militia leaders, and 
regular soldiers (Tanter, Ball, and Van Klinken 2006, 74). At the end of the 
occupation in 1998-99, the real fear of losing benefits was a factor in driving a 
significant minority of Timorese civil servants to support the violent pro-
Indonesian militia (Tanter, Ball, and Van Klinken 2006).  
Militarisation in Timor had ideological facets as both Indonesian and Portuguese 
occupiers promoted an ideology 0f celebrated armed masculinity, which 
encouraged and justified the use of violence by state and non-state actors (Wilson 
2006, Scambary 2009b). Myrttinen argued that the dominant form of Timorese 
masculinity has been a type of “violent masculinity” that is  characterised by the 
“readiness to use violence” (Myrttinen 2005, 238). The Indonesian military fostered 
this readiness to use violence through martial institutions and rituals, using 
martial arts to “bring military values” to society at the same time as creating 
auxiliary state forces (Streicher 2011, Scambary 2009b). Specifically, the Indonesian 
government militarised Timorese youth in the 1980s and 1990s by promoting 
martial institutions such the scout movement (Indonesian: Pramuka), martial arts 
groups, and using student bodies’ in the “performance of nationalist rituals 
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through military-style ceremonies and events to celebrate national days” (CAVR 
2006, Chapter 4, Wandelt 2007). Martial institutions encouraged young boys to 
mimic the work of soldiers. Formally, young boys worked for soldiers as operations 
support (TBO Tenaga Bantuan Operasi) (CAVR 2006, Chapter 4). Most viscerally, 
in the lead up to the 1998-99 militia violence, the Indonesian military designed 
strange blood rituals for Timorese militias (Tanter, Ball, and Van Klinken 2006). 
The rituals, imitations of Timorese ceremonial animal sacrifices, aimed to unify 
and strengthen militia members and inspire them to violence. Thus, through 
rewards, institutions, and rituals, occupiers perpetuated an ideology that 
celebrated violence and armed men.  
Historically, the Timorese resistance, like the Indonesian military, also celebrated 
armed men. Weapons were synonymous with resistance: “being a male member of 
the FALINTIL almost always meant carrying and using arms” (Myrttinen 2005, 
240). Not only FALINTIL, but also the Clandestinos and the exiled diplomatic front 
of FRETILIN emphasised their nearness to weapons and armed men, and “treated 
FALINTIL as the vanguard of the liberation struggle” (Aditjondro 2000). The 
celebration of armed masculinity continued post-independence, for example, in 
government’s commemoration of armed men, including a ten-metre high statue 
of FRETILIN leader Nicolau Lobato carrying an assault rifle at the entrance to the 
Dili airport.  
Importantly, elite Timorese men are associated with the ideal of “armed 
masculinity” even when they were not necessarily armed. In other words, like all 
ideologies, the meanings, representations, and contents of “armed masculinity” are 
not reliably representative of the facts. At the end of Indonesian occupation, few 
armed men remained. Roll reports: “Indonesian intelligence reports filed in 1995 
estimated that as few as 210 fighters held 98 guns” (Roll 2015, 71). Unarmed 
members of the clandestine networks and mass movements comprised the 
majority of the resistance. Yet, men were still associated with an “armed 
masculinity” and thus there existed a strong association between men and arms as 
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those who can claim to have won independence, although this is not consistent 
with the facts. Women carried arms and have been praised as female comrades, 
support staff and spies in the war (Cristalis and Scott 2005, Kent and Kinsella 2015) 
or as  barefoot female teachers doing FRETILIN’s political work of conscientisation 
in the guerrilla years (da Silva 2012), or as mothers, wives or “bush wives” of 
guerrillas (Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015). Thus, Gusmão obfuscated when he 
argued that male soldiers are “the true heroes of the struggle”. Both Gusmão and 
ex-President Taur Matan Ruak54 were “unable to admit that women bore arms too” 
even though some did (Niner 2011, 424).  
The valorisation of armed masculinity has real material outcomes. First, 
participation in the resistance as an armed warrior, or a high ranking member of 
the resistance, has become a prerequisite for political office. Thus, “armed 
masculinity” has evolved in a civilian context, and no longer applies literally to 
men with arms but to a more generalised notion of seniority, leadership and 
entitlement associated with men the Liurai-Dato class. Second, Timorese elites use 
the celebration of armed masculinity to justify access to state resources in the form 
of pensions, construction projects and so on, as I elaborate in Chapter 4. Because 
of the overlap of the association of armed men with the Liurai-Dato class, the 
power of men is not limited to those who are combatants but rather militarised 
masculinities intersect with other aspects of patriarchy. 
Hutching’s (2008) insights on masculinity are salutary here; she argues the 
relational position of masculinity vis-à-vis femininity is most important to 
understanding gender ideologies. Although the ascribed qualities or  content of 
masculine and feminine may vary, there is always a “fixed value hierarchy” between 
them (Hutchings 2008). For this reason, it is necessary to look at the celebration 
of armed masculinity in relation to the construction, and denigration, of the 
excluded feminine (Hutchings 2008, 29). War and militarisation, by arming vast 
numbers of men and marshalling them  into military institutions, “magnifies the 
                                                 
54 Taur Matan Ruak, part of Gusmão’s 2017 alliance, was named as Timor-Leste’s new Prime Minister in 2018.  
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distance between femininity and masculinity and enhances men’s authority in a 
quantum leap” (Kronsell and Svedberg 2011, 23, Cockburn 2013). The valorisation 
of armed masculinity is part of a value hierarchy which juxtaposes it with what is 
considered feminine (weak, dependent) and in need of (male) protection. Running 
parallel are negative tropes of women as “polluters”. In many societies, including 
Timor, women’s fertility puts them in touch with the spiritual world, risking the 
stability of the material world and translating, for example, into the forced 
isolation of women after birth (Hicks 2004, Therik 2004, Rosaldo, Lamphere, and 
Bamberger 1974). Negative stereotypes of women have included women as the 
victims of men’s violence, sex objects and slaves, domestic servants, or chattels of 
war (Wallis 2012b, Schnabel and Tabyshalieva 2012, Rothschild 2017, Hägerdal 
2010). Nonetheless, in the Timor case, militarisation had a significant impact on 
gender relations where the idea of an “armed man” came to be juxtaposed with an 
“unarmed” person. In a feminist analysis, the logic of masculinist protection and 
its corollary of control was taken to the extreme during the war, whereby one 
concrete way that armed men—both Timorese and Indonesian—could control, 
denigrate, and assert entitlement to sexual access to women was through sexual 
and gender-based violence. Thus, I argue the celebration of armed masculinity and 
the denigration of victims of SGBV are two aspects of the same ideological 
hierarchy. Making this ideology explicit helps explain the circumstances under 
which the Indonesian military and Timorese militia used SGBV to achieve political 
and military goals.  
3.4 Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence 
Historically, slaves, serfs, and bonded labourers in Timor were often low-ranked 
women (Hägerdal 2012, 17). It is possible women and girls were enslaved in large 
numbers because they were useful in a greater variety of work roles, including as 
agricultural workers, domestic workers, reproductive workers and sex workers 
(Patterson 2012, 335). In the European-Timorese slave trade, many of the Timorese 
slaves traded were also women and girls, and there they were also sexually 
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exploited (Hägerdal 2012, 274). French explorer de Freycinet’s diary from the 
nineteenth century records that Timorese female slaves’ appearance determined 
their worth and that sexual exploitation of female slaves and their families 
occurred (Gunn 1999, 46).  
At the same time as female slaves were sexually exploited, other women and girls 
were kept only as sexual slaves. At the turn of the nineteenth century, a Portuguese 
journalist accused Timor’s Governor da Suva of “maintaining, with the excuse of 
civilising, harems (Portuguese: serralhos) in what he calls schools”, indicating an 
early overlap between girls’ educational institutions and institutionalised sexual 
violence on a large scale. This practice was repeated by the Japanese and 
Indonesian militaries who kept women as sex slaves in schools (Kammen 2003, 77, 
Matsuno and Oliviera 2016). The historical record thus points to the existence of 
institutionalised sexual exploitation and sexual violence linked to social 
hierarchies and the military.  
Prices paid for female slaves and brideprice (marriage payments to the bride’s 
family) overlapped. This is not unique. Globally, institutional slavery is often found 
in societies with brideprice: “over half [55 percent] of all societies with bridewealth 
[brideprice] hold slaves, the presence of bridewealth more than triples the odds of 
finding institutional slavery” (Patterson 2012, 337). In brideprice marriages, the 
groom’s family pays the bride’s family. In “servile marriage”, that is, marriage that 
resembles slavery, a woman is given in marriage—without her consent—in 
exchange for payment to her kin (Allain 2012, 277-79). A consequence of 
institutionalised slavery is that when women were enslaved, the categories 
defining a woman as a war captive, a slave, or a bride were blurred because there 
was little to differentiate these statuses in practice. Showing how slavery and 
brideprice co-occur, are mediated through kinship relations, and have comparable 
forms, helps to contextualise sexual slavery during the Indonesian occupation. The 
co-occurrence shows how conflict-related SGBV drew on existing unequal gender 
relations, including the gendered institution of slavery. 
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The Indonesian military used SGBV as a weapon of war variously to intimidate the 
broader Timorese population, as proxy violence, to control resources, and to break 
the guerrilla resistance. Early in the invasion, between 1975 and 1979,  there was a 
pattern of gang rape during armed attacks (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). Rape was used 
to establish domination over the broader population, such as by raping those who 
had initially fled to the mountains and who later surrendered or were captured 
(CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). There was a pattern of using violence against women as 
proxy violence against soldiers of the resistance. Peake describes a typical case 
where Indonesian soldiers “raped the wife of a pro-independence figure whom 
they were unable to detain” (Peake et al. 2014). SGBV was a means of gaining 
military intelligence—the Indonesian military used wives of guerrillas as sex slaves 
in order to  “monitor and communicate with their husbands in the bush” 
(Aditjondro 1998, 206). The  military also used sexual torture as a means to procure 
information (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7, 56-7). The Indonesian military and Timorese 
militia targeted wives of male members of the resistance in order to demoralise 
them. Conflict related SGBV was about power and control: armed men’s power 
over women’s bodies and the Timorese population as a whole. One victim summed 
up the meaning of Indonesian military posts, “it is as if these posts, which were 
set-up for security reasons, became in fact places where women were raped” 
(CAVR 2006, 18).   
SGBV was a weapon of war, but was couched in terms of, and reproduced existing 
practices of marriage, sex slavery, and polygyny. Even earlier, during the Second 
World War, the ten thousand Japanese troops in Timor perpetrated domestic 
sexual slavery, either phrasing it in the language of marriage or institutionalising 
sex slavery in public buildings converted into ianjo (Japanese: military brothels) 
(Matsuno and Oliviera 2016). The Indonesian military established similar 
institutions for sexual slavery. The detention of women in military institutions for 
sex slavery was “logistically supported as part of everyday military operations with 
the knowledge of the local military commander” (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7, 45). 
Indonesian and Timorese military men also forced those in domestic sexual 
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slavery, and those in institutionalised sex slavery to perform household labour. 
They were “expected to cook and clean, and attend to other domestic duties” while 
imprisoned in military facilities (Peake et al. 2014, 7).  In the Indonesian period, 
Indonesian soldiers and Timorese militia forced women into relationships that 
mimicked marriages. During the Indonesian occupation, domestic sexual slavery 
could involve a “military man living in [a family’s] home or the woman belonging 
to one man or a range of men” (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). Some domestic sexual 
slavery was couched in terms of the existing practice of polygynous marriage, that 
is, sex slaves were second or third wives. For example, one victim, then 15 years 
old, described how a Timorese member “of Laksaur [militia], put a necklace 
around my neck. He said, ‘This is my war prize. As of now, she is my third wife’ 
(CAVR 2006, 41). The perpetrator referred to the practice of taking war captives as 
chattel slaves and as secondary wives. Placing the necklace around her neck was 
an imitation of the engagement and marriage ceremonies where the groom “puts 
necklaces” on his bride (Tetun: tau korenti / tau morteen) (McWilliam and Traube 
2011, Khan and Hyati 2012, 26). In the Indonesian occupation, Indonesian soldiers 
and Timorese militia also perpetrated sexual slavery in military installations, by 
repeatedly raping women whose names were on “lists”, and by forced marriages 
(CAVR 2006, Chapter 7, 53-4). Some women were imprisoned in military sexual 
slavery for extended periods of time in publicly visible institutions, such as military 
bases or schools (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7, 46). Thus, extant practices of slavery and 
polygyny shaped the form, the institutionalisation, and frequency of conflict-
related sexual slavery in Timor. Conflict-related SGBV was part of ongoing unequal 
gender relations and not exceptional (True 2012, Davies and True 2015). 
Likewise, armed men used existing practices of compensation and brideprice to 
enable and justify sexual violence and sexual slavery. In the cases of sexual slavery 
under the Japanese occupation, perpetrators are known to have paid the women’s 
family a “price”, mimicking the exchange of women using brideprice (Matsuno and 
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Oliviera 2016).55 In the case of sexual violence, the victims and their families could 
obtain compensation  (Nixon 2008, 316, CAVR 2006, 25). This followed the 
practice, documented since the 1930s, of paying compensation to a victim’s family 
in rape cases (Nixon 2008, 320). In both cases—sexual slavery and rape—the 
traditional practices of compensation to the victim’s family were used. This 
compensation is often likened to brideprice (Nixon 2008, 320). In the rare cases 
where a perpetrator of rape was called to account, he could be liable for 
compensation. For example, a Timorese militia member raped one woman 
repeatedly between 1998 and 1999. Eventually, the perpetrator’s wife reported her 
husband to his commander. Afterwards, the perpetrator was ordered to pay a fine 
to the family of the victim and to his own wife (CAVR 2006, 73). Compensation has 
been the usual form of punishment for SGBV in both the courts and traditional 
dispute resolution today, as I explain in Chapter 5. In the case of wartime domestic 
sexual slavery, parents had “little choice other than to allow their daughters to 
“marry” Indonesian military officers” (Peake et al. 2014, 6).56 Frequently, a woman 
was exchanged for the security of the village or family (Peake et al. 2014, 7, CAVR 
2006, Chapter 7, 69-70). Again, the exchange of women as domestic sex slaves to 
prevent inter-group violence had historical precedents and was part of established 
patterns of gender inequality.  
As is true of conflict-related SGBV generally, perpetrators of SGBV could act with 
impunity because of the severe stigmatisation of victims. Moreover, the weakest 
and most vulnerable—refugees, starving women, those who had lost their 
husbands and families, victims of other men’s violence—were targeted, amplifying 
                                                 
55 Sources on sexual slavery in the Indonesian period do not talk about brideprice. The payment of brideprice 
is not discussed in the CAVR report. The report on Japanese sexual slavery does mention payments 
(Matsuno and Oliviera 2016). The absence of brideprice could be because violence was the only coercive 
force used by Indonesian military men so brideprices were not paid in these forced marriages. Discussion 
of brideprice might also have been avoided because survivors, interviewers, and CAVRs authors 
understandably want to reveal the violent coercion present in domestic sexual slavery and forced marriage.  
56 I also recorded the practice of the Indonesian military paying compensation for rapes in the border areas 
of West Timor, Indonesia, in 2015. A Hamlet Chief told me that sexual violence did not cause further 
violence between the West Timorese community and the military men stationed there so long as the 
soldiers followed West Timorese tradition and compensation was paid. Interview with Hamlet Chief, 
WT042, Tasi Feto Timor, Indonesia, 16 March 2015.  
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women’s marginalisation (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). Rape victims were seen as 
soiled, dishonourable, traitorous or amoral; perpetrators relied on “the victim’s 
sense of shame to protect their identity” (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7, Aditjondro 1998). 
To the broader Timorese community, “sex slaves” were seen as “women who take 
goods and money for sex” (Aditjondro 1998, 206).57 Victims of SGBV could be 
blamed, shamed, re-victimised, or rejected by their male partners, family members 
and the wider community (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). Typically, “a woman raped by 
the military might become ‘fair game’ for sexual abuse by other men” increasing 
the numbers of cases of SGBV (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). In one case, a Timorese 
FALINTIL soldier raped a woman bringing food to the guerrillas, one month later 
she was raped by the Indonesian armed forces for having helped the enemy  (CAVR 
2006, Chapter 7). In conflicts, the social stigma attaching to victims, and the real 
socio-economic effects of exclusion, abandonment, or spinsterhood results in low 
levels of reporting (Ban 2012, Davies and True 2015). In the Timor case, it is not 
surprising that stigma and exclusion allowed perpetrators to commit SGBV with 
impunity. 
Sexual and gender-based violence was connected to the distribution of benefits to 
men associated with the military. Perpetrating SGVB could be a way to increase a 
man’s rank or power. For instance, militia members, operation assistants (TBOs) 
or low-ranking civilian officials would “forcibly take women and pass them on to 
the military commanders in return for increased status and rewards with access to 
military power” (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7). The opportunity to commit sexual 
violence with impunity functioned as payment to armed men, or, in True’s words, 
as “compensation to soldiering masculinities” (True 2012, 44-5). As an illustration, 
FALINTIL Commander Ular Rihi recalled how during his capture by Indonesians, 
“they were directing us to watch these [pornographic] films, and inviting us to 
come and rape girls with them, as though this would win our hearts, as though we 
                                                 
57 Women in forced marriages sexual slavery were termed TNI wife, or Feto Nona. Feto is Tetun for woman, 
Nona is a term common in eastern Indonesia for “unmarried woman” or “girl”. 
CLASS FORMATION: SLAVERY AND MILITARISATION  
103 
would think ‘Wow, this is a really good life with the Bapak [Indonesian men]” (Rihi 
2009).   
The Indonesian occupation, however, also represented a juncture that opened 
social and gender relations to transformation, but predominantly for elite women. 
The effects of the occupation on gender relations in Timor-Leste have been 
powerful and complex, as a number of authors have argued (Cristalis and Scott 
2005, Ospina 2006, Joshi 2005, Niner 2016). In the first instance, the formation of 
FRETILIN and the women’s wing of FRETILIN, the Organização Popular Da 
Mulher Timorense (OPMT) was a watershed moment. OPMT was crucial to the 
struggle for women’s liberation and the work of the armed and clandestine fronts. 
Female members of FRETILIN and OPMT saw themselves in a “dual struggle” 
against oppression, first as Timorese anti-colonial nationalists, but second as 
women against patriarchal practices, whether committed by Portuguese or by 
Timorese men in their homes and communities. Founder of the Timorese women’s 
movement, Rosa “Muki” Bonaparte used the term, “double exploitation”  common 
in anti-colonial feminism at the time (Loney 2015). Members of OPMT challenged 
gender roles by taking on roles previously reserved for male members of Liurai 
families such as teachers, health workers, and political educators. In the early years 
1975-79, in FRETILIN areas, women from OPMT took on roles commensurate with 
established roles for women, such as caring for orphans and taking care of health 
and welfare of families (Wigglesworth 2010).  
The struggle for national liberation and the political party of FRETILIN linked itself 
to progressive goals for women’s liberation. After these experiences, women in 
independent Timor-Leste were no longer prepared to “become the slave of some 
man” (Carey 2001, 262). The women’s movement in Timor-Leste grew out of shared 
suffering, goals, and desire to transform gender relations. Other more “traditional 
roles” included women from the OPMT as “moral guardians” of other women. For 
instance, it was the job of the OPMT to “give guidance to women in the kampung 
(Indonesian: village), as well as to stamp out prostitution” (Budiardjo and Liong 
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1984, 204). Nonetheless, political representation of women in FRETILIN was 
initially very limited. In 1975, “FRETILIN’s Central Committee of fifty members 
included only three women” (Loney 2015).58 Further, these women were part of 
Timorese elite; they were “some of the very few Timorese women who had studied 
overseas to graduate at a higher education level” (Wigglesworth 2010, 133). All were 
from Liurai lineages and related to male members of the FRETILIN Central 
Committee (Wigglesworth 2010, 133, Gunn 2011). Thus, although the struggle for 
Timorese women’s liberation both anti-colonial and anti-traditional, gender and 
class relations shaped FRETILIN. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The structural analysis presented in this chapter contributed a new historical 
analysis of social forces in Timor, and their intersection with slavery, 
militarisation, and sexual and gender-based violence. The chapter outlined the 
means by which the Liurai-Dato class emerged and accumulated economic 
resources and political power during their incorporation into the governing 
structures of Portuguese and Indonesian rule. Moreover, this chapter has argued 
that the relation between the Liurai-Dato class, commoners, and slaves are power 
relations. The superordination of the Liurai-Dato class depended on material 
relations of power; namely on the subjugation of lower-ranked lineages, slaves, and 
women. Concretely, control over land, taxes and corvée labour strengthened the 
Liurai-Dato class’s resource accumulation, because commoners, slaves, and 
women were forced to provide resources and labour to Liurai and Dato, and to 
Portuguese and Indonesian rulers. The emergence of the Liurai-Dato class, 
coupled with institutionalised unfree labour of various and gendered types, 
stratified Timorese society, which gives form to social and gender relations in 
contemporary Timor. Liurai or Dato status continues to be a prerequisite for access 
                                                 
58  The three female members were Rosa ‘Muki’ Bonaparte Soares, Maria do Céu Pereira, and Guilhermina 
Araújo. Rosa ‘Muki’ Bonaparte was the head of OPMT. For an overview of women in the Timorese 
nationalist struggle see Loney (2015, 2016) and Cristalis and Scott (2005), Cristalis (2002) 
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to paid work, land, capital, welfare, education, political power, justice, ability to 
marry freely, and social position as I show in Chapters 4 through 8. 
The analyses of conflict-related SGBV contributed two original analyses. First, it 
showed how the forms and institutionalisation of conflict related SGBV was 
couched in terms of, and reproduced aspects of, existing unequal gender relations. 
This included the duplication of large-scale institutions for SGBV in Portuguese, 
Japanese and Indonesian periods. The forms of domestic sexual slavery during war 
were couched in terms of marriage, but also extant practices such as paying 
brideprices (which in turn overlap with paying for slaves), paying compensation to 
victims’ families for SGBV, and polygynous marriage. This analysis contributes 
more empirical data to the feminist contention that conflict related SGBV is part 
of a continuum of violence and does not stand outside extant gender hierarchies 
(Davies and True 2015, Cockburn 2013). Nor does SGBV end when war ends, which 
has ramifications for gender intervention and the broader goals of gender justice. 
Second, this section contributed to the body of the feminist political economy 
work on conflict related SGBV (Meger 2016, 2015, Davies and True 2015). It showed 
how soldiers and militia used SGBV as a weapon of war, to gain resources, 
compensate soldiers, and achieve military goals.  
Militarisation has been a critical instrument of dominance in social and gender 
relations throughout Timorese history. The Liurai-Dato class was progressively 
militarised during Portuguese rule and the Indonesian occupation. The 
Indonesians incorporated significant numbers of men and boys from all social 
classes into the bureaucracy, the army, the police, and the militia, with positions 
of power generally reserved for elite Timorese men. In both periods, proximity to 
the military was a means to gain political and economic benefits. Militia leaders 
had overlapping roles, some in rackets, but most in the civil service and these men 
used their association with the military to attain wealth and power. Militarisation 
was accompanied by an ideology celebrating armed masculinity, which justified 
elite control over resources.  
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Following from the above analysis, the following Chapter 4 shows how in 
independent Timor-Leste the vast bulk of state resources have been distributed to 
elite men, many of whom claim veteran status. This had been justified by the 
celebration of armed masculinity. The resilience of the ideology celebrating armed 
men while denigrating women victims has affected the distribution of state 
resources. In other words, the effectiveness of the intervention on Gender 
Responsive Budgeting has been limited by a gender ideology of valorising heroes 
and denigrating victims. Importantly to this thesis, the growth and nature of the 
Timorese women’s movement are considered together with the widespread and 
systematic nature of SGBV during and after the war. 
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CHAPTER 4.  CLASS, GENDER AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES 
2007-2017 
4.1 Introduction 
The gendered distribution of state resources plays a substantial role in shaping 
outcomes for gender justice. The distribution of state resources has a particularly 
large impact on women because gender divisions of labour means that the burden 
of caring for others fall primarily on women. As Elson showed early on, the extent 
of the care burden “is directly related to macroeconomic policies” because state 
spending on areas like health, education, welfare and so on reduces the burdens 
placed on women (Elson 1993, 239). In times of crisis, if state spending is reduced, 
the burdens on women, and incidences of domestic violence, increase (Hozić and 
True 2016, 9). In the Timor-Leste case, the burdens on women are magnified 
because it has one of the highest rates of poverty and deprivation in Asia (Inder, 
Cornwell, and Datt 2015) and a rigid gender division of labour (Asian Development 
Bank and UNIFEM 2005). In short, the burden of care on non-elite Timorese 
women and girls is onerous.  
The chapter contextualises gender interventions in the political economy of the 
Timorese state. Namely, the distribution of state resources to “so-called veterans” 
cements a coalition between urban-based members of the Liurai-Dato class, the 
political elite, and rural-based members of that same class. The chapter first 
outlines how veterans’ pensions are part of a “politics of memory” (Wallis 2012, 
Kent 2015) that by privileging a masculinist view of war, exclude large segments of 
the population, particularly women, from state resources (Kent and Wallis 2013, 
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Kent 2015). Extending their analyses, the chapter argues that the veteran’s pension 
can be explained by looking at the centrality of state resources for the reproduction 
of the Liurai-Dato class. Policymakers, who are members of the Liurai-Dato class, 
have distributed state resources in a way that preserves social hierarchies, 
including the dominance of the Liurai-Dato class, which often overlaps with 
membership of the resistance. This identity is linked to the valorisation of armed 
masculinity. I argue that similar to earlier periods, (predominantly male) members 
of the Liurai-Dato class are able to capture state resources through both veterans’ 
pensions and infrastructure spending.  In addition to benefitting the political elite 
directly, veterans’ pensions are a way for the Dili-based political elites—the most 
successful members of the Liurai-Dato class, to shore up a rural constituency of 
village leaders and veterans who are also members of the Liurai-Dato class, but not 
part of the Dili-based political elite. This is achieved by distributing resources to 
these men, which in turn helps veterans to ensure the physical infrastructure 
projects favoured by elites, are carried out.  
The gendered distribution of resources has flow-on, gendered effects. A gulf exists 
in the Timorese economy, with significant state resources from the petroleum 
revenues pooling in Dili and subsistence and unpaid work providing for the 
wellbeing of the majority. The distribution of state resources is crucial because 
government spending drives the Timorese economy (World Bank 2017). It is clear 
that state resources are very unequally distributed—the difference in income 
inequality between the highest quintile of Timorese and the majority are 
extraordinarily high (Sepulveda 2011).  Since state spending has been concentrated 
in infrastructure and transfers to the wealthy, rather than on services, health, or 
education, as I show in the central section of the chapter, households are burdened 
with responsibility for care work and household provisioning. Consequently, in 
times of acute crises such as the three-month-long annual hungry season where 
most households must survive on stored food before the first crops come in, 
Timor-Leste relies on the labour of women. Thus, the distribution of state 
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resources matters for gender justice in Timor-Leste, and these flow on effects are 
examined in Chapters 6 through 8.  
In this context, two gender interventions, Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB) 
and a cash transfer to vulnerable mothers, Bolsa da Mãe, to direct state resources 
to women’s needs and enhance gender justice have not been successful. Building 
on extant analyses of GRB in Timor-Leste (Costa 2018, Costa, Sawer, and Sharp 
2013), the second part of the chapter asserts that gender interventions addressing 
the distribution of state resources were largely unsuccessful, except in the limited 
area of monitoring spending on the 2010 Law Against Domestic Violence. When 
cash is distributed to women through Bolsa da Mãe, the targeted beneficiaries are 
in fact their children. Thus GRB did not live up to the aims of gender intervention 
to hold policymakers to account for directing state resources to women’s needs 
and enhance gender justice in budgeting. GRB has not prevented the distribution 
of state resources from the Timorese petroleum fund to (mostly male) members of 
the Liurai-Dato class. The unequal distribution of state resources comes at the 
expense of budget areas that most benefit poor women and girls, such as water 
infrastructure, health, education, and food security.  
4.2 The Independent Timorese State  
The nature of the independent Timorese state sets the context for attempts to 
introduce various gender interventions. The state itself is a relationship of power 
between social forces. The nature of the state—comprised and shaped by 
dominant classes in the Timor case—shapes what kinds of and how institutions, 
including those implementing gender interventions, emerge and how they may be 
used in practice (Jones 2013, 70). Added to this, any analysis of the nature of the 
independent Timorese state must include the distribution of state resources. In 
the Timor-Leste case, a very significant area of state resource distribution, and one 
that affects citizens directly, is cash transfers. The origin of these is a key way to 
understand the Timorese political economy.  
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The valorisation of veterans has been a hallmark of successive Gusmão-controlled 
governments in power in the decade from 2007 to 2017. Demobilisation programs, 
including veterans’ pensions, have been heavily politicised, and key to bolstering 
support for Gusmão’s coalition (Kent and Wallis 2013). The statement in the 
incoming government’s program in 2015 highlights the obligation of the state to 
provide (certain) veterans with cash they “rightfully deserve”, and treating them 
with “greater cordialness, deference and professionalism than ordinary citizens 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2015a). Veterans’ pensions, in particular, are 
a crucial, material part of state-building and the reconstitution of military-era 
patrimonial networks (Roll 2015). As Kent and Kinsella argued, the valorisation of 
veterans uses a politics of memory for political gains and “further promotes a 
culture of ‘militarized masculinity’ that elevates and rewards men who show the 
capacity to use violence” (Kent and Kinsella 2015, 473).  All told, cash transfers have 
been the single most significant political tool used by the government to create 
alliances, reduce dissent and gain legitimacy (Roll 2015, 121). The following section 
explains the origins and centrality of the distribution of state resources to veterans.  
In Timor, cash transfers are especially significant, comprising around 10 to 15 
percent of the state budget. Cash transfers include the veterans’ pensions (Tetun: 
Pensaun Veteranu), the conditional cash transfer to mothers, Bolsa da Mãe, a 
disability pension, an ex-office holders’ pension (Tetun: Pensaun Vitalisa) and 
“other personal benefits” paid by state agency employers to individual civil 
servants. Unlike the Bolsa da Mãe they are not means-tested on an individual’s 
incomes, and did not come with any conditions. Cash transfers to individuals—
including public servants and ex-office holders, was around $210 million, or around 
13 percent of the budget (with 5 percent going to veterans alone, see Figure 4.1 
below ) (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2015b, Lao Hamutuk 2016). In terms 
of total volume, the most significant of these cash transfers is the veterans’ 
pension. In terms of individual benefits, veterans’ pensions were the most 
generous cash transfers from the Timorese government to individuals. Section 4.3 
below explores the budgetary significance of transfers in more detail. 
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Figure 4.1 Public Transfers to Individuals in the 2016 State Budget59 
These cash transfers developed as a response to the first decade of peacebuilding 
interventions in Timor-Leste, which featured a number of security crises. 
Following the deployment of an international military intervention called 
InterFET (see Table 2.1), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, had 
formal authority over Timor-Leste between October 1999 and May 2002. UNTAET 
was conceived as a “maximalist” form of statebuilding, with supreme authority 
over security and administration (Lemay-Hébert 2017). UNTAET sought to build 
new state institutions in line with international liberal standards (Hughes 2009). 
In other words, UNTAET used the model of liberal peace creating liberal 
democratic institutions, enforcing the rule of law and creating liberal markets 
(Richmond and Franks 2009, Lemay-Hébert 2011). However, as a number of 
authors explained, UNTAET faced not a tabula rasa in Timor-Leste, upon which 
they could build new institutions, but a field of social conflict (Jones 2010, 559, 
Hughes 2009). Moreover, although rhetorically UN missions positioned 
statebuilding as starting from a tabula rasa, in fact, institution building, 
development programs, and security employed Timorese people, and had to use 
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existing institutions and practices to achieve their goals (Lemay-Hébert 2011) (as I 
explore in detail in Chapters 5 and 7).  
After the first elections in August 2001, FRETILIN secured a 55 seat majority among 
the 88 elected Timorese members of the Second Transitional Government, and 
ruled with UNTAET in a co-governance model (Goldstone 2013). FRETILIN 
Secretary General, Mari bim Amude Alkatiri was elected Chief Minister and his 
contemporary and rival, Alexandre Ray Kala “Xanana” Gusmão was elected 
President. The division of titles and positons between Alkatiri and Gusmão 
reflected long-standing divides between factions in the Timorese resistance. These 
stemmed from Gusmão’s leading a majority of the FALINTIL guerrilla army to 
reject FRETILIN allegiance in the 1980s. This inter-elite rivalry has been a decisive 
feature of Timorese politics in the four decades since. The Restoration of Timorese 
Independence was declared on 20 May 2002 and FRETILIN continued to lead the 
country.  
As a part of the demobilisation of these easily mobilised groups identifying as 
FALINTIL, the first cash transfers for veterans were made during the UNTAET 
period under the internationally designed FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance 
Program (2001-2002). The programs were designed and run by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) with support from the Canadian and US aid 
agencies (Roll 2015, 78) that aimed to demobilise and reintegrate potential spoilers 
of peace in the new state. Demobilisation consisted of lump sums of $1,060 paid to 
1,308 FALINTIL veterans. At the same time, then President Gusmão established 
special Commissions to authenticate and verify veteran identity (Kent and Kinsella 
2015, 480). The most involved donor to the Commission was the World Bank, 
which contributed half a million dollars to the projects and received regular 
updates on progress (Kent 2006, 17).  Overall, after Timorese independence and 
the end of UNTAET’s administrative control in 2002, the Timorese government 
changed their approach to veterans from demobilisation and reintegration to a 
“valorisation” approach (Roll 2015, Kent 2016). Valorisation rewarded individual 
veterans with money, government contracts and jobs “based on the perceived 
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significance of their service” (Roll 2015, 89). Significantly, the four Presidential 
Commissions from 2004 to 2006 were managed by the two former comrades-in-
arms, Gusmão and Taur Matan Ruak. The Commissions registered veterans 
considered most deserving of money, respect, and honour. Donor support for 
Gusmão to oversee both the veteran’s commissions and security forces recruitment 
was significant in shaping who received money from the valorisation approach.   
As Hughes argued, in the early part of independence, Timorese elites from 
FRETILIN were squeezed between donors aid conditionality demanding market 
driven development and demands from easily mobilised Timorese social forces for 
redistributive policies (Hughes 2009, 134).  The first  government of independence,  
FRETILIN ran on a very tight, aid dependent budget of a few hundred million 
dollars, while interveners spent conspicuously on salaries and accommodation 
(Hughes 2009). Donors mandated the creation of a Petroleum Fund to manage 
and save funds from the shared gas development just south of Timor. The Fund 
was created to avoid the resource curse, but prevented the Timorese government 
from spending money on urgent issues of basic welfare and infrastructure 
(Drysdale 2007, Hughes 2009). Concurrently with Timorese independence, 
UNTAET was wound down. UNTAET was replaced with a much smaller, 
development-orientated Mission of Support (UNMISET). As UNTAET troops and 
staff withdrew, the economy contracted at least 38 percent. At the same time, a 
famine hit the central highlands. Electricity and water supplies to most remote 
rural areas were non-existent (Goldstone 2013, 214, McWilliam 2011). Rebuilding 
happened in Dili but was paralysed in rural areas (Chopra 2002). In the context of 
these deficiencies and challenges, the relationship between the FRETILIN 
government and the UN deteriorated (Jones 2010, 559). 
Although peacebuilders sought to demilitarise Timor and defuse FALINTILs 
claims on the state, many of those demobilised from FALINTIL expected to 
continue to serve in the security forces (Hughes 2009, 104). In another role, 
Gusmão, in exchange for brokering the tense UN-Timorese government 
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relationship, was allowed to handle recruitment for the new defence forces, the 
Forças Defeza de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), which he “promptly staffed with his 
FALINTIL allies” (Jones 2010, 560, Bexley and Nygaard-Christensen 2014). Tensions 
arose because FRETILIN member Rogerio Lobato handled recruitment to the new 
police force, the Poliçia Naçional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), including 300 members 
of the Indonesian-era police force, who were associated with the suppression of 
independence (International Crisis Group 2006, 22). Recruiting for both the army 
and the police excluded many who called themselves FALINTIL veterans, causing 
complaints (Scambary 2009b). The division of roles between the army and the 
police was also unclear (International Crisis Group 2006). Since the interests of 
international groups in demobilisation and the interests of former guerrillas and 
men seeking employment in the security forces did not align, demobilisation was 
partial as well as dissatisfactory (Hughes 2009, 104).  
The strain between older ex-FALINTIL, the police force, and recruits in the new 
army F-FDTL, increased as the UN wound down operation UNMISET in 2005-
2006.60 Grievances over demobilisation and “jobs for the boys” in the security 
forces were “co-opted and mobilised by competing politicians during the 
escalation of intra-elite rivalry” (Hughes 2009, 119, Grindle 2012). The tipping point 
came in 2006 after a group of 156 F-FDTL were sacked after unsuccessfully 
petitioning the Alkatiri government for changes to promotions and privileges. At 
protests, police shot five protesters, after which violence escalated further 
(Kingsbury 2008). Again, thousands of Timorese citizens, in fear of militia and 
gang violence, fled to the central mountains or over the border to West Timor. As 
a result, the UN renewed their military intervention in an expansive operation 
called UNMIT in May 2006 (Goldstone 2013). Timor-Leste went from being 
referred to as a UN peacebuilding success story to a “failed state” (Scambary 2009a, 
Neumann 2006, Arnold 2009). Although for five years veterans had received some 
financial support, disaffected veterans’ factions and allied groups remained 
                                                 
60 The new armed forces, F-FDTL was established on 1 February 2001, despite earlier ideas in the resistance 
that no army would be needed and FALANTIL  would be disbanded upon independence (Kingsbury 2007).  
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engaged in violent protests, clashes and house-burnings, culminating in the 2006-
7 crisis fomented by disaffected politicians and veterans (Hughes 2009, Scambary 
2009b). FRETILIN won the 2007 elections by a slim majority, but was unable to 
form a stable government in the face of political violence. Then President Ramos-
Horta nominated Gusmão to form a government, and Gusmão’s CNRT alliance 
took power. Still, violence threatened the stability of the government, and, with 
the 2008 assassination attempts on Ramos-Horta and Gusmão, veterans 
threatened the lives of key power-holders. The Timorese government sought to 
buy the peace and preserve itself using a variety of means.  
4.3 The Distribution of State Resources Under CNRT 2007-2017  
After the 2006-7 crisis, Gusmão’s formed a coalition led by his new party, The 
National Council for the Reconstruction of Timor, (Tetun: Conselho Nacional de 
Reconstrução de Timor). The CNRT began by remedying the years of austerity 
under peacebuilders and FRETILIN by “buying the peace” from key consituencies 
using cash transfers and other state resources—a pattern that continued 
throughout CNRT’s three successive governments from 2007-2017. CNRT’s tactic 
of obtaining political support using cash payments was enabled by a massive 
increase in state revenues from gas fields in the Timor Sea which began to be 
collected in the petroleum fund in 2005-6 (Goldstone 2013). Timorese citizens had 
seen a decline in their living standards, and their awareness of the oil fund wealth 
increased public pressure on the Gusmão government to distribute it (Porter and 
Rab 2011). Rather than a broad-based welfare program, however, the Gusmão 
government chose to distribute this money to “key constituencies” that is, veterans 
(Porter and Rab 2011, 5). After the 2006-7 crisis, the Commissions’ registers of 
veterans were codified in a series of laws.61 Payments under these laws included 
                                                 
61 First was the Law on Veterans’ Pensions 3/2006. This Law was revised twice: once to make one-off payments 
of $1300 prior to the 2009 village chief elections, and again in 2011 to establish Veterans’ Councils which 
would regulate pension claims. The law was followed by the Decree Law on the Pensions of the Combatants 
and Martyrs of the National Liberation No. 15/2008, as amended by Decree Law Amending Decree law No. 
15/2008 of 4 June No. 25/2008 (Roll 2015).  
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$8,000 to the group of demobilised army members and gang members who 
fomented the crisis and the introduction of much more generous veterans’ 
pensions. Special measures to buy the peace also included expanding veteran’s 
roles in the civil service, healthcare, and granting generous infrastructure building 
contracts—averaging between $500,000 and $1 million—to veterans, and the 
creation of the National Program for Village Development (PNDS) (Tetun: 
Programa Nacional Desenvolivimentu Suku) (International Crisis Group 2013, 3, 
Lao Hamutuk 2013).   
During this period too, international donors supported aspects of payments for 
veterans. Donors were wary of institutionalising long-term claims by veterans on 
the state (Hughes 2009, 105, World Bank 2013). Nonetheless, as I explained above, 
IOM and bilateral donors had initiated small payments to demobilise FALINTIL 
before 2005. After the crisis too, IOM supported the use of cash payments in 
programs to resettle internal displaced persons. Donors also continued to support 
the Veterans’ Commissions. From 2006 donor support came from UNDP (World 
Bank 2008, 12). Allowing the Gusmão government to take “strong ownership” over 
the cash transfers to veterans was one of the manifestations of a pragmatic “local 
turn”  in peacebuilding. This approach received support from donors, underlined 
by some peacebuilders’ and academics’ support for the “charismatic” “unifying” 
hero Gusmão (Bexley and Nygaard-Christensen 2014, cf. Kingsbury 2008).  
Equally important to the winning over of key constituencies, in the 2012 legislative 
election the incumbent CNRT used state resources including cash transfers to 
veterans in order to win votes. To illustrate, on the second day of campaigning the 
CNRT coalition announced the expansion of veterans’ payments to tens of 
thousands of (mostly male) voters. The government then made (backdated) 
payments two weeks before the election totalling $47 million (European Union 
Election Observation Mission 2012, 17). CNRT won the 2012 election with a 
convincing majority. Overall, CNRT justified cash payments as necessary for peace 
and referenced the Timorese constitutions which said veterans should be valorised 
(Kent 2006, Kent and Kinsella 2015). Ensuring stability by “improving veterans’ 
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economic position” who were seen as a “vulnerable” and “deserving” group was 
articulated through numerous development plans (Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste 2011b, 8, 2015a, b). 
At the same time as the expansion of veterans’ pensions, the government 
announced  expansive infrastructure spending, as part of a “New Deal” (Leach and 
Kingsbury 2013). The New Deal was also been part of a process of consolidating 
political support. It was articulated through the Gusmão government’s 2011 
Strategic Development Plan, which comprised spending a majority of the budget 
on physical infrastructure (such as roads, electricity, ports, and airports) 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2011b). This “big push” of spending on state 
infrastructure and citizen welfare was supported by important sections of the 
donor community, notably by the UN Millennium Project Director, Jeffrey Sachs, 
who visited Timor-Leste in 2010 (Goldstone 2013, n18). The government and their 
supporters justified large expenditures by arguing the state’s role was to to set the 
conditions for market-led development. In terms of infrastructure expenditure, in 
the 2016 budget, for example, 45 percent the budget was spent on infrastructure 
projects (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2015b, Lao Hamutuk 2016). 
Altogether cash transfers and infrastructure spending on the Oecusse ZEESMs62 
Special Zones of Social Market Economy— a free trade zone—and the South Coast 
oil development project transfers totalled $475.775 million, just under a third of 
the total government expenditure for 2016 (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 
2015b, Lao Hamutuk 2016).  
Yet infrastructure projects have rarely been well executed and it is increasingly 
suggested that these are more about political patronage than development 
(Scambary 2015, Kingsbury 2017).  A key reason for this conclusion is that many of 
the infrastructure projects have been awarded to influential veterans and their 
networks. Roll describes how, in the Gusmão government’s  rural electrification 
                                                 
62 ZEESMs is the Zona Espeçial de Economia Soçial de Mercado  or the Special Zones of Social Market Economy 
of Timor-Leste. 
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project under the PNDS (2012 onwards) “contracts are awarded to a shell company 
registered in the names of former resistance members and tender processes are 
not required” (Roll 2015, 117). I documented similar cases regarding veterans 
receiving contracts for electrification in the Oecusse free trade zone, ZEESMs. Not 
only did prodigal spending on physical infrastructure benefit a relatively small 
number of people, but corruption was particularly acute in infrastructure projects. 
According to Timorese NGO Luta Hamutuk’s monitoring, only 30 percent of the 
money allocated was used to build infrastructure because of “KKN” or corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (Scambary 2015, Timor Post 2015f). Consequently, the 
majority of the Timorese citizenry perceived their government to be corrupt—
Timor-Leste ranked 133 out of 175 countries in the Corruption Perception Index 
(Bosso 2015).   All of this amounts to a significant distribution of state resources to 
veterans and their networks. 
In sum, the two previous section have argued that the distribution of state 
resources to veterans is a material manifestation of the celebration of armed 
masculinity, which has in the post-conflict era facilitated the emergence of a “new 
political economy of entitlement” of armed men (Hughes 2015, 910). Violent 
groups who might spoil the peace, have, unsurprisingly, been prioritised during 
peacemaking (Goetz and Jenkins 2016, 212). In the Timor-Leste case, like other 
post-conflict countries, the tendancy towards gendered resource distribution is 
compounded because of the spending priorities on security, demobilisation, or 
military restructures, as part of keeping, or “buying the peace”. The valorisation of 
armed masculinity, in this case, veterans, has helped elites to resolve ideological 
contradictions between the narrative of unified national liberation and the 
distribution of state resources to those same elites. It has also helped consolidate 
socio-political orders, as I turn to now.  
CLASS, GENDER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES 2007-2017  
119 
4.3.1 Veterans and the Liurai-Dato Class 
It is the contention of this section that the distribution of state resources is also 
shaped by class bias rather than veteran identity in isolation. But the overlap 
between Liruai-Dato status, veteran status and a position in the elite is complex. 
At the national level a (high ranking) veteran identity—overlaps with Liurai or 
Dato rank. 63  In other words, leadership positions in political parties and the 
military are filled by members of the Liurai-Dato class. As I showed in Chapter 3, 
most leaders of the resistance—FRETILIN, UDT, FALINTIL, CNRT and the 
members of civil service (the clandestine movement) were from the Liurai-Dato 
class (Hicks 1983, 8, Guterres 2006, Kammen 2016). Prominent members of 
political parties who are recorded as having Liurai or  Liurai / Mestiço family 
backgrounds include:  FRETILIN:  Vicente Sahe; Borja da Costa; Xavier do Amaral, 
Nicolau Lobato, Rosa Bonaparte, Justino Mota, Jose Ramos-Horta, Xanana 
Gusmão. From UDT: Francisco Lopes da Cruz, Gaspar Nunes; Domingos de 
Oliveira, Mario Carrascalão, João Carrascalão. From APODETI: José Abilio Osorio 
Soares; and from KOTA Clementino dos Reis Amaral (served in parliament from 
2001-2007) (Guterres 2006, Gunn 2011, 1999, Bovensiepen 2014a, Kammen 2016). As 
I showed in Chapter 3, throughout the Indonesian occupations, Liurai and Dato 
were military leaders for both pro-integration and pro-independence sides (Gunn 
1999, Kammen 2016). Incorporating members of the Liurai-Dato class took place 
because of the Indonesian military used a political strategy of “working with and 
through the local population” (Jones 2010, 255).   
This pattern of the association of a militarised identity  with  political leadership 
continued in the post-independence period as most Timorese parliamentarians 
identify as members of the armed front (FALINTIL), the diplomatic front 
(FRETILIN or the first CNRT) or the clandestine front (RENETIL among others) 
                                                 
63 In the same fashion, most village and hamlet chiefs are from the Liurai-Dato class, as I will explain in more 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6 (Hicks 1983).  As a result many village leaders retained their roles, a pattern that 
has continued into the independence period 
CLASS, GENDER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES 2007-2017 
120 
(Guterres 2006). Francisco da Costa Gutteres, Secretariat of State for Security 
under Gusmão from 2007-2015, claimed in his 2006 PhD dissertation that 
FALINTIL veterans do not seek “any political position or power” due to their 
commitment to FALINTIL principles of “non-alignment (Guterres 2006, 235-6). In 
fact, veterans held a number of positions inside the government and in the 
diplomatic corp. For instance, former President, Taur Matan Ruak, was the last 
military commander of FALINTIL until 1999, and commander of F-FDTL from 
2002-2011. Former Prime Minster Dr Rui Araujo, is from the clandestine front 
organisation RENETIL, and ex-Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão was commander of 
FALINTIL. President Lu-Olu (2017-onwards) from FRETILIIN is also a former 
FALINTIL commander. Leaders of Dili-based militia and gangs—who received 
substantial payouts and veterans contracts—were from elite families, enjoying 
high-levels of education as well as jobs in government and civil society (Scambary 
2015, 290). The pre-eminence of military men, or those claiming an identity as a 
veteran, had important implications for the distribution of state resources.  
There are two aspects to class bias in veterans’ pensions: in the design of eligibility 
criteria, and in the implementation of who receives a pension. First, because 
pension rates are decided through the valorisation approach, that is, the 
significance and length of service, the individuals able to claim the most money 
are elite men. One reason is that the amount of money is determined by military 
rank. Officially, veterans’ pension rates depend on the recipients’ grau (Tetun: lit. 
degree; rank) the grade or seniority in military rank, and number of years served, 
and exclusive dedication to the armed struggle (Kent and Kinsella 2015). Rank was 
thus a proxy for the level of contribution. Therefore, lieutenants, captains, and 
other high ranked members of the resistance receive higher pensions than 
ordinary ranked guerrillas or support staff. As one female Member of Parliament 
said: “Grau  1, 2, 3, this signifies the person’s position or status. This signifies the 
person’s’ work in the liberation; work in the resistance, which determines the 
amount of money”.64 In other words, seniority or rank was assumed to indicate a 
                                                 
64 Interview with a member of the Women’s Cross Party Caucus, (GMPTL), ET085, 11 June 2015 
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higher level of work in the resistance, and thus was rewarded with a larger 
veterans’ pension. Only a handful of men receive the more generous veterans’ 
pensions of between $345 and $575 per month (BELUN 2013, World Bank 2013, Roll 
2015). Fifteen prominent male figures receive the most generous lifetime pension 
of $750 per month  (International Crisis Group 2013). As I showed in Chapter 3, 
historically, military rank (as well as political leadership) was determined by social 
status as Liurai and Dato as this determined access to enough resources, language 
proficiency, literacy, and gave such men the hereditary right to rule. Thus, in the 
resistance—many top leaders and those able to serve exclusively—were often men 
of the Liurai-Dato class. 
The elite-focussed criteria for pensions, however, contradicts the widespread view 
that many  Timorese feel they contributed, and indeed “determined” the outcomes 
of  independence through the vote (Timor Post 2015d). The distribution of state 
resources to former guerrillas is seen as unfair for a number of reasons. In the first 
place, the war was idealised as a nationalist struggle where Indonesian invaders 
were resisted by a united Timorese nation (Carey 2003). Because of the broad-
based nature of the clandestine movement, all Timorese feels that they 
contributed in some way to the resistance and citizens see themselves as veterans 
of the struggle. Over 100,000 people registered for a veterans’ pension, yet only a 
relatively small number have received them, around 11,000 people in 2014 (Dale, 
Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi 2014, World Bank 2013, 3). There has also been 
widespread discontent about the distribution of infrastructure spending and 
pensions to politically well-connected elites (Timor Post 2015a, g, c).  Veterans’ 
pensions have been criticised by activists, media and academics (Lao Hamutuk 
2013, BELUN 2013, International Crisis Group 2013, Kent and Wallis 2013, Scambary 
2015, Roll 2015, Timor Post 2015a, e). NGO Lao Hamutuk has been very critical of 
the Timorese Government’s spending of state resources that benefit only a few 
(McKechnie 2013, Austen et al. 2013, Lao Hamutuk 2016, 2013).  
CLASS, GENDER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES 2007-2017 
122 
The second class bias arises in implementation of the veterans’ pensions. Being 
awarded veteran status—and thus a veterans’ pension—is not dependent on the 
stipulated criteria of actual years of service or “exclusive service”—but is based, in 
most cases, on the claimant’s position within patronage networks (Roll 2015, 198). 
For example, according to Roll, most high-level commissioners added their family 
members to the list of combatants, even if those relatives were not in the resistance 
(Roll 2015, 198).65  Thus, although “exclusive service” is a key legal criterion to 
receive a generous pension, some claimants of the veterans’ pension did not serve 
exclusively. This pattern of elite capture exists not just within the Dili-based 
political elites, but also in rural areas. Rural bureaucrats assigned to register 
veterans’ pension are also members of the Liurai-Dato class because veteran status 
overlaps with roles as village chief, which overlaps with membership of a higher 
ranked lineages (Cummins and Leach 2012, 99, Gusmão 2012, 184-85, Roll 2015, 135-
6). During the war, the village based network leaders (Tetun: Nucleos De 
Resistencia Popular NUREP) were elected, under a FALINTIL commander’s 
supervision, by hamlet leaders. These male village leaders were often from Liurai 
or Dato families (Cummins and Leach 2012, 99). In rural districts in the post-
independence era, FALINTIL-linked bureaucrats in charge of the pensions in 
districts often misrepresented an applicant’s service length (Roll 2015, 194). Doing 
such favours—“from the veranda” as Roll calls it—allows local military-linked 
bureaucrats to grow their networks. Thus, who is counted as a veteran “marks the 
continuation of patronage politics along resistance-era lines and the conservation 
of these power networks in the post-conflict period” (Roll 2015, 194). Thus, rather 
                                                 
65 In the 2010 Government Decree No. 10/2010, on veteran data verification, the Commissioners were (all male) 
leaders in FALINTIL with long service records (1) Faustino dos Santos ‘Renan Selak’; (2) João Miranda ‘Aluk 
Descartes’; (3) Justo Bernardino da Costa ‘Lari Mau’; (4) Camilo Tibúrcio  Hornay ‘Larcy’; (5)  Vidal de Jesus 
‘Riak Leman’ FALINTIL Regional Secretary  (Currently vice Commander of F-FDTL); (6) Calisto  Santos 
‘Koliati’ Vice-Secretary of Ainaro Region; (7)  Pedro Alves Carlos ‘Raituto’ responsible for Caixa Ramelau;  
(8) Gil da Costa Monteiro ‘Oan Suro’ Second Rank Commander of Covalima;  (9) Félix Amaral ‘Sakari’; (10) 
Edmundo Amaral;  (11) Justino da Costa ‘Fitun Mesak’ Secretary of NUREP Bobonaro; (12) Jacinto Viegas 
Vicente ‘Roke’; (13)  Agostinho Soares Carvalheira ‘Samarusa’;  (14) Francisco dos Réis Magno ‘Loco Meo’ 
Secretary of the sub region of Liquiçá; (15) César dos Santos da Silva ‘Merak’; (16) Filinto Fátima Marques 
‘Marconi’; (17)  Ernesto Fernandes ‘Dudo’; (18) Eduardo de Deus Barreto ‘Du Sahe’; (19)  Afonso Martins 
‘Aten Brani’; (20)  Martinho da Cunha ‘Mala’; (21) Zeferino da Cruz Sal ‘Papa Teme’. It is beyond the data 
collected for this thesis to determine the socio-political status—whether their families are Liurai or Dato—
for all these men. It is also beyond the scope of this study to confirm that the Commissioners received the 
highest pension amounts.  
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than entrenching the “perception that veterans (and their families) are a privileged 
social group” (Wallis 2015, 244, emphasis added) by virtue their veteran status, 
elites received veterans’ pensions  as an already privileged social group. As a result, 
cash transfers distribute cash to the already wealthy. All cash transfers including 
veteran, disability, old age pensions, “reached 23 percent of the population in the 
richest quintile” (World Bank 2013, 50).  More than half of the people under the 
poverty line do not receive any cash transfer at all, with “61 percent of the bottom 
two quintiles and 56 percent of the poorest 20 percent not receiving any assistance 
from the main cash transfer programs” (World Bank 2013). In sum, the pattern of 
control over resources at the subnational level reflects historical patterns of 
accumulation, as I have shown Chapter 3.  
A class bias in favour of the Liurai-Dato class was most apparent where some 
members of the unarmed clandestine movement received pensions, whereas many 
others did not (Kent and Wallis 2013).  Some members were able to identify 
themselves with the armed resistance, and crucially, benefit from a veterans’ 
pension. For example, a senior bureaucrat, Eugenio, working for the free trade 
zone Special Zones of Social Market Economy (ZEESM) in Oecusse said:  
My father is a member of the ‘so-called veterans'. It means he 
participated. I don't want to say he's a veteran, because in different 
countries this has a different meaning. My father didn't get a gun and 
go into the wild to fight the Indonesians. He was a key member of the 
clandestine movement.66  
Although Eugenio’s father did not “carry a gun”, he receives a veteran’s pension 
because he was a member of the political resistance in Oecusse.67 In addition to 
veteran status, Eugenio’s father is also a member of a Liurai family. Thus, some 
men from the Liurai-Dato class can access veterans’ pension without having 
physically fought. But many other members of the resistance, especially women, 
have never received a pension (Kent and Wallis 2013). I suggest that the most 
                                                 
66 Interview with male senior bureaucratic Eugenio, ET108, Oecusse, 4 August 2015 
67 Interview with Eugenio’s mother, ET103, Oecusse, 30 July 2015 
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decisive factor is Eugenio’s father’s status as a male member of a historically 
influential Liurai-Dato family. Because of these hierarchies, the valorisation 
approach to pensions is biased in favour of a few men of the Liurai-Dato class, 
making status, not work, or actual contribution, a crucial factor in determining 
eligibility. 
The distribution of resources to veterans plays a significant role in holding 
together coalitions between urban and rural members of the Liurai-Dato class and 
in enforcing the political order. Two examples illustrate this: the elections for 
village chief in 2009 and in the government’s use of veterans to “resolve” disputes 
over development. Veterans’ pensions and one off payments to veterans were key 
to bolstering support for Gusmão’s CNRT in the 2012 legislative election, as I 
explained above. At the village level, village elections after 2005 were not supposed 
to involve political parties. Nonetheless, it was clear from fieldwork that village 
elections remain arenas of political mobilisation along party lines. In the 2009 local 
village council elections, payments to veterans helped veterans mobilise support. 
Shortly before the 2009 village chief elections, Gusmão’s government altered the 
veterans’ pension law to transfer one-off veterans’ payments of $1,380 to over 15,500 
individuals. These individual were classified as having served between four and 
eight years in the resistance, making them ineligible for the ongoing pensions (Roll 
2015, 103).  The payments to veterans demonstrated how Gusmão’s government 
was willing to offer support to veterans and help them “mobilise resources” (Roll 
2015, 138). The cash transfers allowed leading veterans to campaign for local village 
leadership or help candidates of their choice and organise the rank and file. 
Veterans’ campaigning was also aided by the politicisation of militarised 
hierarchies which, “do not allow any members to oppose policy made by their 
commanders” (Guterres 2006, 235). Thus, payments to veterans comprise an 
important material link between the Dili-based members of the Liurai-Dato class 
with rural members of the Liurai-Dato class.  
In social conflicts over land use and rapidly expanding infrastructure development 
projects, veterans are used to “resolve” problems, that is social conflict, and thus 
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to enforce a political order. Traditional dispute resolution favours male power 
holders of the Liurai-Dato class (as I discuss in detail in Chapter 5). It is 
commonplace for members of the Liurai-Dato class to be enrolled by the 
government to ameliorate conflicts between infrastructure project developers and 
ordinary Timorese citizens using “traditional dispute resolution”. A female village 
secretary in Oecusse described the process arising when the community resisted 
the regional government’s attempts to develop land for ZEESMs:  
Village chiefs and hamlet chiefs use adat (Tetun: tradition). For 
example, in ZEESMs, when they meet with people who don't like 
ZEESMs, they take the katua adat (Tetun: elder) with them. When you 
are going to do something, to implement ZEESMs, to build roads, adat 
helps with the development. They have done this many times to 
implement development. It helps a lot with the socialisation of the 
ZEESMs program.68  
A clear example arises again from the case of the ZEESM bureacrat, Eugenio’s  
father, a Naizuf (Meto: King or Liurai) who was also the recipient of a veteran’s 
pension.69  ZEESMs employed Eugenio’s father as a traditional mediator in land 
disputes for the government. During fieldwork in 2015, there were many land 
disputes during the construction of roads, ports, and airports in ZEESMs. People 
were removed from their homes, gardens and agricultural lands when these spaces 
were allocated for new roads. In response to my casual questions about conflicts, 
Eugenio’s father stated that the ema kiik (Tetun: lit. the little people: ordinary 
citizens) were not knowledgeable. He reported that during land disputes ordinary 
citizens told him keeping their land was a human right. Eugenio’s father was of the 
contrasting view, that human rights were different to cultural rights. He further 
argued that if ordinary people wanted development they must expect to sacrifice 
their land.70 This one case illustrates the role of members of the Liurai-Dato class 
in suppressing dissent and mediating complaints which, in turn, can allow the 
                                                 
68 Interview with  Serafina, ET110 female village secretary, Oecusse, 4 August 2015. 
69 Naizuf is the Meto language (the language of Oecusse) equivalent to Liurai, see Table 6.3 Comparative table 
of rank names across districts in Timor-Leste).  
70 Fieldwork notes, Oecusse, 30 July 2015. 
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government to proceed with road building and land clearing for the free trade 
zone, sometimes without compensating landowners (Journal Independente 2017). 
Anecdotally, people in Oecusse have rarely been compensated for land taken for 
development projects.71 In a similar example, Roll also observed the mobilisation 
of veteran authority for political ends in rural areas in 2011. Gusmão met with 
veterans regarding the government’s rural electrification program under the 
National Program for Village Development, PNDS, which at the time consumed a 
controversially large percentage of the budget. One of Roll’s interviewees said that 
veterans used status and intimidation to ensure that no claims to compensation 
for land lost to electricity infrastructure would arise from communities. In return 
for their roles as enforcers for projects, veterans were rewarded with contracts to 
install the electricity infrastructure (Roll 2015, 120, International Crisis Group 2006, 
14, Scambary 2015). The overlaps and links between veteran status, Liurai-Dato 
heritage, and government employment as well as contracting, indicates the 
concentration of power in the hands of certain elite families. 
These families dominate government jobs, which are the primary source of cash in 
the rural districts. To look again at the typical case of Eugenio, many members of 
his family are employed in the Oecusse public service. Eugenio’s cousin is program 
director at the labour ministry, SEFOPE, on a $7,800 annual salary (Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste 2016b). This is around twenty times the average annual 
income in Timor-Leste. Eugenio said in response to a question about his family 
working in the civil service: 
We have a lot of family in government. Maybe not district 
administrator, but directors, and vice-directors. Are you asking me if I 
am from a dynasty? My family here is in the government or the private 
sector or politicians—but is it because of their exposure to education?72 
Eugenio, like many members of the Liurai-Dato class, is uncomfortable speaking 
about class hierarchy. Instead, he suggests that it is his family’s access to 
                                                 
71 Fieldwork notes, discussion with researchers from Lao Hamutuk, Dili, 13 August 2015. 
72 Interview with male senior bureaucratic Eugenio, ET108, Oecusse, 4 August 2015 
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education—and achievements therein—is the reason for their preeminent 
position in the state and access to its resources. 
4.3.2 Gender and Cash Transfers 
As well as class biases, the veteran’s pension also has well-documented internal 
gender biases. Kent and Kinsella (2015) have pointed out how these eligibility 
criteria discriminate against women. For non-elites and women, the length of 
service criteria eliminates them from claims to veteran status, because they worked 
as subsistence farmers or cared for dependents during the war. As women were 
largely excluded from military leadership roles, they were also disqualified from 
generous pensions by the lack of rank. Even women leaders were initially excluded 
from the first veteran’s Commission and the reason given was that these women 
had held political, not military positions (Kent and Kinsella 2015, 480). The 
valorisation of armed masculinity is a lens which makes women’s work in war 
invisible (Kent and Wallis 2013). Roll heard a succinct description of the criteria 
for the pension: “‘If you didn’t carry a gun, you don’t get money’” (Roll 2015, 94). 
Members of Timorese women’s organisation lobbied against the narrow definition 
of a “veteran”. Because cash transfers are made based on valorising armed men, it 
is a view of war through a masculinist lens that excludes women. After this 
lobbying, the law was amended in 2009 to allow women to receive pensions. Still, 
only 13.5 percent of veterans’ pensions are transferred to women (Kent and Kinsella 
2015, 481). However, most of these female recipients of the veterans’ pension 
receive it on behalf of a deceased male relative, and these are the  least generous 
pensions of around $230 a month (Kent and Kinsella 2015, 481, Roll 2015, 104).  
Excising further claims by the citizenry on the state is particularly apparent in the 
lack of reparations to victims of SGBV during the Indonesian occupation. Most 
significantly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions’ recommendations for 
reparations to victims were not enacted, despite ongoing lobbying of the UN by 
Timorese NGOs (cf. Asia Justice and Rights 2017). As such, in independent Timor-
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Leste, veteran status is privileged whereas victim status is marginalised (Harris-
Rimmer 2010, Kent 2016, Rothschild 2017). These authors repeat the questions of 
Timorese women leaders like Maria Domingues-Alves:  “Why is it that the men 
who are tortured by military forces are seen as the heroes, whereas the women who 
are tortured (including rape) are seen as traitors?” (Harris-Rimmer 2010, 125, Kent 
2016). Again, as argued in Chapter 3 and following Kent, this reflects the deliberate 
strategy of associating men with heroism and armed masculinity and women as 
victims—and, because of the unfair stigma attached to the widespread sexual 
violence—as traitors (Kent 2016). In the field in 2015, this kind of sentiment was 
occasionally voiced. Serafina, a female village secretary, stated it most clearly: 
“Veterans get more money than women or victims of violence because the 
government thinks more of the heroes because they fought in the war”. 73  A 
masculinist lens is blind to the fact that, as I have shown in Chapter 3, SGBV was 
used as a weapon of war—an explicit war strategy with material costs and benefits. 
Many of those women subject to SGBV were targeted precisely because of their 
involvement with the resistance.   
An unequal gendered division of labour further validates diminishing women’s 
war-time contributions and their exclusion from a share of state resources. 
Therefore gender relations is a key ideological aspect of how the dominant class 
secures its position in independent Timor-Leste. Ex-President and current Prime 
Minister Taur Matan Ruak has stated that women “just sat there” during the war 
(Kent and Wallis 2013). This renders women’s crucial work in working in, feeding, 
clothing, and protecting the scattered guerrilla resistance and the clandestine 
movement, invisible. Overlooking and diminishing the value of women’s work is 
part-and-parcel of the “everyday” gender order. Again, village secretary Serafina 
questioned this: “I also question [the government’s] plans for veterans getting even 
more money because women are on the receiving end of violence and they have 
the children. I don't understand the government”.74 As Serafina suggests, dividing 
                                                 
73 Interview with  Serafina, Female Secretary of the Village, ET110, Oecusse, 4 August 2015.  
74 Interview with  Serafina, Female Secretary of the Village, ET110, Oecusse, 4 August 2015 
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who is deserving of state resources according to victim-versus-veteran was 
incomprehensible to women who see their labours and suffering go 
unacknowledged.  
Not only  veterans’ pensions, but the entire cash transfer system has inbuilt gender 
bias. Another cash transfer, the Bolsa da Mãe was the part of the New Deal targeted 
at women. The Bolsa da Mãe was transferred to vulnerable women, and for 
policymakers, this made it an intervention to support increasing “gender equality”,  
and reduce poverty (da Cruz 2014, 19). However, the recipients may be vulnerable 
mothers, but the targeted beneficiaries are their children. As such, although it is 
called an intervention for gender equality, it is not clear how the cash transfer was 
supposed to make this change. Rather, increased gender equality is here equated 
with “better” mothering outcomes.  
The cash transfer for mothers, Bolsa da Mãe, unlike the veterans’ pension, is means 
tested and conditional. It is only for “vulnerable” mothers—single and widowed 
mothers with children aged up to 17 years, that is, female-headed households were 
eligible (UNWomen 2015a). Like the Veterans’ Pension, the Bolsa da Mãe was run 
by the Ministry of Social Solidarity under the National Directorate for Social 
Reinsertion (DNRS) (da Cruz 2014). 75  The aim of Bolsa da Mãe is to reduce 
intergenerational poverty and improve education outcomes by giving a small 
amount of cash to vulnerable households. Similar CCTs have been rolled out by 
donors and governments in many countries.76 Broadly, the logic of CCTs is that 
making transfers conditional upon school attendance will reduce poverty because 
“higher levels of education will ultimately translate into higher salaries and better 
                                                 
75 DNRS is Direcão Nacional de Reinsercão Social or The National Directorate of Social Reinsertion in Tetun 
76 Conditional cash transfer programs are common worldwide. For instance, 19 out of 23 countries in Latin 
America have a CCT Program. The payment levels are always quite small, although all are much greater 
than the Timor-Leste program (Fernandes 2015). CCT programs include: Bolsa Familia in Brazil (started 
2003) with an average payment $50 per month; Juntos in Peru (started 2005) with an average payment $70 
per month;  Opportunidades in Mexico; Solidario in Chile (started 1992); and Asignación Universal por Hijo 
in Argentina (started 2009) (Saad-Filho 2015). 
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jobs and thus break the intergenerational transmission of poverty” (Ulrichs and 
Roelen 2012).  
A comparison of state spending on Bolsa da Mãe and veterans’ pension highlights 
the significant and ongoing gender injustice in the distribution of state resources. 
First, for the recipients, the veteran’s pensions are far more generous than Bolsa 
da Mãe. In 2011, veterans’ pensions were between $2,760 and $9,000 per annum 
(World Bank 2013, 3). The top pension is more than ten times the per capita 
monthly non-oil GDP in Timor-Leste. Bolsa da Mãe, in contrast, pays between $60 
and $180 per annum. Even the minimum veterans’ pension for a living veteran is 
$3312 a year, over forty times the average Bolsa da Mãe payment of $80 per annum 
(Fernandes 2015, n26).  Even measured in terms of the very modest Timorese 
national poverty line, which defines poverty as having an income of less than $0.88 
a day, the Bolsa da Mãe was too small to put a household above the poverty line 
(Fernandes 2015).  As a result, it was ineffective at reducing poverty. Moreover, as 
the current maximum amount payable is $15 per month ($5 per month per child) 
regardless of how many children are in the household, this lessens its impact 
because most families have more than three children.77 In rural areas, interviewees 
suggested that the high price of goods meant Bolsa da Mãe did not help the most 
vulnerable. 78  At the individual level, receiving a veteran’s pension placed an 
individual far above the poverty line, while Bolsa da Mãe barely helped a family to 
survive. In terms of the budget, significantly there is a vast gulf between the 
generosity of the veterans’ pension as shown in Figure 4.2 below.  
 
                                                 
77World Bank Development Indicators 2016: Fertility rate, total (births per woman)  
    https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=TL  
78 Interview with ET104 Village Chief, Oecusse, 30 July 2015 
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Figure 4.2 Spending on Veterans’ Pensions versus Bolsa da Mãe (2008-2016) 79 
Compared to Bolsa da Mãe, and all other cash transfers, veterans receive a much 
greater portion of the national budget, as shown in Figure 4.2 below. The budget 
for Bolsa da Mãe was $9m in 2014, whereas it was $90 million for veterans’ 
pensions.80 In 2016, budget spending on payments to veterans was tenfold the 
spending on Bolsa da Mãe. Veterans’ pensions account for a sizeable portion of the 
budget, averaging 5 percent of the total state budget since 2008. Moreover, 
veterans’ pensions consumed 60 percent of the Ministry of Social Solidarity 2015-
2016 budget. 81  Bolsa da Mãe ought to be an area strongly associated with the 
enactment of gender justice through the distribution of state resources to the most 
vulnerable. Yet, its inadequacy and small size compared to the veterans’ pension, 
                                                 
79 2015 Bolsa da Mãe figures are estimates from DNRS line budget in 2013 and 2015 budget books and therefore 
may include non-Bolsa da Mãe spending such as disability.  Data source:  Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste (2015b),  Lao Hamutuk (2016), and World Bank (2013).  
80 Some of the Bolsa da Mãe money went missing after being transferred to bank branches. Of the total budget 
of $9 million in 2014, in total, families did not receive $89,222 although it was paid into the BNCTL banks 
(da Cruz 2014). This is referred to as “leakage”.  
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reflects deep-seated social and gender inequalities. Illustrating dissatisfaction with 
cash transfers, the 2015 Timorese NGO Shadow report to CEDAW complained 
that:   
In the current 2015 State Budget, US$130.4 million has been allocated to 
cash payments to veterans, out of a total US$176.4 million allocated to 
the entire social welfare program. Women are marginalised from the 
veterans’ pension scheme and the very low investment in other social 
welfare programs for the poorest households has a disproportionate 
impact on women. This is only one example of the cumulative failure 
to address inequalities between women and men through Government 
policy” (JSMP, PRADET, and ALFeLa 2015, iii). 
Although aimed at vulnerable women, the same problems of elite capture seen in 
veterans’ pensions befall Bolsa da Mãe. Over the duration of the program, about 
40 percent of Bolsa da Mãe recipients did not meet the qualitative criteria 
stipulated by the law (Fernandes 2015). Female public servants, village chiefs wives, 
and veteran’s families received the payments (da Cruz 2014, 21).82  They were not 
the most vulnerable—single women, widows, with low incomes—for whom the 
program was intended. One reason for this is that public servants responsible for 
running the programs, and village chiefs (who are also members of the Liurai-Dato 
class), were responsible for disseminating information and choosing beneficiaries, 
appropriate or co-opt Bolsa da Mãe, as the Commissioners do for veterans’ 
pensions (World Bank 2013, da Cruz 2014, 21). Information about the program 
failed to reach the community, especially communities in remote areas. Very few 
poor women I interviewed in rural areas had heard of the program, and even fewer 
had received it, despite meeting the criteria. Deep-seated social inequalities are 
also reflected in the targeting, outcomes and corruption in the veterans’ pensions 
and Bolsa da Mãe. 
                                                 
82 The statement in the report is: “Sistema selesaun ba benefisarias nebe balun sidauk tuir kriterius Bolsa Mae 
(Ex. Inan-Aman Funsionariu publiku hetan benefisiu husi Programa Bolsa Mae”; or “The system of selection 
of some beneficiaries does not follow the criteria of Bolsa Mae (For example, Sir and Madam public servants 
receive benefits from the Bolsa Mae Program)” (da Cruz 2014, 21). 
CLASS, GENDER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES 2007-2017  
133 
Given these points, there has been extensive elite capture of all the cash transfer 
programs pointing to the centrality of state resources in securing the political 
order. Across all cash transfer programs, there has been significant “leakage” of 
monies to non-veterans and the non-poor. These have been portrayed as technical 
problems of implementation (World Bank 2013, Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi 
2014). Roll has argued that the state plays a key role in deciding who has access 
(Roll 2015, 17). I agree with Roll, but I go further in arguing that the state itself is 
comprised of members of the Liurai-Dato class. Members of this class shape the 
implementation and outcomes of veterans pensions and Bolsa da Mãe to their 
benefit. The preceding sections have shown that gender and class intersect over 
the distribution of state resources. The following section goes beyond these 
contextual political economies to illustrate the gender intervention seeking to 
tackle gender bias in the distribution of state resources, Gender Responsive 
Budgeting.  
4.4 The Case of Gender Responsive Budgeting  
Gender Responsive Budgeting is a gender intervention designed remedy the 
distribution of state resources and mainstream gender in budgetary policy. GRB is 
a tool of analyses and planning for budgetary policy. The aim of GRB is that policies 
that contribute to women’s well-being and increase women’s empowerment ought 
to be well funded by the state, and policies that detract from women’s well-being, 
or amplify men’s power, or gender inequality, ought not to be funded. This results 
in a budget that is responsive to the areas requiring more gender equality. GRB can 
include the creation of new, costed policies, funding commitments on national 
action plans on gender and women’s empowerment, and accountability 
mechanisms to ensure money was spent where it was committed. Another aim of 
GRB is to create gender-disaggregated data and time use statistics improving 
information on the gendered nature of the economy  (UNIFEM 2009). As feminist 
economic analysts have long argued, the gendered distribution of state resources 
sustains generalised impoverishment and gender inequality (Elson 1993).  GRB has 
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been promoted by international donors since the 1990s because it was increasingly 
recognised that “decision-making behind taxation policies and the distribution of 
public financial resources is highly gendered, as is their impact” (UNIFEM 2009, 
17, Costa 2018).  Overall then, GRB seeks to make governments accountable for 
ensuring their budgets promote the achievement of gender equality and women’s 
rights, especially among the poor (UNIFEM 2009). Many countries piloted GRB 
initiatives, but few proceeded to implementation (Costa 2018, 16). Timor-Leste has 
implemented a few, related kinds of GRB that overall aimed to make the budget 
more responsive to gender inequality (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010c).  
The introduction of GRB in Timor-Leste faced setbacks initially. In the Timor-
Leste case, the introduction of Gender Responsive Budgeting was linked to two 
other gender interventions: increasing women’s political participation in national 
parliament including the introduction of gender quotas for parliament, and 
subsequently, the creation of the women’s parliamentary caucus, the Group of 
Women Parliamentarians in Timor-Leste (henceforth, Women’s Cross-Party 
Caucus). The first efforts to mainstream gender in budgetary decision making, and 
thus a precursor to GRB, came the attempt to establish a standing parliamentary 
commission for gender affairs, equality and children.  The legislation went before 
the parliament in 2004, and was defeated. Reportedly, it lost the vote because 
establishing a commission especially for women was considered by some 
parliamentarians as discriminatory against men (Soetjipto 2014, 34). The defeat 
showed that introduction of GRB would be difficult. Subsequently, Timorese 
Parliament did pass a resolution to include gender equality, but as one of several 
issues presided over by Parliamentary Commissions’ E (2007-2012) and F (2012-
2017).83 
Next, UNWomen held workshops on GRB with the national parliament and UNDP 
in 2008. Following these workshops, Gusmão’s IV Constitutional Government 
                                                 
83 Parliamentary commissions, in the Timorese political system, are permanent standing committees charged 
with jurisdiction over specific areas of lawmaking. 
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issued a Gender Budget Statement for the  2008 and 2009 budgets (Costa 2018, 3). 
Gender Budget Statements are documents or sections of documents that highlight 
how budget spending or revenue promote gender equality (Budlender 2015). The 
2009-2010 “Gender and Culture Statement”, urged the consideration of gender in 
the formulation of departmental annual action plans. The aims of GRB in this case 
was to mainstream gender across the policies and programs of government 
departments.  In association with the statements, the Gender Working Group and 
the Women’s Cross Party Caucus worked to ensure GRB was implemented 
correctly. 
Then the national parliament made Resolution No. 12/2010 instituting a gender-
sensitive budget. Again, this was initially resisted by male member of parliament 
who “ argued that GRB could be construed as special treatment for women” and 
was thus anti-gender equality” (Costa 2015, 107). In the text of Resolution 12/2010, 
the government justifies the introduction of a gender sensitive budget because 
gender equality considerations contribute to “growth and prosperity”, helping 
Timor-Leste reach its social and economic objectives. However, Resolution 12/2010 
interpreted gender as an essentialised sex difference—that women had different 
concerns and needs compared to men (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 
2010a). It did not see gender as involving power relations, and thus did not address 
this. Further, the National Parliament Resolution No. 12/2010 on GRB explicitly 
precludes creating separate budget lines (Portuguese: rubrica orçamental 
separada). The exclusion of separate line items limits the ability to do gender 
disaggregated spending. Consequently, the “line budget does not match their 
programs and [the gender working group] needs a lot of follow up work to really 
track budgets to activities”.84 Likewise, Costa, Sharp and Austen describe “some 
resistance to translating gender equality into detailed policy and budget 
allocations” (Costa, Sharp, and Austen 2009). Lastly, then-President Ramos-Horta 
issued a Presidential Decree No. 13/2010 urging the Timorese Government, 
                                                 
84 Interview with a female international UN manager, ET076, 6 June 2015. 
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through the Ministry of Finance, to implement budgetary policy rules that take 
into account gender equality.   
All through this period, gender mainstreaming of budgets—ensuring that 
spending policy addressed gender equality—was primarily conducted by 
parliamentary institutions, such as the Women’s Cross Party Caucus, and  
Commissions E and F,  or the government’s gender equality office, the  Secretariat 
of State for the Support and Socio-Economic Promotion for Women (SEM). SEM, 
not the more powerful finance ministry, has reviewed the action plans 
accompanying each ministry’s budget (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2014, 
77). This meant GRB was a limited internal process during this period.  
However, the Gender Budget Statements accompanying each budget did not 
continue. Instead, the Timorese parliament established the Gender Working 
Group and a Women’s Cross-Party Caucus to use tools of GRB to monitor budget 
spending and implementation.85The Gender Working Group comprised Timorese 
women’s organisations with technical assistance from UNWomen perform GRB by 
examining the draft national budget, budget execution and implementation.86 At 
this point then, the involvement of civil society organisations meant GRB became 
a “social accountability” tool “to hold public officials answerable for their 
behaviour” (Rodan and Hughes 2012, 367).  On the parliamentary side, the 
Women’s Cross Party Caucus was established by Parliament in 2011 to introduce, 
implement, and monitor gender mainstreaming in national institutions (see Table 
2.2 Gender Interventions in Timor-Leste 2001-2017). One of the main roles of the 
Women’s Cross-Party Caucus was advocacy in parliament and parliamentary 
commissions for gender-sensitive policies, and for proper implementation of 
already introduced policies.87  Gender Working Group and UNWomen also used 
GRB at the government department level to monitor departmental Action Plans 
on gender-sensitive spending. The Gender Working Group monitoring involved 
                                                 
85 The Gender Working Group was established under Government Resolution 27/2011.  
86 Interview with a female Timorese NGO senior manager, ET077, 5 June 2015. 
87 Interview with a member of the Women’s Cross Party Caucus, ET085, 11 June 2015.  
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evaluating budgets and spending using an existing system of gender focal points 
within departments, usually with Director Generals.88  After 2010, no more budget 
statements were issued, and since that period, GRB has become more internal, 
technocratic and ineffective, mirroring reductions in budget transparency across 
the board (Lao Hamutuk 2016, 3).  
Yet, civil society based monitoring separate from parliamentary procedure was not 
able to achieve concrete gender sensitive budgeting. As one member of the Gender 
Working Group put it in 2015, civil society involvement was just a process of 
rubber-stamping the budget:  “they just ask us to come and give input at the end. 
It is just a formality. They do not implement it”.89 This recalls other examples of 
the limitations of participatory budgeting in Southeast Asia which  “has largely 
been […] on the basis of directing civil society energies toward demanding 
technical and administrative tasks to improve governance” (Rodan and Hughes 
2012, 372). Equally, the 2015 NGO shadow report to CEDAW complains 
government measures with respect to gender equality have not been concerned 
with effecting real change. Chiefly, “while the Government expresses its 
commitment to gender mainstreaming through various gender-working groups 
and gender-responsive budgeting, successive budgets since 2009 have not 
included any gender equality impact assessments” (JSMP, PRADET, and ALFeLa 
2015). Thus, despite rhetoric around gender budgeting, for the most part there has 
been little real accountability on outcomes. I turn to the explanations of these now.  
Academic and practitioner literature often cites capacity, technical reasons or 
timing as factors constraining GRB (Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi 2014, World 
Bank 2013). An oft-cited shortcoming of GRB is lack of capacity—of GRB analysts 
or state institutions—but, as Budlender argues, this is “accompanied by and can 
be a screen for—political resistance” to GRB (Budlender 2015, 41).  The orthodox 
view among economists working on post-conflict states is that GRB is not 
                                                 
88 Interview with a female international UN manager, ET076, 6 June 2015. 
89 Interview with a female Timorese NGO Senior manager, ET077, 5 June 2015. 
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compatible with post-conflict states’ lack of capacity. It holds that a complex policy 
tool like GRB should be postponed until the state is more stable and prosperous  
(Costa 2018). I argue in the following section that although technical and 
informational barriers exists, other factors are more crucial. Poor outcomes for 
GRB are a result of an unwillingness to introduce and implement GRB, or the 
necessary strategic compromises and prioritisation by GRB advocates and the 
outright capture of state resources by the Liurai-Dato class.  
One reason for disappointing outcomes on GRB lies with political opposition to 
reforms. Advocates for progressive gender reforms from Timorese women’s 
organisations regularly faced opposition to lobbying for more resources for 
women. Opposition even came from within the ministries they considered to be 
receptive to gender equality. For instance, a gender advocate recalled a 
conversation about what she saw as the disproportionate spending on veterans 
compared to victims of violence. The former Vice-Minister of Social Solidarity, one 
of the ministries most friendly to gender perspectives, said in regards to 
reparations to female victims of violence: “‘I do not agree with these points about 
gender equality’”. It was the gender advocate’s opinion that many male sitting 
members of parliament and ministers alike ignored or sidelined the plight of 
women, especially victims of violence.90 Given such opposition, Timorese women’s 
organisations know that their agenda is contentious and male decision makers are 
likely to oppose them if they take an explicitly feminist approach. Therefore, they 
moderate or reframe their argument. For instance, a Timorese gender advocate 
reported telling male parliamentarians and bureaucrats that gender is “simply” 
about women making their own decisions because women and men's experiences 
are not the same. She continued:  
But we do not say feminist, because if this enters into the conversation, 
they say we are against men. They say we want women to be able to do 
anything they want. Sometimes in Timor, they see the word feminist as 
too extreme. […] That is why you still have to have the NGOs who 
                                                 
90 Interview with a female Timorese NGO Senior manager, ET078, 6 June 2015. 
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understand these problems. The view is that feminism is something 
bad”.91 
Legal anthropologist Merry explains this in the following terms. When “local” 
women’s organisations take up international norms on women’s human rights, 
they need to “translate” them for a domestic context (Merry 2006, 39). Merry takes 
this “translation” to comprise a process whereby “new ideas are framed and 
presented regarding existing cultural norms, values, and practices” (Merry 2006, 
39). On this view, translation from global to local contexts results in “hybrid 
feminist discourse”, which, by drawing on authentic local tradition, is more 
legitimate, making feminist actions more effective  (Merry 2006, 39). While this 
accords with ideas in the local turn, I argue these are political rather than 
translational acts. When Timorese women’s groups avoid using the term feminist, 
rather than performing acts of “translation”, it instead represents political 
compromises with male decision-makers. As described in the above quote, they 
work politically to avoid being branded anti-men for advocating “women can do 
anything they want”, which is considered “too extreme” and for which they may 
face (violent) reprisals. In other words, advocates reframe the argument to 
downplay the challenges to male power but also secure some victories. As a further 
illustration, in the face of GRBs disappointing outcomes,  since 2011, the Gender 
Working Group and the Women’s Cross Party Caucus have made a strategic 
decision to focus only on the budget for the implementation of the 2010 Law 
Against Domestic Violence (LADV) (Costa 2018), the subject of the next section.  
4.4.1 Why Does GRB Have Dissappointing Outcomes? 
Technical constraints regarding a lack of data often comes up when disccussing  
GRB’s outcomes in Timor-Leste. In their monitoring of spending on the LADV, a 
member of the Gender Working Group confirmed the lack of data and line 
responsibility obstructed GRB.   Firstly, she said, only two out of seven responsible 
                                                 
91 Interview with female Timorese NGO Senior manager, ET082, 8 June 2015. 
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line ministries (the Secretariat of State for Security and the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity) could show her where they had spent the money allocated for the 
LADV. This is significant because this monitoring is an area the Gender Working 
Group has focused on since 2011. The Secretariat of State for Security, who had 
budget allocated to support the Vulnerable Person’s Unit, a special police unit for 
victims of GBV had easily traceable spending. However:  
Other ministries, like Education and Health, Justice, they simply said 
this money is for the implementation of the LADV, and there was no 
line budgeting, we do not know what money is for training. After a year 
of implementation, we asked Justice, for example, how much is 
allocated for training on anger management for the prisoners? And they 
said they did not know how much they allocated. They told us to ask 
Finance, but they did not know. Then we asked the Director General, 
who lead the Gender Working group in each ministry, but sometimes 
they are very busy. And then we asked for their spending data, which is 
a difficult thing for them. We [the Gender Working Group] also don't 
have time to look at that.92  
Thus, there was a disconnect between budget allocation, planning and expenditure 
in some ministries, even though departmental Director Generals, as Gender Focal 
Points, were responsible for implementing GRB.93 More problematically, spending 
earmarked for measures to improve women’s access to security under the LADV, 
for instance, was used for other items on an ad hoc basis. The Gender Working 
Group member continued:  
Then, there is a conflict between areas of spending in the budget. The 
departments prioritise other things. They might have marked it for the 
LADV, but then they put it into other things. There's a new priority.94 
Re-allocation of funds suggests not merely an inability to track item expenditure, 
but a more general problem in departments, including those prioritising gender. 
                                                 
92 Interview with a female Timorese NGO senior manager, ET082, 8 June 2015. 
93 Interview with a female international UN manager, ET076, 6 June 2015; and Costa, Sharp, and Austen 
(2009), Costa (2010).  
94 Interview with a female Timorese NGO senior manager, ET082, 8 June 2015. 
CLASS, GENDER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF STATE RESOURCES 2007-2017  
141 
Another and related reason for poor outcomes on GRB is that tracking spending is 
not merely a technical issue. The lack of transparency and state-capacity merge 
with corruption, social hierarchy, and gender ideology. The lack of transparency 
in spending is coupled with political contests over state resources, which leads to 
the limited implementation of GRB. Spending is the real issue. The example of 
budgets in the Vulnerable Persons’ Unit (VPU), the front line police unit in the 
implementation of the LADV, illustrates this. In a review of the national police 
(PNTL) budget, the Gender Working Group recommended the VPU should have 
a new vehicle to serve victims of gender-based violence in a rural district. The 
government granted the VPU’s request. When the vehicle arrived in the rural 
district, the male police commander simply took the car. When the Gender 
Working Group complained to the line ministry, the Secretariat of State for 
Security, the Minister told the working group his department could not order the 
Commander to return the car to the VPU because it was “the hierarchy, the 
structure” of the PNTL.95 In the face of such evidence, it is the actual spending of 
state resources, not the budgeting of them, according to the interests of dominant 
members of social and gender hierarchies, which make the distribution of state 
resources so uneven. 
Those advocates engaged in GRB are largely from the Liurai-Dato class, which has 
also tended to limit the  radical redistribution of state resources to poor women. 96  
As in earlier Portuguese and Indonesian periods, membership of the Liurai-Dato 
class allows members of that class to leverage their social status to contend for jobs 
and resources at the national level: in NGOs, government or political parties. 
Because the Liurai-Dato class dominate paid employment in public and NGO 
sectors in Dili, members of that elite also dominate the Timorese women’s 
movement. For example, Maria Maia dos Reis e Costa, Member of Parliament from 
2007 to 2012 was the daughter of a Liurai in Baucau (Loney 2015). Ilda Maria da 
Conceição, FRETILIN Member of Parliament from 2001-2007 and re-elected in 
                                                 
95 Interview with a female Timorese NGO senior manager, ET082, 8 June 2015. 
96 Interview data. June to September 2015.  
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2017, was the daughter of a Liurai in Viqueque. Female members of the Liurai-Dato 
class also filled better-paid jobs in Timorese women’s organisations and NGOs, 
paralleling Liurai-Dato men’s dominance of military and government jobs. 
Notably, a significant number of women’s NGO leaders are direct descendants of 
Liurai. For example, a president of women’s NGO umbrella organisation Rede Feto 
is the granddaughter of the Liurai of Baucau. Laura Pina Menzes Lopes of the Liurai 
of Maubisse led PATRIA, an organisation that works with UNWomen to raise 
women’s political participation. After the 2017 election, Lopes entered parliament 
as a candidate for FRETILIN and became Secretary of State for Gender Equality 
and Social Inclusion. Another head of a prominent Timorese microfinance 
organisation, and political party member, is the descendant of a Liurai. 
Importantly to this analysis, like their male counterparts, most female members of 
parliament were members of the resistance. One parliamentarian suggested that: 
“Many of them come from the resistance. I think 70 percent of the women in 
Parliament are from the resistance era”. 97  Again, this confirms the overlap 
described in Chapter 3 whereby many of the resistance leadership were from the 
Liurai-Dato class. 
As a result of their patriarchal bargain with men of their class, Timorese women’s 
organisations and parliamentarians did not always challenge the gender injustices 
in cash transfers. As members of the Liurai-Dato class, which overlaps with 
resistance and political party  leadership, women working on GRB benefit from the 
current distribution of state resources that are ideologically justified through the 
valorisation of armed resistance. Quite often, women in parliament and civil 
society receive the veterans’ pension on behalf of a family member, or a male family 
member receives it (Kent 2016). Members of the Timorese women’s movement 
have at times adhered to an ideology that valorised armed masculinity, even while 
sidelined within it. 
                                                 
97 Interview with a female Timorese NGO Senior manager, ET077, 5 June 2015. 
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Gender responsive budgeting has not yet been used to dimish the gender injustice 
in cash transfers programs. In that sense, the aims of GRB to mainstream gender 
in the policies and programs of government departments, in this case, the Ministry 
of Social Solidarity, has not worked. A female member of parliament argued the 
reason for this was that the distribution of cash transfers could not be linked or 
compared but comprised two “separate” issues. She said: “You cannot say, this 
person was a victim of Indonesia, nor was a victim of some other kind violence. 
For the veterans’ pensions, we do not look at whether someone was a victim in the 
past”. The female MP argued that the needs of vulnerable women were being met 
through the Bolsa da Mãe, and, understandably, that progress on poverty 
reduction could not happen overnight.98  The issue of cash transfers to veterans 
being prioritised over victims of SGBV or other vulnerable women thus seemed to 
find little traction among the Women’s Cross-Party Caucus.   
Moreover, the gendered shortcomings of Bolsa da Mãe have not been addressed in 
GRB. These shortcomings include the fact that the beneficiaries of Bolsa da Mãe  
are children, not women; that the transfer is too small; and lastly, that 
conditionality measures in conditional cash transfers like Bolsa da Mãe are often 
experienced as coercive and disempowering by the poor (Rabinovich and 
Diepeveen 2015). To be fair, some of these deeper, structural kinds of flaws that 
authors have described in  Latin American cases (Barrientos 2017, Saad-Filho 2015)  
have also not yet been addressed in practitioner discussions of the Timorese Bolsa 
da Mãe  (World Bank 2013). The World Bank (2013) has recommended the rate paid 
under the Bolsa da Mãe ought to be increased. Even so, given the centrality of cash 
tranfers and the “politics of memory” to the nature of the Timroese state, a slight 
increase in the rate of a conditional cash transfers would not interrupt the 
gendered distribution of state resources to privileged groups. Although GRB gave 
political authority to the Women’s Cross Party Caucus and civil society to 
                                                 
98 Interview with a member of the Women’s Cross Party Caucus, ET085, 11 June 2015. 
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scrutinise the budget, focussing on technical and administrative outcomes of the 
LADV the scope of GRB.  
Another area of state spending that has considerable gendered impacts, but has 
not been part of GRB is physical infrastructure projects such as the ports, airports, 
roads, oil refineries and hotels built in Timor-Leste since 2007. These 
infrastructure projects have been politicised and part of patrimonial networking, 
in smaller electrification projects as I described above, but also in the largest 
projects (Scambary 2015). For example, Gusmão has been personally responsible 
for spending on a series of hundred million dollar projects, first under the National 
Program for Village Development (PNDS) (2012-2015) and then as infrastructure 
minister (2015-2017). Surprisingly to some, Gusmão’s rival from FRETILIN, Alkatiri, 
was given carriage of the hundred million dollar project to develop physical 
infrastructure in Oecusse to enable it to become a free trade zone. The Women’s 
Cross-Party Caucus has supported these high levels of physical infrastructure 
spending, despite criticism of its unequal gendered impacts from Timorese 
women’s organisations and gender experts (Centre for Women and Gender Studies 
2014, UNWomen 2015a). For instance, a female FRETILIN member of the Caucus 
described the Caucus’ support for ZEESMs as setting the conditions for market-led 
development:  
The Women’s Cross-Party Caucus also approved the money for 
ZEESMs. […] The people in ZEESMs are not going to make the factories, 
they are not allowed. This is about creating the conditions. This means 
building basic infrastructure. This is to make a public-private 
partnership, to make an investment, ZEESMs has to start at the 
beginning—basic infrastructure—to create the conditions in order that 
investors come. 99 
At the individual level, state distribution in favour of men through jobs in 
infrastructure means women have less control over resources and must access 
money through men (UNWomen 2015a). At the national budget level, spending 
                                                 
99Interview with a member of the Women’s Cross Party Caucus, ET085, 11 June 2015. 
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limited resources on physical infrastructure rather than health, water access and 
girl’s education takes money away from areas that improve women’s maternal well-
being. Indeed, spending on health and education in Timor-Leste is low. According 
to Lao Hamutuk’s budget submission 
The health sector receives only 4.2% of the total budget, while 
education receives 8.7%, although the number of children reaching pre-
primary and primary school-age has increased dramatically, there is a 
severe lack of equipment and medicine, and disease is widespread (Lao 
Hamutuk 2016) 
Thus, although infrastructure spending in Timor-Leste was an area that would 
have benefitted from GRB, the Women’s Cross-Party Caucus has not yet been 
publicly critical of the gendered distribution of resources in infrastructure 
spending.  
Another reason for the limitations of GRB is that international staff working on 
gender interventions, like all interveners, worked with members of the Timorese 
elite, rather than with a broader cross section of society. International UN staff 
members working in Timor-Leste were aware class privilege of Timorese women’s 
organisations. As one manager acknowledged, “the people who work for us are the 
elite”. 100 Another female UN manager observed that in Timor-Leste, similar to 
women’s movements in Malaysia and Indonesia, women’s “organising is still 
middle-class oriented and city-centred” with notable grassroots exceptions.101 The 
implications for international gender experts often “didn’t know what was going 
on”102 and they were reliant on Timorese women’s organisations as partners to 
implement their programs. Further, as these Timorese women’s organisations have 
long served as “conduits of information, preferences to governments, and suppliers 
of government or market services” they have shaped the focus of GRB in 
accordance with their political compromises and interests, narrowing its scope 
                                                 
100 Interview with female international manager at the UN ET076, 6 June 2015. 
101 Interview with female international senior manager at the UN, ET152, 9 September 2015. 
102 Interview with female international manager at the UN ET076, 6 June 2015. 
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(Rittich 2006, 223). Overall, international interveners were in no position to 
neutralise the role of class in shaping GRB outcomes. In the case of GRB in Timor-
Leste, because female members of the political elite (with overlapping identities as 
members of the  Liurai-Dato class and of the resistance) control and carry out GRB, 
they do not challenge the prevailing hierarchies in the distribution of state 
resources as it currently benefits them and their families. It is possible that GRB, 
like other participatory budgeting measures, can inadvertently, despite the goals 
of participants  “help preserve existing power hierarchies and limit the scope for 
critical evaluation of prevailing reform agendas” (Rodan and Hughes 2012, 368). 
Costa has similarly shown that, despite “codification” in budget processes, 
“traditional gender politics and ways of prioritizing and allocating resources have 
continued to undermine positive change” (Costa 2015, 208). 
The nature of the state, made up of members of Liurai-Dato (as I describe above), 
shaped by the historical monopolisation of resources by armed men (that I 
described in Chapter 3) comprise the context within which gender interventions 
take place. The greatest barrier to a gender just distribution of state resources has 
been a gendered class process that enables their monopolisation by groups of elite 
men, justified by the ideology valorising armed masculinity. Leaving the 
distribution of state resources out of GRB limits its outcomes for gender justice.  
4.5 Conclusion 
As this chapter has outlined, Timorese gender advocates face an upward battle in 
using GRB, and outcomes of GRB must be seen in the context of elite dominance. 
On the technical side, government accountability through the GRB process was 
limited by the lack of gender-disaggregated budget data. GRB was a process largely 
internal to government, with external gender experts called on to “rubber stamp” 
GRB, rather than contribute decision making on state resources. Bureaucrats 
stymied gender sensitive spending for gender-political reasons, although this is 
often couched in terms of a lack of institutional capacity. Most importantly to this 
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chapter, despite positive rhetoric and important advocacy, GRB must be seen in 
the context of elite monopoly of state resources. An obvious example of this was 
the gendered distribution of state resources through veterans’ pensions. Veterans’ 
pensions went to members of the Liurai-Dato class. In addition, the Gusmão 
government used veterans’ pensions as a way to build a coalition with local 
members of the Liurai-Dato class. Men outside the narrow, Dili based elite, were 
enrolled to build support for the government, limit opposition, and ameliorate 
land use conflicts in the government’s favour, again a continuation of earlier 
historical patterns of rule. Paying veterans pensions was justified ideologically by 
the valorisation of armed masculinity, which precluded recognition of and 
redistribution to women, even though in reality, men who did not “carry a gun” 
received pensions. Female members of parliament, women’s organisations and 
NGOs were predominantly from the Liurai-Dato class. Their membership of this 
class limited their advocacy. It was unlikely elite women would press for radical 
redistribution because they benefitted materially and ideologically from their 
association with armed masculinity, even as it excluded them. As a result, women’s 
organisations made a politically strategic decision to focus on government 
accountability for spending on the LADV and scope of GRB narrowed.  
The chapter aims made several contributions to the study of gender relations in 
post-conflict zones. The critique of gendered budgets and cash transfers in Timor-
Leste is well established (Wallis 2015, Kent and Wallis 2013, Wallis 2012b, Niner 
2016, 2017). This chapter built on these works and Costa’s (2018) analysis of GRB in 
Timor-Leste by contextualising the distribution of state resources in the structural 
political economy of Timor-Leste. Concerning this study’s proposition locating the 
cause of uneven outcomes in structural factors of class and gender, the chapter 
examined interests, ideology, and resilience of the Liurai-Dato class. This analysis 
provided a more complete explanation of the uneven results of gender 
intervention and clarified how these were justified by the valorisation of armed 
masculinity. The chapter set forth a unique contribution, contextualising gender 
interventions as structured by elite dominance. Lastly, this chapter brings together 
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insights from feminist security studies—that state and non-state actors prioritise 
violent men after conflict (Elias 2015, Goetz and Jenkins 2016)—with the study of 
GRB in feminist economics that has long drawn the link between gender sensitive 
spending and increasing welfare and gender justice (Elson 1993).  
Returning to the central research question of the thesis—accounting for uneven 
outcomes from gender interventions—GRB using a gender justice lens could entail 
a radical challenge to state distributional patterns to ensure the ending of material 
inequalities between women and men that result in women's subordination to 
men. However, such a redistribution would transfer state resources away from the 
control of men of the Liurai-Dato class. As we saw, distribution of state resources 
plays an important role cementing a rural urban alliance veteran alliance. As a 
result of these vested interests in keeping the current socio-political order that 
GRB as a gender intervention had uneven outcomes, with some successes but little 
overall impact on the gendered distribution of state resources. Similarly, the 
gender intervention Bolsa da Mãe had little support. On the ground, like the 
veteran’s pension, it was primarily captured by elites. Its impact on Timor’s high 
levels of poverty has been negligible. With this in mind, the gendered distribution 
of state resources burdened Timorese women with more work and responsibility 
and failed to alleviate the economic stress faced by households. The lack of state 
resources has real everyday impacts on all areas of life. It also sets the conditions 
for high levels of violence against women, to which the subsequent chapters turn.  
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CHAPTER 5.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter now moves away from the discussion of state power and distribution 
to a lower level of governance and law, the introduction and implementation of a 
law criminalising domestic violence, the 2010 Law Against Domestic Violence 
(LADV). The LADV was the most ambitious and controversial area of gender 
intervention as domestic and international coalitions took up strong positions 
both for and against it. It took ten years of national and international advocacy to 
pass the law and women’s organisations are proud of this achievement. Outcomes 
of the LADV have been uneven. There are new women’s shelters in the districts 
run by women’s organisations and funded by the government under the 2012 
National Action Plan to fund and implement the LADV (UNWomen 2015b, Kniepe 
2013). Legal aid and evidence gathering has improved and community awareness 
that domestic violence is a public crime and not a private issue between couples 
has grown. On the other hand, funding for the LADV remains precarious, police 
and lawyers have not implemented recommendations, few women access formal 
justice and violence against women, including domestic violence, remains very 
high. This is not surprising in the post-conflict context but still warrants 
explanation. The chapter aims to explain the reasons for these uneven outcomes 
by looking at the governance of domestic violence. It does so by moving away from 
the level of the state, to the research question: what have been the experiences of 
rural women of programs aimed to promote women’s empowerment—in this case, 
the LADV.  
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Scholars and practitioners of the local turn in peacebuilding argue the explanation 
of ongoing conflict and violence lay in the disconnect between local and 
international institutions, cultures, and practices. As a result, some scholars take 
what Millar terms a “prescriptive” view of hybridity, and suggest that ongoing 
violence and conflict in society could be reduced by a hybrid justice system (Millar 
2014). In the Timor case, hybrid peacebuilding found the greatest purchase and 
accepted definition as a blend of formal processes and traditional dispute 
resolution processes for resolving crimes in the community mediated by village 
leaders, but chiefly for cases of domestic violence. Scholars and practitioners of the 
local turn justified the hybrid system as pragmatic, cheaper, and more culturally 
legitimate. International peacebuilders and local elites supported these hybrid 
approaches. As a result, peacebuilding programs incorporated hybrid approaches 
into justice in reconciliation and justice programs and into national laws. In 
practice, the local turn in peacebuilding ideologically strengthened coalitions in 
parliament keen to oppose the LADV, and related programs that inadvertently 
helped legitimise village elites’ control of traditional dispute resolution in cases of 
domestic violence. As such, it negatively affected the introduction and 
implementation of the LADV. 
The central argument of this chapter describes the political economy of domestic 
violence that results in uneven outcomes for the LADV as a gender intervention. 
As was argued in Chapters 2 through 4, the causes of uneven outcomes are 
historically-specific power and gender relations in Timor-Leste. The chapter 
argues that these historically specific relations of power are grounded in social 
relations of control over resources, and, in gender relations, control over women. 
Such a position is in contrast to scholars urging a local turn and a hybrid 
framework. I follow feminist scholars who have argued the use of traditional 
dispute resolution was problematic for women’s rights in post-conflict Timor-
Leste (Swaine 2003, Harris-Rimmer 2010, Myrttinen 2005). This chapter, however, 
makes an intersectional argument, that in the case of hybrid approaches to justice, 
advocates for hybrid peace reproduced the gender and class bias of Timorese elites 
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and village leaders. Using a structural feminist political economy analysis, I show 
that traditional dispute resolution in cases of domestic violence has been 
problematic for gender justice because perpetrators, village leaders, as well as 
uncles and fathers of victims, materially benefit from traditional dispute 
resolution. This happens as male leaders and family members are compensated 
with cash and animals when a woman experiences male partner violence. Male 
perpetrators can also buy impunity and avoid formal prosecution or any 
punishment. Thus, supporting local approaches to traditional dispute resolution 
assists those who materially benefit from the continuation of violence against 
women. In analytical terms, it inadvertently supports a political economy of 
domestic violence.  
5.2 Domestic Violence and Traditional Dispute Resolution 
Rates of domestic violence—violence committed against women by their male 
intimate partners (Tetun: Violensia Domestika)—have remained high in Timor-
Leste after independence. While global rates of Violence Against Women (VAW) 
were estimated at around 30 percent of ever-partnered women experiencing 
domestic violence, the Timorese rate is higher and with more repeat incidences 
(García-Moreno et al. 2005). In 2013, three years after the promulgation of the 
LADV, the overwhelming majority of domestic violence cases in the courts (352 in 
four of thirteen districts) were perpetrated “against women by their husbands or 
intimate partners”; only six percent involved female perpetrators. Thus, domestic 
violence in Timor-Leste is case of male violence against women. Domestic violence 
is common and regular; around 60 percent of women experience domestic 
violence and 50 percent of women within the last 12 months (The Asia Foundation 
2016).103 These figures are part of a pattern of widespread use of violence by male 
partners towards women, as evidenced by the figure that 81 percent of women in 
                                                 
103  Earlier estimates of the prevalence and severity of domestic violence in Timor-Leste were probably 
underestimated (The Asia Foundation 2016). 
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Timor-Leste who have experienced domestic violence have experienced this 
violence many times (The Asia Foundation 2016).  
Domestic violence had traditionally been handled at family and village levels. 
Traditional dispute resolution, also called adat or lisan, is a non-state, non-
criminal process for resolving law-breaking in the community, entirely controlled 
by male village leaders.104 Traditional dispute resolution processes nearly always 
exclude women from acting as mediators or even giving evidence  (Myrttinen 
2005). Women are instead represented by their fathers, brothers or uncles. These 
same men are usually also formal political position holders as Village Head, 
(Tetun: Xefe Suku) or Hamlet Head (Tetun: Xefe Aldeia). 
As Chapter 3 on class formation outlined, the Liurai-Dato class has retained 
leadership of Timorese villages over generations. A revival of tradition generally 
across Timor-Leste is visible and “akin to the renewed significance of adat in 
Indonesia and kastom in Melanesia” (Bovensiepen 2014a, 294).  The most visible 
manifestation of this claim to power since Independence was the (re) construction 
of sacred houses (Tetun: uma lulik)(Bovensiepen 2014a, McWilliam 2005, Molnar 
2010). The most formalised manifestation of the claim of village elites’ right to rule 
has been through local governance reform, specifically, the already mentioned 
laws governing community leaders and their election (Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste 2009). Since 2009, (and re-written in 2016) new laws on local 
government have (re)formalised rule of the village by Liurai or Dato, because, 
although nominally democratic, village leaders come from Liurai-Dato class, or 
what Cummins and Leach (2012) call a “co-incumbency” model where the village 
                                                 
104 There has been debate over which term best describes traditional law and practice in Timor-Leste. Adat 
the Indonesian-derived term has wide currency;  Lisan the Tetun term for traditional law and practice has 
been less well recognised in Timor-Leste, but preferred by some writers, including a key informant of the 
local turn, Josh Trindade Trindade (2008); Lulik (Tetun), meaning  “sacred” in Tetun, also describes specific 
aspects of customary practice, including taboos. I concur with Hicks’ definition that adat is the term most 
commonly  used in Timor-Leste which also “includes rules that govern the inheritance of property, spouse 
eligibility, ritual etiquette, taboo observance tara bandu, land ownership, political authority, sanctions, 
[history], oral literature and cosmology” (Hicks 2013, 27).  
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chief is also from a Liurai or Dato family.105 Scholars reported that villagers and 
village chief’s justified village elite men’s control over dispute resolution was 
justified by referring to the long duree of their control and by the belief that a 
change in leadership to a non-elite family would disrupt the cosmological order 
and bring ruin on the village (Brown 2012a, Cummins and Leach 2012).  
Some anthropologists prefer to use the description of traditional dispute 
resolution as nahe biti boot (Tetun: spreading the mat) (Babo-Soares 2004). 
However, as was more commonly found in the fieldwork, people referred to “using 
adat [tradition] to solve the problem” or “uze adat atu resolva problema”. The 
process of traditional dispute resolution requires deciding who is at fault and 
awarding compensation. The aim of traditional dispute resolution is a return to 
peace, harmony, and consensus. In other words, traditional dispute resolution 
aims to preserve the order of things. Nonetheless, although 60 percent of women 
never tell anyone about their experiences of domestic violence, women who seek 
help usually go through a traditional dispute resolution process. Significant 
barriers such as cost, distance and lack of courts outside Dili prevent access to 
formal systems (Kniepe 2013).  
Currently, many of the cases tried by traditional dispute resolution in Timor-Leste 
involve domestic violence. According to village chiefs, much of their job is 
mediating domestic violence disputes, although this is not allowed under the 
LADV as it categorises domestic violence is a public crime, requiring formal 
intervention by the police and the courts.106 This is not the case with traditional 
dispute resolution, which has different aims. In cases of domestic violence, village 
chief mediators should aim to preserve the marriage and prevent divorce. In the 
view of village chiefs, violence against women is not seen as inherently disruptive 
                                                 
105 For example, a female village secretary stated that villagers they vote for the Liurai or the Liurai’s family, 
“because they believe in the Liurai, they look within the Liurai's family, then they vote accordingly. 
Interview with Serafina, ET110 Oecusse 4 August 2015.  
106 Interviews with a village chief ET127 Manufahi, 8 June 2011; and 31 August 2015; with village chief ET104 
Oecusse 1 August 2015 and with hamlet chief ET103 Oecusse 30 July 2015. 
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to the community. Instead, problems with compensation and redress were 
disruptive because they caused families to fight over money (Khan and Hyati 2012).  
5.3 Gender Interventions and the LADV 
Creating and implementing a law against domestic violence was a key aim of the 
Timorese women’s movement and international staff working in various gender 
interventions. Timorese women’s organisations, notably the Popular Organisation 
of Timorese Women (OPMT), had struggled since its inception in 1975 on two 
fronts: for Timorese independence from colonial structures that also oppressed 
women, and against “traditionalist, patriarchal social structures” (Loney 2015, 
paragraph 1). Even prior to international gender intervention Timorese members 
of women’s organisations lobbied for women’s rights, both within FRETILIN and 
within the organs of the Indonesian New Order state-sponsored women’s 
organisations such as the Family Welfare Movement (Indonesian: Pembinaan 
Kesejahteraan Keluarga) (PKK) and Dharma Wanita (Smith 2015a, 59-62).107 As 
described in Chapter 3, SGBV committed by Indonesian and Timorese men was 
prevalent and institutionalised during the Indonesian occupation.  
In 1998, amid the heady air of anti-Suharto rallies and pro-independence rallies, 
the Timorese umbrella network of women’s organisations, the East Timorese 
Women's Communication Forum (FOKUPERS) organised a protest against the 
systemic violence against women (Hall 2009, 314). At this time, FOKUPERS 
“demanded a law against domestic violence and from this came the impetus for a 
national campaign in support of such a law” (Hall 2009, 316).  FOKUPERS then 
organised the first National East Timorese Women’s Congress, paid for by 
UNTAET, in 2000, with over 500 mostly Timorese delegates.  Delegates presented 
the findings from a series of sub-national level meetings with women’s 
organisations and activists held before the National Congress. The resultant  
“Platform for Action” formulated during the National Congress made 
                                                 
107 Domestic violence was not a crime under New Order-era Indonesian law (Hall 2009). 
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recommendations in the priority of  “poverty, law and order, reconciliation and 
justice, culture of violence and decision making and institution-building” (Hunt 
2008, 196-7). In the context of widespread conflict-related SGBV and increasing 
domestic violence in the post-conflict, a law on domestic violence was a key 
demand of the first Timorese National Women’s Conference in 2000 (Hall 2009). 
Rede Feto, a network of women’s organisations, was formed at the same time 
(Trembath, Grenfell, and Noronha 2010). Rede Feto, together with FOKUPERS, 
became a key women’s organisation advocating for a law on domestic violence 
(Hall 2009, 316). 108   Rede Feto aimed to train the 24 women’s organisation to 
advocate and help members implement domestic violence prevention and 
awareness programs across the country (Hall 2009, 316).  
At the same time, members of the Gender and the Law Working Group working 
under UNTAET (see Table 2.2 Gender Interventions in Timor-Leste 2001-2017) 
campaigned for the protection of women's rights in the Timorese Constitution 
from 2000-2002. During this debate over the shape of the constitution, Timorese 
women’s organisations, receiving technical and capacity support from UNIFEM,  
campaigned against key areas of gender inequality such as forced marriage, 
informal dispute resolution of domestic violence cases and brideprice 
(Charlesworth and Wood 2002, UNWomen 2015b). The Working Group reviewed 
the constitution in accordance with international women’s human rights 
frameworks, and then wrote a Charter for Women's Rights, with the aim of 
including it in the constitution (UNWomen 2015b). Most importantly to the 
argument of this chapter, the Charter sought to reform traditional dispute 
resolution, by inserting a constitutional guarantee of “women's participation in 
traditional decision-making processes” (Charlesworth and Wood 2002, 339). 
Lobbying for this guarantee demonstrates that Timorese women’s organisations 
had long sought to reform traditional dispute resolution viewing it as a key site of 
gender injustice, for the reasons that this chapter explains. Despite lobbying by the 
                                                 
108 Interview with Female Timorese NGO Senior Manager ET077, 2 June 2015.  
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Working Group, regulation of such practices was not included in the final 
promulgated constitution (Charlesworth and Wood 2002, 339). Nonetheless, in 
2003, the newly independent Timor-Leste acceded to the 1979 UN Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which 
obliges state parties to protect and fulfil women’s human rights (UNWomen 
2015b). 
Although arising out of the pre-independence activist landscape, Timorese 
women’s organisations were soon supported in their national campaigns by 
donors. A wide variety of international organisations (such as UNIFEM, UNFPA) 
international NGOs (Oxfam, the Asia Foundation) and bilateral donors (USAid 
and AusAid) supported Timorese women’s organisations with funds and expertise. 
For example, UNIFEM paid for staff within the women’s NGOs, for gender experts 
in ministries and directly funded women’s NGOs and programs. Transnational 
alliances of academics, gender experts, and practitioners were subsequently 
responsible for implementing gender interventions (see Table 2.2 Gender 
Interventions in Timor-Leste 2001-2017). As FOKUPERS and other Timorese anti-
VAW organisations drew on international human rights frameworks in framing 
their advocacy for women’s rights, this led them to focus on violence against 
women (Hall 2009, Allden 2007, Grenfell and Trembath 2007). Hall argued it was 
the presence of the UN and the use of international human rights law that allowed 
Timorese women to broaden their campaign against VAW to include Timorese 
perpetrators, not just Indonesian ones  (Hall 2009, 316). Previously, “there was no 
political space for campaigns against domestic violence, all were concentrated on 
the goal of independence” (Hall 2009, 316). In a nationalist framework, 
campaigning against domestic violence undermined male members of the 
resistance and thus undermined independence. After 2004, UNIFEM was a 
recipient of funding under the CEDAW Southeast Asia Programme to help Timor-
Leste implement policies to comply with its commitments under CEDAW 
(UNWomen 2015b). The goals of this programme were to help Timor-Leste to 
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“develop new and revised legislative frameworks”, such as laws criminalising 
domestic violence (UNWomen 2015b).  
Domestic violence laws nearly always cause controversy in the countries that 
introduce them. In Ghana, for example, during the introduction of a bill against 
domestic violence the Ghanaian government claimed to be the voice of the “the 
people” and  constructed  a  “discourse of cultural sovereignty and deployed it 
against women’s rights” by superimposing notions of ‘foreignness’ onto both the 
Bill and Ghanaian women’s rights activists” (Hodžić 2009, 331). In peacebuilding 
missions with large, visible military and other forces, this becomes particularly 
acute, and the introduction of women’s rights legislation has regularly been 
framed by governments subjected to gender interventions, among others, as 
entailing imposition of so-called western feminist values (Chaudhary, Nemat, and 
Suhrke 2011). These sentiments were common among Timorese politicians (Niner 
2011) and the public sphere more generally (Corcoran-Nantes 2009, 169) as those 
pushing gender regressive positions sought to characterise Timorese women’s 
organisations as centralist, westernised, or top down.  
Unsurprisingly then, there was political opposition to the introduction of the 
LADV (Niner 2011, 415). The LADV was put before the Council of Ministers in 2003. 
It was first rejected by the Government’s Council of Ministers, but after an 
internationally supported campaign by Timorese anti-VAW advocates, the 
Council passed the draft legislation in 2004. After that, however, the LADV was 
not promulgated as a law for six years. Similar to the implementation of Gender 
Responsive Budgeting outlined in Chapter 4, opponents claimed technical 
difficulties and limited capacities were an obstacle. Parliamentarians, for example, 
blamed the delay of the LADV on needing to harmonize it with the criminal and 
civil codes (Trembath, Grenfell, and Noronha 2010, 135). 109  Another technical 
screen was the use of the Portuguese language, which reflected deeper problems 
                                                 
109 In turn, passing the penal code was delayed because of a debate between Alkatiri and Gusmão over the 
ability of the parliament to pass decree laws, on, for example, defamation, without any public debate 
(Shoesmith 2008, 77). 
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of exclusion and elite capture using Portuguese (Taylor-Leech 2007, 189, 219, 246, 
Ross 2016). The LADV was drafted, introduced, and promulgated in the official 
national language, which in the Timorese case is Portuguese. This was a barrier for 
members of women’s organisations who were not fluent in Portuguese. Notably, 
among Portuguese speakers in Timor-Leste in the early period of independence, 
male Portuguese speakers outnumbered female speakers 5 to 1 (Corcoran-Nantes 
2009, 168).  
Greater than these delays citing technical grounds, the LADV was painted as a 
foreign imposition of the peacebuilding intervention, rather than a key demand of 
the Timorese women’s movement and a response to the material threat of 
domestic violence in Timorese women’s lives. Prominent female Timorese 
politician Milena Pires explained how “cultural discourse is frequently invoked to 
quash attempts to introduce discussions on women's rights into the East Timorese 
political equation” (Charlesworth and Wood 2002, 336). In that sense, advocacy for 
women’s rights were linked to foreign interventions, in distinction to cultural 
discourses. Parliament was unable to reach quorum during debates on LADV as 
male parliamentarians simply refused to discuss it. One senior NGO manager 
considered that the LADV was blocked deliberately because “policymakers’ 
perspectives are still dominated male authority. And, they thought, if this law on 
domestic violence is passed, then divorce cases will increase and women will have 
more courage; [the LADV] was threatening to them”. 110  According to this 
interviewee, the LADV threatened male legislators’ entitlement to use violence 
against their own wives and intimate partners. Indeed, some prominent male 
Timorese parliamentarians have been accused or arrested for crimes of domestic 
violence. A prominent early case was the Health Minister, Sergio Lobo, who 
escaped prosecution for allegedly “beating his wife with a stick and injecting a 
sedative into her arm with a syringe he had brought for this purpose” (Rede Feto 
2001). Another anonymous female source said it was widely known that a male 
FRETILIN parliamentarian Osario Florindo had in 2012 publicly beat his wife, the 
                                                 
110 Interview with senior manager of a Timorese women’s organisation, ET082, Dili, 8 June 2015. 
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then-director of the anti-VAW network, FOKUPERS.111 Thus, conflicts over the 
introduction of the LADV were not between liberal interveners as upholders of 
women’s rights and Timorese, but also within and across different groups of 
Timorese people, and between elite Timorese men and women.  
International pressure was applied to the Timorese government to pass the law. In 
July 2009, the CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations in 2009 urged 
Timor-Leste to “speedily enact the Law on Domestic Violence and to make it 
widely known to public officials and society at large and to monitor its 
effectiveness”, as well as criminalise marital rape, improving rural women’s access 
to justice and ensure justice is enacted through the formal, not the traditional 
justice system (CEDAW 2009). Following the passage of the penal code in 2009, 
the LADV was passed  in 2010, and it was hailed a great success for transnational 
mobilisation (Hall 2009). The 2010 LADV criminalises domestic violence and 
makes it prosecutable under the criminal code. It defined domestic violence as acts 
committed by a family member, or an intimate partner, that: 
resulted, or may result, in physical, sexual or psychological injuries or 
suffering, economic abuse, including threats such as intimidating acts, 
bodily harm, aggression, coercion, harassment, or deprivation of freedom 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010b). 
The LADV requires all cases to be reported to the police (Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste 2010b). Crucially acknowledging the economic conditions and 
structural inequalities setting the conditions for domestic violence, the LADV set 
out obligations for the state to prosecute perpetrators and support and protect 
victims of violence (Kniepe 2013). It lists the state’s obligations to provide 
specialised police services, women’s shelters, and court processes, at no cost to the 
victim. The 2010 LADV was followed up by the 2012 National Action Plan (NAP) 
on implementing and funding the LADV (UNDP 2013, Kovar 2012, Kniepe 2013). 
                                                 
111  The accusation against Florindo also appeared on a Facebook message board on 17 September 2012, 
“Deputado hosi partidu Fretilin - hola feto kiik, baku nia fen naran **** agora Direktur FOKUPERS to tasak  
didiak”. “Member of Parliament from FRETILIN—slept with a second wife, then beat his wife named *****  
Director of FOKUPERS until [tasak lit. inflamed] bloody”. Copy archived with author. 
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Thus, there were legal obligations on the Timorese state to provide services to 
prevent violence in the family and to protect and support victims of violence. In 
the introduction and promulgation of the LADV, it is clear that coalitions for and 
against parts of the gender intervention often crossed the supposed local-
international divide.   
After 2010, however, it was precisely in the areas of implementation of the law that 
severe problems occurred, as the section on the political economy of traditional 
dispute resolution at the end of this chapter describes. Indeed, similar to the 
gender intervention on Gender Responsive Budgeting, political compromises with 
social forces stymied implementation. Specifically this included ongoing use of 
traditional dispute resolution continued—in direct conflict with the law. 
Moreover, outside gender mainstreaming programming, other peacebuilders were 
working at cross-purposes, and their support for a local turn in peacebuilding 
undermined the gender intervention supporting the LADV. It is to the actions of 
these local and international coalitions affecting the implementation of the LADV 
that I now turn.  
5.3.1 The Local Turn and Domestic Violence Programming  
This section argues that the local turn heavily influenced domestic violence 
programming, domestically and internationally. Like much mainstream work, 
academic work prescribing or describing hybrid peacebuilding rarely addressed or 
recognised violence against women as a form of conflict. Moreover, such work 
rarely addressed empirical research drawing the link between conflict related 
SGBV and domestic violence, and that these can increase after fighting ends 
(Cockburn 2013, True 2014a).  This glaring lacuna has meant there have been two 
parallel debates on peacebuilding in Timor-Leste: one regarding transitional 
justice peacebuilding and hybridity that ignored another one regarding feminist 
approaches to violence against women and legal pluralism.  
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Within the initial UN administration period from 1999 to 2002, UNTAET, there 
were groups of staff advocating for specific measures to protect women from 
violence, and those who saw this as a less urgent problem. In accordance with the 
Women Peace and Security agenda under UNSCR1325, UNTAET ought to have 
implemented gender mainstreaming in all aspects of its mission. However, as Joshi 
argued, UNTAET was only superficially supportive of the Timorese women’s 
movement (Joshi 2005, 205). Most importantly to the argument of this chapter, 
UNTAET did not prioritise domestic violence. Violence against women, was in 
general seen as both a corollary of war, which peacebuilding would end, and as less 
disruptive than civil strife in the post-conflict period. UNTAET carried on using 
laws from the era of Indonesian military occupation. These were not protective of 
women and children’s rights, as they criminalised adultery, did not criminalise 
marital rape and did not “treat domestic violence as a distinct crime” 
(Charlesworth and Wood 2002).112 Moreover, “UNTAET permitted the continued 
use of alternative justice mechanisms at the local level” and postponed the creation 
of a “new criminal justice system” (Nakaya 2010, 101). UNTAET’s early decisions to 
allow VAW cases to be dealt with by traditional dispute resolution were not in line 
with UN international human rights instruments such as CEDAW. In Nakaya’s 
estimate, “UNTAET seemed content to accept the role of traditional justice forms 
for ‘minor crimes’ without defining what constituted a minor crime” (Nakaya 2010, 
101).  
In Timor-Leste, there were two reasons for the introduction of hybrid 
peacebuilding through bringing together formal justice and traditional dispute 
resolution. One, hybrid justice was seen pragmatic and cheaper because the UN 
and the new government lacked “capacity” to provide justice in rural areas. Two, 
hybrid courts were perceived as culturally legitimate because interveners’ culture, 
ideas, and institutions “clashed” with the local ones. In particular, according to 
some scholars, the court system was “fundamentally Western” because it did not 
                                                 
112 In Indonesia, after 1998 and the fall of Suharto, an Indonesian Commission for Anti-Violence Against 
Women was established. 
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“resemble the population’s understanding of justice” (Hohe 2003, 336). On this 
view, the differences between liberal and local ideas, institutions and cultures led 
to more violent conflict between Timorese. Following this logic, some scholars 
made what Millar (2014) calls “a prescriptive case” for a “liberal-local” hybrid 
system on the grounds it could balance international liberal practices with local 
ones, leading to better outcomes (Wallis 2012a). Scholars of the local turn 
influenced the international intervention in a number of peacebuilding programs, 
listed in Table 5.1 below.  
Table 5.1 International Programs with Traditional Dispute Resolution 
Manifestations of hybrid approaches to justice by the international community 
were in the community justice program in Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation (CAVR), the World Bank’s Community Empowerment Program 
and the 2003 Asia Foundation seminar on Traditional Justice. Community 
reconciliation events under CAVR aimed to bring together victims and 
perpetrators of lesser crimes in villages in Timor-Leste in an alternative to the 
formal justice system (Kent 2004). As explained above, CAVR was a UN mandated 
commission to establish the truth regarding the nature, causes, and extent of 
human rights violations from 1974 to 1999. Under the Community Reconciliation 
Program, over 1,400 community reconciliation events were held across all 
subdistricts from 2002-2004. They mixed criminal law, civil procedure and 
traditional and spiritual practices to resolve lesser crimes cheaper and faster than 
PROGRAM YEAR 
World Bank’s Local Governance Program 2001-2003 
Community Reconciliation Program (CAVR Truth Commission) 2002-2004 
The Asia Foundation Justice Sector Programs 2002 - present 
UNDP-UNCDF Local Governance Programs  2003-2012 
Also: Incorporated into Timorese Constitution (2002) and the Law Electing Community 
Leaders (2009 and 2016) 
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the formal court system while remaining sensitive to human rights and women’s 
rights (Burgess 2006, Kent 2004). The aim was to ameliorate community anger and 
facilitate peace in the future. Perpetrators initiated the request to the CAVR, the 
community reconciliation event would hear the case, and the victim, in many 
cases, a whole hamlet or village, would forgive the perpetrator (Burgess 2006, Kent 
2004, 10). Undergoing such a process made the perpetrator immune from formal 
prosecution. The use of traditional dispute resolution excluded women from the 
process, and there were many more women victims who did not participate (Kent 
2004, 37).  
The Asia Foundation seminar held in Dili in 2003 advocated hybrid approaches to 
conflict resolution (Hicks 2013, 26, Trindade 2008). The report on the approaches 
to justice was prepared by hybridity advocates Hohe and Nixon (2003).  The report 
advocated giving village chiefs power to meditate in low-level disputes. In a report 
on the World Bank’s Community Empowerment program, Hohe and Ospina 
recommended the (non-democratic) inclusion of traditional leaders (men from 
the Liurai and Dato families) on village councils: “Traditional leaders could be 
formally appointed to the Village Development Councils” (Hohe and Ospina 2002, 
118). In these approaches, the rule of these men was not connected to the unequal 
position of women in communities. Although the power imbalances in gender 
were mentioned, community cohesion and peace was more important than 
women’s experience of violence. For example, Hohe and Nixon noted for the 
community, “not marrying one’s mother’s brother’s daughter endangers society 
more than, for example, a case of domestic violence” (Hohe and Nixon 2003, 18).  
Hybridity as a form of peacebuilding was subsequently incorporated into the 
national policy sphere, especially after 2007. For example, Dionísio Babo-Soares, 
the former doctoral student of anthropologist James Fox at ANU, and high ranked 
Minister in Gusmão’s government from 2008 to 2017, published a paper arguing 
for the hybridisation of traditional dispute resolution (Tetun: nahe biti boot) and 
state law. In this paper, Babo-Soares argued “this village-level concept of achieving 
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peace and stability could be fitted into the broad concept of state justice” (Babo-
Soares 2004). Such views tended to emphasise the importance of consensus and 
unity over contention and discord and the prioritising of generalised community 
peace over individual rights (Simião 2007, Kovar 2012). Various scholars argued 
that to blend formal processes and traditional dispute resolution was pragmatic, 
cheaper, and more culturally legitimate approach (Jackson et al. 2003, Hohe 2003, 
Hohe-Chopra, Pologruto, and de Deus 2009). Kirk called the blending of formal 
courts and traditional dispute resolution as “practical hybrids” (Kirk 2015). 
There was support for using traditional dispute resolution among Timorese 
national policymakers. In the first place, the Timor-Leste constitution “provides 
for a law to be made to ‘institutionalise means and ways for the non-jurisdictional 
resolution of disputes’” (Wallis 2012a, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2002). 
This provision was further developed in the 2009 (revised in 2016) law on 
Community Leaders which empowered village leaders, 95 percent of which are 
male, to create “grassroots structures” for the resolution and settlement of minor 
disputes (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2009, Wallis 2012a, 749).113 In 2012, 
Babo-Soares, an expert witness for those advocating traditional dispute resolution 
in the courts was appointed Minister of Justice because of his expertise in 
“customary law” (Grenfell 2013, 266).  
5.3.2 The Local Turn’s Gender Bias and Domestic Violence 
Some scholars writing on peacebuilding from an anthropological frame went 
further in advocating for hybrid approaches because gender interventions were 
inauthentic.  Hicks urged the Timorese government and United Nations to stop 
promoting “Western values of governance and jurisprudence” by accommodating 
local adat,” to create “a single political culture” which would promote peace and 
give Timor-Leste more chance of evolving into “a unified nation-state” (Hicks 2013, 
                                                 
113 In the 2016 village elections, 21 out of 442 village chiefs elected were women. This was despite the existence 
of a quota and donor and NGO support for 319 women to run for the office of village chief. 
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26). Hicks’ rejection of “western values” applied most strongly to the area of law 
and gender, where he sees acute disconnect between international and Timorese 
views on “hot-button issues such as domestic violence sexual abuse and rape, 
which obsess the United Nations and their fellow agencies” (Hicks 2013, 31).  
Revealingly, Hicks notes that he enclosed “the terms ‘domestic violence’ and 
‘sexual abuse’ within quotation marks to signal their imprecision as verbal tools 
for scholarly analysis” (Hicks 2013, n26). Brazillian anthropologist Simião, for 
instance, argued that the concept of domestic violence was “invented” by 
international interveners,  because what Timorese victims may have understood 
as a normal “act of aggression” was then “perceived as an act of violation and 
violence” (Simião 2007). On this view, and ignoring the long history of women’s 
rights advocacy, because the gender intervention named VAW as domestic 
violence, and thus as a part of a relations of power and inequality, the gender 
intervention “invented” it. According to Kirk, Timorese village leaders have 
rejected the state justice system’s interventions on domestic violence because it 
imposed “alien institutions onto a population that has historically fought to retain 
its identity” (Kirk 2015, 435).  Likewise, Kirk relied on this evidence to say “the 
LADV can be interpreted as a top-down imposition of norms and practices that 
are still struggling to find widespread acceptance in Timor-Leste” (Kirk 2015, 455).  
Kirk argued that resistance to formal legal processes for domestic violence cases 
“continues a long tradition of Timorese resistance to top-down and alien 
governance arrangement” (Kirk 2015, 441).   
Some authors—contracted as gender analysts—advocated “flexible approaches” to 
traditional dispute resolution. Some suggested that the concept of VAW came 
from Western feminism, again disregarding the history of Timorese women’s 
activism, effectively dismissing violence against women as an issue. For example, 
Kovar, who worked for UNDP as the Access to Justice Adviser to the Public 
Defender General, argued in 2012 that:  
Much of the previous research may have approached domestic violence 
issues from a Western perspective or a centralised one, coming from the 
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capital city, Dili. This has in some instances led to a coloured interpretation 
of the reality of domestic violence in Timor-Leste (Kovar 2012, 210, emphasis 
added).   
Kovar’s assertion of a binary difference between Western and Timorese 
understandings and approaches to domestic violence, like much of the writing on  
traditional dispute resolution, is based on work by practitioners trained as 
anthropologists who advocated for hybrid justice, including Babo-Soares (2004) 
and Hohe (2002b, 2003). Subsequent research has not supported the assertion that 
reports of domestic violence are “coloured interpretations”, that is, overstated or 
overestimated. Instead, given better prevalence data, early reports are said to have 
underestimated the extent, severity and frequency of domestic violence (The Asia 
Foundation 2016, Wigglesworth et al. 2015). 
Hybridity was also used to advance “taking local agency seriously” in terms of 
further empowering traditional dispute resolution and families to deal with cases 
of domestic violence. Nixon makes two claims for an agential approach. First,  he 
argues that his view of the hybrid justice program run by a New Zealand aid agency 
in Timor-Leste took a “balanced” and “realistic” approach arguing that women 
should have a choice about whether to deal with crimes of violence through 
traditional dispute resolution or the courts (Nixon 2008, 370). In his words, “It is, 
however, reported [in Timor-Leste] that many ‘rapes’ initially occur as consensual 
acts agreed to on the basis that marriage will follow. The claim that an act of rape 
took place is said to often result in cases where the man subsequently reneges on 
the promise to marry” (Nixon 2008, 333). Indeed, there is confusion in 
communities as to what constitutes a sexual crime, but here Nixon’s statements 
minimise the extent, prevalence, and seriousness of sexual violence, especially 
against girls, who are often in no position to reject men.  
In the debate over traditional dispute resolution procedures, as in other areas of 
intervention, advocates of hybridity ignore the extent to which extant local law 
and practice had been combined with Indonesian modes of governance during the 
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occupation.114 For instance, the privileging of community welfare and unity over 
individual rights is a feature of New Order ideology. The New Order heavily 
promoted consensus-driven decision-making (Indonesian: musyawarah-mufakat), 
which aimed to maintain harmony in the material as well as the spiritual world (in 
so far as the prevailing order was sacralised). Under the New Order, the promotion 
of consensus-style decision making in adat, “tried to freeze Indonesian society in 
the stasis of a mythic vision of the Indonesian past, which stressed consensus, 
harmony and tradition, but also obedience and passivity” (Aspinall and Fealy 2010, 
5). These legacies have been strong, yet mis-recognised in research. For example, 
Hohe and Ospina, in their evaluation report on the World Bank’s Community 
Empowerment Program, defined the “decision-making concepts” in villages in 
Timor-Leste, as “very much characterised by the notion of discussion and 
agreement by everybody”  (Hohe and Ospina 2002, 68). In sum, advocates for the 
local turn in effect reproduced ideological legacies of the New Order that 
emphasise the importance of preserving the prevailing social and political order, 
which in turn supports power holders from the Liurai-Dato class.  
5.4 The Political Economy of Traditional Dispute Resolution  
My key argument is that traditional dispute resolution has material outcomes that 
impair gender justice. As previously mentioned, the process of traditional dispute 
resolution involves deciding fault, reaching consensus, and payment of 
compensation, not punishment. Compensation and payments to mediators can be 
hundreds of dollars and numerous animals. Rather than view the use of traditional 
dispute resolution as the persistence of local informal/traditional institutions, I 
understand this to be the persistence of structural relations, of which these 
traditional dispute resolution processes are but a part. These unequal class 
relations intersect with gender relations and explain barriers to achieving gender 
justice through the gender intervention supporting the LADV.  
                                                 
114 For examples concerning politics and economics, see Hughes (2009, 208).  
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Domestic violence cases progress up a “ladder” of traditional resolution 
mechanisms from the family to the hamlet and then to the village levels. The 
material exchanges involved are critical to elites’ control over resources and 
legitimacy. In the context of high rates of poverty, traditional dispute resolution 
takes much-needed resources from poorer villagers and women and transfers them 
to male family members and male village elites. The sums involved are significant 
as tens or hundreds of dollars in Timor-Leste means a great deal where cash 
incomes, in generous estimates, are around US$400 a year (Inder, Cornwell, and 
Datt 2015). There are three groups of beneficiaries from traditional dispute 
resolution: the female victim’s family, the mediators, and the male perpetrator. 
Conversely, female victims are marginalised and endangered at each step.  
At the first step on the ladder of traditional dispute resolution, male heads of the 
perpetrator’s family and the victim’s family “sit together” to resolve the problem. 
Traditional dispute resolution could also begin if a victim ran away from her 
husband, or a victims’ natal family complained that she was being treated badly. 
The family heads would then decide whether the violence was the husband’s fault 
or the wife’s.115 Even though prevalence surveys show that domestic violence is 
overwhelmingly male violence against women, in Timorese traditional dispute 
resolution a woman can be found to have caused the violence (Khan and Hyati 
2012, 18). Legitimate reasons for a husband using violence against a wife can 
include a wife burning food, neglecting the children, having affairs or questioning 
her husband over his extra-marital affairs or polygyny (Wigglesworth et al. 2015). 
During fieldwork, some men, one a young boy of fifteen, reported that they had 
assaulted their wife or girlfriend after she questioned him regarding sexual liaisons 
outside their relationship.116  
If family level male mediators decide the husband is at fault, he pays a fine, often 
a pig, or another small animal to the victim’s family, the Umane (Tetun: wife’s 
                                                 
115 Interview with ET130 wife of the Village Chief, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
116 Fieldwork notes, 2011 and 2015. Also reported in an interview with two young ordinary male citizens, ET150 
and ET151, Manufahi, 9 September 2015. 
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family or wifegivers). Compensation does vary from district to district but can 
include animals, palm wine or palm spirit, cash or cloths (UNDP 2013).  Thus, first, 
a victim’s family benefits from compensation payments in traditional dispute 
resolution. If the wife’s family is higher status, they find it easier to compel the 
husband to pay the fine. If, the wife’s family is lower status, they are in no position 
to compel the husband to pay the fine (Graydon 2016, 130). Moreover, the gender 
division of labour holds women responsible for small animal husbandry, including 
of pigs, the woman victim has usually raised the pig used to pay the compensation. 
That is, her husband pays a fine for his violence towards his wife using the proceeds 
of her work. The material implication for victims is that if women bring cases of 
domestic violence to their families and leaders, they risk being blamed and then 
fined, thus incurring material losses. Given these points, a woman victim has no 
real material interest in pursuing traditional dispute resolution because it will 
result in her household wealth decreasing.  
Resolution at the family level will fail if the two families do not agree on who is to 
blame, or the wife presses separation or divorce. If this happens, traditional dispute 
resolution progresses to the second step of the ladder. Mediators at this level are 
village chiefs, hamlet heads, and spiritual leaders (Tetun: lia nain). This second 
level of traditional dispute resolution was conducted by mediators and male 
relatives. Accordingly, those conducting mediation were usually of the Liurai-Dato 
class. As some young women reported, the authority vested in these all-male 
mediators is ultimate because Timorese elders can curse a person of lesser status, 
especially young people, with death.117 
Village leaders benefit materially from traditional dispute resolution at this level. 
In return for their work meditating, they can sometimes receive a small animal 
such as a pig, cigarettes, cash or palm wine, and always the ritually important areca 
nut and betel leaf (Tetun: bua malus).118 Sometimes mediators received hundreds 
                                                 
117 Interview with two young female ordinary citizens, ET147 and ET148 on 8 September, 2015. 
118 Interview with ET131 Manufahi 1 September 2015. 
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of dollars. Importantly, gifts offered by the perpetrators’ family influence village 
leaders to favour of the perpetrator, reducing the amount he ought to pay in 
compensation to the victim’s family (Alves and Alita 2009, 67). Dispute resolution 
ends with a ritual meal together (Tetun: haan hamutuk). These kinds of meals are 
small-scale adat ceremonies. The whole community is not invited: only the 
mediators and the male leaders of the wife’s and husband’s respective families.119 
Afterwards, having received compensation and a meal, village leaders feel that 
balance is restored and the woman victim returns to living with her husband 
(UNDP 2013). One Hamlet Chief reported to me that he preferred traditional 
dispute resolution because it made perpetrators stay with their wives: “If it goes to 
court, then he will leave his wife; they will separate”.120  
As described in Chapter 3, village leaders are from aristocratic or noble lineages of 
Timorese society, the Liurai-Dato class. Because kinship links are so integral to 
organising Timorese society, leaders’ control over domestic violence also 
strengthens their control over village law and politics. Village leaders can appeal 
to feudal, kinship, democratic, and martial sources of legitimacy. Village leaders 
are the apex of separate but related kinship groups linked together through 
marriage. Because their source of authority lies in their roles as heads of lineages, 
which is dependent on marriage, they require political control over marriages. 
Liurai and Dato have an interest in restoring these balances. Their control over 
traditional dispute resolution is not, therefore, the continuation of an authentic 
cultural tradition, but another aspect of their structural superordination.  
The third beneficiary of traditional dispute resolution is the perpetrator. As the 
Timorese NGO shadow report to CEDAW describes, compensation payments lead 
to impunity for certain men:  
Often the solution is for the perpetrator to pay a fine or compensation to 
the victim’s family. This phenomenon empowers men to commit violence 
                                                 
119 Interview with female villager, Brigida, ET146 Manufahi 8 September 2015. 
120 Interview with village chief ET104 Oecusse 1 August 2015.  
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because when a man has money, horses and buffalos, he is free to do violence 
against women (Alves and Alita 2009, 18, emphasis added).  
For some, the final step of the ladder is seen as the formal courts of law. For 
instance, families will sometimes turn to the courts if there is a failure of traditional 
dispute resolution, especially if compensation amounts cannot be agreed on, and 
this becomes another step in the ladder of traditional dispute resolution.121  
5.5 Legal Pluralism, Accumulation and Control 
Very few women report violence within formal processes prescribed under the 
LADV, nonetheless, domestic violence is the single largest category of crime 
committed in Timor-Leste (JSMP, PRADET, and ALFeLa 2015). Under the formal 
process of the LADV, police call specialist victims’ services, such as a shelter. The 
woman victim would then be able to stay in a woman’s shelter. There are 
provisions to remove the perpetrator in the LADV, but these are rarely used 
(Kniepe 2013). While at the shelter, specialist staff arrange an examination to 
collect forensic evidence for the court case. The women’s shelter then would work 
with the legal aid agency to prepare a court case.122 It takes some time before it 
reaches one of the periodic mobile courts or the Dili court. Most often the weakest 
charge of “simple physical assault characterised as domestic violence” was brought, 
rather than the stronger charge under the LADV of repeated assault, or as an 
aggravated charge with a sexual assault or attempted manslaughter (Kniepe 2013, 
2). 
The implementation of the LADV under conditions of the local turn has resulted 
in a widespread practice and justification for legal pluralism. This kind of legal 
pluralism in Timor-Leste’s formal domestic violence cases is well-documented 
(Grenfell 2013, Charlesworth and Wood 2002). Court decisions on domestic 
violence tend to reproduce gender injustices present in traditional dispute 
                                                 
121 Interview with village chief, Bonifacio ET127, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
122 Interview with senior manager of a women’s shelter ET112, Oecusse, 5 August 2015.  
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resolution. For instance, court cases have resulted in a “fault-finding process” 
resembling traditional dispute resolution (Kniepe 2013, 3).123 Once in the court, the 
judge often sent cases back for traditional dispute resolution (Kniepe 2013). Also, 
frequently the court has ordered the perpetrator to pay a fine, often around 30 USD 
in cash over a period—again a similar outcome to traditional dispute resolution. 
As one Hamlet Chief said, although the LADV meant a change in some things, the 
outcomes of paying someone money were similar: 
Nowadays you have to go to the justice system. You can't just tell someone 
to go here or there to pay compensation […] But some things are the same. 
Both have their headaches. You have to take money to the Umane [the 
wife’s family]—With the state, it’s the same.124  
As the Hamlet Chief pointed out, the perpetrator paying money was the rule in 
either case. In the formal system then, the material benefits of compensation 
became a fine. The money to pay the fine, however, resulted in a loss of resources 
for the victim’s household. Most problematically, the court system relied on these 
perpetrator fines instead of civil compensation. Provisions in the LADV for the 
state to provide civic compensation consisting of economic support for women 
victims including alimony, welfare and school payments are only vary rarely used 
(Kniepe 2013, 4, JSMP, PRADET, and ALFeLa 2015). Thus, despite reaching 
program goals of socialisation and training, the LADV is not being implemented. 
In other words, the outcomes of the gender intervention are uneven.  
Another uneven outcome of intervention arises out of resistance to the LADV. 
Although the LADV should prevent the use of traditional dispute resolution, on 
the ground it is still common. One reason is because, women victims still faced a 
general unwillingness of the police to treat domestic violence as a crime (Khan and 
Hyati 2012).  Formal police and court processes often deliberately used traditional 
dispute resolution or deferred to male family members in charging perpetrators 
                                                 
123 The observation that they resemble a “fault finding process”  has also been made regarding rape sentencing 
in formal courts in Papua New Guinea (Zorn 2012). 
124 Interview with hamlet chief ET105, Oecusse, 30 July 2015. 
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(Kniepe 2013). By 2015, education programs or “socialisation” of the LADV had 
raised awareness that traditional dispute resolution was not permitted for 
domestic violence cases because it was a crime and required police involvement. 
Thus, to avoid the mandatory reporting, male leaders told me there were two levels 
of domestic violence, normal or everyday violence (Tetun: violensia bai-bain) and 
serious violence, usually involving blood (Tetun: violensia boot). 125  They 
maintained only serious violence required any action from community members 
or the police. Everyday violence would continue to be mediated between the two 
families. 
Another similarity between traditional dispute resolution and the current state of 
legal pluralism concerned the lack of post-trial protection for the victim. Global 
research on domestic violence has shown that the breakdown of the relationship 
is the most dangerous times for female victims of violence (Morgan and Chadwick 
2009). In Timorese courts, the most common punishment issued by courts was a 
suspended sentence. Thus, the perpetrator continues or resumes living in the 
family home, putting the victim at risk (Kniepe 2013, 2). Protection orders making 
the perpetrator leave are provided for in the LADV but have never been used 
(JSMP, PRADET, and ALFeLa 2015). These kinds of risks for victims were not seen 
as problematic by some scholars backing hybrid approaches. For example, Nixon 
who worked on justice issues for Asia Foundation Timor-Leste asserted that 
traditional dispute resolution of rape using compensation payments had been 
judged too harshly “under the powerful beam of the human rights spotlight” 
(Nixon 2008, 333). In terms of restoring community balance, a return to the family 
is what Kirk advocated for in terms of “practical hybrids” for domestic violence 
cases. He proposed the continuation of the practice whereby legal aid lawyers 
“assist clients to submit reconciliation letters to judges, which use them to justify 
                                                 
125 Interview with male teacher Antonio ET131, Manufahi,  1 September 2015; and village chief Bonifacio ET127, 
1 September 2015. 
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a suspended sentence or a fine, allowing the offender to return to his family” (Kirk 
2015).  
In the final analysis, I argue that seeing legal and traditional dispute resolution as 
either a clash or a hybrid of international and local institutions, cultures, or 
processes is misplaced. Firstly, because the notion of discrete realms of locals and 
internationals regarding traditional dispute resolution ignored Timorese 
feminists’ long struggles against gender inequality within their families and 
societies (Loney 2015, Niner 2011). Secondly, it is not a matter of the institution 
having more legitimacy at the local level, but about what kind of power relations 
this justice system supports. In the case of domestic violence, a feminist political 
economy analysis shows that it is in the interest of male members of the Liurai-
Dato class  as senior family members and village leaders (which also overlaps with 
the category of perpetrators), to retain control of domestic violence dispute 
resolution in villages. When we look at material outcomes, fines issued by both 
courts and traditional dispute resolution benefit those in authority and 
disadvantage female victims of domestic violence. Crucially, a feminist political 
economy approach used here highlights the underlying power relations of 
traditional dispute resolution. 
The feminist structural political economy approach shows that traditional dispute 
resolution is thus a process which transfers goods or money from victims of 
violence and other families to village leaders. It has been my purpose to show that 
traditional dispute resolution is a process of control over both material resources 
and women. Some researchers took women’s continued use of traditional dispute 
resolution to be evidence of its effectiveness and legitimacy (Graydon 2016). 
However, an equally reasonable assumption could be that because sixty percent of 
women never tell anyone about abuse by their partner, this is evidence that women 
victims of violence do not trust either formal or informal systems because both 
systems are dangerous and do not support victim’s interests (The Asia Foundation 
2016, Kniepe 2013). It is clear from over a decade of research on domestic violence 
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in Timor-Leste that for women facing domestic violence, there are few protections, 
while for perpetrators there is limited punishment.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The chapter argued that critical scholars and practitioners advocating a local turn 
saw uneven outcomes of peacebuilding interventions, such as high levels of 
violence, as arising from a clash of institutional legitimacy, which resulted in 
(descriptive hybridity) or could be resolved by using (prescriptive hybridity) 
hybrid systems. But hybridity does not explain the uneven outcomes of gender 
interventions, because gender interventions are about changing gender relations 
in progressive ways, and these are supported and challenged by various coalitions 
of local and international groups. Timorese women’s organisations have fought for 
equality of treatment in marriage, divorce, and freedom from violence. The chapter 
showed that national level politicians blocked the LADV on technical grounds. 
Legislative technicalities were a screen for their political opposition to the LADV. 
Some women activists argued male politicians opposed on the grounds it 
criminalised male entitlement (read their own entitlement) to use violence. More 
than a theoretical debate, scholars’, and practitioners’ advocacy for the local turn 
and hybridity affected the outcomes of this gender intervention to support the 
LADV. By encouraging the retention of traditional dispute resolution, advocates 
for hybridity and a local turn inadvertently empowered village elites who benefit 
from the political economy of domestic violence.   
This chapter explained the uneven outcomes from the introduction and 
implementation of the 2010 LADV, by elaborating a political economy of 
traditional dispute resolution. As revealed by the theoretical framework, 
historically specific social and gender relations provide a more accurate 
explanation for the uneven outcomes of intervention. In the last part of the 
chapter, I looked at the political economy of dispute resolution and showed who 
benefitted and who lost from these processes. Legal pluralism has allowed this 
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system to continue unchanged. As a result, the Timorese government did not fulfil 
its obligations under the LADV. Examining these material outcomes gave precise 
reasons for the continuation of traditional dispute resolution. I argued this is a 
more compelling reason than cultural explanations of legitimacy because cultural 
explanation cannot account for the unequal exercise of power by different social 
groups and different groups of men and women. Moreover, support for traditional 
leaders is part of their strategy of rule. Goetz and Jenkins argue that during 
peacebuilding and state formation more generally, ceding control of the family, 
kinship and personal law is a strategy of rule (Goetz and Jenkins 2016). As I showed 
in the previous Chapter 4, after 2007, the alliance between Dili-based and rural 
members of the Liurai-Dato class was vital to Gusmão’s successive governments. 
Likewise, ceding control of dispute resolution to village chiefs added to village 
chiefs’ ideological and material resources. In that sense, a local turn to traditional 
dispute resolution shored up this rural-urban coalition. 
The next chapter expands on this analysis and uses a structural analysis of kinship 
(Fishburne-Collier 1988) to show how domestic violence is driven by social and 
gender relations entailed in kinship systems based on the exchange of women 
through brideprice.  By looking at the exchange of women and the distribution of 
money and goods using brideprice I develop another compelling set of 
explanations for uneven outcomes for the gender interventions, chiefly the uneven 
outcomes of the LADV.  
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CHAPTER 6.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
BRIDEPRICE  
6.1 Introduction 
Brideprice is a controversial and common topic in Timor-Leste, and one with 
significant effects on outcomes of the gender intervention on domestic violence. 
Timorese women’s organisations have long campaigned against brideprice. 
Despite these critiques, and the links between brideprice and domestic violence, 
there has been no explicit, long-term, or well-funded gender intervention 
challenging brideprice. Instead, I argue that the uneven outcomes of the LADV can 
be explained by the enduring, unchallenged, and central role of brideprice. Part of 
that explanation lies in the central role brideprice plays in structuring class. 
Brideprice links gender relations to class relations in a material way. This chapter 
applies a political economy of domestic violence combining the work of feminist 
anthropologist Fishburne-Collier (1988) describing how marriage and social 
hierarchy are co-constitutive, with that of True (2012) on the political economy of 
violence against women. Using a combination of these two materialist frameworks 
explains how brideprice in the Timorese political economy has limited the 
effectiveness of the LADV as a gender intervention. 
This chapter looks once more at the LADV and the governance of domestic 
violence. I again cover anthropological perspectives because these have influenced 
interventions in the Timor-Leste case. But although it moves away from the state 
and the LADV to a discussion of kinship, the state is not absent from the coming 
discussion. Many scholars have demonstrated that kinship networks in Timor are 
constituted through complex exchanges, and these networks are structured to 
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cope with poverty in the absence of state welfare (see Chapter 4). However, these 
kinship networks are not relations of equals, rather, they are relations between 
ranked families, and the payment of brideprice creates and reproduces these 
hierarchies. These exchanges of brideprice for women mean that the Liurai-Dato 
class can extract more valuables from lower-ranked lineages because they marry 
their daughters to lower-ranked lineages and charge significantly high brideprices. 
Timorese leaders, including national, village, and hamlet chiefs, are always from 
higher-ranked lineages. These men are the apex of concatenated lineages, and 
form a recognisable Liurai-Dato class, as I described in Chapter 3. The exchange of 
women, therefore, has distributive outcomes, but is of more importance to Liurai 
and Dato families in rural areas who do not have the same access to other material 
resources as urban based members of the Liurai-Dato class.  
Brideprice contributes to the continuation of domestic violence because of the 
differential power brideprice gives to men, and because brideprice undergirds the 
social order and has distributive effects. First, women themselves do not have 
access to brideprice paid to their male kin. Second, in violent marriages, it is not 
in the interest of parents of daughters to aid her in a divorce if her husband has 
already paid her brideprice in full. If brideprice payments are complete, the bride’s 
parents have to return the brideprice to the husband’s family. On the other hand, 
if parents encourage their daughter to return to her violent husband they receive 
compensation payments, as I described in Chapter 5. Third, paying brideprice 
allows men to justify control over their wives. Globally, dowry and brideprice do 
negatively affect violence against women (UNWomen 2013, Hudson 2016).  
6.2 The Extent, Form, Invisibility and Debates of Brideprice  
Payments for marriage are pervasive internationally, practised in around 75 
percent of human societies today (Hudson and Matfess 2017, Hudson 2016). There 
are six forms of marriage payments (see Table 6.2 Types of Marriage Payments 
below). Globally, the most widely practiced of these is brideprice. Brideprice is a 
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payment of assets from the groom’s family to the bride’s family (Anderson 2007). 
Brideservice is where a groom owes a debt of labour, not assets, to the bride’s 
family. In comparison, dowry is a payment of assets from the bride’s family to the 
groom or the groom’s family. Dower, as distinct from dowry also comprises the 
groom’s family paying assets, but these should go to the bride. Dower can thus 
insure a wife against widowhood, abandonment or remarriage (Rapoport 2005). 
Bridetoken is a small payment from the groom’s family to the bride’s family. 
Finally, reciprocal gift exchanges or sister exchanges exist, usually among people 
with little property, and are rarer (Fishburne-Collier 1988).  
MARRIAGE PAYMENT DIRECTION & VOLUME OF VALUABLES 
BRIDEPRICE 
 (ALSO TERMED  
BRIDEWEALTH) 
Net assets move from groom’s family to the bride’s family 
DOWRY 
 (ALSO TERMED 
MARRIAGE PORTION) 
Net assets move from bride’s parents to the groom/ or groom’s 
family. 
Sometimes this is considered the bride’s property, but it most often 
passes into the practical control of the groom or the groom’s family 
DOWER 
(ALSO TERMED BRIDE 
GIFT) 
Net assets move from the groom and his kin to the bride. The 
payment is to insure her against divorce, or the death or incapacity 
of her husband. 
 
When dower payments are made to, or are controlled by, the 
bride’s family, they are brideprice 
BRIDESERVICE A groom labours for a given period for the bride’s family in 
exchange for his wife 
BRIDE TOKEN Marriage payments are relatively small, but still move from the 
groom’s family to the bride’s family 
GIFT EXCHANGE/ SISTER 
EXCHANGE  
Marriage payments are reciprocal or involve the exchange of sisters 
and valuables 
Table 6.1 Types of Marriage Payments  
Globally, brideprices are substantial. Anderson (2007) estimated the global 
average brideprice at around four times the annual income of a family, and dowries 
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at around six times the family’s annual income. 126  All things considered, 
brideprices involve the transmission of significant volumes of property and labour 
and thus have “economic functions” as well as symbolic ones (Goody and Tambiah 
1973, 1, Anderson 2007).   
Internationally, there is a substantial overlap of brideprice with women’s 
subordinate status in law, women’s ill-being, and gender-based violence (Wendo 
2004, Hudson 2016, Jolly, Stewart, and Brewer 2012). Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
despite these overlaps, governments have generally been reluctant to challenge 
male dominance in areas of “personal law” like brideprice (Goetz 2007). A few 
governments have tried to regulate or ban marriage payments, including India 
(1961), Pakistan (1976) and Bangladesh (1980) but these have been relatively 
unsuccessful (Anderson 2007, 161).  
Academics have largely overlooked the importance of brideprice to social and 
political life. Taking up this theme, Hudson and Matfess (2017) argued that 
brideprice was hiding in “plain sight” as a decisive factor driving violent conflict. 
Brideprices are many times an individual’s income, affecting the welfare of women 
and the distribution of wealth across society (Anderson 2007, 152). Likewise, the 
present chapter holds brideprice is a vital yet and long overlooked factor driving 
social and political outcomes.  While as Hudson and Matfess (2017)  point out, the 
links between brideprice, conflict and war is in need of further research, the link 
between brideprice,  kinship, hierarchy and community-level conflicts has been 
explored by anthropologists, notably by the feminist anthropologist Fishburne-
Collier (1988). 
One of the economic processes arising from brideprice is social stratification. 
Brideprice stratifies social groups in two related processes: it establishes rank, and 
it transfers wealth from lower ranked lineages to higher ranks. Societies with 
ranked lineages using brideprice are class societies, but class domination is 
                                                 
126 Cf. Jolly (2015), Tarney (2017) for more examples of high brideprice rates internationally  
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partially obscured by age and gender hierarchies and expressed in the language of 
kinship, confusing ethnographers (Meillassoux 1975, 86-7). Age and gender shape 
hierarchies within ranks. Brideprice societies usually have “three hereditary ranks 
plus a category of outcasts or slaves”, that is, four ranks in total (Fishburne-Collier 
1988, 147).  
First, brideprice establishes and confirms a person’s rank. In turn, a person’s rank 
determines access to, and control over, food, goods, land, education, labour, and 
choice of marriage partner. When brideprice comprises goods with market values, 
such as ivory and gold (or, in the Timor-Leste case, buffalo, metal breast disks and 
cash), groups with more access to valuables can use those valuables to pay higher 
brideprices for wives, confirming their high status. Men with more assets can also 
pay to marry more than one wife (polygyny), which is also a marker of high social 
status (Meillassoux 1975, 72-74). At the same time, women for whom high 
brideprices are paid are seen as higher status and bringing honour to themselves 
and their families.  
Second, brideprice is a kin-based means of accumulation: higher ranked men gain 
materially from brideprice, chiefly because their daughters “cost more” but also 
because they are able to pay less or delay payments for wives (Fishburne-Collier 
1988, 144, Goody and Tambiah 1973, 13). As a result, higher ranked men are 
polygynous; they can afford to marry more wives. Higher ranked women are first 
wives, lower ranked women and slave women are second and third wives and so 
on. Crucially, as Fishburne-Collier explained, polygyny provides higher ranked 
men with daughters from their liaisons with wives of lower ranks (or slaves) that 
they can exchange to lower ranked men in return for brideprice, increasing high 
ranked men’s wealth. Low ranked men unable to pay any brideprice at all must 
labour for their father-in-law or wife’s uncles as debt bondsmen (Fishburne-Collier 
1988, 146-8).   
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRIDEPRICE 
182 
The role of brideprice in the creation of rank, or social stratification, is not well-
recognised by those practicing brideprice or by scholars because the focus is 
usually on a bride’s economic function or value. To explain, societies practising 
brideprice see brideprices as reflecting a woman’s value, and this view isoften 
replicated in ethnographic reporting of the meaning of brideprice. On this view, 
brideprices are paid for the bride’s productive and reproductive labour (Goody and 
Tambiah 1973, Boserup 1989, Alanamu 2015, Jolly 2015, 68, 71). This interpretation 
is reflected in the anthropological nomenclature describing the groom’s family as 
“wifetakers” and the bride’s family as “wifegivers”: brideprice compensates 
wifegivers for the loss of a daughter’s labour and fertility, and wifegivers are 
valorised as the givers of life. Relatedly, brideprices are seen to vary according to 
the marriage market; scarcity of brides leads to higher brideprices (Anderson 
2007).  
However, marriage’s “economic functions” need social and political 
contextualisation (Goody and Tambiah 1973, 1, Anderson 2007, Patterson 2012, 
337). Part of this is the need to recognise how brideprice and social inequality 
overlap. The overlap of brideprice and social inequality is very apparent in the 
relationship of brideprice to polygyny and slavery. Brideprice and polygyny overlap 
all over the world (Patterson 2012, 337, Goody and Tambiah 1973, 11, Fishburne-
Collier 1988, Hudson 2016). Moreover, where there is both brideprice and 
polygyny, slavery is likely to occur (Patterson 2012, 337). High brideprices mean a 
small number of men monopolise marriageable women. Patterson suggests that 
this shortage of women means men of limited means take low-status, low cost or 
enslaved women as sexual partners until they can afford to marry  (Patterson 2012, 
337). Both slavery and polygyny have negative effects on women. Polygyny, even 
when it exists as an option but is rarely practised, weakens women’s status within 
the household and society (Thomas et al. 2011, 372). This is because the power to 
take a second wife can pressurise a woman into conforming to her husband’s 
wishes (Gaffney-Rhys 2011). Also, it reinforces a view of women as domestic 
labourers and reproducers. Finally, polygynous relationships are more 
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hierarchical, competitive and violent, and women in polygynous relationships are 
likely to be poorer, and less educated (Gaffney-Rhys 2011, Rees et al. 2016). 
6.3 Brideprice in Timor-Leste 
In Timor, brideprice is a longstanding practice; having been recorded during the 
colonial period in both Portuguese East Timor and Dutch West Timor, in 
particular among Liurai lineages (Hägerdal 2012, Gunn 1999). Currently, the 
majority of Timorese practice brideprice. Only around twelve percent of Timorese 
are matrilineal and do not practice brideprice but pay a much smaller amount, 
akin to a bride token. Brideprice comprises higher value “male” gifts: buffalo and 
cash. The bride’s family counters with a much smaller number of less valuable 
assets: pigs, necklaces and Tais (Tetun: traditional woven cloth). In the western 
exclave of Oecusse, a village chief, related to the Liurai family, explained he would 
charge a high brideprice for his daughter because: 
Now adat is stronger. For example, my children have attended school. 
If a man comes to marry her, then I will charge US$20,000 dollars. She's 
young and will look after her family well. Then you get a price of 
US$20,000 or $50,000.127  
The village chief lives in quite a simple house with a basic garden. Because his 
daughter has been to school, he will charge a high price, many times his yearly 
income.  Given the low average rural incomes, brideprices are the some of the most 
substantial sums that ordinary Timorese citizens ever deal with. In Timor-Leste, 
brideprice can vary between a bride token of $200 in matrinlineal families and large 
brideprices of around $70,000, but are more commonly ten or twenty thousand 
dollars (see Table 6.2). By way of comparison, the average annual income in rural 
Timor-Leste is around US$384 (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2011a)128
                                                 
127 Interview with a male village chief, ET104, Oecusse, 30 July 2015. 
128  The median income figure of $384 per year attempts to quantify non-cash parts of income. This is 
problematic, however, as they include an imputed value for rental costs, even though most Timorese do 
not rent their house. Therefore, the actual amount of cash used by an individual is much lower than this  
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2011a). See  Inder, Cornwell, and Datt (2015) for a discussion.  
 
 
PUBLICATION DATE OF 
DATA 
DISTRICT DESCENT MINIMUM  MAXIMUM (USD UNLESS 
OTHERWISE STATED)  
USD IN 2017 PRICES  
HESSING AND TIMO (1923) 1918-1923 Dutch West Timor (Atoni 
group) 
Patrilineal 150 guilders ($720 $PPP) 1,000 guilders for a royal 
marriage ($4,800 $PPP) 
$720 to $4,800 
GUNN (1999, 38) 1880s - - 30 Buffalo129 100 Buffalo $36,000  to  $120,000 
FORMAN (1980, 342) 1970s Baucau Patrilineal 6-9 Buffalo 50 Buffalo + 50 Makassar 
swords + Belak (Jewellery) 
$7,200 to $60,000 
MEARNS (2002, 50) 2002 Viqueque Patrilineal - 30 Buffalo $36,000 
FIELD (2004, 184-8) 2000-2003 Dili Patrilineal - AUD 400 + AUD 100 bee 
manas (bride token) + AUD 
400 for birth certificate 
$670  
MCWILLIAM (2011, 751) 2004-2011 Lautem (Fataluku) Patrilineal - 77 Buffalo  $92,400 
WIGGLESWORTH (2010) 2007 Lautem Patrilineal -  80 Buffalo $96,000 
SILVA (2011, 156) 2008 Ainaro - - $2,000 $2,000 
SILVA (2011, 157) 2008 - - - $2,000  $2,000 
SILVA (2011, 154) 2008 Dili - $500 $3,000 $500 to $3,000 
KHAN AND HYATI (2012) 2009 Manatuto Matrilineal $500 $1,000 $500 to  $1,000 
KHAN AND HYATI (2012, 27) 2009 Suai Patrilineal - $5,100 + 6 Belak, 5 buffalo $11,100 
KHAN AND HYATI (2012, 27) 2009 Betano, Manufahi Patrilineal $2,500 + 10 Belak, 10 
Buffalo  
More than $2,500 + 10 Belak, 
10 Buffalo  
$14,500 and above  
SILVA AND SIMIÃO (2012, 
368) 
2010 - - - $10,000 $10,000 
NINER (2012, 145) 2010 Dili - - 77 Buffalo $92,400 
WIGGLESWORTH ET AL. 
(2015, 25) 
2014 - - - $10,000 $10,000  
                                                 
129 All buffalo to USD calculations are estimates only using 2017 prices of:  1 Buffalo 200 kg live weight is around USD $1200. Traditional events may require buffalo with special marks, which can cost 
$2000 to $7000. These calculations do not include estimates of the dollar value of jewellery (Tetun: Belak) contributed to the brideprice.  
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Author’s Field research 2015 Oecusse Patrilineal $1000 (for matrilateral 
cousin marriage) 
$50,000 $1,000 to $50,000 
Author’s Field research 2015 Manufahi Matrilineal $100 $200 $100 to $200 
Table 6.2 Brideprice Costs across Publications and Author’s Field Research. 
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The terminology, definition, meaning, and significance of brideprice has been 
hotly debated in anthropological and gender practitioner literature on Timor-
Leste. The common term used for brideprice in the anthropological literature on 
Timor-Leste is barlake (or barlaque). Hull’s Tetun-English dictionary defines 
barlake as “common law marriage”, 130  while the Dili Institute of Technology 
dictionary defines barlake as “brideprice”. 131  I use the term brideprice instead 
because the term for marriage payments with a wide currency is “folin”; the Tetun 
noun for “price”, or the verb hafolin,132 or feto nia folin, which is Tetun for “woman’s 
price”.133 Thus, brideprice is the closest translation to the Tetun terms, rather than 
barlake, which is a blended Indonesian/Portuguese term. Although barlake is 
widely understood to mean the assets passed from the groom’s family to the 
bride’s.  However, adat also stands in for brideprice.134  For example, when asked 
to define adat, most of my interviewees responded by discussing brideprice. To 
many Timorese, adat is all about marriage and sexual rights. A Hamlet Chief in 
Oecusse, defined adat as:  
Adat is barlake [. …] If you have paid the barlake, that means that 
person is mine, not everyone’s. This is adat. Adat is important 
everywhere in Timor. There is just one adat. The barlake is then like a 
tara bandu, [an official prohibition]. If someone else tries to tama 
[interfere with/enter] they'll be scared because that person has a 
                                                 
130 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.v. “barlake”.  
131 Word Finder: English-Tetun / Tetun-English, Second Edition., s.v. “barlaki”.  
132 Standard Tetun-English Dictionary, Second Edition., s.v. “hafolin” The term “hafolin”, which is derived from 
folin (Tetun: price or brideprice). Hafolin as a transitive verb means: One, to appreciate, value or esteem; 
Two, to negotiate; and Three, as a noun, brideprice, or arranged marriage. 
133 In West Timor, Indonesia, the term belis is used instead (Hägerdal 2010). Belis is possibly derived from the 
Indonesian beli or to buy. Belis is used throughout Nusa Tenggara Timur province on the islands of Timor, 
Rote, Sabu and Flores (Hägerdal 2010). Compare the standard Indonesian for brideprice, mahar, which is 
derived from the Islamic tradition. Kamus Indonesia Inggris: An Indonesian-English Dictionary, Third 
Edition., s.v. “mahar”. Mahar means “expensive” in Tetun.   
134 I concur with Hicks’ definition that adat in Timor-Leste denotes customary law governing “inheritance of 
property, spouse eligibility, ritual etiquette, tara bandu (Tetun: taboo observance), land ownership, political 
authority, sanctions, oral literature and cosmology” (Hicks 2013, 27). Lisan (Tetun: customary practice) is 
less well-recognised but preferred by some writers like Trindade (2008). Lulik (Tetun: sacred or taboo) 
describes specific aspects of custom regarding sacred and profane objects, people, especially those things 
which might be subject to a tara bandu (Tetun: official prohibition). Portuguese speakers favour the term 
Kostumes (Tetun: customs). Lastly,  Kultura (Tetun: culture) is used to speak about material culture and 
custom in general. 
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husband already. You can't interfere with her because there’s a bandu 
[traditional prohibition].135  
The debate over gifts and commodities is linked to a basic divide between 
Durkheim-type approaches emphasising culture and Marxist/feminist ones 
highlighting production and hierarchy. Anthropologists in the Durkheim tradition 
tend to call brideprice, “bridewealth” and frame it as an exchange of gifts, not a 
transaction. For example, Mauss, drawing on Durkheim, said in 1925 that brides 
were gifts that resulted in debts which were so valuable, and irreducible, that they 
could only be repaid with a gift of a bride, such as a sister or daughter (Strathern 
1988). Thus, on the Durkheimian tradition, the gift of brides sets up family 
relations,  and brides are gifts that are  “embedded in relations of reciprocity and 
mutual dependence” (Jolly 2015). Anthropologists using this approach have made 
important points regarding the political and economic functions of brideprice. 
One, brideprice sets up relations of interdependence between groups, which helps 
with social protection, and welfare. Two, brideprice sets up alliances for peaceful 
relations between groups to exchange goods and the means to live and grow. 
Three, anthropologists have shown how societies that exchange women for 
brideprice take careful steps to de-commodify brides, by using, for example, 
special kinds of marriage gifts, not everyday money (Hoskins 2004). As such, 
scholars in the Durkheimian tradition consider that if societies changed practices 
like brideprice, it would disrupt socio-cultural fabrics. Given their emphasis is on 
cohesion and solidarity, they tend to view this negatively.  
Marxist/feminist approaches see this differently. The first point of difference is the 
emphasis on power, and brideprice as part of the structuring of power and the 
social order (Meillassoux 1975, Fishburne-Collier 1988). This has a material basis. 
Because brides are paid for using items with exchange values outside the marriage 
market, that is cash or cows or cowries can be used to buy items other than brides, 
brides become things with exchange value (Meillassoux 1975). In other words, 
                                                 
135 Interview with male hamlet Chief, ET105, Oecusse, 1 August 2015. 
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brides become a commodity in the circuits of material power. Using a gendered 
lens, I argue that a woman’s participation in brideprice is as one of the objects 
exchanged, not as agent and beneficiary. This draws on Rubin’s critique of Levi-
Strauss’ analsysis of the exchange of women. Rubin argues that in the exchange of 
women, the woman is the “conduit to the relationship rather than the partner to 
it” (Rubin 1975, 174). 136 Importantly, brideprice’s value as a linking mechanism 
benefits men:   
The result of the gift of women is more profound than the result of other 
gift transactions because the relationship thus established is not just 
one of reciprocity but of kinship. The exchange partners have become 
affines [relatives by marriage] and their descendants will be related by 
blood (Rubin 1975, 174) 
The second point of difference concerns societies’ justifications for brideprice. 
Brideprice societies revere women and reproduction. This emphasis on 
reproduction, I argue, should be seen as ideological. That is, to follow Rosaldo 
(1980, 400), reverence for reproduction has to be understood as the justification 
for a social and political order, “with reference not to biological constraints but 
instead to local and specific forms of social relationship and, in particular, of social 
inequality”. It is from this understanding of gender ideology that Fishburne-Collier 
and Rosaldo (1981, 278-9) conclude that societies using brideprice tend “in their 
rituals and cosmology to display a preoccupation with female reproductive 
capacities; women are valued as mothers but feared for their polluting blood”. 
6.3.1 Coalitions For and Against Brideprice 
Timorese women’s organisations have long said that brideprice is a problem for 
women’s rights, but there is no mention of brideprice in the LADV. In the early 
1970s, before the invasion, Timorese women intellectuals living in Portugal 
                                                 
136 Fieldwork notes from a brideprice negotiation ceremony, Dili, 14 August 2011: “The highest ranked man sat 
with four or five older men and one woman.” Thus, the brideprice negotiation  was between mostly male 
lineage heads, not between women.  
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debated the role of brideprice in the social and economic status of women in 
Timorese society (Loney 2015). Early on, women in FRETILIN and then in the 
diaspora debated and criticised brideprice (Loney 2015, Wigglesworth 2010). After 
independence, a report by FOKUPERS described brideprice as “oppressive” 
because women are treated like chattels and Atan (Tetun: slave) (Charlesworth 
and Wood 2002, 336). The Gender Affairs Unit (GAU) of UNTAET supported a 
campaign to regulate brideprice, but was unsuccessful. GAU provided monetary 
support and technical assistance to the Gender and Constitutional Working Group 
to draft the Charter on Women’s Rights containing ten articles that Timorese 
women’s organisations wished to include in the new constitution. Among them 
was a call for the government to “regulate the dowry system to prevent violence 
against women” (Gender and Constitution Subcommittee 2001). These attempts 
were unsuccessful, however, as only non-discrimination in access to political rights 
(Article 3) was included in the constitution (Charlesworth and Wood 2002, 356).  
Subsequently, in the very widespread consultation with over 83 urban and regional 
women’s organisations in 2008-9 to produce the 2009 NGO shadow report to 
CEDAW, “ninety percent of participants” said “that there is extreme discrimination 
against women through cultural practices in wedding ceremonies” (Alves and Alita 
2009, 17). In their view:  
When a man pays dowry [sic: brideprice] to a woman’s family, the man’s 
family gains a full right to control the women. Because of the 
[brideprice] system, men often consider women as their property rather 
than their partners. Women must serve the men’s families; vote 
according to men’s choices; work in the kitchen all day during 
traditional ceremonies and have their meal at midnight after all the 
people have eaten. Women have no right to civil or cultural privileges 
and benefits related to their families and social life family life (Alves and 
Alita 2009, 17).  
Brideprice, according to this report, was damaging to women’s power within the 
household and kinship group, and reduces their claims to their children. It bound 
them more tightly to the  gender division of labour and gave them less access to 
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food. The women’s organisations took a material view of brideprice involving 
commodification. For example, they argued that use of cash and buffalo as 
brideprice can result in negative outcome because “women become equivalent to 
livestock”: to dispose of freely (Meillassoux 1975, 72-74, Alves and Alita 2009).  For 
that reason, brideprice is a “major deterrent” to the “achievement of women’s 
rights and a contributing factor to violence against women” (Alves and Alita 2009, 
17). After identifying brideprice as a significant source of discrimination against 
women, the shadow report concluded that “the state must draft an anti-dowry law 
[sic: brideprice] in order to regularise [brideprice] in Timor-Leste” (Alves & Alita, 
2009, 17). The rest of this section discusses academic and practitioners support or 
contestation of brideprice and the following section discusses everyday citizen’s 
views. 
A key reason for the lack of action on brideprice has been the impacts of 
anthropological debates over brideprice’s definition as a gift or a commodity, 
which has influenced national and international policy makers. Again, specific 
kinds of anthropological perspectives had an impact on policy because of the 
prominence of anthropology in the local turn. The contestation over brideprice’s 
meanings can be partially explained by the long history of “anthropological 
queasiness about the commoditisation of women” which resulted in 
anthropologists using the term bridewealth instead of brideprice (Jolly 2015, 73). 
In the Timor case, this results in the preference for the term barlake instead of 
brideprice, although, as I explained at the outset, brideprice is the more accurate 
translation of the Tetun term folin. Some of this reluctance to describe brideprice 
as commodification is that people practising brideprice also generally deny that 
they sell their daughters, even though they charge a price. A village chief declared: 
“Your children are not things to sell”.137  
Many anthropologists working on brideprice in Timor-Leste took the culture-
based view of brideprice as a symbolic act of gift giving, not as a commodity 
                                                 
137 Interview with a male village chief, ET104, Oecusse, 30 July 2015. 
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exchange. For example, Silva stated, “criticisms of barlake are often grounded on 
the view that it amounts to the selling of women. As such, it is judged to be 
illegitimate following the (Western) ideology that persons and things are 
incommensurable” (Silva and Simião 2012, 366). According to Silva, there is a 
Western ideology versus an authentic Timorese view of brideprice and that 
brideprice is a gift or exchange, not a commodity. Hicks similarly explained 
contentions over brideprice using the Durkheim influenced model I explained 
above. Hicks reproduced these view when rejecting [Timorese and international] 
feminist criticism of brideprice. First, he argued that Timorese people do not 
consider brideprice to be selling a woman.  Second, the bride has immaterial value 
because of her ability to work and reproduce and therefore cannot be substituted 
for a set of material objects. Third, because brideprice sets up a kinship relation, 
on Hicks’ view, the exchange of brides for valuables cannot be a sale (Hicks 2012, 
129-30).  
In the anthropological literature on Timor, practices and beliefs about women, 
childbirth and marriage are depicted in great descriptive detail in anthropological 
works (Forman 1980, Fox 1980, Francillion 1980, Traube 1980, Hicks 2004, Therik 
2004). Despite many studies of gender, gender dualisms, kinship, and marriage, 
anthropological work on kinship in Timor has been inattentive to the power 
relations of gender relations. This literature is characterised by its focus on 
describing dualisms as the organising principle of Timorese society.138  Feminist 
anthropologists Rosaldo’s critique of the edited book on dualisms in Timor and 
Eastern Indonesia, The Flow of Life (Fox 1980) is salutary here. Rosaldo opined that 
in the Fox volume “what high-rank and power mean are nowhere entertained nor 
is rank treated systematically in relation to actual marriage” (Rosaldo 1982, 214). 
The link between marriage and rank was naturalised as the expected order of 
things. In essence, such scholars did not adequately explore the political or 
                                                 
138  Dualisms were describe in kinship (wifegiving and wifetaking houses); in the social order (between 
aristocrats and nobles) (Trindade 2008); in colonial relations (Shepherd and McWilliam 2013); in 
interactions with the Church (Therik 2004); and in studies on marriage, childbirth and death (Clamagirand 
1980, Forman 1980, Fox 1980). 
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economic implications of the unequal gendered dualisms of male/female, 
wifegiver/wifetaker. Namely, dualisms always privilege one term (male; the right 
hand; outside; cooked; purity) over the other (female; the left hand; inside; raw’; 
pollution) although both are seen as necessary or “complementary”. Gender 
relations are thus naturalised and taken for granted.  
Concurrent with the local turn in peacebuilding, peacebuilders relied on these 
anthropological works on Timor-Leste to frame their understandings of Timor-
Leste (Gunn 2007). As I showed in Chapter 5, support among some interveners for 
the traditional dispute resolution was apparent in the intervention in the justice 
system. It also extended to brideprice, which was viewed as both an authentic gift 
system the “most iconic of Timor-Leste’s institutions” (Hicks 2012, 124). Again, a 
key academic informant of the local turn, Trindade, has argued that the focus on 
women and fertility signify that women are highly valued. Anthropologist Silva 
argued against government regulation of brideprice, claiming that brideprice’s 
controversy demonstrated contention between local views on brideprice and 
westernised, government, or educated views. As such, brideprice was a matter of 
“Foho (Tetun: Mountains) versus Dili” (Silva 2011).  More recently, some have 
suggested the matrifocality and respect for women can be a starting point to 
improve women’s rights, specifically by leveraging a reverence for reproduction to 
reform traditional dispute resolution processes (Graydon 2016, 144). An example 
of anthropologists shaping practice is a 2002 report by an Australian 
anthropologist Mearns. The report described the discussion of brideprice during a 
training session about domestic violence in the district of Viqueque: 
Some of the women involved were well educated and very articulate 
but they remained committed to a worldview that the western women 
found incomprehensible. This extended to the desire to keep a 
brideprice system “because this shows how our parents value us”. 
However, they were prepared to concede that current rates (around 30 
buffalo [around $36,000 as seen in Table 6.1 above] and other 
payments) were probably too high. Clearly, the value systems inherent 
in village people’s understandings and their systems of justice remain 
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significantly at odds with those of the western educated social 
transformers employed by the UN” (Mearns 2002, 50) 
Academic and practitioner discussions on how best to rebuild Timorese society 
started from the assumption Timorese institutions, laws and cultures were 
definable, distinct, authentic, and therefore more legitimate than those imposed 
from the top-down by international peacebuilders. Thus, the local turn in 
peacebuilding supported the retention and reinvigoration of brideprice.  
In literature on brideprice in Timor, scholars rarely asked, “where are the women?” 
(Rosaldo 1980, Tickner 2006). For instance, McWilliams’ described the last 
brideprice negotiations at a death ceremony, a kore metan (Tetun: death ceremony 
or end of mourning ceremony), in which male kin negotiated the final settlement 
of the brideprice owed to the late woman’s natal family. The negotiations 
comprised “lengthy and often theatrical negotiations over payment of outstanding 
debt obligations usually fuelled by liberal quantities of palm liquor and tobacco as 
others prepare baskets of steamed rice and boiled meat for feeding guests” 
(McWilliam 2011).  The “others” referred to here are women, the objects of the 
discussion, and invisible workers. In other words, women’s labour and men’s 
agency in controlling women’s roles in production and reproduction are unnoticed 
as McWilliam focusses on the public theatricality of men.  
Similarly, women in Timor-Leste are not the primary decision makers on 
brideprice; they do not decide the nature of the exchange, who will be exchanged, 
for what price, or who will supply the goods. It is mostly the senior men, the uncles 
and the katuas (Tetun: male elders) who negotiate the amount of brideprice. In 
the Timorese preferred marriage is of a bride from a higher-ranked lineage to a 
groom from a lower-ranked lineage. The large size of the brideprice demonstrates 
the high status of the bride’s lineage. The prestige and honour of brideprice thus 
accrues to the wifegiving lineages (patrilineages) in recognition of their higher 
status. Prestige also accrues to the wifetaking lineages in recognition of their 
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ability to afford such a high status and costly bride for their male relative and 
because of their new marital connection with their social superiors.   
In Timor-Leste brideprice systems, women do not directly benefit from brideprice 
as they are the objects, not the parties to the exchange. As Rubin laid out, when 
women are exchanged as gifts between lineages, setting up a generational link 
between families also implies:  
A distinction between gift and giver. If women are the gifts, then it is 
men who are the exchange partners […]The relations of such a system 
are such that women are in no position to realise the benefits of their 
own circulation (Rubin 1975, 174) 
In Timor, the valuables, the cash and goods comprising brideprice are given to the 
“the wife’s father, who must redistribute the folin [brideprice] among his 
kinsmen”(Hicks 2012, 128).139 Women do not control access to and redistribution 
of the money, buffalo, pigs, belak (Tetun: jewellery), swords, or Tais (Tetun: cloth). 
Kinsmen have a right to the redistribution of brideprice, not kinswomen. The 
brideprice is distributed to male relatives according to whether they contributed 
cash or goods to the upbringing of the girl-child, their importance in the family, 
and age, whether he is considered katuas (Tetun: a male elder). As Silva recounted, 
in a ceremony she witnessed, brideprice was “distributed among all the men of his 
house/family. The elder would get more than the younger, but they would all 
receive their share for having contributed, one way or another, to the upbringing 
of the bride” (Silva 2011, 156).  
Women’s lack of access to money or valuables from brideprice is reflective of the 
tendency for men to have ownership or control of capital. The patrilineal clan 
“forms the basis for inherited land entitlements for its agnatic membership” 
(McWilliam 2011 750). Therefore, women do not inherit land, although they may 
                                                 
139 Some marriage payments in brideprice systems transfer the valuables to the bride, not to her family. These 
are called dower systems and is common in Islamic marriage payments (Mahr). It should be an economic 
buffer for wives in case of divorce or death.  
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feel they have ownership rights. Even among those groups with matrilineal descent 
and often matrilocal residence, although women felt that they held land jointly 
with husbands, it would be held in their husband’s name. For example, when asked 
about the upcoming registration in the new land cadastre, the women said:  
Brigida: The land, it is far away—my husband and I own it together.  
Melissa: If the state finally comes to give you a certificate, whose name 
will be on it?  
Brigida: Just one. My husband's.140  
6.3.2  Everyday, Ambivalent Attitudes to Brideprice  
As I have already shown, brideprice is often presented as “pan-Timorese” and 
“iconic”, (Hicks 2012), or a “cosmologically vital” (Hohe-Chopra, Pologruto, and de 
Deus 2009) system enjoying the support of all Timorese, but not all Timorese 
people experience brideprice as a positive practice. The existence of  a wide variety 
of negative and ambiguous attitudes to brideprice across the country undermines 
Silva and Simião’s or Hicks’ easy characterisation of rural versus city views on 
brideprice (Silva and Simião 2012, Hicks 2012).  For instance, there is also a fairly 
common perception among a wide variety of people, including those in the 
countryside, that brideprice is damaging for rural communities’ economic 
development. An illiterate, elderly hamlet chief in Oecusse had a perception that 
brideprice has decreased, which he viewed positively given the difficulties in 
making a living:  
Before adat was strong, now it is not as strong because now we have an 
enlightened life—moris naroman—the kids go to school, people care for 
each other. But adat [brideprice] has decreased because people also 
have to look for food and drink [sustenance]. If you are just hunting for 
brideprice, what are you going to eat and drink? 141 
                                                 
140Interview with a female villager, ET146, Manufahi, 7 September 2015. See Thu, Scott, and Van Niel (2007)   
for a discussion on the inconsistencies of matrilineal land inheritance in Timor-Leste. 
141Interview with a male hamlet chief, ET105, Oecusse, 1 August 2015. ET105 never went to school.  
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In his view, high brideprice impoverished families, and their extended families 
were no longer so eager to help. Thus, he thought that a reduction in brideprice 
would be beneficial:  
[…] because children also have rights, mothers and fathers have rights, 
families have rights. If they are going to pay brideprice and suffer, who 
is going to help them?  Their parents can help them, but this is the new 
kind of life now, and it's not the same as mine, or their parents’142  
Some Timorese, even those with low levels of education in the countryside are thus 
concerned that brideprice impoverishes people. Some rural-based interviewees 
expressed serious reservations about brideprice. Consider this statement from a 
young mother in Oecusse:  
We heard about the government's programs to try to reduce the amount 
of money people spend on festivities. Before, when a man goes to ask 
the woman's parents for her hand in marriage, you had to pay money or 
give an animal. Now there is a tara bandu (Tetun: a ban); you are only 
allowed to bring coffee or cake or sirih pina (Indonesian: areca nut and 
betel leaf). This is better. It reduces the problems for Ema Susar (Tetun: 
poor people with difficulties).143 
Finally, a member of Timorese women’s organisation told me that many Timorese 
in Dili (who have access to paid employment for instance) consider brideprice 
embarrassing and have stopped paying it: “Barlake, in Dili, this has reduced. Some 
people still use it, but not many. They start to feel embarrassed about paying it. 
But in the rural areas, it is strong, very strong. Not stronger, just the same as 
before”.144  
However, some Timorese women from elite families viewed brideprice positively 
as being part of a woman’s honour. Serafina, a young woman employed in the local 
                                                 
142 Interview with a male hamlet chief, ET105, Oecusse, 1 August 2015.  
143 Although the interviewee ET113 mentions a government program to reduce the amount of money paid in 
engagement ceremonies, I did not find any other evidence of such a program. Interview with a female 
farmer, ET113, Oecusse, 5 August 2015. ET113 finished high school.  
144 Interview with a female Timorese senior manager in a women’s organisation, ET089, 11 July 2015 
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government as the village secretary, told me that brideprice honours women: 
“Adat is very important. If you do not have adat, women do not have honour. It is 
the idea of dignity”. 145  The support by some educated women for brideprice  
suggests neither education, nor traditional worldview alone informs 
understandings of brideprices (Niner 2012, Graydon 2016, 57). Instead, based on 
my fieldwork I argue class interests shape views on brideprice. To explain, Serafina 
was high-ranking because she was related to the District Administrator of Passabe, 
a subdistrict of Oecusse. Brideprice was a signal of rank and her family’s higher 
status, and therefore she supported it. The fact the brideprice system benefits 
high-rank families also means that women from these families support 
brideprice—part of their patriarchal bargain—and account for reports of Timorese 
women supporting brideprice as they believe it values them (Niner 2012, Graydon 
2016, 57). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in matrilineal groups in Manufahi (who do not practice 
brideprice) some people had negative perceptions of brideprice. For example, 
Lucia, wife of the village chief argued that brideprice is used to justify domestic 
violence, because if her husband beats her “then the man will just say, ‘oh that's 
my money; that's like one of my cattle”.146 Lucia said that her lineage does not pay 
brideprice and this reduces the risk of violence. This assertion is supported by 
evidence. Narcisco and Tilman suggest, “Women’s positions appear to be stronger 
when postmarital residence is matrilocal, rather than patrilocal” because they have 
access to a support network (Narciso, Henriques, and Tilman 2012). Lucia argues 
that brideprice can force women to remain in violent marriages, and that her 
matrilineal system was superior:  “Here there is no folin [brideprice]. Here they just 
                                                 
145 Interview with female Secretary of the Village, ET110, Oecusse, 4 August 2015. ET110 had finished high 
school.  
146 Khan and Hyati note that women members of patrilineal groups that do not pay barlake are subject to less 
domestic violence. “It is striking that Manatuto, a district in which barlake is not usually paid by kaben-sai 
[patrilineal] communities, has the lowest level of domestic violence in the country (Khan and Hyati 2012, 
34) 
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pay $100 or $200. In the future, if the price is $10,000 or $20,000, if the woman 
returns to her family [in divorce] you have to pay it back”.147  
The impetus to regulate brideprice practice has come from within communities. 
Even so, this has not necessarily been out of concern for women’s rights. Khan and 
Hyati describe an interesting case where a village had introduced brideprice 
regulation. The village chief explained why: 
In the past, in my grandmother’s time, barlake [brideprice] could be 
$500 to $1000, and only when this was fully paid would the wife be 
released to the husband’s family. But this left the parents without 
someone to care for them in their old age because the husband would 
not allow her to come [after paying so much brideprice]. So we changed 
the system (Khan and Hyati 2012, 28). 
Nowadays, of its own accord, this community accepts no brideprice when their 
daughters get married (Khan and Hyati 2012, 28). It was not, however, the result 
of concern for women’s rights, or concern about the impoverishment of families. 
Rather, women’s labour was too crucial to be allocated entirely to a husband’s 
patrilineage and given the needs of care for the elderly in an environment with 
little infrastructure or broad-based welfare support.   
Scholars have differed on the effect that (partial) monetization has had on 
brideprice. McWilliam (2011) argued the change from brideprice in buffalo to cash 
is only a matter of convenience. It does not represent the commodification of 
brideprice because it remains a symbolic gesture. McWilliam argues because the 
system features a token reciprocity, the gift of pigs and cloth from the bride’s 
family to the groom’s, even when the brideprice is paid in cash, means that 
brideprice should still be considered as a gift (McWilliam 2011). Yet, some scholars 
have argued monetization will decrease brideprice. Hicks shared this view that 
development and modernisation will diminish brideprices:  
                                                 
147 Interview with Lucia, wife of village chief ET131, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
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social expectations that the ‘generic’ bridewealth should amount to a 
substantial proportion of a family’s wealth will be supplanted by a desire 
to invest resources in the individual’s own family rather than 
redistribute it to affines [in-laws] with whom, in any case, reciprocal ties 
will have become increasingly tenuous (Hicks 2012, 133). 
Others have said the monetization has led to inflation:  
the shift to a cash economy has meant that in contemporary times, 
brideprice is commonly paid in monetary currency, a transition 
associated with a rapid inflation in the cost to the husband and his 
family (Rees et al. 2016). 
According to the majority of my interlocutors, with one or two exceptions, 
brideprice is not decreasing in volume, frequency, or importance with its 
monetisation. These reports from interlocutors are confirmed by my survey of 
brideprice volumes reported  in the literature in Table 6.2. As others note, societies 
using brideprice usually try to de-commodify the brideprice by using special items 
as brideprice (Hoskins 2004). Likewise, in contemporary Timor, brideprice is often 
reckoned in buffalo and jewellery although it may often be paid in cash. Because 
of the careful semantic work done to de-commodify the 
gifts/payments/brideprice, it makes more sense to look at the accumulation of 
labour, debts, animals and cash in more general terms. That is, I propose that 
brideprice is a consistent feature of the Timorese political economy that allows 
accumulation by the Liurai-Dato class. Nowadays, these already powerful lineages 
look for other material bases such as elected office or patrimonial networks to 
accumulate wealth. Nonetheless, they still benefit materially, as they have 
historically, from brideprice as I show in the following sections.  
6.4  Social Forces and Brideprice  
Brideprice is less about the value of a woman, or about market factors, than it is 
about rank and class. Like other brideprice societies, Timor has “ranked, named, 
hereditary status groups” that are larger than a single family (Fishburne-Collier 
1988, 143). Societies using brideprice have four ranks. The Timor-Leste case 
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conforms to this pattern. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are four hereditary ranks:  
kings (Tetun: Liurai), nobles (Tetun: Dato), peasants or farmers (Tetun: Ema bai-
bain; Toos Nain), and slaves (Tetun: Atan) (see Table 6.3 which explains the names 
for these ranks in three districts across Timor-Leste). Those claiming high rank—
kings and nobles—can include, however, many individuals. In any one Timorese 
village, around half the inhabitants are ranked as high-status and half as peasants, 
leading to the assumption that around half the Timorese population is from the 
Liurai Dato class (Hicks 1990). 148  Every village contains some higher-ranked, 
Liurai-Dato lineages, and some commoner lineages. Although nearly all people in 
these villages face high levels of poverty and deprivation, difference in wealth 
between high-ranked and low-ranked people is starkly defined and regulated 
through marriage.  







KING Naizuf Liurai Ratu 
NOBLE Tobe 
Meo (warrior class) 
Dato/Baino Paca 
PEASANT Tob Ema Reino / Toos Nain Akan 
SLAVE Ata Atan Acar 
Table 6.3 Rank in Timor-Leste: Three Districts 
Timorese society is also a gerontocracy, with elders outranking youth. Age 
hierarchy is referred to as a Maun/Alin relationship (Tetun: older brother/younger 
brother) (Hicks 2004, 73). In Timor-Leste, wifegivers outrank wifetakers, and 
leadership is hereditary even though not all high-ranked men become leaders. 
(Hicks 1990, McWilliam 2012, 2011). The most rigidly stratified groups in Timor 
                                                 
148 Recall from Chapter 3 that only a quarter of the population could vote in a village election during the 
Portuguese era because women did not have the franchise. 
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have castes, not ranks (see Table 6.3). These caste-based systems in the district of 
Lautem, have in theory, little social mobility:  
If a couple were not of the same caste, then there would be no marriage. 
In recent times, young men and women are able to choose their 
partners but they are still expected to marry from within their own 
caste. Inter-caste marriage is still frowned upon; women are not 
permitted to marry men of a lower caste but in some circumstances men 
may do so (Corcoran-Nantes 2009, 177).  
Taken to an extreme in Los Palos, the exchange of women and brideprice are 
crucially bound up with social status across all of Timor-Leste.  
The ranked kinship system is based around a system of male relatives or 
patrilineages. These systems are defined by patrilineal descent and patrilocal 
residence, which affect land and property inheritance, rights to labour, and access 
to other material resources. Most Timorese practice patrilineal descent and 
patrilocal residence. Less than 12 percent of the population practice matrilineal 
descent and many matrilineal groups incorporate patrilineal features (Narciso, 
Henriques, and Tilman 2012, Thu, Scott, and Van Niel 2007). Thus, my main 
discussion focusses on patrilineal groups, or “patrilineages”. Patrilineal descent 
means that kin groups are related through males. In Timor-Leste’s patrilineal 
groups, male individuals are counted as part of the father’s descent group, and 
females marry into their husband’s descent group. Male children are then part of 
the father's house, while women move to their husband's family. There is a 
preference for patrilocal residence, that is, for newly married couples to live near 
the husband’s relatives. The husband’s family thus pays a brideprice for the bride 
to enter their lineage group and for control over her labour and children. Women 
are thus obliged to perform labour obligations (cooking, childcare, washing, 
cleaning, gardening and farming) for their husbands’ family. 
In Timor-Leste, the ideal marriage for its patrilineal groups is a “matrilateral cross-
cousin marriage”, which limits the amount of brideprice that must be paid (Hicks 
2015, 23). A matrilateral marriage is where mother’s brother’s daughter is married 
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to her father’s sister’s son. For example, in the far eastern part of Timor-Leste, 
Fataluku society follows asymmetric prescriptive alliance by marrying sons to their 
matrilateral cousins: “In doing so, they reproduce the direction of earlier patterns 
of marriage exchange and follow what Fataluku term ‘the wide path and trail’ 
(McWilliam 2011, 750). I documented the same preference for matrilateral cousin 
marriage in Oecusse. Here, a village chief told me:  
Years ago, I married [my wife] and I paid her price. Now, if my boy 
marries my wife’s niece there is no price, it wouldn't be right to charge. 
That's culture: the right path or the wrong path. There is not a 
contract.149 
The village chief is explaining that because he paid the brideprice for his wife, a 
matrilateral cousin marriage between his son and his wife’s niece would not incur 
a brideprice. By following the “right path”, the village chief means he has to pay 
attention to the preference for matrilateral cousin marriage: he paid his wife’s 
brideprice, now if his son marries his maternal cousin (or an equivalent relative 
from his sister’s family) there would be no brideprice, just a token. His son would 
be following the same marriage pattern as his father, (as represented in Figure 6.1). 
It is important to see how this sets up relationships between patrilineal clans over 
generations. It sets up a pattern of marriage between families, which is why it is 
metaphorically a well-travelled path or road, the “right path” as the village chief 
puts it. McWilliam explained that Timorese favour matrilateral cousin marriages 
because everybody knows everyone already, they live close to one another, and the 
two lineages are of a similar status (McWilliam 2011, 750). They are also favoured 
because the brideprice is much lower.  
                                                 
149 Interview with a male village chief, ET104, Oecusse, 30 July 2015. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Matrilateral Cousin Marriage & Brideprice
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As autochthonous or first settling inhabitants, Liurai lineages are accorded the 
right to rule, which is also partially justified through marriage (Bovensiepen 2014b, 
Yoder 2016, 116). In many myths, high-ranking lineages, the first settling lineages, 
give wives and land to the in-migrating group, who must pay a brideprice for brides 
from the Liurai lineages. Accordingly, the highest ranks, Liurai, intermarry with 
the Dato lineages, but not with the commoner or slave lineages. According to Fox, 
the “settlement lord” or Liurai gives wives to incoming male settlers in exchange 
for brideprice: “a settlement lord establishes his position as progenitor by giving a 
woman to the first, and possibly the second, in-coming member of a different” 
lineage (Fox 1996, 144). The second incoming group, in turn, gives wives to other 
incoming groups producing, in theory, an ordered hierarchy of lineages in which 
the wifegiving house is described as the male house and the wifetakers as the 
female house (Fox 1996, 144). Even today, deliberation among the noble and 
aristocratic lineages claiming to be the autochthonous lineage are a common 
method for determining land ownership, although these claims also lead to intra-
elite conflicts, such as in Oecusse. There, three different families claim the right to 
rule.150 With this in mind, marriage and rank determine access to land and thus to 
wealth.  
As previously explained, in Timor-Leste, higher-ranked, first settling lineages 
continued to control political and economic power during Indonesian rule and 
into the present. Up to the present time, lineage hierarchy continues to influence 
social and political outcomes. For example, Antonio, from a high-ranking, first 
settling lineage, hamlet Fehuk in the village of Mota, Manufahi,151 said they have a 
problem with incoming settlers: 
Hamlet Fehuk in the village of Mota is my land, and people from hamlet 
Fetokiik have settled here. I command them to go, but they refuse. They 
                                                 
150  These claims have massive implications for the development of the social market free trade zone in 
Oecusse. A government historian told me of the government’s decision to research the “true history” of 
Oecusse in the lead up to the 500-year anniversary of Portuguese arrival in Lifau, Oecusse, led to problems. 
The project encountered problems because at least three families—claimed to be the true rulers of Oecusse. 
Interview with government researcher from Oecusse on 23 July 2015, Dili.  
151 Name of village and hamlet changed to de-identify data. 
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want to stay here permanently. There has been no solution as yet. They 
live in Mota but give allegiance to another village! That's what we don't 
want. They don't want to register to vote here because they don't like 
the leaders of our village, Mota.152 
After prompting, Antonio replied that villagers in hamlet Fetokiik are reluctant to 
give allegiance to Mota because of brutality from the village chief during the 
Indonesian occupation. The chief had two men from the lower-ranked lineage in 
hamlet Fetokiik strung up a tree and beaten, leaving one dead.  
He beat hamlet Fetokiik, the lower ones [the lower lineages].  Then all 
of them ran to another suku (village). After that, they returned to their 
place in Fetokiik, but don't want to register to vote. The village chief of 
Mota must be their leader, but they don't want him to be.153 
Importantly, this violence is structural, that is, it was committed by a high ranked 
village chief of Mota on members of hamlet Fetokiik the lower-ranked lineage in 
the village, living nearest near the flooding river, close to the malaria-prone 
lowlands and furthest from the sacred mountain area. After the assault, lower 
ranked villagers sought refuge in another village. Following Timorese 
independence, lower ranked villagers returned to their land in the lowland area in 
the area of the village Mota, but refused to participate in elections for the high 
ranked village chief of Mota because he is a relative of the former chief who beat 
them. Because of their refusal to acknowledge higher status lineages, those living 
in hamlet Fetokiik have since had no access to roads, electricity, or services. 
Antonio saw the lineages of Fetokiik as interlopers who are granted land, and who 
should thus pay allegiance to the village chief of Mota.  
6.4.1 Accumulation Through Brideprice 
In brideprice societies, marriage organises social inequality (Fishburne-Collier 
1988). For this reason, changing brideprice would challenge the pre-eminence of 
                                                 
152 Interview with Antonio, ET130, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
153 Interview with Antonio, ET130, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
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higher ranked lineages and their ability to accumulate cash. High-ranked lineages 
can charge a lot more brideprice than low-ranked lineages, as seen in Table 6.2.154 
Consequently, although all men benefit materially from their daughters’ 
brideprice, high-ranked men benefit more (Meillassoux 1975). Brideprice leads to 
the accumulation of wealth (cash, buffaloes and belak (Tetun: ceremonial 
jewellery) by the wifegiving house and the impoverishment of the wifetakers. 
Higher-ranked lineages always receive more valuable gifts and brideprice transfers 
wealth up the ranks (as shown in Figure 6.2). Buffalo and cash are worth much 
more than cloth and pigs and are given in greater quantities. As such, brideprice 
is not a reciprocal gift exchange but asymmetric.  
Unequal marriages between high ranked and low ranked people ensure a 
generations-long unequal exchange of money and goods between families, which 
increases in intensity during periods of economic stagnation and crisis. Silva (2011) 
has described debt as “idiomatic” in Timorese society. In contrast, I argue that debt 
is a material relation with real material effects.155 When, as in the case of Timor, 
brideprices are sky high, the husband’s family (wifetakers) remains indebted to the 
wife’s family (wifegivers) for years or even generations, with sons obliged to pay 
for their parents’ brideprice debts (Corcoran-Nantes 2009, 91, Wigglesworth 2010, 
127). 156 This exchange of women using brideprice is the “principal medium for 
reproducing social relations”  (McWilliam 2011, 749). Lower-ranked wifetakers will 
continue to give more expensive gifts:  “symmetric [sic] gift giving will continue 
indefinitely—wifegivers always give pigs and cloth, and wifetakers buffalo and 
cash” (McWilliam 2011, 752). McWilliam says the gift giving is symmetric, as indeed 
the acts of giving are, but the volume and value of gifts is asymmetric, as is typical 
in brideprice systems. Thus, brideprice debts can be “precisely quantified” and are 
not “reciprocal obligations” involving some egalitarianism as some scholars argue 
(Silva and Simião 2012), but “calculative forms of mutual appropriation or 
                                                 
154 Hudson and Matfess (2017) claimed that brideprice is set at a flat rate, but it is not.  
155 Debt is a major organising principle of human social and political relations (Graeber 2011).  
156 Fieldwork notes, 8 September 2015.  
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expectations of engagement” (McWilliam 2011). As a result, brideprice has been a 
means of kin-based accumulation for the Liurai-Dato lineages, as seen in Figure 
6.2 below where brides marry down ranks (hypogamously) and buffalo and cash 
are redistributed upwards.157  
This process has intensified in the post-conflict economy. In the stagnant 
Timorese post-independence economy, marriage mediated exchanges after 
delinking from the large Indonesian economy has, “galvanised opportunities for 
the reassertion of ascribed social hierarchies and the public expression of personal 
prestige” (McWilliam 2011, 747). That is, there has been an extra driver of 
brideprice as a means to accumulate and solidify class relations between the Liurai-
Dato class and their debtors. This reinvigoration made changes to brideprice 
through a gender intervention unlikely, given the power and interests of this class.
                                                 




Figure 6.2  Brideprice Transfers Wealth Upwards 
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It is important to realise that in brideprice societies, “labour is divided by rank” 
and access to labourers is also often organised by marriage (Fishburne-Collier 
1988, 143). To illustrate, at all cultural events, higher lineages do not work to 
prepare the food, drink and festival areas; they merely arrive after preparations, as 
one female farmer in Oecusse explained:  
Rich people just come on the night. We ordinary folk do the cooking. 
Those people are not used to cooking. At their homes, they never cook 
right? They always need a pembantu (Indonesian: a maid). There's 
always someone who helps Bapak sira (those misters/higher status 
men) to cook. They go to work and come home and just eat.158 
As the highest ranking group, men from Liurai-Dato lineages do not perform the 
labour necessary to produce valuables for brideprice and other ceremonies, they 
rely on other, low-ranking men and women to do it for them. Consider one of 
Tilman’s interlocutors, a spiritual leader (lia nain) justifying a Liurai in Viqueque 
extracting valuables from his subjects:  
If the Liurai’s child wants to get married, [….] the people give buffalo as 
the brideprice. The parents cannot give buffalo as a brideprice 
otherwise the marriage won’t endure, they could all die, from the 
children up to the mother. Their role is to work in the vegetable garden 
and rice fields to give food to the Liurai [….] During traditional 
celebrations with dancing if the Liurai wants to take a Tais, sword or 
Belak from one of his subjects then the person will give it to him. When 
playing cards for money, if the Liurai wants to take everything then he 
will (Tilman 2012, 198) 
In this example, it is clear that, not only do Liurai charge more for their daughters, 
when their sons marry, lower ranked people can sometimes pay the brideprice for 
them. Access to paid work adds to the ability of men of the Liurai-Dato class to 
operate at the high end of the brideprice market. Because many Liurai-Dato men 
have paid jobs, they can also rely on these incomes pay higher brideprices. Again, 
this is typical of brideprice systems as described by Fishburne-Collier: “high-
                                                 
158 Interview with a female farmer, ET113, Oecusse, 5 August 2015. 
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ranking families are free to pursue culturally valuable activities [like war or 
politics] because they have slaves, outcasts and debt-bondsmen” to labour for 
them (Fishburne-Collier 1988, 143). Further, marriage and brideprice play a role in 
organising labour through debt-bondage. For example, if a lower-ranked person 
marries the daughter of Liurai, that is, the difference in rank between the lineages 
is very great; the peasant man takes on an enormous debt and becomes his father-
in-law’s debt-bondsman (Nixon 2008, 316). Gunn reports of this practice in 1880s 
Timor, where “enslavement of the husband to the family of the wife can occur” 
(Gunn 1999, 47). Brideprice causing debt bondage is common in the closely-related 
cultures of Eastern Indonesia (Hoskins 2004, 97). Again, a difference in rank causes 
a high brideprice, leading to debts, leading to control of labour by the higher-
ranked lineages.  
It is important to note that debt and social inequality are particularly interlinked 
through brideprice in Timor-Leste. In other words, kinship organises social 
inequality, and the mechanism that reproduces this inequality is debt between 
lineages. Brideprice initiates complex networks of exchange and obligations in 
which social and material debts are repaid using animals, goods, belongings, land, 
labour, favours, promissory notes or even sons and daughters. In Timor-Leste, 
social relations—like kinship relations—are shaped by and constituted by, debt. 
Sons owe debts to fathers and uncles, children to mothers, citizens to the war 
veterans who fought and died. Describing these relationships as a form of debt 
expresses a more significant and more important relationship than merely a debt 
that can be simply repaid in time or money. Some have suggested, drawing on 
ideas of the moral economy present in many places globally, that these debts create 
a notion of reciprocity and social cohesion in Timor-Leste (Shepherd and 
McWilliam 2013, Scott 1976).  
To illustrate the movement of brideprice across different parts of the economy I 
use a model derived from Kabeer (2003, 28). Figure 6.3 below shows the types of 
brideprice payments in an iceberg. The different modes of brideprice payment are 
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located in various parts of the economy, some formal and recognised, some 
unrecognised and informal.  
  
 
Figure 6.3 Brideprice in the Formal and Informal Economy 
To start at the bottom tier, according to Timorese and anthropological definitions 
as I explained in Chapter 6, brideprice pays for the reproductive and care labour of 
the bride. The bride’s labour is thus a part of the reproductive and care economy, 
which is unrecognised in the formal traded economy. Second, brideprice is 
reckoned in buffaloes, which farmers use in the subsistence economy as work 
animals. Also, women’s labour in the fields of her husband is part of the 
subsistence economy. Bonded labour owed by the husband to his father in law, in 
part payment of brideprice, as I discussed in Chapter 6, and is also part of the 
subsistence economy. Third, trade in buffalo is part of the informal economy of 
barter. Brideprice can also take the form of labour in kind owed by the male 




• Buffalo, Belak (jewellery), pigs, 












THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRIDEPRICE 
212 
economy. Lastly, brideprice becomes part of the formally “traded economy” when 
it is paid in cash or paid for in part by a microfinance loan. At the top of the 
economic iceberg, brideprice as cash has been made “visible” and counted in the 
formally traded economy. Like an iceberg, only the top quartile, the traded 
economy, is visible. Because it is largely invisible in the formal economy, and 
associated most concretely with the invisible subsistence and reproductive parts 
of the economy, brideprice’s role in class based accumulation is obscured.  
6.4.2 Brideprice and Domestic Violence 
In general, brideprice can cause higher rates of domestic violence because it marks 
wives out as the property of husbands and their families. Paying a brideprice means 
that a husband, and his family, has access to and control over a woman’s 
productive work in the fields, her domestic labour, and her children (Alves and 
Alita 2009, Boserup 1989, Meillassoux 1975). In the Timor case, research shows that 
brideprice is “something men would refer to as a way of reinforcing their rights 
over their wives” (Khan and Hyati 2012, 37). Specifically, if a husband has paid the 
brideprice in full, he can justify using violence over his wife to ensure she labours 
for him (UNHCR 2004, paragraph 53). The role of brideprice being used  as part of 
a “discourse” to justify domestic violence has been partially explored by Grenfell et 
al. (2015). 
When women are considered the property of men, this leads to both domestic 
violence and kinship groups disputing rights to women. Streicher’s ethnography 
focussing on masculinity in Dili provides a common contemporary example of this 
phenomena. She quotes a young man describing how fights arise over girls:  “‘So 
when the other groups  [from other communities] have a party, and we go there, 
and there are a lot of girls, and we want to dance with them, but maybe they refuse 
to dance with us, that maybe also creates conflict’” (Streicher 2011, 64). Streicher 
concludes that the young men’s behaviour is based on  “the assumption that girls 
are the ‘property’ of communities, so that conflict about girls becomes a 
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competition about both, the honour of the men and the honour of the community”  
(Streicher 2011, 64). I witnessed the same dynamic of men controlling with whom 
their young female sisters and cousins danced or dated at three cultural 
celebrations in 2015: a wedding; after a traditional dispute resolution and at a kore 
metan (Tetun: end of mourning ceremony).  
Brideprice’s connection to traditional dispute resolution sets the conditions for 
high levels of gender-based violence. As I explained in the preceding Chapter 5, 
traditional dispute resolution mitigates against gender justice (Stewart 2016). 
Fishburne-Collier’s model of brideprice societies can help provide an explanatory 
model for the connection between brideprice and traditional dispute resolution 
because it explains disputes. Fishburne-Collier argued that in brideprice societies, 
because kinship organises inequality, disputes over women are endemic 
(Fishburne-Collier 1988, 3). Common dispute topics include brideprice payment, 
arranged marriage, rape, conception, inheritance, rights to labour, divorce, 
adultery, and domestic violence (Fishburne-Collier 1988, 3). In brideprice systems 
specifically, the status of the brideprice payment (arrears, partially paid, fully paid)  
can start or prevent common disputes. For example, where brideprice is not fully 
paid, domestic violence is considered a violation principally against wife’s natal 
family, entitling a wife’s natal family to material compensation. Although a natal 
family may wish to protect their female relative, there is a material incentive for a 
woman’s family to return her to her husband to receive compensation (Fishburne-
Collier 1988). Moreover, in the case of divorce, internationally the experience has 
been that brideprice must be returned (Goody and Tambiah 1973, 12).  In the 
Timor-Leste case, more evidence is needed, but Graydon described two victims 
seeking divorce failing to receive sanctuary because their natal families feared 
having to return a brideprice (Graydon 2016, 57). Divorce also risks the alliance 
between the patrilineages and any children—valued for their labour and 
brideprices—remain with their father’s kin. Economic and political losses for 
women’s natal family, especially under conditions of debilitating poverty, make 
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divorce very unlikely. In this way, brideprice sets the structural (economic and 
political) conditions for the continuation of high levels of domestic violence. 
High brideprices constrain people’s choices of marriage partner, which, according 
to some young male interlocutors, increases the rate of adultery and adultery-
related violence. When marriages are not between lineages of the same status, 
these require higher brideprice because it is a new path of alliance between 
families. Timorese parents then have to tuur hamutuk (Tetun: sit together) to 
negotiate the brideprice. This can lead to intractable arguments when one person’s 
lineage requires a very high brideprice. It can result in “people wanting to get 
married but can’t because of adat or brideprice”. 159  Interviewees in Manufahi 
suggested that the combination of high brideprice and the fact that lower lineage 
men were unable to afford to marry higher lineage girls, who were also more 
desirable, led to grief, extra-marital affairs, and domestic violence.160 As described 
in Chapter 5, adultery and jealousy were often referred to as a driving cause of 
domestic violence.  
Crucially, brideprice can increase the rates of domestic violence because it leads to 
economic pressure on households to give money to the wife’s family. As I 
mentioned earlier, the role brideprice plays in accumulation may be increasing 
because of the stagnant economy, and this, in turn, leads to greater pressure on 
families to give gifts to the bride’s family (wifegivers). The economic stagnation of 
large parts of the economy in the post-independence period meant many Timorese 
turned to dependence on the “exchange economy”, which has at its basis, 
brideprice (McWilliam 2011, 748).  I argue that a return to these marriage mediated 
exchanges represent the pressure of the lack of distribution of state resources, not 
a return to stronger kin ties and community spirit. The obligations to wifegivers 
continue at a rate of around once or twice a month, whenever there is a cultural 
ceremony—a birth, a death, a marriage or a kore metan (Tetun: end of mourning 
                                                 
159 Interview with Rosita, female farmer ET138, Manufahi, 4 September 2015. 
160 Interview with young men, ET150 and ET151 in Manufahi, 8 September 2015.  
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party). As a result, these ongoing and smaller brideprice repayments are the 
household’s responsibility, although they will also call on other family members in 
the patrilineages for help. Under those circumstances, repayments lead to “a 
heavy, and sometimes unreasonable, burden on couples, which can lead to 
indebtedness and financial problems” (Khan and Hyati 2012, 37).  These findings 
mirror mine that “financial problems were almost universally described as the 
main trigger for violence” (Khan and Hyati 2012, 37). The pressure of brideprice 
debts on already extremely deprived households can trigger violence. Similarly, in 
a recent report on the economic dimensions of violence against women, 
“respondents often cited poverty or a lack of money as a stressor that led to 
arguments and conflict within the household” (Grenfell et al. 2015, 36). Wives are 
under pressure to make sure their conjugal household pays money to their natal 
household. Many described to me the pressure from the wife’s family [wifegiver] 
as a key pressure on household finances. Economic reasons were the most 
common reason people gave for the occurrence of domestic violence. For example, 
Antonio discussed a case of domestic violence in the village of Mota. He said:  
The problem was because of economic problems in their house. Their 
household income is not enough. Insufficient. They did not have 
enough to take to the cultural ceremony. The women nags, pipipipipip 
…. then the man [makes hitting gesture]. 
Now they are good. No, the household economy is not any better, but 
she does not nag anymore. Because she is scared. 161 
Financial pressure on the household to pay money to the lineage increases the 
economic burden, which affects women’s labour and experience of domestic 
violence. Indeed, a recent quantitative study of the argued problems repaying 
brideprice is linked to higher rates of domestic violence. The study found that 
“women with the most severe problems with brideprice also reported a threefold 
increase in conflict with their spouse and a fivefold increase in conflict with family” 
(Rees et al. 2016, 1). Moreover, problems with repaying brideprice has greater 
                                                 
161 Interview with Antonio, ET130, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
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implications for poverty-affected households than wealthier households: “Women 
with the most severe problems with brideprice had twice the poverty scores as 
those with no problems with the custom” (Rees et al. 2016, 1).  
Thus, the pressure of the bride’s family obliging the married couple for gifts 
increases the rate of violence. When violence occurs, this is usually, as Chapter 5 
explained, dealt with using a traditional dispute resolution process. If the violence, 
triggered by economic problems in the household, forces the victim to seek refuge, 
her family might return her to her husband if he pays the appropriate 
compensation. Thus, the wifegivers receive assets, but this is in the form of 
compensation this time, rather than an obligatory gifts. To reiterate, traditional 
dispute resolution is mediated in the first instance by the male heads of the 
respective families, who have an interest in restoring the balance through 
compensation (Fishburne-Collier 1988).  
6.5 Conclusion  
Chapter 6 has argued that brideprice is a foundation of the Timorese political 
economy. Instead of a culturalist approach, most common in the literature on 
gender and brideprice, this thesis has deployed a feminist political economy 
approach. Scholars advocating for cultural approaches to brideprice and 
traditional dispute resolution have inadvertently supported a system that relies on 
material expropriation from lower-ranked to higher ranked lineages and violent 
control over women. This feminist political economy approach focussed on gender 
disaggregating the benefits and burdens of brideprice. Brideprice is large, dwarfing 
most people’s incomes. The chapter argued hierarchical social structure in Timor-
Leste hinges on material accumulation through brideprice. There are broader 
implications for this work linking social class, brideprice, and political economy. 
This link between social order and the exchange of women has been noted in 
anthropology works, but not its politico-economic significance in cementing social 
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class. Further, large-scale quantitative research is needed to establish actual 
brideprice values, and historical research to record their shifts, or not, over time.  
Chapter 6 drew on fieldwork and secondary material to show that brideprice is a 
cause of domestic violence. Brideprice can be used by perpetrators to justify 
domestic violence. But more than that, increased financial stress on households 
causes domestic violence. Ironically, a woman must pay for her brideprice through 
labouring to provide cash payments to her father’s family over many years. 
Brideprice causes significant debts, leading to indebtedness, which affects poor 
households more than wealthy ones. Men and women in Timor-Leste cite over-
indebtedness and poverty as the main reasons for domestic violence, and constant 
repayments of brideprice fuel this financial strain. Debts can lead households to 
marry off their daughters forcefully, one example of the connection of brideprice, 
debt and sexual violence. Many lineages now pay brideprice in cash, and brideprice 
is now more closely connected to the cash economy. Timorese finance brideprice 
using microfinance loans, subject to high interest rates. Microfinance links 
brideprice to the international financial market. I conclude that approaches that 
see brideprice as a cultural phenomenon overlook the connections to the political 
economy and to the connections of material conditions to domestic violence and 
debt.  
When viewed through the lens of gender justice, the centrality of  brideprice marks 
a continuity between patriarchy in the private sphere and in government and 
market spheres such as Goetz described (2007, 39). The use of brideprice strips 
many female citizens of legitimacy as their marriages mark them as exchange 
objects in a marriage market. Brideprice involves large sums, accumulation, and 
extraction. To paraphrase Goetz again, because of its role in cementing and 
reproducing class relations—that is, the state and the family have deep 






CHAPTER 7.  MICROFINANCE INTERVENTIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
In Timor-Leste, donors have framed microfinance as a gender-sensitive technology 
of financial inclusion to reduce poverty at the individual and community level. It 
has been an important but infrequently examined gender intervention and for that 
reason, adverse social and political outcomes of microfinance in Timor-Leste 
remain little understood. I contend the outcomes of microfinance have been 
uneven with little to show for donor invention despite the expansion of the 
industry. There are a number of reasons for these uneven outcomes. 
International finance institutions such as UN Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), as well as bilateral donors such as USAID and 
Australian Aid (AusAid) have promoted the use of microfinance as an 
indispensable policy to reduce poverty and empower women in Timor. By 2016, 
Timor-Leste had a sizeable formal microfinance sector, with three microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) holding loan portfolios worth at least $14.5 million.162 These 
loans are held by 14,000, mainly women, borrowers. 
The chapter applies a historical feminist political economy analysis to the gender 
intervention using microfinance. This chapter argues that explaining the uneven 
outcomes in feminist political economy terms focuses attention on the 
historically-specific class and gender relations. The chapter asserts that 
interveners’ ideologically-driven promotion of microfinance continued without 
                                                 
162 The total portfolio only includes two MFIs as the total portfolio for BNCTL is not known.  
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robust evidence for microfinance’s effectiveness in poverty reduction and women’s 
empowerment. But microfinance did not arrive in Timor-Leste with UN 
peacekeepers. In the case of Timor-Leste, in the small amount of practitioner 
writing on microfinance, the tendency is to under-historicise it as a creation of 
international interveners. It is the contention of this chapter that Indonesian-era 
microfinance shaped the Timorese political economy under conditions of violence 
and coercive militarised conflict. The Indonesian military, their supporters, and 
village elites benefitted from microfinance. 
Despite the association between authoritarianism of the New Order and 
microfinance, microfinance found support in both major Timorese political blocs, 
FRETILIN and CRNT. In short, microfinance as a market-led development strategy 
of interveners found common cause with national elite policy thinking. What the 
interventions did do was to shape the outcomes of microfinance. Instead of 
reducing poverty and empowering women, interveners’ support of microfinance 
has contributed to the financialisation of the Timorese post-conflict economy and 
society with adverse outcomes for many of the poor, especially women. In 
particular, the chapter argues that the combination of market-led development 
and national elite interests resulting in the promotion of microfinance and self-
help, at the expense of gender just state resource distribution. 
In the following chapter (Chapter 8) I explain the uneven outcomes of the 
intervention, showing how microfinance is neither an empowering, local-level 
intervention, nor an imposition of international institutions onto authentic 
institutions. Instead, different social forces can benefit from new modes of 
accumulation and power in microfinance. Microfinance extracts capital from 
Timorese borrowers at high interest rates, which accumulate as profits. By 
encouraging the flowering of self-help group (SHG) and MFI microfinance, 
interveners have promoted class-based strategies of credit-led accumulation. That 
is, high interest rates transfer sums of money from poorer Timorese to richer ones. 
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In order to explain the outcomes of the gender intervention to promote 
microfinance, I first explain the forms, debates, history of microfinance. There is 
an extensive literature on liberal markets, gender and outcomes of microfinance 
that can help explain the uneven outcomes of microfinance in Timor-Leste. This 
deepens the understanding of interveners’ aims and microfinance’s outcomes by 
placing it in a global context. The second part of the chapter describes and analyses 
the history shaping the development of microfinance in Timor, as this is important 
to understand class and gender dynamics. Thirdly, the chapter describes the 
interventions aims, especially focussing on the coalitions between international 
donors and national policy makers to promote microfinance.  
7.2 Forms and Aims of Microfinance Interventions  
Processes of microfinance are similar across the world. Microfinance describes 
financial services using small or micro amounts of money.163 These micro loans, 
savings, insurance, and remittances are designed for people with very low incomes, 
such as subsistence farmers and petty traders. Banks do not normally lend to these 
low income earners because they lack collateral or reside in remote areas where 
services are limited. Despite a change of name to microfinance, microcredit—that 
is, loans—remain the predominant form of microfinance (Haase 2013, Mader 2015, 
Karim 2011). 164  Loans are intended to allow investment in existing or new 
productive activities to generate income, employ family members and smooth 
economic shocks (Haase 2013).  
Essentially, there are four kinds of institution offering microfinance in Timor-Leste 
(Table 7.1). One, either the MFI’s or the microfinance unit of the Timorese national 
bank, Banco Nacional Commerçio de Timor-Leste (BNCTL), provide formal 
microfinance. Two, SHGs provide microfinance. These are also called savings and 
                                                 
163The loan amount should be small relative to a person’s annual income, no more than 250 percent (CGAP 
2003).  




loans cooperatives, Usaha Bersama Simpan Pinjam (Indonesian: literally Business 
Together Saving Lending), or credit cooperatives. 165  Three, there were non-
financial cooperatives, usually agricultural cooperatives. Four, informal 
microfinance is a loan from a moneylender. 
In microfinance provided by an MFI, a field officer from the MFI attracts a group 
of 8-10 clients, trains them, and disperses the first loans. The field officer organises 
a governance system, usually holding an election for a leader and treasurer. The 
field officer subsequently returns weekly or monthly to collect repayments. The 
MFI charges interest on these repayments, which it uses to cover overheads. The 
group decides which member receives loans in which order. Because the group 
must cover individual defaults and the loan officer will not disperse new loans until 
the group repays the old one, the group exerts strong pressure to repay to get the 
next tranche of loans. Microfinance is thus famous for its high repayment rates of 
uncollateralised loans (Mader 2015). 
In SHG microfinance, the process of loans remains similar. Initial capital comes 
from the group’s savings, or from an external grant (Credit Unions Australia 2011, 
FIELD-Support 2014). An officer trains women and forms a group, but the first 
steps consist of compulsory savings by the members until the group saves enough 
capital. Members decide the interest rate, usually higher than MFIs’ interest rates. 
International NGOs pushed this model of SHG microfinance in many developing 
countries. Advocates assume SHGs are more equitable than MFI microfinance 
because members control groups and profits return to members, rather than to 
shareholders of the MFI. However, SHGs are credit-driven models, and people join 
to access loans (Seeds of Life 2016, Isern et al. 2007). There is little regulation or 
supervision of SHGs. In Timor-Leste, some SHGs are supervised by their NGO 
partners, and some are not supervised, except nominally by the Law 16/2004 
                                                 
165 I classified all of these kinds of SHG group together, as do other writers on Timorese microfinance. 
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Governing Cooperatives (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2004) (see Table 
7.1). 166 
                                                 
166 Table 7.1 is author’s own composed from interview data from NGOs and microfinance clients and various 
sources including Solano (2013), Seeds of Life (2016), UNCDF (2014), Coulibaly (2014), Wronka (2015), 








SHG MICROFINANCE  (SELF-
HELP GROUPS) AKA FINANCIAL 





INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS 
(MONEY LENDERS)  
NUMBER Two MFIs; One Bank 
(BNCTL) providing micro-
loans 
25 Credit unions (2011); 
unknown number of SHGs  
Unknown number  Unknown number 
ORIGIN OF  
CAPITAL  
Initial loan capital from 
MFI 
Initial loan capital from savings 
in group, or from NGO 
supporter 
Initial loan  capital from 
savings in group, or from 
NGO supporter 
Initial loan capital comes from MFI 
or SHG or own capital 
CONNECTION TO 
FINANCIAL MARKET 
Connected to financial 
market through Financial 
Intermediaries  (FIs) 
Not connected to financial 
market 
Not connected to 
financial market 
Not connected to financial market 
INTEREST RATES Around 35 % p.a. Between 24 and 120% p.a. N/A 240-360 % p.a.  
PROFIT SHARING Loans repaid to MFI Loans repaid to group and 
profit split between members, 
in principle  
Loans repaid to group 
and profit split between 
members, in principle 
Moneylenders make loans at  higher 
interest rates to people outside SHG 
of MFI. Profits to individuals or split 
between SHG members  
REGULATION Regulated and supervised Some registered, some not, 
generally unsupervised except 
by NGO supporters 
Some registered, some 
not, generally 
unsupervised 
Not recognised, regulated or 
supervised 
SUBSIDIES Donor subsidies to MFI 
itself  
Subsidies to NGO providers Subsidies to NGO 
providers 
No direct subsidies 
Table 7.1. The Four Types of Microfinance in Timor-Leste 
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At a basic level, microfinance is a gender intervention because microfinance 
targets women clients. In early iterations, this drew on feminist thinking wherein 
a pivotal obstacle to women’s rights was that women lacked access and control 
over resources (Eyben, Kabeer, and Cornwall 2008, Garikipati 2010).  Thus, at the 
individual level, making loans to women through microfinance ought to increase 
their access to income and lead to economic empowerment vis-à-vis their position 
in the household (Kabeer 2003). A source of livelihood separate to male relatives 
was said to give women more autonomy and a stronger voice in the household 
(Cameron and Ananga 2015). Where there were strong patriarchal controls on 
women’s movements, microfinance allowed women scope for income, without 
necessarily disrupting domestic responsibilities or patriarchal norms in the same 
way that wage labour could (Kabeer 2000). Since microfinance was supposed to 
help redress gendered power relations in the household, it was hoped it would 
reduce violence against women. In cases of domestic violence, or abandonment or 
divorce, microfinance allowed women the opportunity to have an independent 
income and live separately from a male partner when there are no other social 
safety nets. 
Advocates for microfinance hold that women’s empowerment on an economic 
dimension could have a flow-on effect to political or social dimensions of 
empowerment (Cornwall 2014). Microfinance using the basic group model could 
create social bonds between women leading to greater social solidarity and 
empowerment (Mayoux 2001, Kabeer 2001, 2005, Rankin 2002). Sometimes 
microfinance programming contained additional features, on the basis that alone, 
microfinance did not transform gender relations (Mayoux 2000). These could 
include specific training or resources for group members on women’s leadership, 
domestic violence, challenging male authority or group organising (Mayoux 2000, 
Drolet 2010).   
Once marginal, from the late 1990s microfinance was included in donors’ poverty 
reduction programs targeted at women. On the positive side, donors’ focus on 
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women and poverty reduction drew attention to the fact that poverty was a 
“gendered experience”, with significant burdens for women (Chant 2008, 167, 171-
2). Women’s incorporation into the World Bank’s “inclusion” agenda starting in 
1995 was largely in the form of market inclusion efforts, and chief among these was 
microfinance (Bedford 2007). Women would be given the opportunity to empower 
themselves by their inclusion in markets: labour markets, credit markets, and as 
entrepreneurs. Donors made an “efficiency” argument for promoting 
microfinance. On this view, women’s empowerment was more efficient to the 
economy as a whole. Empowering women was  “championed as a means to lift 
economies, drive growth, improve infant and child health, enhance women’s skills 
as mothers as well as to open up opportunities for women’s economic and political 
engagement” (Eyben, Kabeer, and Cornwall 2008, 1). Also, women’s economic 
empowerment was a “good investment” because “of the expectation that women 
would spend their income on their families, thereby improving development more 
generally” (Chant and Sweetman 2012, 519). Women’s empowerment through 
using microfinance was justified as a “smart” investment for development, welfare, 
and the economy. 
7.2.1 Outcomes: Poverty Reduction and Women’s Empowerment 
After decades of qualitative and quantities measurement, it is now clear 
microfinance does not reduce poverty. Banks and microfinance providers often 
measure success in terms of outputs such as the uptake of loans, numbers of people 
trained and repayment rates. Critics respond that uptake or client numbers are no 
evidence for microfinance’s impacts on poverty reduction or women’s 
empowerment (Vik 2013). After a decade of research, randomised controlled trials 
measuring impact have not found that microfinance increased household incomes, 
business profits, or saving rates (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2015, Bauchet et 
al. 2011). A systematic review of evidence from sub-Saharan Africa showed that 
microfinance had mixed impacts on incomes: some people grew richer, but some 
people became poorer because of microfinance, leading to zero overall impact on 
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poverty  (Stewart et al. 2010). On the question of microfinance encouraging 
broader economic growth, Nega and Schneider (2014) argued that social 
entrepreneurship using microfinance has no impact on economic growth. 
Regarding development, other authors suggested that without broader service 
provision such as health, welfare and housing microfinance does not positively 
impact development (Ahlin, Lin, and Maio 2011, Ahlin and Jiang 2008). In the final 
analysis, the systematic review explicitly recommended that donors “avoid the 
promotion of microfinance as a means to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals” (Stewart et al. 2010, 7).  
Providing microfinance to women does not necessarily transform gender relations, 
but most certainly relies on existing gender dynamics in the household and society 
to function (Goetz and Gupta 1996, Mayoux 2001, Kabeer 2001, Elyachar 2002, 
Isserles 2003, Kabeer 2005, Eyben, Kabeer, and Cornwall 2008). Studies showed 
that microfinance intersects with the gendered division of labour, and unequal 
access to and control over resources. For instance, some evidence showed that 
although women did the work to acquire and repay loans, women did not get to 
use the loan, and did not directly benefit (Rahman 1999, Goetz and Gupta 1996).  
It was not based on a redistributive or welfare-based approach. Some authors 
argued that microfinance instrumentalises an ideology of empowerment of self-
help and self-actualisation that cannot address structural inequalities (Elyachar 
2002).  
Likewise, because violence against women is rooted in unequal power relations 
between men and women,  the  “impact of access to material resources may be 
conditioned by various other factors making outcomes difficult to predict”   
(Kabeer 2014, 12). Evidence on the effect of microfinance on rates of VAW is mixed. 
That is, women’s greater access to and control over resources in communities and 
households, including those offered by microfinance, can be (violently) contested 
(Eves and Crawford 2013). Accordingly, more microfinance access may result in 
increased, not decreased, violence against women (Malhotra, Schuler, and 
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Boender 2002, Rahman 1999, Eves and Crawford 2013). In another study on 
Bangladesh, domestic violence perpetration rates were comparable between 
husbands of microfinance clients and husbands of non-clients. However, husbands 
of microfinance clients in urban areas used microfinance more often to justify their 
perpetration of domestic violence (Murshid 2016, 146). That financial resources 
may have such “destabilising effects for women is particularly alarming”, given that 
women receiving microcredit can report higher rates of domestic violence in 
Bangladesh (Murshid 2016, 147).  
Charging high interest rates to the poor is the most controversial aspect of 
microfinance because of the implication of usury. Liberalised microfinance sectors 
charge high interest rates, globally averaging 26.6 percent per annum, although in 
individual cases percentages can run into the hundreds (CGAP 2003, Mader 2014, 
608). High interest rates have effects at the individual and social level because 
“debt creates a state of domination and subordination between creditor and 
debtor, and it has both a financial and a social component” (Karim 2011, 37, Rankin 
2004). The nature of debt means that domination and subordination are carried 
forward temporally; debt shapes the future power relations between people 
(Graeber 2011). Thus, in a study by Guérin, Kumar, and Agier (2013)  microfinance 
was part of the reproduction of unequal access to, and control over, power and 
resources because  microfinance gave some women power over other women.  
7.2.2 Outcomes: Financialisation  
Despite the mixed or negative evidence on both women’s economic empowerment 
and poverty reduction, the promotion and growth of microfinance continued 
apace, amounting to a “microfinance revolution” (Robinson 2002). In countries 
across the world, a neoliberal push to liberalise agricultural credit markets 
precipitated the “microfinance revolution”. International organisations and 
experts pushed microfinance towards the financially sustainable model since the 
1970s, starting with the Ohio School, instrumental to the Indonesian government’s 
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embrace of “sustainable” microfinance (Gonzalez-Vega 1977). The Ohio school 
argued that providing micro- and group loans to the poor through banks, rather 
than through the state at commercial rates would avoid the inefficiency and 
corruption of subsidised agricultural credit in state-led development and the 
bureaucratic aid industry (Gonzalez-Vega 1977). Thus, “financially sustainable” 
refers to microfinance providers covering their overheads and to become profit-
making using the yield on interest rates. On this view, MFIs that rely on 
government or donor money to subsidise client interest rates are considered to be 
“unsustainable microfinance” (Ravicz 1998, Rahman 1999).  Critics have termed 
the microfinance industry’s move away from poverty reduction or women’s 
economic empowerment to focus on financial sustainability as microfinance’s 
“mission drift” (Augsburg and Fouillet 2013). 
From the late 1990s, and concurrent with the use of microfinance in poverty 
reduction programs, the role of commercial finance and Financial Intermediaries 
(FIs) in microfinance expanded. FIs are specially created investment banks and 
managed funds that invest in microfinance. Globally, in 2009, at least half of MFIs 
commercial loans (or guarantees for loans) were sourced through the international 
financial sector, that is, FIs (Reille and Glisovic-Mezieres 2009). Financial 
Intermediaries such as the Grameen Trust, Blue Orchard 167  and Oiko Credit 
accelerated the expansion of financially sustainable microfinance because they 
have increased the availability of commercial loans for MFIs (Reille, Forster, and 
Rozas 2011). Investors put capital into FIs who supply commercial loans to MFIs 
because microfinance portfolios have consistently had investment returns of 5 
percent per annum, which is a rate higher than many other forms of investment, 
given the historically low cost of loans (Reille, Forster, and Rozas 2011). This return 
arises from the gap between the cost of the wholesale loans, and the price of credit 
given to the poor. Another factor in the expansion of microfinance was the public 
offerings of shares in MFIs such as Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Banco 
                                                 
167 Blue Orchard, for example, is a Swiss-regulated, Luxembourg-based microfinance investment bank that 
was started by the United Nations in 2000. 
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Compartmentos, which made billions of dollars of profits for shareholders and 
state-owned enterprises  (Mader 2015, 67-8, Lieberman et al. 2008). Accordingly,  
microfinance facilitates surplus extraction from poor citizens in developing 
countries to capital owners in developed countries (Mader 2015).   
One result of this investment is that the sources of funding for microfinance are 
increasingly in the hands of financial asset managers, not development 
organisations. Internationally, the donor percentage of capital in microfinance 
institutions declined rapidly from 30 percent in 2002 to just 3.4 percent in 2007 
(Augsburg and Fouillet 2013).  The sources of funding for microfinance are  almost 
wholly controlled by financial asset managers in FIs, not development 
organisations, although donor governments continue to make transfers to 
microfinance FIs. Microfinance is a part of a new “deep marketisation” of 
development as the financialisation of development describes the current 
situation wherein the financial market that sets the conditions for development 
(Carroll 2015). The sums of money invested by donors and banks in microfinance 
changes the relationship between citizens states and markets (Carroll 2015).  
Microfinance works politically by “minimising or containing resistance to the 
adverse social implications that these policies engender” (Weber 2014, 545). 
Foremost, microfinance functions as a political safety valve by providing 
marginalised people with small amounts of cash and by pushing labour into 
precarious informal markets, where organisation is difficult (Weber 2002). Debt 
itself becomes a political tool, whether by trapping poor people in debt cycles 
(Gehlich-Shillabeer 2008), or by creating neoliberal subjects (Elyachar 2005, Karim 
2008) or by limiting citizen’s claims on the state for resources and infrastructure 
(Weber 2014, Mader 2015).  
In order to create the conditions for liberalised (micro)finance markets, 
interveners work through, with and around the state (Carroll 2015). Working 
through the state, donors draft laws (de)regulating the microfinance markets. 
Especially since the 1970s and 1980s, interveners have disciplined governments 
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into crafting liberalised financial sector policies and used microfinance politically 
to mediate the adverse effects (Weber 2014, 2004). Microfinance interventions are, 
as Rankin states, “a highly contested planning activity through which global 
economic processes articulate with local cultural-political structures via the 
mediating power of the state” (Rankin 2001). Donors also use microfinance to  
work with the state to push and domesticate liberalised markets. For example, 
microfinance was used to minimise individual resistance to large scale structural 
adjustments in Latin America (Weber 2004). Donors also use microfinance to  
work around the state. Interveners such as the UNCDF, active in Timor-Leste, now 
promote microfinance using the term “financial inclusion”, not microfinance, 
given microfinance’s (and previously microcredit’s) bad reputation for charging 
high rates.168  Financial inclusion brings together SHGs, microfinance and loans to 
small and medium size enterprises. However, financial inclusion also usually 
means the expansion of microfinance to pay for public goods such as water, 
sanitation and power, and the use of insurance and derivatives to insure against 
losses (Mader 2016, Soederberg 2014).  
Microfinance advocates and policymakers have always been at pains to 
differentiate between empowering microfinance and rapacious moneylenders. 
However, given recurrent crises of microfinance and its role in suicides, violence 
and debt cycles, microfinance advocates are now on the back foot (Guérin, Labie, 
and Servet 2015). Echoing earlier differentiations between microfinance and 
money lending, currently voices critical of MFI or financially sustainable 
microfinance likewise wish to differentiate between market-driven microfinance 
and “grassroots” SHG microfinance (Duggan 2016). SHGs are seen as an 
independent, localised, and more beneficial form of finance. However, for 
borrowers on the ground, there may be little to differentiate MFI, SHGs and 
                                                 
168UNCDF is the United Nations main IFI active in Timor-Leste. Their mission shift to microfinance and 
financial inclusion has been particularly acute since the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Mastercard Foundation became major donors in 2008 and 2010 respectively.  
     Source: http://www.uncdf.org/contributions-to-uncdf 
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moneylenders, and there is a great deal of overlap of personnel.169  Moreover, SHGs 
in Timor-Leste have higher interest rates than MFIs, anywhere from 24-120 percent 
per annum (See Table 8.1). All three are credit and interest-driven models, and all 
three have overlapping historical roots. The nature of debt, obligation, and control 
over financial resources has important implications for class and gender relations. 
I trace the historical development of microfinance in various forms now. 
7.3 Militarised Microfinance in Timor-Leste 
Like Mader (2015) and Turnell (2009) urge, the next section uses historical political 
economy approach to examine the colonial and neo-colonial lineages of 
microfinance in Timor-Leste. It is essential to understand that although 
microfinance is now the policy of choice for poverty reduction and women’s 
empowerment in Timor-Leste, it was not introduced by international donors in 
the post-conflict era, and this historical legacy shapes class and gender relations. 
Microfinance was a part of the Indonesian occupation and rural development 
strategy, which in turn was derived from Dutch colonial policy. Accordingly, the 
structure of Indonesian village microfinance and the interplay of patrimonial 
relationships and cooperatives continue to shape outcomes for microfinance in 
Timor-Leste today. In Timor-Leste currently, both SHG microfinance and MFI 
microfinance can be called a “cooperative” using the terms kooperativa (Tetun) or 
Kooperasi Simpan Pinjam (Indonesian). According to the 2004 Law on 
Cooperatives, citizens can start cooperatives dealing with trade, education, 
factories, fishing or culture. However, the most common form of cooperative is a 
financial cooperative, and on the ground, “cooperative” is a synonym for 
microfinance. The use of this term arises because of the historical overlap of 
agricultural credit with the expansion of profit-driven finance over the last three 
                                                 
169 There is also little to differentiate SHG and MFI microfinance and the Rotating Savings and Loans 
Associations (ROSCAS), called arisan in Indonesian. Sometimes these are held to be even more innocuous 
than SHG microfinance, but in fact many ROSCAS charge interest, some use violence to enforce payments, 
some on lend to others outside the group at higher interest rates. Thus, ROSCAs too may be 
indistinguishable from other forms of informal credit (Low 1995). 
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decades. These historically specific relations set the parameters within which 
gender interventions take place.   
For the Timorese independence movement, notably left-wing FRETILIN, 
“cooperative” signified a particular, independent mode of development, 
compatible with Timorese culture and different to market capitalism. After 
declaring Timor-Leste’s independence in Portugal 1974, FRETILIN began 
organising the rural economy into cooperatives, believing these should be the basis 
of a social economy (Aditjondro 2001, 109, Guterres 2006, Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste 2002). These included the nationalisation of state land to be run by 
cooperatives (Rocamora 1980, 19). FRETILIN Central Committee member, Abilio 
Araújo, who was later expelled from FRETILIN, described cooperatives in 1980 as 
having two goals of “[first] conscientise to [second] mobilise the people” 
(Rocamora 1980, 19, Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 55). Nicolau Lobato, a Timorese 
leader, admitted to a journalist in 1974 that the Timorese remained “suspicious” of 
his new FRETILIN cooperatives, because “they had been drawn into similar 
collectives before by either the Portuguese or the Japanese only to find themselves 
dispossessed” (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 55). The Indonesian annexation in 1975, 
resulting fighting and displacement disrupted the foundations of the colonial 
economy and FRETILIN’s nascent cooperatives.  
Although they had a vastly different vision of the state and society, cooperatives 
funded through microfinance were also a crucial part of the Indonesian control 
over the rural economy during the New Order. Understanding outcomes of 
microfinance in Timor-Leste today require unearthing how it was a part of 
Indonesian occupation policy in the past. Moreover, it is neither well known nor 
widely publicised that Indonesian microfinance’s lineage is in Dutch colonial 
policy. This lacuna is unsurprising; the New Order period reframed history 
narrowly to exclude both the “every day” and social inequalities of the colonial-era 
(Stoler and Strassler 2000, 12). In Indonesia itself, microfinance’s antecedents are 
in Dutch colonial government’s rural credit programs, introduced in 1901 as part 
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of Holland’s “Ethical” colonial policy (Maurer 1999). In the Dutch policy, rural  
banks would provide subsidised agricultural credit to smallholders grouped in 
cooperatives. A major creditor was the state-owned Hulp en Spaarbank der 
Inlandsche Bestuurs Ambtenaren in Java, established in 1895 (Robinson 2002). 
Agricultural credit to smallholders grouped in cooperatives would reduce famine 
by firstly, helping groups to stockpile emergency food supplies and fostering 
“mutual cooperation” or gotong royong. 170   Secondly, it would combat money 
lenders, whom the Dutch made scapegoats for the impoverishment of the 
population in the earlier, high-taxing and brutal Cultivation System (Prawiranata 
2013). The creation of agricultural credit was aimed at the household level, and 
part of what Stoler calls the “microphysics” of the subjugation and control of 
colonial rule that spread across Asia in the early twentieth century (Stoler 2001, 
833).  
After 1945, in independent Indonesia, President Sukarno (1945-1965) introduced 
credit cooperatives, but these became a hallmark of New Order development 
policy under President Suharto (1965-1998). Credit cooperatives were aligned with 
organising the economy according to “family principles” and “self-sufficiency” 
(Republic of Indonesia 1945, Article XXXIII).  In 1968, under President Suharto, the 
Indonesian government transformed the former Dutch colonial bank Hulp en 
Spaarbank der Inlandsche Bestuurs Ambtenaren into the Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(BRI) (Maurer 1999, Robinson 2004). BRI provided the credit to distribute seed, 
fertiliser, technical assistance and pesticides through a network of compulsory 
Village Unit Cooperative or Kooperasi Unit Desa (KUD) in every village, a central 
institution in President Suharto’s New Order (Suradisastra 2006). Farmers who 
needed government resources such as seeds and credit were obliged to be 
members of the KUD.  
                                                 
170 Likewise, gotong royong became an important part of the New Order’s political toolkit, at once justifying 
unpaid work gangs and community cohesion and order (Bowen 1986).  
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War shaped Indonesian microfinance in occupied East Timor because rural credit 
overlapped with powerful military institutions. Members of the Indonesian 
military used cooperatives operating with rural credit to accumulate wealth. Army-
directed Chinese-Indonesian businesses, PT Denok and PT Batara Indra Group, 
were logistics companies in the initial military invasion of East Timor with 
connections to Indonesian General Benny Murdani. After the invasion, PT Denok 
took over the Portuguese coffee plantations, marble and sandalwood exports 
(Aditjondro 1996).  It exercised a monopoly over the coffee industry using the KUD 
cooperative organisations to manage the production storage and profit from coffee 
(Danzer 2008: 183-4, Budiardjo and Liong 1984).  The majority of profits—between 
5 and 15 million US dollars year—were accrued to leaders of the military in East 
Timor (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 104). However, local Timorese elites also 
benefitted, especially if they were in Timorese-Indonesian military units (Danzer 
2008). The wealthy Carrascalão family’s plantations were returned to them in 1980, 
and PT Denok gave them higher per kilo prices than to those farmers working in 
the KUD (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, 105). The structure of KUD and the interplay 
of patrimonial relationships and cooperatives continue to shape microfinance in 
Timor-Leste today. For example, generally speaking, the heads of the village 
cooperative were usually the village heads, a pattern that continues today (Ravicz 
1998, 3).171  
From the mid-1980s and during the New Order, IFIs promoted the financialisation 
of microfinance and poverty. The falling oil prices in the 1980s allowed the World 
Bank to pressure Indonesia to liberalise agricultural credit (Holloh 1998). 
Sustainable or commercial microfinance became a model for the World Bank-
backed “new wave” of microfinance in Indonesia. The new forms of profit-driven 
microfinance came in the context of  increasing economic liberalisation in 
Indonesia, supervised by IFIs (Tilley 2017). Changes to rural credit were on the 
advice of US-based academics from the Harvard Institute of Development (Mader 
                                                 
171 Interview with a senior manager of a Timorese MFI, ET120, Dili, 16 August 2015. 
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2015). These academics criticised existing models of rural credit, arguing 
subsidised rural credit did not benefit the rural majority because elites captured 
the benefits, as I described above (Mosley et al. 2012, Robinson 2002). As a solution, 
US advisors wanted  the Indonesian Government to “reduce, and even eliminate, 
the need for subsidies,” which could be accomplished in three ways: “by charging  
real interest rates, aggressively pursuing repayments, and achieving a significant 
volume of business” (Ravicz 1998, ix).172  
In the 1990s, the microfinance terrain changed again when the US exerted pressure 
on Indonesia to open up occupied East Timor to trade. Externally, the opening up 
of Timor-Leste in the 1990s coincided with increased US-pressure on Indonesia to 
liberalise agriculture in East Timor. At the same time, in line with IFI ideas, the 
Indonesian state-owned bank BRI launched commercial microfinance products.  
These had commercial interest rates that would allow the institutions to operate 
at a profit. They also expanded the numbers of borrowers, which was a condition 
of financially self-sustaining microfinance. In Indonesia, the subsidised KUD  
provided a large customer base to convert to financially sustainable MFI 
microfinance (Ravicz 1998). For example, by 1988, there were over 172 village 
cooperative units or Kooperasi Unit Desa (KUD) in East Timor with over 32,000 
members (BAPPENAS 1988, 832). These KUD, largely controlled by the Indonesian 
military, were opened up to commercial competition.  
In East Timor, there was already pressure and internal competition within the 
army-controlled network of companies and the affiliated KUD. In 1994, the East 
Timor Centre for Village Cooperative Units, PUSKUD, received a US$6.8 million 
grant from USAID to promote organic coffee production for export and set up a 
separate group of village cooperative units (KUD) (Piedade 2003). This group 
challenged the military-connected PT Denok and PT Batara Indra Group and their 
KUD. The chairperson of the centrally controlled PUSKUD at that time was 
                                                 




Herminio da Costa. He was also the third-in-command leader of the pro-
integration umbrella grouping of militia, Pasukan Pro-Intergrasi (Indonesian) and 
leader of militia Aitarak (Tetun), which killed many and razed the Timorese capital 
Dili to the ground in 1998.173 After Independence and with the help of USAID, 
PUKSUD cooperatives were rebranded as “Cooperativa Café Timor”, still the 
biggest coffee producer in Timor and the largest sector of the non-oil export 
economy (Piedade 2003, USAID and Mendez England & Associates 2013).  
Under Suharto’s New Order, gender ideology and the state apparatus reinforced 
the gendered division of labour and this shaped how microfinance worked on the 
ground. The state controlled access to microfinance for women’s craft, trading or 
farming groups through the state organisation of public servants’ wives, the Family 
Welfare Movement (PKK) (Suryakusuma 2011). The PKK was a hierarchical chain 
of command, incorporating every public servant’s wife; each woman allotted a title 
and responsibility reflecting the importance of her husband. The PKK extended 
from the wife of the President to the wife of a hamlet leader. Together with other 
key organisations such as Dharma Wanita, it propagated an ideology of gender 
relations that defined women by their role as wives and mothers looking after their 
family’s welfare (Muchtar 1999). Critics have termed this “State Ibuism” or State 
Mother-ism (Syamsiyatun 2007, Wieringa 1992, Stivens 1990). Accordingly, elite 
women managed issues such as family planning, hygiene, and welfare, but all of 
these activities first started with savings and loans (Holloh 1998, 74). These women 
ran the village savings and loans groups for women,  and the compulsory village 
arisan (rotating savings and credit groups ROSCAs) (Holloh 1998, 40, 69).  
In the context of New Order authoritarianism, the PKK, together with the state 
family planning agency (BKKBN), both ran microfinance groups that ensured state 
supervision of  family life, reproduction, and the gendered division of labour 
(Wieringa 1993). Most concretely, the New Order linked population control to 
                                                 
173 Although implicated in this and the Liquica Church massacre, da Costa has never been tried for war crimes, 
and is a political functionary in West Timor. See Masters of Terror database :   
    http://www.syaldi.web.id/mot/Herminio%20da%20Costa.htm  
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microfinance. From 1979, microfinance groups started by the family planning 
agency required women to use contraceptives before they could get loans 
(Shiffman 2002, 1209). Further, with funding and support from the World Bank, in 
the 1990s, BRI enrolled midwives in microfinance program for midwives to 
encourage more mothers to use private sector health services (The Summa 
Foundation 1998). In East Timor, the BKKBN and the PKK helped with government 
family planning programs where sterilisation and birth control were used 
coercively against Timorese women, as a military strategy of population control, 
mirroring the use of SGBV as a weapon of war (Aditjondro 1998, 116, Budiardjo and 
Liong 1984).  
7.4 Microfinance Intervention: The Visible Hand 
During the peacebuilding intervention, interveners supported the existing 
microfinance industry in the newly independent Timor-Leste, seeking to expand 
and reshape it. From 2002-2017, donors spent a total of nearly $US45 million on 
various projects promoting microfinance (see Table 7.2). So significant is the 
microfinance industry today that it shapes the Timorese economy, and both have 
experienced interconnected crises in association with liberalisation, with material 











$9,882,367 $1,318,772 $33,757,404 $44,958,544 
Table 7.2 Donor Spending on Microfinance 2002-2018 (Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste 2017, Wronka 2015) 
Since East Timor province had been economically dependent on Indonesia, after 
independence, the economy contracted around 40-45 percent, bankrupting many 
petty traders and microfinance groups (Allden 2009). Moving into the gap, the 
World Bank, ADB, the UNCDF, and a variety of NGOs all founded new MFIs. The 
World Bank’s Community Empowerment Program (CEP) used microfinance to 
recapitalise shops, businesses, and infrastructure destroyed in the militia violence 
of 1998-99. Other microfinance schemes included Opportunidade Timor Lorosa’e 
offering same-day (pay-day) loans, Moris Rasik supported by the Grameen Bank 
investor network, and Tuba Rai Metin started by Catholic Relief Services (Marino 
2006). In 2001, ADB set up the Institute of Microfinance of Timor-Leste (IMfTL), 
which quickly attracted many new microfinance clients. 
Interveners saw microfinance as a way to address economic losses from the war, 
alleviate poverty, and foster social cohesion. In Timor-Leste, the UN mission 
believed that the expansion of microfinance would have a beneficial effect on 
incomes and poverty reduction, reducing the credit “bottleneck” impeding rural 
development (UNMIT 2009). Microfinance could help achieve the Millennium 
Development Goal on poverty reduction by 2015 by extending market access: that 
is  increasing “financial services for the poor and low-income people, both women 
and men” (UNCDF 2014, 5). It would do so by remedying the market’s failure to 
provide “sustainable” (profitable) sources of credit to the poor, thereby allowing a 
poor individual to earn income through entrepreneurial activities or by earning 
interest on savings. SHG microfinance would also help grow social capital. In 
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addition to MFI credit, SHG microfinance would help grow savings and social 
capital. For example, Credit Unions Australia, who worked in Timor-Leste on the 
expansion of credit cooperatives, with the peak financial cooperative body, Hanai 
Malu,  suggested that for a given group, having a joint liability for a loan fostered 
social cohesion and strengthened social ties among members (Credit Unions 
Australia 2011, 6-7).  
Yet the microfinance industry in Timor-Leste faced successive crises. From 1999 to 
2002, UN staffing levels drove Dili’s service economy and real estate market. But 
in 2002, the international troop withdrawal caused a severe economic contraction 
and a related microfinance crisis. Repayment rates in the CEP credit scheme fell to 
40 percent, and the scheme was declared a failure and abandoned (Conroy 2004, 
Hughes 2009). A few years later in 2006, violent upheaval and fear of army and 
police rivalry in the political crisis caused thousands to flee, and non-oil GDP 
contracted by at least five percent. Microfinance-supported businesses, such as 
small retail shops and credit unions across Timor-Leste went bankrupt, and 
microfinance providers across Timor-Leste shut their doors.174 IMfTL had large 
numbers of microfinance defaulters who were unlikely to repay (Day 2010).  
After the crises and microfinance collapse, IFIs took three steps to consolidate the 
microfinance sector. As a first step, ADB gave their debt-plagued microfinance 
institute IMfTL, to the government of Timor-Leste. It became a state-owned 
commercial bank, Banco Nacional Commerçio de Timor-Leste (BNCTL). The 
“rescue” of IMfTL thus transferred MFI debt to the Timorese state, and socialising 
donor-finance created losses. The second step donors took was re-capitalising the 
MFIs through a joint IFI and Timorese government-funded project, INFUSE. 
Between 2008 and 2015, INFUSE made a series of grants and soft-loans to only two 
                                                 
174 The commercial banking sector was also severely disrupted. The Portuguese owned Banco Naçional 
Ultramarino (BNU), which operated in Timor-Leste during the colonial period and with an average loan 
size of around 12000 USD, experienced major repayment problems. Around half of its 97 million USD loan 
portfolio remains non-performing (FIELD-Support 2014, 11). 
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MFIs, Moris Rasik and Tuba Rai Metin, amounting to nearly $8 million (De Sousa 
Shields 2011, UNCDF 2014).175 
The third step was regulation, not to protect borrowers but to ensure Timorese 
microfinance conformed to market principles. INFUSE provided capacity-building 
and expertise to draft a law regulating MFIs (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 
2010d). The Public Instruction No. 06/2010 Licensing and Supervision of Other 
Deposit Taking Institutions conformed to liberalised financial market ideals: high 
interest rates, commercial borrowing, no subsidies directly to clients, and 
collateralising the moveable property of the poor (UNCDF 2014). Under this law, 
Timorese MFIs were required to source their loans from international credit 
markets. For example, Moris Rasik borrowed from the FI Blue Orchard.  Under 
these conditional grants, the MFIs had to increase the number of borrowers in line 
with typical standards evaluating MFIs on the basis of their expansion and not on 
their impact on either poverty or women’s empowerment (Day 2010, Vik 2013). 
Under the law, the MFIs are subject to supervision by the Timorese central bank 
to ensure their interest rate is high enough to be financially sustainable or 
profitable.176 These requirements mean that the two Timorese MFIs currently have 
effective interest rates of around 35% a year (see Table 8.1).  
The bailouts show that microfinance in Timor-Leste is not a financially sustainable 
development. Rather, instead of donors or governments subsidising the poor 
directly through grants or transfer programs, the public sector and donors 
subsidise the private sector MFIs (Mader 2015, 56). Microfinance is most materially 
valuable to NGO, government, and private sector groups who own and run 
microfinance and benefit in the form of jobs and grants. The injection of tens of 
                                                 
175Data (project donor, title, aims, results and disbursed funds 2002-2017) collected from  
     https://aidtransparency.gov.tl/portal/.  
176One MFI struggled to meet the requirements of the law, especially the international capital requirements, 
profits, and for minimum requirements for staff to have tertiary qualifications. Interview with ET120, Senior 
Manager of an MFI, 16 August 2015. 
MICROFINANCE INTERVENTIONS 
242 
millions of dollars from donors and government enabled the two MFIs to survive 
and come to dominate the Timorese credit market.   
In another area, donors encouraged liberalised financial sectors through the 
expansion of SHG microfinance. I argue SHG growth is promoted along with 
liberalised financial markets and thus represents another layer of finance. The 
links between liberalisation in both SHG and MFI microfinance has been 
overlooked in the literature. Particularly after the 2006-7 political crisis, NGOs 
such as Oxfam, Seeds of Life, and UNDP Compasis began training SHGs to 
mobilise savings to use as loans within the group. There are currently at least ten 
NGOs, and other government departments, running SHG groups in Timor-Leste. 
These SHGs have thousands of customers, although because these groups are not 
registered or supervised, it is unclear how many groups there are (Wronka 2015 
also see Table 7.1) (). SHG advocates argue that because SHGs they are organised 
and run for members, they represent a form of self-empowerment (Dichter and 
Harper 2007, Cameron and Ananga 2015). As I explained above, microfinance can 
work with and through the state to deliver aid and development. SHGs have 
become a dominant form for delivering development goods to poor rural women 
(Jakimow 2009, 473).  
Donors and IFIs promote SHGs as a “natural” response of communities to poverty, 
but SHGs, like other kinds of financial markets, are neither natural nor authentic. 
The perception of SHGs and other forms of informal credit like arisan as “natural” 
or “traditional” or “voluntary” is long held, although there is little empirical 
evidence to support claims it predated colonialism (Holloh 1998). A similar view 
of SHGs as arising in a natural fashion can be seen in a recent USAID report on 
agricultural finance. The authors cautioned against government regulation of 
SHGs or subsidising agricultural cooperatives because it would “hinder the 
spontaneous expansion of informal UBSP village savings and loan associations 
[SHGs] as entry-level financial service providers that are not ready or willing to 
convert into formal financial cooperatives” (FIELD-Support 2014, 11). The 
demonisation of subsidised and regulated SHGs as inhibiting the “spontaneous” 
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development of community-level credit markets echoes US academics’ advice to 
the Indonesian government to foster commercial microfinance in the 1980s.  
However, there are adverse outcomes for the expansion of unregulated informal 
credit markets, as I show in Chapter 8. SHGs were not about self-help as much as 
they were about financial intermediation within a given group or community. 
Although more evidence would be needed to assess this finding, this would change 
the view of SHG as mutual assistance groups as groups of debtors and creditors: or 
in other words, class led accumulation. Globally, research on SHGs in Uganda and 
Laos reported problems with over-indebtedness and lack of clear distinctions 
between microfinance, pyramid schemes and moneylending (Duggan 2016, Koichi 
2015). Holloh, writing on SHGs in Indonesia, said that each group contained half 
lenders and half borrowers (Holloh 1998, 97). Regardless of the internal workings 
of SHGS, it is well established that unregulated expansion of SHGs can lead to 
general mistrust of SHGS and credit market volatility, which ought to be cause for 
concern for poverty reduction programs (Duggan 2016, Holloh 1998, Low 1995, 10).   
7.5 The Local Turn and Microfinance 
Politically, the blossoming of MFI and SHG microfinance arose at a confluence of 
two policy ideals. One of these ideals came from the leftist party of independence, 
FRETILIN—calling credit groups “cooperatives”—and the other ideal came from 
neoliberal approaches to poverty reduction—calling credit groups “microfinance”   
(Hughes 2015). Cooperatives/microfinance’s social credentials as a bottom-up 
intervention resonated with Timorese elite political ideology (Budiardjo and Liong 
1984, 55), while microfinance’s neoliberal focus on market-led development suited 
donor and government policy  (Hughes 2015, 917). It also resonated with the local 
turn in peacebuilding in its prioritising of local needs and bottom-up measures. In 
Hughes’ analysis, although FRETILIN’s form of locally based development was:  
[…] based upon very different ideological foundations from 
neoliberalism, [it] found common cause with neoliberalism’s local turn 
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precisely via such development strategies as funding cooperatives 
through microcredit (Hughes 2015, 917) 
Support for cooperatives’ “co-existence” with the public and private sectors in the 
economy was written into the 2002 constitution (Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste 2002). However, on what terms these would co-exist, or the role of finance 
in cooperatives, was not clarified constitutionally. In other documents, there was 
a suspicion of state interventionism. The 2004 Law on Cooperatives, written 
during FRETILIN’s term, states that the Indonesian occupiers “distorted” 
cooperatives to:  
[…] prevent their associates’ self-reliance. Cooperatives came to be an 
organized form of creating and strengthening the spirit of dependence 
of the community on subsidies and assistance granted by the occupying 
State, as a way of fostering alienation and buying social peace’ 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2004, emphasis added).  
FRETILIN and the Indonesian occupiers both promoted cooperatives as part of 
rural development strategy. Yet, the view of Timorese lawmakers was that the 
involvement of the state in cooperatives fostered dependency, not community 
empowerment. Thus, it is precisely what Elyachar calls a “pro-people, anti-state”  
ideal that resonates with the Timorese elite, but also with neoliberalism (Elyachar 
2002, 496).  
Successive Timorese governments have supported market-led approaches to 
poverty reduction using microfinance as “access to finance” is considered to be a 
crucial “bottleneck” in the growth of the private sector (Wronka 2015).  Indeed 
support for microfinance is now formalised in what Soederberg calls “soft law”—
the Timorese government’s accession to the Maya Declaration on Financial 
Inclusion (Soederberg 2014). The Timorese Government’s Strategic Development 
Plan 2011-2030, aims for “the private sector to be the primary source of growth in 
incomes and employment in rural areas of Timor-Leste” (Government of Timor-
Leste 2011). In this plan, the Central Bank of Timor-Leste (BNTL) promoted the 
provision of credit to the private sector to enhance national development goals 
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(BNTL 2013). In 2015, Prime Minister Dr Rui Araújo confirmed that his government 
would continue to promote BNCTL to “provide micro, small and medium 
companies with access to credit (De Araújo 2015). Cooperatives run using 
microfinance are seen as a major part of private sector investment in rural areas. 
Araújo’s program describes how  “the Government will continue to support the 
formation of cooperatives to encourage private sector growth in rural areas” 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2015a, Section 3.12).  
Since independence, microfinance has been one of the fundamental ways 
successive Timorese governments envisaged integrating women into a market 
economy. Responsibility for monitoring and some implementation of programs 
with women’s economic empowerment lay with the office for the Socio-Economic 
Promotion for Women, SEM. A senior male manager described how his role was 
to make one-off grants to women’s groups in the productive sector. SEMs process 
for the grants was to formalise and register a business: “groups of five to ten can 
apply for the grant. These are pure grants. We encourage them to deal with the 
banks because there is no second phase of funding. Initial capital only”.177 The 
Oecusse free trade zone, ZEESMs was another example of the claimed linkages 
between microfinance and economic growth. ZEESMs “frontloaded” government 
spending on infrastructure such as roads, an airport, hotels and a harbour to 
service foreign private-sector companies. They had stated social goals, including 
reducing poverty by increasing employment and incomes. 178  Where women’s 
participation was considered, microfinance was a way of acknowledging and 
promoting women’s work. For example, microfinance for small enterprises would 
aid in the integration of social and gender goals into ZEESMs.  According to 
ZEESMs policymakers, ZEESMs would provide jobs and growth directly in 
construction and export industries. During fieldwork in 2015, a senior staff member 
                                                 
177 Interview with senior government official ET108, Dili, 4 August 2015. 
178The Budget preamble for ZEESMs states that the economic zone will “give priority to social economic 
activity which could propagate a good life for the whole community in the region” (original in Tetun) 
“prioridade ba atividade sosio-ekonómiku ne’ebé bele habelar moris di’ak ba komunidade tomak iha rejiaun 
ne’e”  (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2016a). 
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planned for ZEESMs to link the 300 existing microfinance (MFI and SHG) groups 
in Oecusse with export processing in the zone, such as strawberry farming. 
However the staff member was vague on the outcomes for poverty reduction or 
women’s empowerment. Others have similarly noted the lack of coordination and 
cohesion across the four ministries implementing microfinance policy (Day 2010, 
Wronka 2015, Lyman, Shrader, and Tomilova 2015) 
The promotion of microfinance’s poverty reduction potential has ignored the 
effects of previous microfinance crises and minimised the risks of expanding low 
return, petty trade businesses in the volatile Timorese economy. Microfinance 
markets are prone to crisis from endogenous and exogenous factors (Guérin, Labie, 
and Servet 2015). Internationally, at least eight countries experienced destabilising 
microfinance crises between 2008 and 2015.179 In Timor-Leste, publicly available 
evaluation reports on microfinance’s performance through crises are mixed. 
Reports from the IFC, UNCDF and USAID were upbeat about microfinance’s 
performance and potential (Day 2007, UNCDF 2014, FIELD-Support 2014, USAID 
and Mendez England & Associates 2013). Moreover, risks for microfinance clients 
or local credit markets associated with the expansion of MFI or SHG microfinance 
were not mentioned (See for example FIELD-Support 2014, Solano 2013, Day 2007, 
2010). None took into account the widely acknowledged problems regarding the 
limited ability of governments to regulate and limit default risk, loan arbitrage, 
market saturation, or ensure a realistic capital to loan ratio, especially in SHGs 
(Staschen 2002). Only the independent evaluation of the microfinance component 
of the World Bank’s CEP was pessimistic (Conroy 2004). The report outlined how 
the credit component of emergency micro- and midi- loans were supposed to 
promote post-conflict reconstruction by recapitalising retail shops and using 
credit to fund village infrastructure. However, it concluded that microfinance was 
not suited to a high-risk post-conflict environment because of the fragility of the 
                                                 
179Microfinance crises reported in the press between 2008 and 2015 included: Nicaragua 2008; Bosnia-
Herzogovina 2008-9; Morocco 2009; Kolar (India) 2009; Uganda 2009;  Andhra Pradesh (India) 2010; 
Pakistan 2010; Ghana 2015; and Cambodia 2017 (Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010, Lyman, Shrader, and 
Tomilova 2015, Boateng et al. 2016, Bateman 2017). 
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economy and the vulnerability Timorese citizens faced during downturns (Conroy 
2004).180   
When microfinance groups went bankrupt in an economic downturn, IFIs, donors 
and governments attributed this to the rural poor’s lack of capacity or training in 
money management. Hence, the promotion of microfinance in Timor-Leste has 
elided structural poverty and reframed poverty as an agential problem, solved or 
exacerbated by the actions and “mentality” of the poor. However, fieldwork data 
from Timor points rather to the external risks for borrowers. Hughes (2015) showed 
that microfinance groups in the Timorese district of Liquisa collapsed because of 
stagnating economic growth. In my fieldwork, a manager in a Timorese NGO re-
told this common story regarding their program:  
When the UN mission was still in Timor-Leste [in 2012], there were many 
foreigners, and they bought many pieces and textiles and then women got 
money. They could have money for basics. Now the UN has left, there is not 
enough business.181 
Without foreigners buying cloth at the markets, microfinance clients were unable 
to increase their incomes or repay their debts. Despite these structural and  
historical causes of poverty in Timor-Leste, elites I interviewed, such as civil 
servants and NGO workers,  tended to view citizens’ as being responsible for their 
poverty. In the words of the Director of the donor-supported, Timorese 
Cooperative peak body Hanai Malu: 
In my opinion, the problem we face is one of mentality.  The population’s 
lives are conservative, in particular, they do not adapt to reality […] For 
example, the people have a base, a cow or a goat. They do not sell the cow 
in order to develop the cow that it might become two cows, but instead, 
they slaughter it for an animist sacrifice (Ferreira 2012, 24) 
                                                 
180  There are similarities with the way emergency microfinance loans were used by the World Bank in 
Structural Adjustment in Bolivia. Cf. Weber (2004).  
181 Interview with a NGO manager, ET084, Dili, Timor-Leste, 10 June 2015. 
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Ferreira’s opinion illustrates how the “inability or unwillingness” of the poor to 
“adapt” and join the market to overcome poverty is seen as “individual weakness”, 
in this case, a weak mentality (Soederberg 2014, 204). In another example, a 
Timorese microfinance expert reported that policymakers argued ordinary 
Timorese put no value on being self-sufficient, instead “the government must 
always come to the rescue” (Allden 2009, 278).  Even the former National Director 
of Micro Cooperatives and Small Business, Jacinta dos Santos, said:  
The problem is a mentality where people just ask [for handouts]. However, 
because there is a different attitude of helping yourself in a cooperative, 
they know a cooperative needs to be independent and do things to help 
themselves. It is not just that someone else should continue to come and 
give them support (Timor Post 2015b) 
For policy elites, microfinance stands in for welfare; consumer credit provided 
through microfinance or “debtfare” is promoted to avoid provisioning welfare 
(Soederberg 2014, 196). Microfinance shifts the responsibility for poverty from 
structures to agents by entrenching the idea the core problem facing people is their 
lack of assets. On this logic, the core solution is to extend credit, shifting attention 
from the fact that poverty structural. That is, poverty is borne of “rampant 
inequality and of rotten relationships that are rife with coercion, discrimination, 
exploitation and powerlessness rampant inequality” (Copestake et al. 2015, 5).   
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter elucidated factors influencing the implementation and outcomes of 
microfinance as gender interventions. First, the chapter described the market logic 
of microfinance used internationally, its use in poverty reduction programs and 
deployment in gender and development. The chapter presented some 
contemporary international research on microfinance that has found little positive 
impact on either poverty or gender empowerment. Financial intermediaries and 
the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation have been particularly 
important actors in shifting microfinance to the finance market or 
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“financialisation”. Part of the reasons for financialisation lie in microfinance’s 
profitability, and part of the reason is that it shifts development work from states 
to markets, thus changing the relationship between the citizen and the market.  
The chapter argued that the outcomes of microfinance as a gender intervention 
are shaped by historical political economy legacies. In government and donor 
documents, the tendency is to make a sharp division between an older-style 
Indonesian microfinance and microfinance promoted interveners and the national 
government. In contrast, the chapter revealed the legacy of military involvement 
and the transition from state-led (as a tool of enrichment and control for the 
Indonesian military) to market-led microfinance. Because of their involvement 
with financial resources, microfinance strengthened the Liurai-Dato class and 
aspects of gender relations, an argument for which more evidence will be supplied 
in Chapter 8.  
Since independence, the microfinance industry has expanded, collapsed, and 
expanded again. As such, the IFC and financial intermediaries set the conditions 
and rules for the microfinance industry. The consolidation of MFI microfinance 
was only possible using donor funds. Put simply, microfinance in Timor-Leste is 
not financially sustainable as donors claim because it has required donor funding 
over a long period. At the same time, donors have also encouraged the expansion 
of SHG microfinance, with significant consequences, as Chapter 8 will now discuss. 
The support of both MFI and SHG microfinance has continued without robust 
evidence that it reduces poverty or empowers women.  
Taking this historical approach to microfinance during the occupation and the 
intervention revealed the hidden “visible hand” of the military, the state, and 
donors in microfinance’s development. By drawing attention to the role of the state 
and interveners support of microfinance, it showed how microfinance is prone to 
crises, and required subsidies from the state to function, as other critical studies 
of microfinance have shown (Morduch 1999). These subsidies primarily benefit 
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MFIs and NGOs, not microfinance clients. Instead, during times of economic 
downturn, under-regulated microfinance can pose risks to microfinance clients in 
the form of over-indebtedness and resultant social stress. Lack of regulation and 
supervision of credit markets is explored in Chapter 8.  
Finally, the chapter documented how microfinance is a policy tool arising from 
neoliberal approaches to poverty reduction and women’s empowerment, but 
Timorese elites support it for additional reasons. Microfinance was commensurate 
with the ideology of grassroots development, it met donor conditionality for 
private sector development, and it was a development policy that encouraged self-
help, not dependence on the state. Microfinance as a policy to reduce poverty, puts 
the onus for growth in incomes on the poor, which corresponds with elite interests 
in centralising spending in Dili. This repeats the elite centric distribition  of state 




CHAPTER 8.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
MICROFINANCE 
8.1 Introduction  
The historical and (international) political economy context of microfinance were 
laid out in Chapter 7. This present chapter uses this prior contextualisation to 
describe and account for the uneven outcomes of the gender interventions for  
microfinance. I previously argued that MFI microfinance extracts money from the 
poor through high-interest rates to international financial institutions (credit-led 
accumulation). Of particular significance, and the subject of this final chapter, is 
that credit-led accumulation was repeated in miniature in both MFI and SHG 
microfinance at the village level. The central argument of the chapter is that by 
encouraging the expansion of both SHG and MFI microfinance to promote 
women’s economic empowerment, the gender intervention for microfinance in 
fact promoted class-based strategies of credit-led accumulation. Microfinance, 
instead of increasing the poor’s access to capital and therefore improving incomes, 
has instead strengthened the economic control of the Liurai-Dato class over poorer 
villages by rendering (kinship and social) debt relations interest-bearing and more 
formal. The first part of the chapter contextualises the class-based accumulation 
by describing village political economy in some depth.  
The second part of the chapter describes village level credit led accumulation. 
Microfinance reconfigures the (previously described) heavy social debts into 
interest-bearing loans. As microfinance occurs in a “dense web of social and kin 
obligations” (Karim 2011, xvi); complex networks of exchange and obligations that 
encourage and coerce repayment in the form of meagre belongings, land, labour 
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or promissory notes. Here, meagre but significant sums are transferred, through 
sky-high interest rates, from poorer to relatively wealthier sections of Timorese 
communities. This transfer happens because SHG and MFI microfinance overlap 
with one another and with moneylending, and none are properly regulated. 
In terms of these social relations, rural elites in Timor-Leste continued to use 
microfinance as a way of controlling economic life in the village. This in turn 
supports, as I have previously described, the Liurai and Dato’s historical, political, 
and cultural claims over the right to rule over other villagers. Following this 
historical framework, the third part of the chapter describes how legacies of the 
New Order shape gender and social relations. The fourth part of the chapter 
describes how economies of debt and exchange are fundamental to power in 
villages with low levels of monetisation and exchange economies originating in 
brideprice exchanges. Because of its complicity and reliance on hierarchies to 
function, microfinance in Timor-Leste fails to help the poorest. Poor people 
experienced microfinance as extractive.  
In Timor-Leste microfinance happens in a context where social and gender 
relations are expressed in terms of debt, as I argued in Chapter 6 on brideprice 
(Silva 2008, McWilliam 2011). Thus, the fourth part of the chapter argues that debts 
from microfinance thus fit within an already established repertoire of social 
domination. In terms of gender relations, I also examine the limited nature of 
empowerment through microfinance because of the centrality of male authority in 
Timorese kinship relations and the role microfinance plays in brideprice. Debts, as 
already described in Chapter 6, set the conditions for high levels of violence against 
women.  
The chapter lastly argues that pursuing a rural development policy based on the 
so-called cooperative model (actually microfinance) mixed with donor goals for 
women’s economic empowerment in reality shifts risks and responsibility from the 
central government onto women and the rural poor. I show the unevenness of this 
outcome by placing the “success stories” of entrepreneurial poor women in broader 
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social and gender relations. Moreover, the co-occurrence of these three kinds of 
under-regulated finance systems has created a shadow financial system in Timor-
Leste that is unstable. 
8.2 Village Political Economy  
Here I explain why by describing the outcomes of microfinance in post-conflict 
Timor-Leste through a village level case study in Manufahi supplemented with 
some observations from fieldwork in Oecusse, which is saturated with 
microfinance.182 The village of Mota (Suku Mota) in Manufahi has population of 
around a thousand residents in seven hamlets. Fehuk is the highest ranked hamlet 
and is high up (Tetun: leten), closer to the mountain, reflecting its elevated status. 
The leading family in Hamlet Fehuk is the founding Liurai lineage, and the leaders 
of this hamlet have ultimate authority on who may farm the productive land in 
Mota. As elsewhere in Timor-Leste, all of the leadership positions are occupied by 
members of Liurai and Dato lineages, although the male village chief of Hamlet 
Fehuk, Bonifacio, is a Dato married to a female member of the Liurai lineage, as 
their lineage is matrilineal. In Mota, the Liurai’s son is a member of parliament. 
His cousin’s husband, Bonifacio, see Figure 8.2, was elected Village Chief (Tetun:  
Xefe Suku) in 2009. Bonifacio leads the Village Council, whose members comprise 
his relatives, members of higher lineage houses, and their in-married male 
relatives.    
Liurai and Dato lineages have businesses buying and selling cattle, chickens, 
clothes or they own small shops or kiosks (Tetun: kios), in addition to their family 
farms. The village chiefs and hamlet heads own all the kiosks except one, and 
microfinance has funded most of this small retail expansion. Others have noted 
that in Timor-Leste these small microfinance-funded kiosks are now so numerous 
that the market is saturated (Seeds of Life 2016, Moxham 2005). At least two of the 
                                                 
182The following information is drawn principally from four months of fieldwork, interviews and participant 
observation comprising three weeks in Oecusse in 2015, six weeks in 2011, and six weeks in 2015 in Mota, 
Manufahi. Place names have been changed.  
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small shops in the village are supplied with government subsidised, imported rice 
by the owner’s relative, a son of the Liurai who is a member of parliament. In this 
village, like many in Timor-Leste, the road to the district capital is terrible. The 
river makes it impassable in the wet season, so many residents buy items such as 
oil, salt and rice from these shops. Their dependence on these retail outlets means 
that owners can overcharge. Indeed, press reports showed that government 
subsidised rice has been sold under monopolies by village leaders in these small 
shops for double and triple the stipulated price (March 2012).  
Members of higher lineages can afford to hire extended family members from their 
lower ranked (more distant) relatives to work on their fields during busy periods. 
The majority of Mota’s villagers are peasant lineages and subsistence farmers who 
usually pay for consumer items and school costs by raising and selling a few 
animals  a year but sometimes own  small businesses (Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste 2011a). Of the peasant lineages, the lowest/poorest do not own 
businesses and survive on subsistence farming and animal husbandry of pigs and 
chickens. A small number of men in this group can earn small incomes working as 
day labourers.183  
In the village of Mota, adult literacy is 46 percent, there is no access to electricity, 
and only 62% of children are enrolled in primary school (Asian Development Bank 
2012). Even with these figures, the Asian Development Bank ranks Suku Mota as 
having just below average living standards compared with other villages in Timor-
Leste. In sum, the village of Mota is comprised of one group dominating animal 
husbandry, small shops, and businesses, and another group mostly engaged in 
subsistence farming of corn and a few vegetables on more marginal land. This 
poorer group, the lower ranked lineages, are often referred to as ema araska or ema 
susar (Tetun: people with hardships/problems).  
                                                 
183 Government benefits do not reach the poor, as I showed in Chapter 4, because the veterans’ pension is not 
means tested and is rather a regressive form of welfare. To reiterate, the Bolsa da Mãe payment for mothers 
reaches both wealthier and poorer Timorese (Fernandes 2015).  
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8.2.1 Village Lending and Borrowing 
In this context, I spoke at length to microfinance client, Lucia, about her 
experiences with microfinance in Mota. Lucia is the wife of the village leader. She 
is related through her maternal uncle to the Liurai and a member of Timorese 
parliament. She founded a Moris Rasik microfinance group  in 2007. The loans she 
received allowed her to start three businesses: a kiosk (Tetun: kios), a bakery and 
a tailor. In 2012, BNCTL opened an office in the district capital, and government-
subsidised microfinance expanded to Manufahi. Lucia was tired of weekly 
repayment schedules and high-interest rates of around 35% at Moris Rasik. Lucia 
and her brother, a schoolteacher, received training in managing a cooperative 
through BNCTL in 2012 from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Because her 
brother is a schoolteacher, he had already accessed the public servant’s loan 
program to refurbish his house, buy a car and to start a business.  Together, they 
founded a new microfinance group to enable them to access better loan 
conditions. Lucia’s loan from BNCTL has a government-subsidised interest rate of 
12% per annum, and the 15 members of the group, all relatively wealthy group 
members use it to borrow for large expenses. Lucia’s group considered their 
experiences with microfinance to have been very positive. Lucia’s cooperative is 
successful, and she had a reputation in the village as an empowered, hardworking 
and resourceful entrepreneur. Lucia is a microfinance success story.  
Microfinance lenders are politically and economically well-connected and use this 
to their benefit by controlling access to resources, as Lucia’s case will illustrate.  
Lucia’s success in building her businesses has been because of her ability to tap 
into her network of relations in positions of power. Her relative brings 
government-subsidised rice to sell at market, as I explained above. Moreover, 
another of her relatives is a loan officer with the local district branch of BNCTL, 
the state-owned bank offering group microfinance at a much lower rate of 12 
percent per annum. We might suppose in Timor-Leste that loan officers also act 
as mediators between moneylenders and the microfinance organisations, as they 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MICROFINANCE 
256 
do in the Indian case (Guérin 2014, 48).  This accords with Guérin’s findings that 
certain “women use microcredit groups for a better position within …clientelist 
networks” (Guérin 2014, 46).  
A further example is how Lucia’s husband, Bonifacio, as village chief, restricted 
access to his signature on government paperwork for citizens, or prevented 
citizens from complaining to higher levels of the district administration. He also 
controlled access to public programs such as solar energy; the cash transfer Bolsa 
da Mãe; or water facilities; and traditional dispute resolution.184 Guérin noted the 
same phenomena in her field sites in India: the controllers of political power and 
interaction with the state are also those lending money to the lower status 
members of their communities (Guérin 2014, 45).  She stated that “lenders are well 
connected both with the administration and local political leaders and provide 
what can be broadly qualified as “political support” (Guérin 2014, 45). In Timor-
Leste, as in South India, “given that a large number of resources are channelled 
through the state and political networks, women have a greater interest in 
negotiating their involvement in those networks than in challenging them” 
(Guérin 2014, 47). Taken together, microfinance and preferential access to state 
resources such as subsidised rice and subsidised credit help the elected leaders of 
Mota to control many areas of economic life of the village. 
Contrary to the cooperatives law, Lucia’s microfinance group on-sell credit to 
people outside the MFI and SHG microfinance groups, as a moneylending 
business.185 For example, on Row 3 of Table 8.1, we can see that Lucia’s group 
                                                 
184 Interviews with Village Chief Bonifacio ET127, Manufahi, 1 September 2015, and Rosita ET138, Manufahi, 4 
September 2015. 
185 Sources for data in Table 8.2: Interest rates are reported on www.mixmarkets.org  as “Yield on Gross Profit”. 
Most MFIs do not report their actual interest rates (Rosenberg et al. 2013). Both of the Timorese MFIs report 
that they have a “flat interest rate” of 12% per annum. However, as Wronka stated in her report on Access 
to Finance, “interest paid every month is calculated based on the total loan amount instead of the 
outstanding balance” (Wronka 2015, 14). This translates to a doubling of the interest rate over time. As a 
result, she estimates Moris Rasik and Tuba Rai Metin to have an interest rate of 30.16% per annum. Even 
so, Wronka does not include fees and charges. These account for the extra 5 percent yield on portfolio profit 
recorded in the mixmarkets data as I report here, which I take to be a more accurate reflection of the actual 
rate paid by borrowers.  
     Moris Rasik data from www.mixmarkets.org  Accessed 5 January 2016. Tuba Rai Metin data from 
www.mixmarkets.org  Accessed 5 January 2016. BNCTL data from Audit Report 2014  BNCTL Banco 
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procures the BNCTL loan at a lower interest rate, 12% and sells the credit on at a 
higher rate to people outside the group (120-360%).186 In fact, Lucia was elected 
president of the group because of her experience with Moris Rasik, which taught 
her “a lot about giving people credit”, implying that she had been running the 
moneylending business floated with a Moris Rasik loan in prior years.187 Currently, 
as president of the microfinance group, she chooses borrowers based on people’s 
character: “you must look at their background. If you give it to them and they have 
a good history, all is well, if they don’t have a good history, then that’s bad”.188 
Lucia told me that a prospective borrower’s “character” was particularly important 
when lending for cultural ceremonies such as weddings and brideprice.189 Village 
elites dominate the most profitable area of the economy, consumer credit. Table 
8.1 shows that many of the SHG and MFI groups are controlled by village leaders, 
and Figure 8.1 shows the kinship network underlying Lucia’s microfinance group.  
 
                                                 
Nacional Commercio de Timor-Leste (2014) and Interviews with Antonio ET130, Lucia ET131, Manufahi, 1 
September 2015 and Brigida  ET146, 7 September, 2015.  
     Alola Foundation data from Annual Report Alola Foundation (2014, 18) and Interview with a male senior 
manager at Alola ET083, Dili, 9 June 2015.  
     UNDP Compasis data from UNDP Compasis evaluation (Coulibaly 2014). 
     Seeds of Life data from Seeds of Life evaluation reports 2013 and 2016 (Seeds of Life 2016, Solano 2013). 
     Timorese NGO Oecusse data from focus group interview with Timorese Women’s NGO ET096, ET097, 
ET098, ET099, Oecusse, 27 July 2015. 
186 Interview with Brigida, ET146, Manufahi, 7 September 2015. 
187 Interview with Lucia, ET130 and Antonio ET131, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
188 Interview with Lucia, ET130 Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
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Figure 8.1  Overlapping Kinship & Microfinance in Mota 
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Microfinance literature is at pains to describe a sharp division between 
microfinance as benevolent and pro-poor while moneylenders are abusive and 
exploitative, but across Timor-Leste, as elsewhere, these categories are blurred.  
The use of microfinance to fund moneylending businesses is overlooked in the 
practitioner literature on microfinance in Timor-Leste and more broadly. 
Monitoring and evaluation reports show lending to non-members in four NGO 
programs for SHGs that together cover most districts in Timor (Coulibaly 2014: 23, 
Solano 2013).  That is, in Timorese SHG microfinance, SHG members raise the 
initial capital themselves and sell the credit on to people outside the group.  
According to evaluations, UNDP Compasis, Seeds of Life, and Care International 
SHGs had reported lending to non-members. In UNDP Compasis SHGs in 
Oecusse, “most groups are lending money to non-members at a higher interest 
rate” (Coulibaly 2014), at rates of at least 30-120 percent per annum. Loan arbitrage 
was happening in two Compasis SHG groups in the district of Ermera (see Rows 3 
and 7 of Table 8.1). Although program evaluators in SHG microfinance reported 
unsanctioned lending outside the group, evaluators have not recognised the 
implications, namely that higher interest rates extract money from non-members 
to members (Coulibaly 2014, Solano 2013).  
Again, the use of microfinance to finance moneylending businesses has also been 
recorded by researchers working in Bangladesh, India, and Senegal (Karim 2011, 
Guérin 2014, Perry 2002, Koichi 2015). During the Andhra Pradesh microfinance 
crisis, the overlap was noted in the global press: “traditional moneylenders, the 
Wall Street Journal reported, were not being displaced by MFIs but rather were 
thriving, thanks to them” (Mader 2015, 172). Similarly, Perry documented the 
overlap of microcredit and moneylending in rural Senegal with the rise of the 
female moneylender: “female members opt not to invest their loans in artisanal 
activities or to petty trade but to invest in moneylending” (Perry 2002, 31). In a 
climate where other forms of entrepreneurship are risky and crowded, the demand 
for loans is a smart investment. One of Karim’s interlocutors who used 
microfinance to float moneylending described it simply: “I realised that this was a 
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lucrative business. All I had to do was raise money and give it to someone else to 
invest. I decided to join different NGOs to raise money” (Karim 2011, 108). Karim, 
for instance, found that women in the home had few options to be entrepreneurial 
except for money lending:   
One activity that women engaged in was moneylending. In their social 
world, money lending proved to be a particularly viable option. As 
moneylenders, women could stay at home and lend to traders who could 
not get microfinance loans (Karim 2014, 159) 
In the Timor-Leste case, although there are few official controls of women’s 
movements, lending money at higher interest rates is an easy way to make money 
and convert the capital and labour of the lower lineages into cash.  
8.2.2 New Order Gender Legacies 
The dominance of the village leader’s wife in microfinance groups and resulting 
patterns of debt relations builds on systems created during the authoritarian 
Indonesian New Order’s occupation of Timor-Leste. Lucia’s case fits this pattern 
too, as she is the wife of the village chief of Mota. Under the New Order, as I 
explained in Chapter 7, microfinance for women was organised under the PKK. 
The role of PKK members was to promote government interventions in village life, 
especially in the areas of hygiene and family planning. PKK conducted arisan 
(lottery) and microfinance groups. Today, the location of power within 
microfinance groups closely resembles the institution of the PKK.190 As I explained 
earlier, each male official’s wife, including the village chief’s wife, had a 
corresponding place in the PKK hierarchy (Muchtar 1999). 
A senior manager at Moris Rasik was aware of the issue: “I know the PKK, and I try 
to get away from this system. When I began at Moris Rasik, in the majority of the 
                                                 
190 The other mass women’s organisations affiliated with the government during the New Order was Dharma 
Wanita for wives of officials and Dharma Pertiwi for wives of military and police (Muchtar 1999, 21).  
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centres the leaders were the wives of the Xefe Suku [village chief]”.191 She said she  
had tried to change this practice, but it “takes time”. The senior manager described 
how a typical village chief’s wife behaved as leader of a microfinance group, “She 
doesn’t allow others to get bigger loans, when she does, some of the loans have to 
be for her. She keeps them subdued, she says, you don’t help me, you don’t cover 
up for me, I won’t approve you”.192 
 This general trend represents a continuation of the control over poorer women by 
the wife of the village chief, as was common under the PKK. To emphasise, 
although this finding is particular to the post-New Order setting, such an outcome 
is not unusual for women’s empowerment in microfinance generally. Guerin, 
Kumar and Agier’s found in their study of similar microfinance programs that 
“women having agency require or imply domination over other women” (Guérin, 
Kumar, and Agier 2013, 76). Domination is required because microfinance groups 
involve groups of women, with peer pressure used to enforce payments. Internally, 
the structure of microfinance groups is hierarchical. Coulibaly found that group 
leaders exercised pronounced control over the SHGs in Ermera and Oecusse. This 
control makes the other group members, according to the evaluation, “dependent 
on the treasurer and the group president. It is possible that members are not aware 
of the profit made by the group” (Coulibaly 2014, 17).   
At the same time that Lucia exercised control over other men and women’s 
economic activities through monopolisation of small shops and lower-interest 
loans, it was clear that within her family, male relatives considered her 
subordinate. Lucia’s older brother, Antonio, also had a leadership role in the 
microfinance group. He insisted that, although Lucia was the president, and he the 
treasurer of the microfinance group, he was still her superior in kinship and adat: 
Antonio: There is some agreement [between adat in Suku Mota and 
women’s rights] but women’s rights are a bit less. Men have to be a bit 
                                                 
191 Interview with ET120, Senior Manager of an MFI, 16 August 2015. 
192 Interview with ET120, Senior Manager of an MFI, 16 August 2015. 
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higher. Men cannot be lower than women. […] Because of this, women 
have to be subordinate to men. Like me. I have a younger sister, Lucia, 
according to adat; she has to listen to me. I am a man. She is a woman. 
That’s simply how it is for them, they all have to be a little lower. They 
have to listen to men.  
Melissa: But according to universal human rights, people are all the 
same.  
Antonio: I agree with the human rights—then it is just one system. 
However, when it comes to implementing your adat, then women have 
to be a little lower.193 
Older brother Antonio was happy to support women’s equality intuitively and at 
the national level, but in terms of his own privileges, he was not. The division 
between public and domestic spheres means that although Lucia has authority in 
her work for the microfinance group, within the kinship group and household, she 
must be subordinate.  
Village leader’s monopolisation of state resources has led to resentment. There was 
a perception among those who were not directly connected with the village chief’s 
family that they had used the power and position to enrich themselves. 194  I 
conducted interviews with members of Hamlet Feto-Kiik, comprised of lower 
lineages and in-migrants. It is located near the river, and subjected to more malaria 
and flooding.  Rosita, a female villager, complained that leaders ought to “provide 
shade” that is, protect them as a large tree provides a canopy for coffee crops, their 
leaders have failed in their obligations; they “haven’t taken care of us, however 
many years they’ve been in charge”.195 Sancio, a villager in lower ranked hamlet 
Feto Kiik, described how they had applied for an electricity connection but either 
the village chief or the state had prevented them access:  
Some of us borrowed money from our family from our neighbours, gave 
our electoral cards and money and photocopies to the Village Chief, and 
                                                 
193 Interview with schoolteacher, Antonio, ET130 Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
194 Interview with Rosita, ET138, Manufahi, 4 September 2015. 
195 Interview with Rosita, ET138, Manufahi, 4 September 2015 and Sancio, ET137, Manufahi, 4 September 2015. 
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until today we still don't have it. The electricity hasn't arrived. Why not? 
We people of Mota, we take care of our lands, our lives, and our work 
but the State doesn't value us: they “don’t consider us” (Tetun: la foo 
konsiderasaun) 196 
8.2.3 An “Independent Life” or a “Struggle Against Death”? 
In Timor-Leste, the MFI Moris Rasik has earned the unflattering nickname, Mate 
Rasik or “die alone”—a play on words of their name, which means “independent 
life”. In the Timor-Leste case, poorer people who have no economic power “forsa 
la iha” (Tetun: no force) turned to Lucia for help, that is, for moneylending 
services. Lucia’s group lent to poorer members when someone was ill, and they 
could not work in the fields to support their families.197 Lucia and her microfinance 
group members receive profits from interest. 198  In this way, a debt relation 
between higher ranked and lower ranked villagers is established. Through the 
interest, the village leader’s microfinance group was able to extract capital from 
poorer villagers. As Mader says, this comprises the real relation of debt.  
The lack of sufficient capital to satisfy needs among one class, poor 
people, becomes the basis for a contract with members of another 
class who are willing (for whatever reasons, whether “social” or 
“financial”) to rent out capital (Mader 2015, 104) 
Likewise, Guérin noted in India that debt is asymmetric between higher and lower 
castes, that is “it is unusual to borrow from a lower caste” (Guérin 2014, 45). This 
was reflected in the data in Timor-Leste too.  
In Timor-Leste poorer people fear microfinance because of the high-interest rates, 
risks of repossession and over-indebtedness. As I described in Chapter 7, the new 
microfinance architecture enables creditors to accept moveable property as 
collateral, thus making it available for forfeiture. Article D of the Law on Other 
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Deposit Taking Institutions which regulates MFIs makes it possible for MFIs to 
collateralise debts, using meagre belongings, “moveable  property” as well as land 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010d). The fear of microfinance comes from 
the fear of losing this. In Oecusse, which is saturated with microfinance, 
interviewees said that having to sell assets to pay a debt was the reason they did 
not want a loan.199  
Michaela: Yes, we have microfinance people here—people from Moris 
Rasik, from Tuba Rai [another MFI], many people from Oecusse. Our 
family doesn't use it. Because you get problems from it.  
Elisabetha: Your money will go. The state will come and take your 
house! 
Michaela: You don't have to give everything to the state, but you must 
pay. We know about this because we heard about it. It has already 
happened here before.200  
Another interviewee in Oecusse reported she knew an MFI client whose husband 
had killed himself after having sold their house and land to repay their debt.201 In 
Manufahi too, interviewees described financial stress from MFI microfinance: “In 
Same [Manufahi’s district capital], you have Moris Rasik, they have a very high 
interest rate. Some people can't pay, because the interest rate is very high, and 
their money is already gone”.202 Researchers Trembath, Grenfell, and Noronha 
(2010) evaluating NGO impacts on local communities encountered similar views 
on the Timorese island Atauru. Back in Suku Mota in Manufahi, Lucia pointed to 
the financial stress of borrowing: “If you borrow a lot of money, and you use it well, 
that's fine, [. …] but if you don't know how, you just have debt. Then the fear never 
ends. It’s just a struggle against death/collapse”.203 In Suku Mota, people reported 
                                                 
199 Interview with woman villager Michaela, ET113, and her mother, Elisabetha, ET114, Oecusse, 5 August 2015. 
200 Interview with woman villager Michaela, ET113, and her mother, Elisabetha, ET114, Oecusse, 5 August 2015. 
201  Interview with villager and laundress Lina ET102, Oecusse, 7 July 2015. Similar experiences with 
microfinance and micro-insurance suicides were reported in the microfinance crisis in Bangladesh in 2010 
(Weber 2014) and the Andhra Pradesh (Mader 2015). 
202 Interview with schoolteacher, Antonio, ET130 Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
203 Interview with Lucia, ET131, Manufahi, 1 September 2015. 
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furniture taken as collateral by SHG and MFI member.204 In an Australian Aid 
funded agricultural cooperative/microfinance, Seeds of Life, SHGs required 
members to sell collateral to pay overdue debts (Solano 2013, 9).205 Repossession 
of household items in this fashion in Timor-Leste supports Weber’s argument that 
microfinance disciplines the poor by making possible the collateralisation of the 
“meagre” belongings of the poor, preventing debt strikes and the like (Weber 2014, 
548). 
8.2.4 Debts and Domestic Violence 
I have previously argued that kinship, particularly brideprice, organises social 
inequality into a four-tier system in Timor-Leste. Although reciprocity and 
cohesion are part of Timorese social life, I take a different approach than existing 
ethnographies by analysing debt through the lens of material relations and power. 
I argue that attention to the reciprocal aspects of kinship debts has romanticised 
the role that debt and obligation plays in class and gender stratification. Guérin 
states regarding the South Indian case, “debt may produce solidarity and social 
cohesion but also exploitation, hierarchy, and domination” (Guérin 2014, 41). To 
rephrase, debt is not merely an idiom with symbolic significance but a crucial part 
of material social relations with critical distributive outcomes and associated 
power imbalances.  
The creation of high debts has a negative impact on women and girls and can lead 
to the sale of girls and women to pay debts. Others have connected indebtedness 
to the sale of children: “In rural areas, heavily indebted parents sometimes 
provided their children as indentured servants to settle debts. If the child was a 
girl, the receiving family could also demand any dowry payment normally owed to 
the girl’s parents” (United States Department of State 2013). Wigglesworth also 
noted that  “among poor families a daughter may be given in marriage to a creditor 
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as a means of repaying a pre-existing debt, although the practice is now less 
common” (Wigglesworth 2010, 127). Thus, the linking of brideprice with debts 
between lineages is linked to human trafficking.  
Gender relations also affect microfinance borrowers in terms of the use they make 
of the loans (Rahman 1999). Women are often the “holders of the money” in 
households in Timor-Leste (Grenfell et al. 2015). However, this is often a fraught 
position, as women must manage household budgets with little control over 
income and significant areas of spending. As  Guerin notes in rural South India, 
when women are “called on to manage budgets without having any control over 
income; they have no choice but to multiply the sources and routes of debt, which 
are often strictly feminine” (Guérin 2014, 46). A recent report on the economic 
dimensions of domestic violence in Timor-Leste acknowledged that “the 
management of household funds by women can often be a two-edged sword: it 
gives them an important measure of influence, yet can also place them at risk of 
violence when they are not seen as sufficiently compliant by an abusive spouse” 
(Grenfell et al. 2015, 13). The same process frequently came through in my 
fieldwork, as a manager in a local women’s NGO in Oecusse related:   
Sometimes women get a loan but they don't use it for a business, they 
use it for the household, for the children. Then, when it comes time to 
repay the money, then they have to sell household items, then it leads 
to strife in the household. This is one of the problems […] When the 
money is finished, and you have no things left, then you have problems 
in the household.206 
Moreover, the widespread use of microfinance to pay for consumption of food, or 
school uniforms and supplies creates debts which in turn put economic pressure 
on households already below the poverty line. Many interlocutors blamed 
                                                 
206 Focus Group Interview with managers at a Timorese Women’s NGO: ET096 Female Timorese NGO  
Director, ET097 Male Timorese NGO Program Manager, ET098 Female Timorese NGO Finance Officer, 
ET099 Female Timorese NGO Program Manager, Oecusse 27 July 2015. 
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household poverty and economic stress for domestic violence, phenomena already 
seen in Chapter 6 on brideprice debts driving domestic violence.  
Microfinance organisations generally claim they only make loans to women 
entrepreneurs for productive activities, but lending for brideprice was common in 
Timor-Leste. As one member of a microfinance group said: “If we are loaning for 
[brideprice] ceremonies, it depends on the person. If they are going to be late with 
the payment, then we do not loan to them”.207 The use of microfinance to pay for 
brideprice is not surprising. Microcredit has been a source for dowry payments for 
some time (Rozario 2002, 68).  The lens of feminist political economy reveals that 
when microfinance is used to help pay for brideprice, brideprice becomes part of 
the formal and international financial market, and it accrues interest. Brideprice 
already plays a foundational role in the social structure, by forming debt relations 
between higher-ranked and lower-ranked lineages, as I have explained over the 
course of this study. Since brideprices are so large they most often manifest as 
debt, it has great affinity with microfinance. As I show in this chapter, 
microfinance is dominated by members of the Liurai-Dato class, and they make 
money by charging high levels of interests to vulnerable groups. Thus, both 
microfinance and brideprice result in ordinary citizens owing debts to higher 
ranked lineages. Importantly, brideprices are owed in perpetuity, when brideprice 
is monetised through cash microfinance loans; it is then subject to (very high) 
interest. Moreover, when this microfinance is provided through a microfinance 
provider, the profit from the interest rate on the brideprice accrues to a 
microfinance institution connected to the international financial market.  
Microfinance debts, like brideprice debts, are owed from lower ranked lineages to 
higher ranked ones. Microfinance debt relationships flow in the same direction as 
brideprice debts—they mirror the obligations of lower lineages to higher lineages. 
In the case of brideprice, high-status lineages—Liurai and Dato—can charge more 
money for brides than lower-status lineages can. Thus, they accumulate 
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brideprice, or, more commonly, debts owed to them. In that sense, microfinance 
is not separate from the broader political economy of debt in Timor-Leste. Wealthy 
families, usually from these high-status lineages, loan money to lower status 
lineages who accumulate the debts. Debts and reciprocity are framed in terms of 
“looking after” the lower lineages, such as Lucia’s microfinance group loaning 
money to those in the village too ill to work.208   
8.3 Risks of Microfinance  
In the Timor-Leste case, only the wealthier, those from the higher lineages, are 
able to benefit from access to microfinance. One monitoring report from Seeds of 
Life SHG suggests that their sponsored microfinance SHGs were “not reaching the 
poorest of the poor, which is supposed to be their target population. This is 
observed especially in those Hamlets where the “microfinance groups are bigger, 
have raised greater capital and are asking for higher monthly compulsory savings 
to their members” (Solano 2013, 32). The findings presented are similar to other 
studies of microfinance showing that microfinance tends to reach the 
economically active poor, not the poorest (Bauchet et al. 2011). For example in 
India, the majority of new clients for microfinance do not come from the bottom 
30% of a village (Kabeer 2005, 4711). This same finding concurs with the results of 
a randomised experiment evaluation of microfinance in Ghana. There, “it was only 
the larger female-owned businesses that benefited in terms of profit. Women from 
the general population are not always, nor, indeed, more likely to be, able to 
convert capital into profits, and men tend to be more successful overall” (Bauchet 
et al. 2011, 11).   
The microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh highlights endogenous and exogenous 
risks for poor borrowers, overexposed moneylenders, and the micro-financial 
market. These also apply in the Timor-Leste case. Mader describes the four 
endogenous causes of the Andhra Pradesh crisis. One, rapid growth in the 
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numbers of loans, because of, two, the withdrawal of state-sponsored agricultural 
credit. Three, state-sponsored MFI loans to poor sectors of the community 
replaced earlier direct state credit (Mader 2015, 164-5). Four, MFIs were able to 
“poach” new clients from older programs of subsidised credit and existing SHG 
members (Mader 2015, 164-5). This was in the context of wider economic pressures, 
land pressures that squeezed farmers onto smaller and smaller plots; promoting 
cash crops over food crops created dependency on volatile markets; the withdrawal 
of welfare subsidies by the state made life more expensive; and degraded 
environment and climate risks. Increased lending and NGO privatisation were 
coupled with extensive shareholder investments in microfinance, which also 
created a boom in Indian microfinance (Mader 2015, 168). All these factors 
contributed to increased borrowing from MFIs. 
Moving to the Timor-Leste case, some comparable risks exist. In the stagnant 
agricultural sector, the endogenous risks are that borrowers do not have enough 
income to pay loans due to persistent droughts, floods, landslides and other 
natural disasters and must either further borrow or sell assets to repay loans. 
Microfinance already moved from  state-subsidised to MFI microfinance, although 
there are uneven pockets of state subsidies to microfinance (Wronka 2015). The 
exogenous risks are the low levels of stable government spending on agriculture, 
patrimonialism in the allocation of veterans’ pensions, political instability and 
decreasing oil receipts, leading to aid dependency and certainly less budget 
spending (Scambary 2015, Drysdale 2007). Microfinance in Timor-Leste has been 
prone to such risks and crises before, and many risks remain, which the poor know 
only too well.  
The expansion of SHGs of MFIs promoted by donors under the rubric of financial 
inclusion does not take into account key factors increasing risks in microfinance. 
In addition to conflict and economic driven instability, financial markets are 
inherently unstable. MFIs and SHGs are no different, risks to micro-financial 
markets include “contagious” defaulting, loan arbitrage, market saturation, capital 
to loan ratio in SHGs, stagnant economic situations or consumer protection and 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MICROFINANCE 
271 
over-indebtedness (Staschen 2002, Wronka 2015). For those moneylenders 
operating SHGs in the shadow market, moneylenders need to be able to threaten 
severe or violent sanctions in order to ensure repayment. Any government wishing 
to expand SHGs in this manner would have to note that supervision is a daunting 
task (Duggan 2016).  If repayment of the principal does not occur, because of over-
indebtedness or external shocks, then microfinance is prone to collapse. 
Microfinance is a risky business and prone to financial crises with real, material 
effects as seen in recent microfinance crises in Nicaragua 2008; Bosnia-
Herzegovina 2008-9; Morocco 2009; Kolar (India) 2009; Uganda 2009; Andhra 
Pradesh (India) 2010; Pakistan 2010; and Ghana 2015. 
Advocates for microfinance’s poverty reduction potential ignored the risks in 
under-regulated, high-interest credit products. Levels of overindebtedness in 
Timor-Leste have not been measured quantitively, and this chapter’s qualitative 
findings suggest they deserve attention. Moneylending is rarely mentioned in the 
practitioner literature in Timor-Leste explicitly. Assessments of microfinance in 
Timor-Leste minimised endogenous risks associated with the expansion of MFI or 
SHG microfinance (See for example FIELD-Support 2014, Solano 2013, Day 2007, 
2010). Moreover, there are no consumer credit protections in MFI regulations in 
Timor-Leste (Day 2010). Encouraging the expansion of MFI and SHG microfinance 
does not take into account the acknowledged problems regarding the limited 
ability of governments to regulate and limit default risk, loan arbitrage, market 
saturation, or ensure a realistic capital to loan ratio (Staschen 2002). Yet, when 
microfinance groups go bankrupt after external shocks or economic downturn, 
donor and government documents explain this away as the rural poor’s lack of 
capacity or that culture was an obstacle to development. 
8.4 Conclusion 
Microfinance does not work for the people it is meant to target, precisely because 
it works for other groups of Timorese. However, microfinance does “work at” 
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something. It works at the (re)production of inequality through class based 
accumulation at the village level. It reproduces gendered economies of debt and 
brideprice and the gender division of labour. It is materially valuable to NGO, 
government, and private sector groups who own and run microfinance and benefit 
in the form of jobs and attracting international aid funding.  
The way microfinance works in Manufahi and Oecusse undoes assumptions 
donors and government make about the outcomes of microfinance in Timor-Leste. 
Firstly, many loans were used for consumption, and the main entrepreneurial 
activity of moneylending. Microfinance has helped village elites to be economically 
active. In contrast to cultural explanations of outcomes that use “local” and 
“international” as a starting point for analysis, and portray microfinance as a 
bottom up tool of development, a feminist political economy approach shows how 
microfinance reproduced class relations. The (re)growth of microfinance did not 
“trickle down” in villages and raise living standards overall but rather allowed elites 
to retain control of the village economy and extract wealth from poorer members. 
This mirrors historical patterns seen in Chapter 3, and political economies of 
domestic violence I examined in Chapter 5. Political economy analysis of power in 
the village fits with the properly historicised view of microfinance in Timor-Leste 
as containing legacies of colonial and neo-colonial economic governance. Again, 
these class structures are not “natural” categories, consented to by the majority, 
but constituted through material relations of inequality and strengthened through 
war and militarisation during the New Order, and earlier Portuguese 
mercantilism, slavery and plantation driven economies. 
Thirdly, the status of the Liurai-Dato class depends on the exchange of women. 
Microfinance is another way to reckon these intergenerational and community 
debts. Microfinance intersects with gender through bride price in a concrete 
fashion. This chapter argued that despite the rhetoric of access to credit 
empowering the poor and empowering women, microfinance works to strengthen 
debt regulated inequality. Microfinance programs reinforce this gender order and 
village leaders’ control, even when some women in the families of village leaders 
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experience greater economic empowerment. Microfinance transforms the dense 
web of kinship relations from debt relations to loan relations—they are two sides 
of the same coin.  
At the policy level, microfinance facilitates the political elite’s shifting of 
responsibility for poverty onto the poor at the same time as satisfying neoliberal 
donor demands and freeing up budgets to buy support from veterans. But shifting 
these responsibilities comes with risk, as microfinance markets, like all markets, 
are unstable and prone to crash. In Timor-Leste, the lack of consumer protection 
and expansion of SHG microfinance entails risks. High levels of overindebtedness 






CHAPTER 9.  CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, and especially since UNSCR 1325 on Gender, Peace and 
Security, peacebuilding interventions increasingly incorporated gender 
perspectives. Peacebuilding interventions use both gender mainstreaming and 
development programs for women’s empowerment. On the whole, however, these 
gender interventions have had uneven results. Scholars have attempted to explain 
the reasons for the uneven outcomes of gender interventions, even where these 
uneven outcomes are unsurprising. The central aim of this study has been to 
contribute to the study of gender and peacebuilding through a feminist political 
economy lens by examining the outcomes of gender interventions in Timor-Leste.  
The thesis sought to answer the question: What can explain the uneven outcomes 
of gender interventions? As the thesis has shown, the outcomes of gender 
interventions for GRB, the LADV and microfinance have been uneven when 
measured by interveners’ aims. However, more crucially, this thesis measured 
gender intervention against the yardstick of gender justice, which entails an 
evaluation of the distribution of resources and power (Goetz 2007).  The use of this 
measure allows the study to go further than the successes and failures of the 
specific interventions to encompass redistributive aspects of gender interventions. 
In other words, using gender justice allowed the thesis to answer the question: 
what are the different distributional outcomes of gender interventions for different 
groups? Using gender justice also allowed the thesis to look at the material 
relations of power driving domestic violence, which is significant given the 
prevalence and severity of violence against women after conflict.  
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Dominant explanations of peacebuilding’s uneven results use ideas popularised by 
the local turn and this thesis is in part a rejoinder to these. Scholars associated 
with the local turn made timely and essential critiques of liberal peacebuilding. 
However, the study found the local turn and hybridity were inadequate tools with 
which to examine gender interventions, partially because the assumptions and 
premises guiding the local turn are insufficiently attentive to class and gender 
hierarchies within local societies. What is more, when turning to the examination 
of peacebuilding in practice, theories of the local turn found purchase among the 
dominant classes in Timor-Leste. This alliance of domestic and international 
support contributed to aspects of the local turn being incorporated into 
peacebuilding in practice in Timor-Leste. I have argued this inadvertently 
provided a veil of legitimacy to the continuation and reinvigoration of highly 
unequal gender relations in the critical areas of state resources after peace 
settlements, traditional dispute resolution, and brideprice.  
The thesis has pushed forward the analysis of gender interventions by using a 
structural feminist political economy frame. Such a framework reveals that gender 
relations are a crucial aspect of the broader processes through which the dominant 
class secures its position in independent Timor-Leste. The theoretical framework 
combined a structural political economy approach used elsewhere in the study of 
Southeast Asian politics and development, and the Timor-Leste case (Hameiri, 
Hughes, and Scarpello 2017, Hughes 2015, Jones 2010) together with the feminist 
political economy of True (2012). True’s political economy of violence against 
women provided a framework with which the thesis sought to explain material 
(resource and power related) drivers of high levels of violence against women in 
post-conflict Timor-Leste. Kinship was added to this synthetic framework because 
kinship is a crucial factor constituting both gender and class structural power 
relations, but a factor neglected by theoretical strands of FPE and structural 
political economy. The synthetic framework entailed an understanding of the 
shape of the state as resulting from the outcomes of contests between social forces.  
As such, rather than contests between local and international groups, the analysis 
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considered that international interveners are just one of a number of groups in 
contests over the socio-political order. In this study, class was the fundamental 
social force examined. I argued that structural relations of class and gender are the 
cause of uneven outcomes of gender intervention in no small measure because 
these structures are mutually constitutive. Consequently, the Timor-Leste case 
study implies that an analysis of the outcomes of gender intervention requires an 
understanding of how gender interventions work in practice and comprehensive 
analysis of historically specific gender and class relations.  
9.2 The Political Economy of Gender Interventions: Empirical 
Findings 
This thesis has shown that the control over women, reproduction, and the gender 
division of labour are fraught areas of gender intervention and areas that feature 
contests and coalitions within and across categories of local and international.  
Chapter 3 argued the explanation for the uneven outcomes of gender interventions 
lies with historically specific social forces. Chapter 3 was novel in applying a 
structural political economy approach to the history of Timor-Leste. The structural 
political economy approach used in Chapter 3 and again in Chapter 7, made a 
significant contribution to the study of Timorese politics because it allowed the 
chapter to isolate the emergence and continuing dominance of the Liurai-Dato 
class as a crucial part of the political analysis. This class emerged through the 
monopolisation of slavery, the military and was characterised by the valorisation 
of armed masculinity. Further, this chapter showed that the existence of slave 
status and its overlap with gender relations is an overlooked area of historiography. 
The relations between the Liurai-Dato class and those from slave backgrounds also 
profoundly shaped the hierarchical structure present in Timorese society. 
Although these relations arise from a kinship structure that exists across the 
country from village to city, the Liurai-Dato class is split in two parts. Only the 
most successful members of the class have been able to leverage their high-born 
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status into well-paid political leadership, government or private sector jobs in Dili. 
Family members who are unable to break into these higher levels of the state or 
the NGO sector remain in less prestigious functions such as village chiefs or 
similar.  
Chapter 4 built on this historical background to describe the expanding 
dominance of the Liurai-Dato class in the post-independence period through an 
examination of the distribution of state resources. In the Timor-Leste case, buying 
the peace using veterans’ pensions funnelled resources to the Liurai-Dato class. 
The Dili-based elites take the bulk this money, but with crucial resources also 
directed to patrimonial networks in villages. At the same time as the expansion of 
veterans’ pensions, donors pushed for means-tested cash transfers to vulnerable 
women to encourage better health and education outcomes for their children. 
Cash transfers to women are, however, dwarfed by the volumes of veterans’ 
pensions. The study made an important contribution by showing that the Bolsa da 
Mãe, although also too small to be effective in reducing poverty, in any case, is, 
like other kinds of state resources, at least partially captured by members of the 
Liurai-Dato class and thus does not benefit the most vulnerable.   
The last section of Chapter 4 moved away from contextual factors to examine the 
narrowing of the mandate and disappointing outcomes of gender responsive 
budgeting thus far. In the face of this Timorese political economy, gender 
responsive budgeting failed to take hold in any meaningful way. After a series of 
compromises and with its mandate falling away, GRB has narrowed to focus on the 
implementation of the Law Against Domestic Violence. Again, class interests play 
a role. The Women’s Cross Party Caucus has made political and patriarchal 
bargains with men of their class which has tended to limit the radical 
redistribution of state resources to poor women. Overall, however, the capture of 
state resources by men explains the failure of gender interventions to redistribute 
state resources. The lack of redistribution has flow-on effects to other areas of 
welfare that damage prospects for gender justice. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 showed how gender intervention for the Law Against Domestic 
Violence has had uneven outcomes. Overall, the peacebuilding intervention in 
Timor-Leste was shaped by the local turn. Thus, when we look at gender 
interventions, on their terms, and regarding gender justice, we see that 
peacebuilders made alliances with members of the dominant class. Chapter 6 
looked at the political economy of brideprice. Brideprice has been a controversial 
topic for anthropologists, scholars looking at gender and for national and 
international level gender experts working in Timor-Leste. The focus of intense 
debate, there has nonetheless been no gender intervention on brideprice. Existing 
works on brideprice in Timor-Leste have rehearsed older anthropological debates 
over whether brides constitute a commodity or gift. Scholars whose works have 
informed local approaches say criticism of brideprice is misplaced because 
brideprice is a vital cultural practice, holding together families and promoting 
peace. Timorese women’s organisations with both urban and rural members, in 
contrast, have long opposed brideprice as damaging to women’s human rights and 
as a driver of violence against women (Alves and Alita 2009). Chapter 6 took a 
structural feminist political economy approach, examining how brideprice is an 
overlooked but central part of the Timorese economy setting up long-term debts 
between families.  
Chapters 7 and 8 were paired in order to explore the historically specific factors 
affecting implementation of microfinance as a gender intervention (Chapter 7) and 
its outcomes (Chapter 8). Microfinance was contextualised as part of the 
development and military policy of the Indonesian invasion. A historical approach 
helped explained how village based members of the Liurai-Dato class were able to 
monopolise political power and resources through their access to finance and 
debts. The study contains implications and conclusion that have contributed to 
the study of gender and peacebuilding more broadly.  
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9.3 The Political Economy of Gender Interventions: Implications  
All chapters showed how gender relations are strategic part of the ways in which 
the Liurai-Dato class secures its position. Although all cases showed the 
dominance of the Liurai-Dato class, and their dependence on gender relations for 
reproduction, this took place in different settings, with different results for 
different societal groups. I traced these differentiated outcomes. Assessments of 
the post-2006-7 crisis showed  that veterans’ pensions help CNRT buy the peace 
from key belligerent actors threatening the political elite (Porter and Rab 2011, 
International Crisis Group 2013). However, the present study contributed to the 
scholarly understanding of how veterans’ pensions also allowed Gusmão’s CNRT 
to create a political network of funded veterans into rural villages, establishing 
patronage links where the disconnect between local and national had been the rule  
(Roll 2015, Hughes 2009). Moreover, the study pointed to the important role of 
veterans in enforcing the political order. In rural areas, veterans (often also village 
leaders) have been enrolled by the political elite to help mitigate, resolve, and 
enforce land disputes in the rapid expansion of spending on physical infrastructure 
projects. In one case in Oecusse, veteran identity overlapped with membership of 
the Liurai-Dato class.  
This thesis has made a number of contributions to the empirical study of gender 
relations in Timor-Leste, but it has wider applicability. Using a gendered lens to 
examine peacebuilding allowed the analysis to move beyond the local turn’s 
proposition of a clash or divide between liberal international and local cultures, 
institution and practices are the reason for uneven outcomes of peacebuilding 
intervention. The thesis questioned the current orthodoxy of using hybrid peace 
frameworks because, like the local turn, hybridity left power relations within 
different social and gender orders unexamined, and as such, could still not account 
for uneven outcomes. The alternative framework used here—structural feminist 
political economy—moved the discussion beyond local and international to the 
development of historically specific social forces. Others have applied structural 
political economy to the case of Timor-Leste (Hughes 2009, Jones 2010, Hughes, 
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Öjendal, and Schierenbeck 2015, Hughes 2015, Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello 
2017). However, describing how the gender order is essential to the consolidation 
of the post-conflict political order pushed this literature forward. The study 
showed the coalition of Dili based and rural members of the Liurai Dato class as 
key to understanding the contemporary Timorese state. Political economy 
explanations grounded in an account of the intersection between historically 
specific gender and class relations in this sense gave a more accurate picture. The 
application of a structural feminist political economy approach was able to extract 
the various gender progressive and gender regressive alliances that defy simple 
labelling of local or international. This study has shown that the distribution of 
state resources, the control over traditional dispute resolution and debt relations 
has been essential to the reproduction of the Liurai-Dato class’ power in villages. 
This reproduction is also achieved through the close control over kinship, which 
is, at the same time, a means of accumulation.  
GRB’s efficacy as a gender intervention was evaluated by looking at the distribution 
of state resources through cash transfers, particularly veterans’ pensions. Although 
Gender Responsive Budgeting in Timor-Leste has been considered a successful 
case of “women acting for women” (Costa, Sawer, and Sharp 2013), over time, GRB 
narrowed and failed to address the capture of state resources by members of the 
dominant class. The distribution of state resources is gendered in three ways. First, 
at an individual level, the distribution of state resources is deeply gendered. The 
ideology valorising armed masculinity has been used to justify the distribution of 
state resources—both cash transfers and infrastructure contracts—to men. This 
ideology is deeply gendered because it privileges heroes over victims. The 
distribution of state resources is in itself a source of gender injustice in that the 
overwhelming beneficiaries of state resources have been men. Around 87 percent 
of veterans’ pensions go to men and lucrative government contracts likewise. 
Transfers to women through the Bolsa da Mãe are too small, conditional, and 
reinforce gender roles.  
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Second, at the level of the state, the gendered distribution of resources to men 
detracts from spending in areas of high import to women’s well-being and results 
in gender injustice. The Timor-Leste case provides confirmatory evidence that 
peacebuilding can involve concessions to, and buying off, armed groups, and this 
is particularly relevant in the area of personal law and the distribution of resources 
(Goetz and Jenkins 2016).  In the Timor-Leste case, the unequal distribution of 
resources towards the dominant class has had negative, if typical, affects gender 
relations. GRB in post-conflict states ought to be an area of gender intervention 
with considerable positive outcomes for gender justice. Yet a more radical or social 
justice inspired gender responsive budgeting has been stymied by the interests of 
men of the Liurai-Dato class monopolising state resources within their networks.  
Third, the nature of the Timorese state set the boundaries of gender interventions. 
Namely, the post-conflict distribution of resources to well-connected men, rather 
than state infrastructure, health, welfare and education has detrimental effects on 
the well-being of women and increases their burdens because of the gender 
division of labour. The post-conflict distribution of resources has also been 
profoundly shaped by second generation neoliberal reform agendas. Programs 
inimical to the everyday welfare of the majority—patrimonial projects, cash 
transfers to the elite, lack of spending on health education and welfare and 
microfinance—have ruled government programming from 2007 to 2017. This has 
continued the lack of spending on welfare under the neoliberal UN era in the post 
conflict period from 1999 to 2006. The resultant continuing impoverishment of 
rural areas also had flow-on effects. Poverty and scant resources were shown to be 
linked to brideprice, because the cash, goods, and reciprocal networks provide 
some material security for families. But these networks and brideprice itself drives 
violence against women and thus material reciprocity comes at the cost of gender 
justice. Poverty encourages over-indebtedness through microfinance—which 
transfers wealth to MFIs and thence to international financial institutions, and 
exorbitant debts owed to higher ranked lineages. This discussion of the three ways 
that the gendered distribution of resources impacts gender intervention leads to 
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the first conclusion that gender interventions cannot be measured according to 
program level aims because this misses the broader political implications of state 
resource distribution.  
The thesis argued that by evaluating gender interventions according to who gets 
what from peacebuilding interventions leads to a more accurate picture of the 
outcomes of peacebuilding for women. Moreover, the fact that the most vulnerable 
women were impacted negatively by (the lack of) gender interventions in the 
distribution of state resources, the LADV, brideprice and microfinance points to 
the need for gender interventions to look at their outcomes in terms of gender 
justice. The chapters, in exploring the political economy of gender intervention all 
point to the necessity of conceptualising gender intervention as an inherently 
political activity for all groups, and alliances thereof.  
The co-constitutive nature of class and gender relations continued, not just at the 
level of the state, but also at the level of the village. The implementation of the 
LADV has had only limited success because, in villages, members of the Liurai-
Dato class rely on their control over marriage and traditional dispute resolution as 
a means of accumulation. These material considerations, not culture per se, forms 
the basis for objections to change to traditional law, culture, marriage custom, and 
institutions. Thus, the second conclusion of the thesis is that historically specific 
power relations between dominant and subordinate classes shape outcomes of 
gender interventions profoundly. The Liurai-Dato class’ monopolisation of 
resources continues to be justified ideologically by the valorisation of armed 
masculinity. 
Following from this conclusion about the material aspects of the relations between 
Liurai-Dato class and subordinate classes is the importance of gender ideology in 
undergirding this control. This section comprising the paired Chapters 5 and 6 
moved away from the state level to discuss lower level governance (and of course 
its association with state politics and political economy). A third and critical 
conclusion is outcomes are uneven because brideprice connects the dominant class 
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vertically across the state and is a vital part of class based accumulation and 
interests. The present study is the first piece of research showing how brideprice 
can be a means of class-based accumulation in a post-conflict setting. A 
considerable empirical contribution of the thesis was to show how the emergence 
and dominance of the Liurai-Dato class was conditional on gender relations. As 
such, brideprice is not a peripheral aspect of cultural practice but rather is central 
to the political economy of Timor-Leste. Brideprice establishes status—wealthy 
families charge higher brideprices—and allows higher ranks to accumulate wealth, 
shoring up their political power and dominance. In that sense, brideprice is a basis 
of social structure, connecting gender and class. This finding makes a meaningful 
contribution to the study of the role of gender in conflict because it challenges 
Hudson and Matfess’ assertion that brideprices are “flat taxes” spurring men to 
partake in conflict (Hudson and Matfess 2017). Rather, the relationship between 
brideprice and violence is more complex because it is classed in particular ways. 
Domestic violence has different drivers for different classes. The conclusion I draw 
here has been an intersectional one, focussing on the political economy of 
brideprice. It reveals brideprice’s role—not as some anachronistic aspect of 
cultural practice—but an essential part of contemporary processes of class 
formation and class conflict. Brideprices benefit dominant groups and are 
detrimental to subordinate ones because they initiate accumulation and debt 
relations. At an individual level, they create obligations between powerful fathers-
in-law and less powerful sons-in-law. At the group level, it creates a series of 
material obligations where resources flow upwards from lower ranks to higher 
ranks in return for brides.  
A fourth conclusion is that, in the Timor-Leste case, various international and 
national groups support, while others resist gender interventions, and their support 
depends on their interests and ideology. Chapters 5 and 6 showed that coalitions of 
peacebuilders and national elites make concessions in areas of personal law—the 
realm of the local—and involved particular compromises in and concessions to 
powerful, patriarchal groups and traditions (Goetz and Jenkins 2016). As a result, 
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support for a “local turn” in peacebuilding can inadvertently support groups who 
benefit from the continuation of unequal gender relations. Such a finding provides 
empirical evidence of what Wallis, Jeffery, and Kent (2016) have called the “dark 
side of hybridity”. A crucial contribution of Chapter 5 showed how interveners 
supported traditional dispute resolution and legal pluralism in the courts, which 
inadvertently fuelled a political economy of domestic violence. Again, Chapter 5 
showed it was in the interest of the village-based members of the Liurai-Dato class 
to retain control over traditional dispute resolution as they benefitted materially. 
Village leaders’ interests in using traditional dispute resolution aligned with the 
interests of ordinary men because the subordination of their wives, daughters, and 
sisters conferred a patriarchal dividend on ordinary men from the gender division 
of labour.  
A fifth conclusion is gender interventions in finance are not new and require 
historical and gendered analysis to contextualise these within the expansion of 
state development, as well as neoliberal globalisation. Kinship relations—defined 
through debts—play out through gender interventions on microfinance. However, 
the mutually constitutive relationship between debts, kinship, and finance is not 
a new occurrence. Instead, microfinance shaped social and gender relations 
through the decades of conflict. Chapter 7 historicised microfinance as a part of 
the New Order Indonesian occupation. Microfinance linked cooperatives were 
heavily implicated in the Indonesian military's extraction of money from the 
occupied country. The same microfinance groups were also linked to the changing 
modes of microfinance in Indonesia from state-subsidised credit to “financially 
sustainable” microfinance. In particular, war and militarism, and elite interests 
shaped outcomes on the ground in Timor. In the post-independence period, in 
villages, the Liurai-Dato class can control local resources through debts, and these 







The 2011 fieldwork study was on the different, but related topic of decentralised 
governance and village leadership in post-conflict Timor-Leste, undertaken for a 
uncompleted degree at a different institution, the University of Vienna, Austria. 
Earlier fieldwork in Timor-Leste from 2011 provides background to the thesis. I 
conducted around eighteen semi-structured interviews, primarily in Manufahi in 
Timor-Leste, over a period of five months (see Table 10.1). These interviews were 
obtained ethically under ethical standards applicable at the University of Vienna, 
Austria. These standards were taught through the Institute for Social and Cultural 
Anthropology (KSA), where I was enrolled. The University of Vienna did not 
require formal human research ethics approval. However, like all KSA research 
students doing fieldwork, I was required to inform research participants of possible 
adverse outcomes, protect their privacy and anonymise their data, inform them of 
the scope and aims of the research for participants to give informed (oral) consent. 
The results of this research were not submitted for a degree in Austria.  In 2015, I 
interviewed some of these participants again using formal, signed consent forms, 
following the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research (Murdoch University Permit Number 014/188).  
The West Timor data was not drawn on in any detail in the thesis. The reason for 
this was simply that I had too much, diverse data (including over 172 semi-
structured interviews) given the time and space constraints of a PhD thesis project. 
To include both case studies in the final dissertation would not have done justice 
to the richness of the material.  
Readers should note interviews from earlier fieldwork in Timor-Leste in 2015 are 
cited as ET followed by a three digit number (for example ET010) with some 
information on the gender, social status and affiliation listed in the footnote. More 
detailed information beyond on the age, linguistic background of participants is 
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listed in Table 10.1. Those few from West Timor, Indonesia were cited as WT, 
followed by a three-digit number (for example WT010). The few interviews from 
2011 cited in the thesis were cited as ET, followed by a three-digit number and the 
year, 2011 (for example, ET156 – 2011). 
Locating interviewees (sampling) was done purposively. Names of national 
policymakers, experts, and gender experts were gathered from websites, the 
Timorese news, documentary research, and drawing on my established and 
emergent Dili-based networks. For example, the Oecusse subnational contact list 
was drawn up with the help of an international gender and police-building expert. 
In terms of establishing contact with village leaders and subnational leaders in 
rural areas, these were drawn initially from my existing network of contacts in 
Timor-Leste from the 2011 fieldwork. Interlocutors included village leaders, Liurai 
and Dato, veterans and members of NGOs and women’s organisation networks. 
Initial interviews were instrumental in introducing the researcher to other 
potential participants. Locating interviewees used, in other words, purposive 
snowball sampling. This is deemed the most efficient in this type of research where 
the researcher becomes a temporary feature of the rural community in which she 
is working (Kerstan and Berninghausen 1992). However, drawing on elite level 
networks and snowball sampling introduced bias. Partiality arises is in part 
because elite, or male, or educated interlocutors/participants act as gatekeepers, 
intentionally or unintentionally controlling the terms on which researchers can 
talk with ordinary citizens.  
With this in mind, avoiding one-sided sampling within patrimonial networks, 
within which I had to operate, was a principal aim of the 2015 fieldwork. The broad 
range of interlocutors is evidenced in Table 10.1 below. Roll (2014) gives a good 
account of problematic bias in qualitative snowball sampling in Timorese 
patrimonial networks. I compensated for this common problem by purposively 
trying to sample beyond the networks of “gatekeepers” and “patrons”. In all sites, 
I initially approached higher status formal and informal gatekeepers, seeking 
formal and informal approvals while conducting interviews. Next, at each field site, 
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I employed one or two younger, educated people from the area as research 
assistants. Research assistants introduced me to the community and acted as 
informal “key informants” (Rabinow 1977). Walking around with research 
assistants allowed me to reach lower status community members because the 
familiar faces of my research assistants reassured community members that I was 
under someone’s supervision and protection. This “supervised” freedom allowed 
me to move beyond gatekeepers’ networks and talk to people unrelated to village 
chiefs, hamlet chiefs, or other subnational leaders. Getting beyond those networks 
with research assistants, who, as young people were often considered to be of low 
status provided vital insights into hierarchy and subordination on the island of 
Timor-Leste. Methodologically, I look critically at elites’ historical narratives, and 
social scientists’ reproduction of them, to sketch the material and structural 
implication of who benefitted and by what means, from the gender division of 
labour, economic processes, war and militarisation, and international 
intervention. 
Questions were drawn from a “menu” of questions, only some of which are 
discussed briefly here. The initial questions established and discussed the social 
status of the participant and their social group, and the social relations and gender 
relations surrounding them. Social status was also elicited through biodata forms 
asking about participants’ first languages, education level, occupation, number of 
people living with them and so on. The biodata forms also helped clarify oral 
information during the interview. The forms asked interviewees to self-estimate 
whether they considered themselves of ordinary class status (Tetun: Ema Bai Bain) 
or famers (Tetun: Toos Nain) or upper middle class (Indonesian: Kelas menengah 
atas), or of Liurai or Dato rank or indeed whether they considered themselves elite 
(Tetun: Ema Boot). Next, the interview itself established biographical narratives 
and kinship affiliations. I drew kinship diagrams to establish people’s affiliation 
across administrative bodies and families. Social status, biography and affiliations 
were particularly useful for understanding interests, benefits and access to 
resources. Other areas of discussions also centred on kinship, authority, adat and 
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extra-legal institutions. It established common ground and definitions, who 
exercises (extra) legal authority, transactions, problems with legitimacy and 
authority and brideprice. It also elicited opinions about ideal types of authority, 
ideal types of romantic partners, problems in family relationships, marriage, 
brideprice, and dispute resolution.  
The penultimate area of discussion was gender and violence, probing the juncture 
of gender, class and the “local” to analyse systemic issues. Discussion topics 
included definitions of gender and violence, women’s organisations, typical 
circumstances when domestic violence takes place, traditional dispute resolution, 
and transactions of goods and cash associated with it. These issues were handled 
with care, drawing on my professional experience working with European NGO 
network, Women Against Violence Europe. Discussing these issues in the 
Timorese context often involved interviewees asking me questions about VAW in 
other countries. I replied that VAW occurred all over the world because of gender 
relations, but different countries and communities experienced different drivers of 
VAW, different legal processes and different outcomes. The results of these 
discussions, where participants discussed their experiences, particularly the 
intersections of brideprice and traditional dispute resolution are presented in 
Chapter 6 and 7. The final part of the interview often moved back to the political 
economy of the everyday, looking at who gets what, when and how, and feelings 
of justice or fairness, whether in the family, village, organisation or the nation or 
between these levels. 
Interview data was collated and analysed using Nvivo qualitative research 
software. Not all interviews were transcribed: some were merely annotated. Two 
coding schemes were developed to identify and analyse themes. First, an a priori 
coding scheme was developed based on the research question and the structural 
political economy of Southeast Asia (Hughes 2009, Hutchison et al. 2014, Rodan, 
Hewison, and Robison 2006, Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007) and feminist political 
economy (True 2012). These coded data from interviews, reports and newspaper 
articles according to thematic areas such as control over resources, elites, class 
APPENDIX 
291 
formation and so on. Second, a coding scheme emerged out of the data itself, or in 
vivo (Bernard and Ryan 2003). Initially, these were based on interview questions, 
but over time, themes emerged forming the main empirical areas of the thesis: 
control over state resources, development and infrastructure, veterans’ payments 
and welfare, poverty and inequality, marriage and brideprice, microfinance and 
village elites.  
The interview process followed a set format. Interviewees were given an 
information letter, in Tetun, Indonesian, or English, describing the scope of the 
study, its aims, their role, and possible risks. We read and explained the letter to 
those with low levels of literacy. We then discussed the information letter, and the 
aims of my research and my background, after which participants were nearly 
always happy to sign the consent form. The interviews were all audio-recorded 
except one or two informal interviews, which were recorded in writing. At the 
same time, participants completed, with the help of the researcher and research 
assistant, biodata forms. These forms aided collation, and record keeping, in 
particular with the substantive data collection on social status. 
Next, participants were engaged in face-to-face, semi-structured interviews of 
about 40-60 minutes in length. I conducted nearly all the interviews myself, in 
Tetun, Indonesian, or English. Nonetheless, in rural areas, research assistants were 
also crucial in smoothing communication and overcoming considerable gaps in 
understanding. Rural Timorese citizen’s first language is not typically Tetun. Tetun 
itself is a creolised and non-standard language (Ross 2016). Thus, reflecting the use 
of Tetun in practice, many participants spoke a version of Tetun heavily influenced 





Table 10.1  List of Cited Interviewees 









1.  ET076  Female 
International 
Manager at UN 
- Dili English Elite 6 June 2015 French 
2.  ET077  Female Timorese 
NGO Senior 
Manager 
- Dili Tetun Elite 5 June 2015 N/A 
3.  ET078  Female Timorese 
NGO Senior 
Manager 
- Dili Tetun/ English Liurai 6 June 2015 Portuguese 
4.  ET079  Female Timorese 
NGO Senior 
Manager 
- Dili Tetun / 
English 
Liurai 11 July 2015 Mambai 
5.  ET082  Female Timorese 
NGO Senior 
Manager 
36 Dili Tetun Elite 8 June 2015 Tetun Praça 
6.  ET083  Male Manager 
At Alola 
43 Dili English Dato 9 June 2015  Makkassae 
7.  ET085  Female member 
of GMPTL 
57 Dili Tetun Elite 11 June 2015 Tetun Praça / 
Portuguese 




- Dili Tetun Liurai 17 July 2015 Mambai 
 
 









9.  ET096  Female Timorese 
NGO Director  
32 Oecusse Tetun / 
Indonesian 
Liurai 27 July 2015 Meto 
10.  ET097  Male Timorese 
NGO Program 
Manager  
32 Oecusse Tetun / 
Indonesian 
Elite 27 July 2015 Meto 
11.  ET098  Female Timorese 
NGO Finance 
Officer 
29 Oecusse Tetun / 
Indonesian 
Elite 27 July 2015 Meto 
12.  ET099  Female Timorese 
NGO Program  
Manager 
30 Oecusse Tetun / 
Indonesian 
Elite 27 July 2015 Meto 
13.  ET102 Lina Female Villager 43 Oecusse Tetun Citizen 30 July 2015 Meto 




59 Oecusse Tetun Liurai 30 July Meto 
15.  ET104  Male Village 
Chief 
61 Oecusse Tetun / 
Indonesian 
Elite 30 July 2015 Meto 
16.  ET105  Male Hamlet 
Chief and 
Farmer 
62 Oecusse Tetun  / 
Indonesian 
 2 August 2015 Meto 
17.  ET108 Eugenio  Senior 
Government 
Official 
- Oecusse Tetun / 
English 
Elite 4 August 2015 Meto / Portuguese 
18.  ET110  Serafina Female Secretary 
of the Village 
32 Oecusse Tetun  / 
Indonesian 
 4 Aug 2015 Meto 
19.  ET112 - Female Senior 
Manager, 
Women’s Shelter 
34 Oecusse Tetun Liurai 4 August 2015 Meto 
 
 









20.  ET113 Michaela Female Farmer 29 Oecusse Tetun  / 
Indonesian 
Citizen 5 August 2015 Tetun 
21.  ET114 Elisabetha Female Farmer 60 Oecusse Tetun Citizen 5 August 2015 Meto 




NA Dili English Elite 16 August 2015 Tetun / Portu-
guese 
23.  ET122  Catholic Nun in 
a leadership role 
 Dili English Elite 18 August 2015 Portuguese 
24.  ET127 Bonifacio Male Village 
Chief Suku Mota 
~50 Manufahi Tetun Dato 1 September 2015 
and June 2011 
Laklae 
25.  ET130 Antonio Male Teacher 43 Manufahi Tetun Dato 1 September 2015 Tetun Therik 
26.  ET131 Lucia   Wife of Village 
Chief and 
Businesswoman 
47 Manufahi Tetun Dato  1 September 2015 Tetun Therik 
27.  ET137 Sancio Female Villager 35 Manufahi Tetun Village 
Elite 
4 September Tetun  
28.  ET138 Rosita Female Villager 29 Manufahi Tetun Citizen 4 September 2015 Tetun Therik 
29.  ET139  Female Villager 45 Manufahi Tetun Citizen 4 September 2015 Tetun Therik 
30.  ET146  Brigida Female Villager 
Suku Mota  
31 Manufahi Tetun Dato 7 S September 
2015 
Tetun Therik 
31.  ET152  Female UN 
Senior Manager 
-  Dili English Elite 9 September 2015 - 
32.  ET158-2011  Daughter of a 
Village Chief 
55 Dili Tetun Elite 7 July 2011 Tetun Therik 
 
 














- Dili English Elite 23 July 2015 Meto 
34.  WT042  Hamlet Chief 50 Belu, West 
Timor, 
Indonesia 
Indonesian Elite 16 March 2015 Tetun Therik 
35.  WT071  Male East 
Timorese ex-
Militia member, 













Note that I use the term Tetun, not Tetum, reflecting how Tetun sounds when 
spoken (Ross 2016).  
TERM LANGUAGE DEFINITION 
A Luta Continua Portuguese The Struggle Continues. A FRETILIN slogan. The same 
call to revolutionary struggle is used by FRELIMO in 
Mozambique 
Acar Fataluku Slave 
Adat Tetun/ 
Indonesian  
Customary law governing “inheritance of property, 
spouse eligibility, ritual etiquette, tara bandu (Tetun: 
taboo observance), land ownership, political authority, 
sanctions, oral literature and cosmology 
Administrador Tetun Administrator for the district 
Affines English  Relatives by marriage 
Akan Fataluku Commoner/farmer 
Akanu Fataluku Slave caste 
Aldeia Tetun Hamlet 
Amaf Naek Meto Noble 
Angotta DPR Indonesian Member of Indonesian Parliament 
APODETI  Tetun Associação Popular Democrática Timorense 
Arisan Indonesian Lottery. Rotating Savings and Loans  
ASDT  Tetun Associação Social-Democrática Timorense. Timorese 
Social Democratic Association. Later Fretilin 
Asuliar Tetun Servant 
Atan Tetun Slave 
Auxiliar Tetun Auxiliaries / servants 
Axuliar Portuguese Help 
Babinsa Indonesian Non-commissioned guidance officer or team 
Baikeno; Baiqueno Tetun Tetun word for the language of Oecusse 
Baino Tetun A noble. See “dato” 
Bapak  Indonesian 
and Tetun 
Indonesian for “Man or Mister”; used to refer to 
Indonesian men in Timor during the occupation 
Barlake; Barlaki; 
Barlaque  
Tetun 1. Brideprice  
2. Common-law marriage 
Bee Manas Ai Tukan Tetun Lit. Hot water and firewood. A payment made from the 
groom’s family to the bride’s at a couple’s engagement 




TERM LANGUAGE DEFINITION 
Belak Tetun Disk made of gold, silver or bronze worn as jewellery 




Bolsa da Mãe Tetun Mother’s Purse. A conditional cash transfer aimed at 
vulnerable women.  
Bua Malus Tetun Areca nut and betel leaf chewed to produce a narcotic 
effect.  
Budak Indonesian Slave 
Buibere Tetun A term used for “woman” among FRETLIN and 
FALINTIL. Also a term for a female farmer who is also 
a female revolutionary subject. See also Maubere  
Bupati Indonesian District head 
Camat Indonesian Subdistrict head 
Capitacão Portuguese Head tax 
Chattel Slavery English The enslaver has rights of ownership over the slave, 
with the intent to exploit through the use, 
management, profit, transfer that person 
Clandestinos Tetun Members of the clandestine nationalist front for 
independent Timor-Leste 
Comité Executivo Da 
Luta  
Portuguese Executive Committee for the Struggle  
Cooperativa Café Timor Tetun National Timorese coffee cooperative.  
Cooperativa Credito Tetun Credit cooperative 
Corvée  French A form of labour tax exacted by a lord or local authority 
Dato Tetun Noble 
Debt bondage   English Debtors pledge their labour, or the labour of a 
dependent, as security for a debt. 
Deportardu Tetun Deported political prisoners 
Deputada Tetun A Female Parliamentarian 
Desa Indonesian 1. Village 
2. Village Administrative Area 
Dharma Wanita Indonesian Lit. Women’s Duty; Indonesian Women’s association 
of wives of civil servants  
Differend French Mimicry in a coloniser’s language that asserts an 
injustice has been done, although the coloniser’s 
language in inadequate to express this injustice  
Distriktu Tetun District Administrative Area 
Dom  Portuguese King 
Ekonomia  Tetun 1. The national economy 
2. The household economy 
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TERM LANGUAGE DEFINITION 
Ema Boot Tetun Important or “great” person 
Ema Kiik Tetun Ordinary or “little” person 
Ema Reino   Tetun Commoner 
Ema Susar  Tetun Poor people with difficulties  
Endogamous English The practice of marrying within a clan or tribe or family 
group 
Estado do India Portuguese The Indian State. The name for the Portuguese colonial 
empire.  
FALINTIL  Tetun Forças Armadas De Libertação Naçional De Timor-
Leste.  The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of 
Timor-Leste 
Feto Nia Folin Tetun Lit. Woman’s price. Brideprice. See Barlake.  
F-FDTL Tetun FALINTIL – Forças Defeza de Timor-Leste. The 
Defence forces of Timor-Leste. The  name of the post-
independence armed forces of Timor-Leste.  
FOKUPERS  Indonesian  Forum Kommunikasi Perempuan East Timor. East 
Timorese Women's Communication Forum 
Folin Tetun 1. Price 
2. Brideprice 
FRETILIN  Tetun Frente Revolucionário Do Timor-Leste Independente. 
The Revolutionary Front For Independent Timor-Leste 
GMPTL  Tetun Grupo Mulhers Parliamentario Timor-Leste. Lit. Group 
of Women Parliamentarians in Timor-Leste. The 
Timorese  
Gotong Royong  Indonesian Lit. “Mutual cooperation”. A form of labour done be the 
community on local public works  popularised by 
Suharto’s New Order 
GPK  Indonesian Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan.  Lit. “Security 
disturbance movement”. Indonesian armed forces term 
for  anti-Indonesian forces FALINTIL 
Grau Tetun Grade or seniority in military rank 
Hafolin Tetun Hafolin is a transitive verb meaning: 
1. To appreciate, value or esteem 
2. To negotiate 
3. However, in the third definition, as a noun, 
hafolin means brideprice or arranged 
marriage 
Hanai Malu Tetun Timorese national cooperative peak body 
HANSIP  Indonesian  Pertahanan Sipil. Civilian defence organisation. Militia 
hypogamous English A marriage between a high status or high class woman 
with a low status or low class man 
Ianjo Japanese Military brothel  
Kadeira Tetun 1. Chair 
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2. Political position  
Kampung  Indonesian Village 
Katuas/Ketuas Tetun A male elder or leader or male elders 
Kepala Desa   Indonesian  Head of the village; village chief 
Ketua Indonesian Leader 
Ketua Adat Indonesian Male Spiritual Leader 
Kios Tetun Small shop selling small amounts of everyday items 
such as oil, rice, salt, cigarettes, cola.  
Kooperativa  Tetun Cooperative 
Koramil Indonesian Sub–district military command 
Kore Metan Tetun Lit. Cutting/Lifting the black cloth. Ceremony marking 
a death, the anniversary of a death or the end of 
mourning.  
Koremetan  Naçional  Tetun National memorialising ceremony 
Korperasi Simpan 
Pinjam 
Indonesian Savings and Loans Cooperative 
Kostumes  Tetun Customs 
KUD Indonesian Kooperasi Unit Desa. Village Unit Cooperative. New 
Order era organisation  
Kultura  Tetun Culture 
LADV  English Law Against Domestic Violence. The 2010 Law Against 
Domestic Violence. In Tetun: Lei Contra Violensia 
Domestika  
Lafurana Hi Kare  Makassae Lit. Hearth and knife. A sister 
Laksaur Militia Tetun An East Timorese militia based in Suai, Cova Lima 
Lao Hamutuk Tetun Walk Together. A Timorese NGO working on 
economic development monitoring.  
Lia Loos Tetun Truth 
Lia Nain  Tetun Lit. Owner of the voice; elder 
Lisan  Tetun Customary practice 
Liurai Tetun Lit. “more land”, King, Landowner 
Lulik Tetun Sacred or taboo 
Lutu-Hum Tetun Tetun: retainers of a Liurai lit. “Dwellers at the bottom 
of the pale [wooden fence]” 
Mate Rasik Tetun Die alone 
Matrilocal residence English Married couple reside with the wife’s family 
Maubere Tetun A term for a male Timorese farmer repurposed by 
FRETILIN to symbolise a revolutionary subject. See 
also “Buibere” 
Meo  Baikeno Noble warrior class in Oecusse 
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Mestiço Portuguese Timorese, Portuguese, Mozambican, Angolan, 
Brazilian, Hakka Chinese, Macanese, Arab, Indonesian-
Malay or Dutch.  
MFI   English Microfinance institution  
Mikrokredit Indonesian Microcredit 
Moris Rasik Tetun Lit. “Independent life”, or self starting. A large 
Timorese Microfinance Organisation 




NUREP Tetun Nucleos De Resistencia Popular. The nucleus of the 
popular resistance. The village-based resistance 
network leaders.   
OMT  Tetun Organização  Mulher Timorense. The women’s wing of 
conservative CNRT party 
Operasi Sapu Jagad  Indonesian “Operation global clean sweep”. The Indonesian 
organised operation to kill, deport and destroy East 
Timor after its people voted split from Indonesia in 
1999 
OPMT  Tetun Organização Popular Da Mulher Timorense. Popular 
Organisation of Timorese Women. The women’s wing 
of the FRETILIN party  
Opportunidade Timor 
Lorosa’e 
Tetun Opportunity Timor-Leste. A Christian microfinance 
provider in Timor-Leste 
Ordinença  Portuguese Ordnance or Military Logistic Support 
Paca Fataluku Noble 
Pasukan Pro-Intergrasi Indonesian Pro-integration umbrella grouping of Timorese militia 
Patria Tetun Fundação Pátria. A Timorese women’s rights NGO 
Patrlineages English Kin groups related through males  
Patrilocal residence English Married couples reside with the husband’s family 
Pembantu Indonesian A Maid; home help.  
Pensaun Veteranus Tetun Veterans’ Pension 
Pensaun Vitalisia Tetun Life Pension. A pension paid to ex-members of 
parliament for life.  
Petani  Indonesian Farmer 
Piastres  Portuguese Portuguese currency 
Pramuka Indonesian Indonesian scout movement 
Preman  Indonesian Strongmen or gangsters 
Rai Lulik Tetun The spiritual world 
Ratih  Indonesian Rakyat Terlatih. Trained civilians; civilian militia 
Ratu Fataluku King 
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Rede Feto Tetun The East Timor Women’s Network 
Regulo Portuguese  Petty king 
Reino  Portuguese 1. Peasant  
2. Kingdom, Realm; Tribe; Subjects; 
Commoners; People 
RENETIL  Tetun Resistência  Naçional  dos Estudantes de Timor-




Portuguese Separate budget lines 
Rukun Tetangga (RW) Indonesian Neighbourhood association 
Rukun Warga (RW) Indonesian Administrative unit 
Sagrada Familia Tetun A violent group of ex-FALINTIL, banned by the state, 
and led by Cornelio Gama, or Elle Seti L7 
SAPT  Portuguese Sociedade Agricola Patria E Trabalho. Agricultural 
Society for the Fatherland and Workers 
Saun Tetun The material world 
Secretaria Suko Tetun Secretary of the Suku 
SEM Tetun Sekretária Estadu Ba Apoiu No Promosaun Sosiu-
Ekonomika Ba Feto. The Secretariat of State for the 
Support and Socio-Economic Promotion for Women 
(2015-2017) 
SEPI Tetun Sekretária Estadu Promosaun Igualdade. The 
Secretariat of State for the the Promotion of Equality 
(2012-2015) 
Serfdom English A tenant who is by law, custom, or agreement is bound 
to live and labour on land belonging to a landlord, to 
render a service to the landlord, and not free to change 
their status 
Serralhos Portuguese Harem 
Servile marriage  English A woman, without the right to refuse, is married on 
payment of money or in kind to her parents, guardian, 
family 
Servo, Servi, or Servidor  Tetun Serf 
Sirih Pina Indonesian  Areca nut and betel leaf combination chewed to 
produce a mild narcotic effect. Used in many 
ceremonies.  
STAE Tetun Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral. The 
Secretary for Technical Administration of Elections  
Department of State Administration 
Subdistriktu Tetun Subdistrict Administrative area smaller than a District 
Suku, Suco, Suko Tetun 1. Village 
2. Village administrative area.  
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This word is a Portuguese rendering of Suku (I) which 
means tribe in modern Indonesian. Three spellings 
exist today in Tetun: Suku, Suko, Suco 
Tais Tetun Traditional Timorese woven cloth. Tais can be worn as 
skirts and scarfs and used in marriage and mortuary 
ceremonies.  
Tama Tetun 1. Enter 
2. Interfere 
Tara Bandu   Tetun Official prohibition (e.g. on entering a plot of land) 
Tau korenti, 
Tau morteen 
Tetun Lit. “Put a necklace”. A ceremony to mark an 
engagement 
TBO  Indonesian Tenaga Bantuan Operasi. Military operations’ 
assistants 
Temukung  Atoni: Head of the lineage 
Tob, Tobe Baikeno Noble 
Toos Nain Tetun Farmer 
Topasses Indonesian Derived from the Indonesian topi or hat. Topasses were 
also commonly called “Black Portuguese”  
Tua Haraki Tetun Palm liquor  
Tuba Rai Metin Tetun “Stand firmly on the ground”. A Timorese Microfinance 
Institution 
Tuur Hamutuk Tetun Sit together to resolve a problem or to celebrate 
UBSP Usaha Bersama 
Simpan Pinjam   
Indonesian Usaha Bersama Simpan Pinjam  Lit. Business Together 
Saving Lending. Microfinance Savings and Loans   
UDT  Tetun União Democrática Timorense. Timorese Democratic 
Union. Timorese political party 
Ulun-Houris Tetun Chattel slave, usually war captives. The name means 
‘living head’ owing to the tradition of head hunting in 
Timor 
Uma Tetun 1. House  
2. Lineage group 
Umane Tetun Wife’s family, wifegivers 
Usif   Meto 
(Baikeno) 
King 
Violensia bai-bain Tetun normal or everyday (domestic) violence 
Violensia boot Tetun Serious (domestic) violence, usually involving blood 
VPU  English Vulnerable Persons’ Unit. A unit in the Timorese Police 
Force to protect vulnerable persons such as women and 
children.  
Wanra  Indonesian  Perlawanan Rakyat. People's resistance. Civilian militia 
Wifegiver English Lineage group providing a wife to another group 
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Wifetaker English Lineage group receiving a wife from another group 
Xefe Aldeia Tetun Hamlet chief 
Xefe Posto  Tetun Chief of the Post 
ZEESMS  Tetun Zona Espeçial de Economia Soçial de Mercado. Special 
Zones of Social Market Economy of Timor-Leste. The 
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